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This thesis is a study of resonant things in Victorian writers’ houses/museums – a 
reading of those material objects that seem especially fit to presence the writer to 
whom they once belonged. Through the study of a selection of autographic objects in 
the houses/museums of Victorian writers, this thesis considers the following 
questions: What is resonance? How do things presence the absent individual with 
whom they are associated? Why do some categories of things – objects seemingly 
‘imbued with a lasting sediment of their owners’ (Pascoe 3) – seem especially fit for 
the task of presencing, and how have we described or understood this phenomenon 
through narrative?  
 Through a reading of things, categories of things, images, novels, life writing, 
cultural and critical theory and the house/museum space, this thesis will examine the 
relationship between presencing things, material metonymy, and remembrance. It 
will suggest that certain categories of things have qualities that allow them to serve 
as remembrancers, standing-in-for and eliciting a sense of the absent individual with 
whom they were once connected. 
 Chapter one lays the ground for this reading of resonant things by contextualizing 
writers’ houses/museums as sites of literary pilgrimage and introducing and defining 
some of the key concepts and terms employed in this study such as autographic 
object, authenticity, contiguity and resonance. Chapter two moves inside the writer’s 
house/museum in order to demonstrate how things can ‘world’ via a reading of 
Marion Harland’s late nineteenth-century description of a tour of the Carlyle’s House 
alongside Martin Heidegger’s concept of worlding. Chapters three, four, five, and six 
look at different types of museum things, beginning with hair – the object most 
closely associated with the writer’s body – and then moving on to clothing, writerly 
tools such as desks and chairs, and ending with handwriting. Through assessing the 
particular qualities of each categorical thing alongside the concepts we meet these 
things with and the way that encounters with these things have been described in a 
variety of narratives, a number of the dynamics contributing to affective encounters 
with writerly things are uncovered. These dynamics or factors include: autographic 
ascription, authenticity, contiguity, metonymical fitness, equipmentality, and 
stasis/conspicuousness.   
 Ultimately this thesis argues that certain things have a particular fitness for the 
task of evoking or presencing the absent individual for whom they stand, and that in 
doing so everyday objects undergo a metamorphosis: ceasing to be everyday tools fit 
for a specific task (for wearing, for sitting, for writing with) and becoming instead 
tools for remembrance – evocative things that presence both the absent individual 
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Introduction 
 
On the fifth of July 1850, Charlotte Brontë signed her name in the guest book at Sir 
Walter Scott’s former home, Abbotsford. Scott had been dead some eighteen years 
by then and the author’s house – already a tourist destination in his lifetime – had 
become a site of pilgrimage. Brontë’s visit followed Charles Dickens’s visit to 
Abbotsford by some nine years and both long preceded my first visit to Abbotsford 
in 2011. What was fascinating to me then was not just that I was standing in Scott’s 
house amongst myriad objects of both personal and historical significance (Scott 
himself being quite the collector of relics) but also the fact that I was very likely 
standing in the same rooms Charlotte Brontë and Charles Dickens had stood in – all 
of us thinking about Scott and sensing Scott through his things, through the objects 
that had survived him.  
 As a writer I have always been drawn to the life-stories of literary figures and to 
the museums that hope to exemplify, amplify or encapsulate elements of their 
biography. This thesis was born from a kind of two-fold noticing: first, my sense 
over a period of heightened museum-going of the intense affective responses I had 
upon beholding particular objects, and second, from a growing awareness of the 
types of things that not only generated an affective state, but which seemed to figure 
prominently in all of the writers’ museums I visited: object categories like locks of 
hair, clothing, furniture, writing implements, and handwriting – things that appeared 
again and again across collections. My curiousity about these ‘writerly things’ led me 
to what was then the bourgeoning field of thing theory and into an enquiry as to the 
nature of resonance. Why, I wondered, did certain objects seem particularly fit for 
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the task of evoking a sense of the absent writer’s presence – that felt-connection 
between the past and the present, the dead writer and the person encountering their 
things?  
 Whether Charlotte Brontë did not write much about her visit to Abbotsford or 
whether those particular letters have not survived the intervening one and a half 
centuries is unknown. In a letter to her friend Laetitia Wheelwright describing her 
trip to Scotland (in the company of her publisher George Smith) Brontë describes 
Edinburgh as a ‘vivid page of history’ and adds ‘as to Melrose and Abbotsford the 
very names possess music and magic’ (Wilcocks).  
 Where Abbotsford evoked something magical for Charlotte Brontë, Charles 
Dickens might be said to have felt the opposite. In his correspondence a far less 
effusive recollection of what he saw at Abbotsford survives. In a letter written in 
1851 to his friend Mrs Watson, Dickens recounts his perception of one object in 
particular:  
When I was at Abbotsford I saw in a vile glass case the last clothes Scott wore. 
Among them an old white hat, which seemed to be tumbled and bent and 
broken by the uneasy, purposelessness wandering, hither and thither, of his 
heavy head. It so embodied Lockhart’s [his biographer’s] pathetic description 
of him when he tried to write, and laid down his pen and cried, that it 
associated itself in my mind with broken powers and mental weakness from 
that hour. (Dickens, Letters 254-255) 
 
Here, Dickens is describing an instance in which something as simple as a hat ‘bent 
and broken’ by the author’s use comes to embody biographical events attributed to 
the author while he was alive (specifically Scott trying to write in his last months and 
laying down his pen to cry). For Dickens the hat’s material aspects correspond so 
strongly with Lockhart’s description of Scott trying to write that the hat and the 
narrative it suggests (both in terms of action and emotion) become infused ‘from that 
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hour’ (255). In provoking and evoking recollections of Scott and an event in Scott’s 
life the hat in the glass case becomes, madeleine-like,1 an object of association – a 
metonymical thing that brings to presence both historical events (Scott’s last months, 
his failing health) and the absent individual to whom the hat was once – and still is – 
ascribed. 
 This thesis is a study of the ways in which a writer’s things evoke the absent 
writer in the Victorian writer’s house/museum setting: encounters not wholly unlike 
the one Dickens described at Abbotsford wherein a thing comes to stand for an 
absent individual, presencing them (despite death and the lapse of time) in such a 
way that they or their historical lives are cognized, sensed or felt. Where affective 
encounters with things have, at times, been positioned within the realm of the 
sentimental2 this thesis maintains that resonant or affective encounters with things 
are the result of an interplay between the concepts we meet things with (this is Sir 
Walter Scott’s chair, a chair is for sitting) and the thing’s particular qualities. 
Through an analysis of four of the central categories of things in the writer’s 
house/museum (locks of hair, clothing, writer’s tools and handwriting) and narratives 
of encounter that describe how we experience things, I have identified six dynamics 
                                                 
1 See Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (60-63) for his famous description of the provocation of involuntary memory 
brought on by the taste of a madeleine biscuit. This narrative is also interesting for the narrator’s suggestion that the way 
material objects hold memory seems to correlate to a belief in animism:  
I feel that there is much to be said for the Celtic belief that the souls of those we have lost are held captive in some 
inferior being, in an animal, in a plant, in some inanimate object, and thus effectively lost to us until the day (which 
to many never comes) when we happen to pass by the tree or obtain possession of the object which forms their 
prison. Then they start and tremble, they call us by our name, and as soon as we have recognized them, the spell is 
broken. Delivered by us, they have overcome death, and return to share our life. And so it is with our own past. It is a 
labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all efforts of our intellect must prove futile. The past is hidden somewhere 
outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some material object… (59).  
Here Proust is distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary memory, the latter manifested in the case suggested here via 
the provocation of things: ‘[t]hen they start and tremble…’ (59). Once memory is evoked via the object the narrator suggests 
that the individual with whom the object is connected returns ‘to share our life’ – which suggests that they are presenced in 
the form of affective remembrance.  
2 For direct statements about sentiment and objects see Hood who suggests that ‘[m]any collectors are motivated by the emotion 
generated by objects and the connection that objects make with the past. Collectors relish the sentimental feeling one can get 
from having and holding something from another time’ (199, see also xi, xvi). See also Woolf ‘Haworth’ on literary 
pilgrimages; Lutz 130, Trubek 8, Tamen ‘Review’ 543, Connor Paraphernalia 2, and Hallam and Hockey who affirm that 
while memory objects and personal mementos provide ‘an important resource for personal meaning making, [they] might be 
trivialized as merely “sentimental.” For instance, they may be coded as disparate fragments residing in a “female” domain of 
excessive emotion and irrational, possessive impulses’ (19).  
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that contribute to a thing’s ability to provoke and evoke presence: autographic 
ascription, authenticity, contiguity, metonymical fitness, equipmentality and stasis. 
While each of the categories of things studied here – and each thing itself – brings its 
own particular mode of presentation or giving-forth to an encounter, these six 
essential qualities come consistently to the fore in our encounters with things that 
presence the absent writer with whom they are connected.  
 
Contexts and Framework 
 
My proposition that things in the Victorian writer’s house/museum can provoke and 
evoke a sense of encounter with the absent writer with whom they were once 
connected locates this thesis in the intersection between literary studies, cultural 
memory studies and material culture studies. Accordingly three different kinds of 
discourse have informed this work: literary narratives and narratives of encounter, 
studies on mourning and memory, and material culture studies or ‘thing theory’. 
Although these three fields of enquiry involve complex formations that will only be 
fully explored as the thesis progresses, I would like to briefly present some of the key 
ideas, arguments and scholars related to this enquiry in order to make clear the 
terrain from which my own arguments emerge and to which this thesis aims to 
contribute.  
 
Memory Sites and Meaningful Objects 
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Literary narratives and narratives of encounter comprise the largest category of work 
considered in this thesis, a category that includes readings from the life writing, 
creative work and biographies of the authors whose houses are featured here; texts 
focusing on encounters within the writer’s house/museum setting; the textual 
ephemera associated with the museums this thesis considers (guide books, visitor 
comments, Society publications, news articles, museum signage, installations etc.), 
and the houses/museums themselves.  
 There are two critical anthologies that engage directly with the idea of literary 
tourism as a mode of meaningful encounter and literary houses as sites of contact. 
Harald Hendrix’s Writers’ Houses and the Making of Memory (2008) links literary 
tourism to the dynamics of memory and material presence. In stating that literary 
pilgrimages to writers’ houses are about contact and ‘the communication between 
readers and writers, mediated through the house and the objects it contains’ (237) 
Hendrix foregrounds writers’ houses as sites of communication and remembrance. 
Reading writers’ houses as mnemonic devices for the living authors this anthology 
considers meaning-making through readings of the house as both a private / personal 
space and as a public monument / site of remembrance, a transition that moves the 
house and its contents from its personal relations into the sphere ‘of collective and 
cultural memory’ (5) which is to say a location in which aspects of the past abide and 
are made accessible to visitors.  
 Through emphasizing aspects of the phenomenology of reading Mike Robinson 
and Hans Christian Anderson’s Literature and Tourism: Explorations of Tourism, 
Writers and Writing (2002) posits that literature can provide a special kind of access 
for the house/museum visitor who has been a reader of the author’s work. Their 
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suggestion that the writer’s house may have served as a repository for the author 
themselves – ‘of memories linked to objects or spaces, as an archive which 
documents a person's intellectual and emotional biography’ (5) – nuances readings of 
the visitor’s investment in being ‘where the author’s pen physically touched paper’ 
(15). The authentic nature of such encounters and the ‘tangible connections’ that 
writers’ houses provide (15) is contrasted by a reading of the literary souvenir as an 
object that may have ‘very little connection’ to the authors (65) – a reading of things-
in-museums that foregrounds the role of contiguity between visitors and things.  
 While both Hendrix and Robinson/Anderson’s texts are narratives about 
encounter they are also narratives of encounter in that how they frame their analyses 
is informative. For example, in stating that houses offer ‘tangible connections’ to the 
writer (Robinson 15) or that some of the souvenir objects have ‘very little 
connection’ to the writers (65), the use of the word ‘connection’ becomes 
informative, affirming my reading of the role of contiguity (of touching or of being 
proximate to a touched place or space) in affective encounters. In a similar fashion 
Simon Goldhill’s 2011 literary travelogue Freud’s Couch, Scott’s Buttocks, Brontë’s 
Grave, a contemporary reading of Victorian literary destinations and the objects 
found within them, offers a dual reading: what is expressed through narrative and 
what is said through figures of speech. Both a literary history and a first-person 
account of (mostly failed) encounters with sites of literary pilgrimage, Goldhill’s 
book skeptically deconstructs the relationship between the physical material left 
behind and the visitor’s expectations of it. Anne Trubek’s A Skeptic’s Guide to 
Writers Houses (2011) similarly deconstructs cultural expectations of affect in 
writers houses against her own narrative of encounter, a book that demonstrates via 
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Trubek’s lack of resonant experiences (and the occasional meaningful one) that there 
are dominant narratives and tropes that frame – and appear to be determinate in – 
resonant encounters with literary things. 
 Judith Pascoe’s 2006 The Hummingbird Cabinet: A Rare and Curious History of 
Romantic Collectors traces the developing interest in collecting objects that seem to 
be ‘imbued with a lasting sediment of their owners’ (3) in the Romantic era. Her 
reading of collecting as a way of fashioning identity before the rise of the Victorian 
museum, and of literary artifacts as connected to material longing grounds the 
Victorian fascination with literary artifacts in the Romantic cult of the genius. 
Pascoe’s reading of what she terms ‘authenticating narratives’ (narratives that 
support or invent provenance) offers an insight into how our relationship with things 
can be shaped by the biographies imposed on them.  
 Working in the field of cultural memory studies, Ann Rigney, in her 2008 essay 
‘Abbotsford: Dislocation and Cultural Remembrance’ and more expansively in her 
book The Afterlives of Walter Scott: Memory on the Move (2012) investigates Sir 
Walter Scott’s construction of Abbotsford as a site of memory. Rigney analyzes 
Abbotsford as ‘the material embodiment of the writer's life’ with ‘a memorial 
layering’ (Abbotsford 81), an analysis that is expanded upon in her 2012 reading of 
Scott’s own forgotten status and the contemporary vacancies of Scott as a referent 
(i.e. streets called ‘Waverly’ where the word does not signify Scott to the street’s 
inhabitants). Addressing issues of literary canonization and Scott’s own complicity in 
creating a memory site of his home, Rigney challenges the reading of writers’ sites as 
happened-upon or intact repositories of meaning by reading both Abbotsford and 
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Scott’s monuments as mediated and constructed things subject to the transient nature 
of cultural memory. 
 In addition to work that foregrounds the writer’s house/museum, studies on 
memory and mourning – especially related to the keeping and preserving of things as 
a mode of commemoration or as a means of maintaining a sense of contact with the 
dead – have informed this study. Elizabeth Hallam and Jenny Hockey’s Death, 
Memory and Material Culture (2001) examines material culture as a mediating force 
in our relationship with the dead and suggests that an exterior scaffolding for 
memory is possible and can be found, among other cases, in museums (33).3 
Challenging notions of the pastness of the dead and the ways the dead might be 
manifest in material objects, they read material objects as part of a system of recall 
and examine the ways in which death and memory are spatialized. 
 In Margaret Gibson’s Objects Of The Dead: Mourning and Memory in Everyday 
Life (2008) contemporary grief practices in relation to the objects the dead leave 
behind are examined through both cultural texts and interviews with the bereaved. 
Gibson interrogates the way the belongings of the dead come to take on powerful 
meanings. Describing objects of the dead as memory traces, themes of absence and 
presence and material connection are developed. Reading death relations through 
Philippe Ariès’s argument that concepts of death and the afterlife since the 
nineteenth century have focused on reunification (Gibson 163) Gibson foregrounds 
the desire for connection and reconnection that the living often harbour for the dead.4 
                                                 
3 The idea of things as a kind of external cognitive scaffolding is also found in John Sutton’s ‘Porous Memory and the 
Cognitive Life of Things’ an analysis that troubles the tradition of confining memory to the body and which points (more 
directly than in Hallam and Hockey’s book) in the direction of theories which extend the boundaries of thought (and memory) 
into the world. For an overview of texts that have integrated thing theory and distributed cognition theory see Sutton’s ‘Material 
Agency, Skills and History: Distributed Cognition and the Archeology of Memory’ in Material Agency (2008) (37-55 esp pgs 
44-47).  
4 Philippe Ariès reading of the shifts in attitudes toward death in Western Attitudes Towards Death from the Middle Ages to the 
Present has also informed this thesis, in particular his suggestion that the dominant death narrative in the eighteenth century 
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Bridging anthropological readings of magic and contemporary readings of material 
resonance, Gibson argues that ‘[w]hile the body relics of contemporary secular 
societies are not about supernatural power, they can contain, and continue, notional 
ideas of magic and the idea that, in a body fragment or an object that has touched a 
body, one is drawing close to an aura or essence’ (169). Linking the universal theme 
of bereavement through ‘things’ and ideas of the cult of celebrity she affirms the role 
of contact/contiguity in encounters with autographic things: ‘[t]he culture of celebrity 
relics is interesting because of its continuation of the belief in an immaterial essence 
materialized and enduring in a body fragment or an object that has had contact with a 
body’ (169). Gibson’s notion of essence is expanded upon in this thesis through 
readings of sympathetic magic in Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890-1915), 
Marcel Mauss’s A General Theory of Magic (1902) and – shifting disciplines to 
contemporary cognitive psychology – Bruce Hood’s Supersense: Why We Believe in 
the Unbelievable (2009).  
 Bruce Hood’s contemporary reading of supernatural beliefs including what he 
describes as ‘our physicalizing of the spiritual’ and our tendency to believe that 
‘objects and locations…give us a deeper sense of continuity with the past’ (34) is 
grounded in his assertion that affective encounters with things – i.e. why we want to 
hold Einstein’s pen but won’t wear the murderer Fred West’s cardigan – is a natural 
aspect of our mind’s design. His reading of sympathetic magic positions it within 
mental and social structures as a practice that creates or disrupts social cohesion. He 
argues that such social structures include our need to make and maintain physical 
                                                 
underwent a transition wherein one became ‘less concerned with his own death than with la mort de toi, the death of the other 
person’ (56). Ariès work provides a unique context within which to read the death narratives of Victorian authors, for example 
through his reading of the ‘romantic death’ – which Ariès finds in the Brontë family (58) – and his attention to the development 
of commemorative sites. 
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contact with others – a reading of contiguity he contrasts through considerations of 
recent studies in disgust and traditional notions of the taboo.  Rather than debunking 
the concept of an essence in things he examines why psychological essentialism, 
vitalistic reasoning and sympathetic magic are useful in cultural relations (161). 
While Hood refutes the possibility of an essence in things (he defines essence as ‘an 
underlying, invisible property that defines the true nature of something’ (24)) he does 
acknowledge that ‘[o]bjects are tangible, physical links with the past that can 
instantly transport us back to earlier days through a sense of connectedness’ (199). 
Hood’s concept of psychological essentialism as the ‘driver’ of our relations with 
(un-essenced) things will be challenged in this thesis through the assertion that things 
have their own essential qualities that come to the fore in our encounters with them – 
a reading of meaningful material encounters that falls under the domain of ‘thing 
theory’, one of the descriptors for material culture studies post-1990.  
 
Thinking through Things 
 
In ‘Thing Theory’ – Bill Brown’s introductory essay to his Critical Inquiry 2001 
special issue Things – Brown raises the question as to whether or not a theory of 
‘things’ – ‘the entifiable that is unspecifiable’ – is possible (5). Building on what he 
described in a 1998 essay as ‘the recent interest in a newly materialist knowledge of 
culture’ (How 960) Brown challenges the false dialectic between object and thing 
(Thing 3-6) and suggests that one of the ways to theorize things in their complexity is 
through a revision of the order of relations between subjects and objects. In his 
description of the way the ‘thingness of things’ begins to presence itself through 
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objects Brown hints at a Heideggerean phenomenology of encounter, one where 
things might be best understood not by staring at them and re-objectifying them but 
by beginning with the work things perform and how that work informs subject-object 
relations in specific contexts (Thing 5-7). Through troubling the subject/object 
dialectic in terms of the question of whether we determine things or things determine 
us, Brown proposes a reading of things and subject-object (or object-subject) 
relations that might begin with things and the role things play in our lives as 
materials with their own biographies and potential disclosures – a methodology that 
is prefigured in his 1999 essay ‘The Secret Life of Things: Virginia Woolf and the 
Matter of Modernism’ when he reads Virginia Woolf’s short story ‘Solid Objects’ 
not for what it discloses about subject-object relations (what the broken bits of glass 
and china in the story say about human subjects) but for what the broken bits of glass 
and china in the story – as things that act on, provoke, and inform Woolf’s 
protagonist – reveal about the world in which the story was written. Brown calls this 
reading of things in literature a ‘materialist phenomenology’ – a phenomenology that 
‘asks both how, in history (how, in one cultural formation), human subjects and 
material objects constitute one another, and what remains outside the regularities of 
that constitution that can disrupt the cultural memory…’ – in Brown’s case, the 
cultural memory of modernity and modernism (Secret 5). This question of co-
constitution – of how things and people constitute one another – is one of the central 
themes in ‘thing theory’ and the search for meanings and things (and meanings in 
things) in the margins is one of the ways a materialist phenomenology can operate. 
By bringing these marginal or, more correctly, marginalized things to the fore, 
dominant narratives are expanded upon or confounded (Secret 5). 
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 Where Brown’s material interests tend to be situated around modernist things and 
modernist or contemporary texts and art, Elaine Freedgood’s foregrounding of things 
focuses on the Victorian era. In The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the 
Victorian Novel (2006) Freedgood also unseats the hierarchy of subject over thing by 
rescuing some of the things in Victorian novels (Jane Eyre’s mahogany furniture 
among them) from being read as extended signs reflective of the characters to which 
they are ascribed. By enlivening the history of a number of objects in Victorian 
novels and revealing their cultural relations (for example the part mahogany played 
in the slave trade) Freedgood reaffirms some of their status as ‘highly consequential 
in the world in which the text was produced’ (2). Unlike Brown, whose interests in 
modernist and contemporary ‘things’ locates many of his objects within commodity 
cultures (see especially ‘How to Do Things with Things (A Toy Story)’) for 
Freedgood, Victorian things have the potential to be read outside dominant 
commodity narratives. Freedgood suggests that literary-critical readings of Victorian 
realism that focus on commodification are: 
…often more symptomatic of our own immersion in commodity culture than of 
the critical dictates or demands of realism itself–especially in its mid-
nineteenth-century form. We imagine that the realist novel ‘thinks’ about 
things the way that we do, or that we have learned commodity thinking from 
the novel and its representational traditions. We then fail to discern a culture 
that may have preceded commodity culture: what I call ‘thing culture.’ (142) 
 
Freedgood’s assertion that Victorian things might have circulated through Victorian 
culture in a way that did not foreground their commodity status reflects the ways in 
which the writers considered in this thesis tended to write about things (even in their 
pursuit of them as in the case of Thomas Carlyle’s bathing cap) and locates this 
enquiry into the resonant power of things in a culture that had yet to wrestle with the 
decay of aura posited by Walter Benjamin in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
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Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936) (a reading of the authentic and mimetic that has an 
affinity with Mary Douglas’s analysis of the allographic (reproduced) and 
autographic (original) in her 1994 essay ‘The Genuine Article’ discussed in chapter 
one).  
 Although practitioners of ‘thing theory’ vary in terms of the extent to which they, 
as individuals, might ascribe agency to things, and how, having ascribed agency they 
describe the agency they give (or find in) things, contemporary investigations in 
thing theory tend to begin with, or arrive at, the notion that things can and do prod 
us, inform us, and contribute to our sense of self (Riggins 1994; Miller 2010; Brown 
1998, 1999, 2001; Connor 2011, 2012; Hudek 2014).5 Questions as to whether or not 
things ‘speak’ and, if so, whether or not such ‘speaking’ is anything more than a kind 
of ventriloquism, or interpretation (Tamen 2001) tend to address not a literal 
speaking – unless under the rubric of Victorian It-Narratives (Freedgood 2010) or 
Bill Brown’s reading of the Charlie McCarthy (ventriloquist) dummy (1998) – but, 
rather, an anxiety about giving too much power to things. As Sherry Turkle notes in 
Evocative Objects: Things We Think With ‘[t]he acknowledgement of the power of 
objects has not come easy’ (6). In ‘Can the Sofa Speak? A Look at Thing Theory’ 
(2005) John Plotz marginalizes the question of whether or not things can speak by 
suggesting that thing theory is best situated in less regimental zones of enquiry (109-
110). He states: ‘Thing theory highlights, or ought to highlight, approaches to the 
margins – of language, of cognition, of material substance’ (110).  
                                                 
5 For example, in Dan Miller’s Stuff, a material culture reading (largely through an anthropological lens) of community 
engagements with a number of material objects including clothing, houses and mobile phones, Miller describes his interest in 
challenging ‘our common-sense opposition between the person and the thing, the animate and inanimate, the subject and the 
object’ (5) eventually stating that ‘[i]t is now clear that in material culture we are concerned at least as much with how things 
make people as the other way around’ (42).  
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  The recent emphasis in critical discourse on questions of agency, subject/object 
dialectics, and whether or not things ‘speak’, while vital, has helped identify a gap in 
material culture discourse. As Bill Brown states in a footnote in ‘How to Do Things 
with Things (A Toy Story)’: ‘The following pages, which do not ask the 
Heideggerean question (about how the thing things, and how it things the world), 
address not the “nature of things” but the “culture of things”…’ (936). This thesis is 
concerned with exactly that omission – with how things world and with what that 
worlding encounter is like. By demonstrating that the things this thesis focuses on – 
locks of hair, clothing, writerly equipment and handwriting – have qualities that 
make them particularly fit for the task of provoking memory and evoking the absent 
writer with whom they are associated I am ascribing a significant amount of agency 
to things. Rather than objects that simply respond to a receptive human subject, I 
demonstrate that the things considered here provoke, that as with Proust’s madeleine, 
encounters with things can conjure involuntary memories, abstract associations and 
felt presences. By privileging the language and narratives of encounter I demonstrate 




Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is a central figure in the philosophy of things. His 
most sustained considerations about things and the ‘thingliness’ of things can be 
found in his seminal work Being and Time (published in 1927), in What Is A Thing? 
(based on a lecture held in the winter semester of 1935/1936 at the University of 
Freiburg, and published in English in 1967) and his essays ‘The Origin of the Work 
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of Art’, ‘The Thing’, and ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (based on lectures given in 
1935, 1950, and 1951 respectively and assembled in 1971 in Poetry, Language, 
Thought). Heidegger’s work informs this thesis in four ways: 1) through his 
suggestion that things are never fully revealed to us in our encounters with them but 
that aspects of a thing and its relations can be brought to the fore in certain kinds of 
encounter;6 2) through providing an analysis of encounters with things that 
demonstrates that environments are comprised of relations, a reading of settings that 
informs the reading of a thing in a writer’s house/museum as always already in a 
context; 3) through his concept of tool use which informs the changed assignment of 
things on display in a writer’s house/museum, how, for example, Charles Dickens’s 
desk and chair transition from things used for writing with to things used for 
remembering with; and 4) through his concept of ‘worlding’ which places beings and 
things in an inseparable and (potentially resonant) relation. 
  Point four – Heidegger’s concept of ‘worlding’ – is the most amorphous of the 
ideas applied in this thesis. The concept, explored in Heidegger’s 1919 lecture course 
but explicated more fully in his mid-century lectures, is developed in chapter two but 
warrants an introduction here. In this thesis I read Heidegger’s concept of worlding 
as an experience of integration in which human subjects and worldly objects inform 
and constitute each other. Worlding is, as chapter two will explore, the sensuous way 
                                                 
6 In What is a Thing? Heidegger emphasizes the subjective nature of our encounters with things and references the elusive 
nature of things as entities we cannot know and which always have aspects that are hidden from our view: ‘…we are individual 
subjects and egos, and what we represent and mean are only subjective pictures which we carry around in us; we never reach 
the things themselves’ (11-12). Heidegger suggests that things stand in different truths and that the way to proceed in an 
investigation of those truths is through everyday encounters (14). Largely consumed with a reading of Kant’s concept of the 
thing in his Critique of Pure Reason, What is a Thing? is nonetheless valuable for Heidegger’s assertion that the dynamic that 
exists between us and things is mutually constitutive. As Eugene Gendlin states in his summary analysis: 
Heidegger is not saying that a thing is something subjective. ‘What a “this” is does not depend upon our 
caprice and our pleasure.’ What it is does depend upon us, but ‘it also equally depends upon the things’ (26, 
20; also 243, 188). This ‘between’ is not as though first we and things could have existed separately and then 
interacted. Rather, what a person is is always already a having things given, and a thing is already something 
that encounters. (Gendlin 258) 
Here Gendlin is affirming that in a Heideggerean reading of things, things have their own way of standing-forth, a way that is 
not determined by us but by a relation (always already in play) between us and things – a suggestion furthered by the concept of 
worlding wherein things stand forth in meaningful relations. 
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things bring concrete and abstract relations to the fore – a mode of encounter that is 
heightened at particular times and through particular things – for the later Heidegger, 
especially through works of visual and literary art. In ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’ Heidegger states:  
The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar 
and unfamiliar things that are just there. But neither is it a merely imagined 
framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The 
world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible 
realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object 
that stands before us and can be seen. (PLT 43) 
 
Here Heidegger dismisses any potential correlation between ‘world’ as a concept and 
the referential noun ‘world’ which might be taken as what’s around us: ‘the mere 
collection of the countable and uncountable…’ (43). World here is neither noun nor 
verb (the world, worlding) but the whole of our existence in relation to all that exists 
and the ways in which that existing occurs and unfolds. World is not locatable in a 
venue but is the fabric from which our encounters, thoughts, and identities are sewn. 
Worlding, as this thesis employs it, is the set of relations that comes to the fore from 
things and beings together in an unfragmented way in the writer’s house/museum. It 
is the palpable and affective sense of the past in the present, of the material and 
incorporeal/abstract together; it is ‘atmosphere’ and encounter. As Heidegger 
suggests above, it is more than material tangibles and the concepts we meet things 
with but rather a condition of existence, of being in and amongst the concrete and 
abstract, the sayable and the unsayable. Günter Figal suggests in his reading of 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘world’ that world is, in essence, experiential: 
World is the context of things in which they are ‘meaningful,’ which means: in 
which they have a meaning and are thereby in some way important for the one 
experiencing, and for their life…. which means: there are not first things which 
are then meaningful in each experience in a secondary sense, but rather things 
exist as meaningful. Meaningfulness is the way things exist. (5)  
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World in this reading is not some ‘out there’ encounter that is separate from the one 
encountering, it is not a place or a location, but the always-already meaningful way 
we move through existence, an encounter shaped by our concerns and dealings.  
 In order to take a first step in delineating a shape for what it is for things to 
‘world’ in the context of this thesis I will turn briefly to Heidegger’s jug analogy in 
‘The Thing’ – an analogy that takes a thinging thing (a jug) and explicates how it 
expands a set of (already unified) relations – a description that reflects Heidegger’s 
use of thinging and worlding things (like art and bridges and temples) in other 
lectures.   
 In ‘The Thing’ Heidegger notes that a jug is an object with a physical form but 
also a vessel (a thing with-which to hold, carry liquid). While this vessel is made (by 
the potter) the vessel aspect of it belongs to the jug in the form of its void. 
(Heidegger points out that we cannot make the void that gives the jug its being as a 
vessel but can only fashion the parts of the jug that illustrate the void, such as the 
jug’s sides and bottom.) Made, the jug stands forth doubly: in its being made and as a 
thing that now shows aspects of itself (such as its holding, giving/pouring qualities). 
In the pouring of water or wine from the jug Heidegger expresses a version of 
worlding: how the pouring may be a gift, how nature dwells in what is poured (the 
rock in the spring that gives the water in the jug its taste), how the celebration or 
ritual for which the pouring occurs creates further sets of relations between people, 
things, ideas, beliefs and so forth which are integrated in their ‘onefoldedness’ – 
relations that, in this lecture, Heidegger describes as a gathering (a word, that 
Heidegger likes to note, is connected to the German word for thing) (PLT 163-180). 
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 In Heidegger’s work worlding is often described as an integrated state or 
heightened kind of awareness borne from a sense of the inseparable relations 
between beings and things. In ‘The Thing’ he states that things can have a worlding 
being (178) and that through being present to things or concerned with the thing’s 
worlding being the world is brought near  (178-179). This is a nearness I attribute to 
encounters with resonant things in the writer’s house/museum setting. If 
encountering Emily Brontë’s cracked and repaired Christening mug (Fig. 1, below) 
resonates a sense of Emily, or of the moment the cup may have broken, of its repair, 
her childhood or her writing life, then I am suggesting that the thing worlds. In 
worlding, the idea of a barrier between the past and present and Emily and the viewer 
is elided in that the thing brings whole sets of relations to the fore. To repeat, as 
Heidegger expressed it: things can have a worlding being (178) and through being 
present to things or through being concerned with the thing’s worlding being the 
world, in the form of sets of relations, is brought near  (178-179).  
 
       
Fig. 1. Emily Brontë’s Christening Mug © Brontë Parsonage Museum, Haworth (Dinsdale, 
 Laycock and Akhurst 12). 
 
 
  24 
Approaching Things 
 
The terms used in the study of resonant or meaningful things that connect individuals 
with the absent/dead and the past are as varied as things themselves. Described as 
‘relics’ (Lutz 2011), ‘significant objects’ (Sellers 2013), ‘beloved objects’ (K. Brown 
1998), ‘melancholy objects’ or ‘objects of the dead’ (Gibson 2004, 2009), ‘memory 
objects’ (Ash 1996; Hallam and Hockey 2001; Sutton 2002), ‘evocative objects’ 
(Turkle 2007), ‘linking objects’ and ‘nostalgic objects’ (Akhtar 2005), ‘resonant 
objects’ (Pascoe 2006), ‘cultural artifacts’ (Greenblatt 1990), ‘memorabilia’ and 
‘fetishes’ (Hood 2009), ‘personalia’ (Hardwick 1968), or ‘objects of the last 
moment’ (Körte 2004) things of all sorts have moved to the forefront of critical 
studies and thought.  
 Although there were a number of paths available to me in the study of resonant 
things, including a deconstruction of the problems of subject/object relations and the 
question of agency, the clearest framework for this investigation was provided by a 
reading of material encounters. If affective encounters are difficult to relay, if it is the 
case that there ‘might be called a general lack of practice in articulating an affective 
response’ (de Bolla 16) and if, – as Eugene Gendlin suggests in his analysis of 
Heidegger’s What is a Thing? – ‘what we are as humans and how we constitute 
situations and things is always partly and irreducibly linguistic’ (284) then a reading 
of such encounters through how they are described opens up both the space of the 
encounter and the degree of attention allotted to the dynamics that occur within it. 
 This thesis is therefore a study of the structure of experience of affective 
encounters with writerly things, a study that foregrounds how language helps reveal 
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structures of consciousness and intuited aspects of material things in those 
encounters. The word ‘phenomenology’ when used in relation to this work is 
intended to signify both a reading of the structure of encounter with phenomena and 
an analysis of the properties of an affective state via description. A formal 
engagement with the history and structure of phenomenology as a method (i.e. its 
evolution from Husserl on) lies outside the domain of this thesis.  
 In terms of my methodology I am asserting that affective or resonant encounters 
with things in the writer’s house/museum are not wholly determined by individuals 
but by individuals and things together. Having identified a gap in recent thing theory 
discourse as to how things world I have employed narratives of encounter as a means 
of illuminating some of the dynamics involved in resonant encounters with things. 
The six dynamics I have identified as fundamental to worlding encounters in writers’ 
houses/museums are autographic ascription, authenticity, contiguity, metonymical 
fitness, equipmentality and stasis. My assertion that these six dynamics are 
fundamental to resonant encounters with things in the writer’s house/museum is 
supported through readings of four of the central object categories in writers’ 
houses/museums: hair, clothing, writer’s tools and handwriting. In analyzing these 
dynamics and these objects I suggest that a fundamental aspect of an encounter with 
things in writers’ houses/museums is the metamorphosis of a thing from its original 
tool-use (a chair to sit in, a pen to write with) to a new kind of tool-use: for 
remembering with. As resonant or affective encounters with things are largely 
unquantifiable this thesis marries concrete approaches to the subject (in the form of 
anthropological, scientific or linguistic theory) to Heidegger’s phenomenological and 
existential philosophy. This thesis, as such, is not a deconstruction of resonant 
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encounters with things (as if such encounters could be anatomized) but a bringing to 
the fore of some of the previously undisclosed yet fundamental dynamics in such 
encounters.  
 Ultimately this thesis is ground in narrative. If the writer’s house/museum is a 
resonant location because it was the very place where a writer or writers once lived it 
seems fitting that the ways in which those writers saw and described things in their 
literary work and life-writing should figure prominently in the investigation of the 
resonant power of things. In this way Victorian writers’ narratives about hair, 
clothing, furniture / writing implements and handwriting have proven to be 
indispensible in the analysis of the dynamics of encounter in the Victorian writer’s 
house/museum. 
  Chapter one contextualizes this investigation of resonant encounters with 
writerly things through an analysis of the writer’s house as a site of encounter 
thereby grounding this study of things in real-world contexts. Chapter one then 
introduces and defines four of the key concepts employed in this thesis – autographic 
objects (via Mary Douglas), authenticity (via Anne Trubek and Judith Pascoe), 
contiguity (via George Lakoff and Mark Johnson) and resonance (via Stephen 
Greenblatt) – definitions that lay the ground for chapter two’s analysis of 
Heidegger’s ‘worlding’ concept.  
 Chapter two explores some of the phenomenological aspects of encounters with 
writerly things. Employing Marion Harland’s late-nineteenth-century description of a 
visit to the Carlyle’s House alongside Martin Heidegger’s concept of ‘worlding’ and 
Charlotte Brontë’s fictional account of an environmental experience with things in 
her novel Villette, this chapter will assert that house/museum settings have the ability 
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to effectively gather and exhibit (or ‘world’) a powerful sense of both the absent 
writer and the absent writer’s life – an encounter that is generated through things. By 
drawing parallels between Heidegger’s philosophical reading of thingly encounters 
and worlding and Harland’s Victorian narrative this chapter seeks to unsettle any 
potential perceptions of resonant encounters in the writer’s house/museum as wholly 
subjective or isolatable in order to position resonant experiences as a kind of 
encounter brought about by individuals and environments together. 
 Chapters three, four, five, and six look at specific categories of things found in the 
museums: hair, clothing, writerly tools and handwriting in order to support this 
thesis’s argument that resonant encounters with things involve many of the same 
dynamics. Chapter three focuses on contiguity by reading hair and locks of hair as a 
material vestige of the writer’s body, a reading supported by Victorian narratives in 
which hair is conceived of as a vital and connecting fragment. Artefacts from the 
Wordsworth Trust collection support the idea that hair was employed as a 
remembracer and that hair was believed to be both symbolic and actualizing, an idea 
developed by an analysis of Edmund Leach’s essay ‘Magical Hair’ and readings of 
hair binding narratives in Wuthering Heights and Villette.  
 Chapter four focuses on clothes and metonymy while reaffirming the power of 
contiguity. Beginning with a reading of a caricature of a pair of Thomas Carlyle’s 
trousers and proceeding through a reading of how the Carlyles wrote about clothing, 
the equipmental nature of clothing and its metonymical properties will be 
demonstrated. Latter parts of this chapter will assert that empty or unoccupied 
clothes were especially fit for presencing the absent wearer, and that as a material 
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remain clothes have the ability to act as archives of both bodily and historical 
knowledge.  
 Chapter five considers the power of writerly tools especially desks, chairs, and 
writing implements. This chapter suggests that as actual tools used in the production 
of these writers’ works these objects are especially meaningful as a remembrancer in 
the context of the writer’s house/museum. Employing Heidegger’s definitions of 
equipment alongside a reading of Charles Dickens’s desk and chair, this chapter 
considers the effects of stasis on tools – suggesting that displaying writerly objects 
brings to the fore a new modulation of readiness-to-hand, one that is conducive to 
evocation or remembrance.  
 Chapter six analyzes writers’ handwriting. Reading fragments of Charlotte 
Brontë’s writing as worlding marks (marks that signal both thought and a now-absent 
bodily self) this chapter concerns itself with the ‘magical value’ of the written words 
and the event or instance of inscription. As the material trace of the writer and their 
thoughts in the form of a mark or marks on paper this chapter equates the 
fundamental material aspect of the mark with an event of being. Returning to the 
concept of ‘worlding’ this chapter affirms the ability of even the slightest mark 
ascribed to the writer to provoke a sense of encounter. 
 Overall this thesis argues that resonant encounters are made by beings and things 
together: by the concepts we meet things with and the thing’s own mode of showing 
forth, and that certain things are especially fit for the task of evoking / provoking a 
sense of the absent individual for whom they stand. Through identifying some of the 
fundamental dynamics of resonant encounters with a writer’s things, and through 
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reading narratives of encounters with things, this thesis hopes to demonstrate that 




There is no formulaic answer to the question of how resonance is created or affective 
experiences ‘work’. In his introduction in Art Matters – Peter de Bolla’s examination 
of affective experiences in relation to art – de Bolla states broadly ‘my task is to 
arrive at a better understanding of what it is to be moved profoundly by a work of 
art’ (3). Echoing de Bolla’s aim, the task of this thesis is to arrive at a better 
understanding of resonant encounters with writerly things and to discover what 
dynamics seem most essential in these encounters. Through illuminating some of the 
factors involved in those encounters and through analyzing how those encounters 
have been (and continue to be) described, it is hoped that I have not only made a case 
for the validity and usefulness of meaningful things but that I have also demonstrated 
the vital role things themselves play in the process of meaning-making and 
recollection.   
 There is, of course, a danger in attempting to speak collectively or generally about 
something that is always experienced individually. My aim in this thesis is not to be 
‘right’ for everyone; it is not to establish rules or a set of absolute conditions within 
which affective experiences of meaningful things must be ground, rather it is to build 
a platform from which future considerations of the affective experience of 
autographic objects or evocative things might depart, and to reveal through both 
material and narrative readings some of the foundational elements of such 
  30 
encounters. I assert that the larger dynamics of affective encounters with museal 
things has remained under-examined, hampered perhaps by the subjective nature of 
affective encounters. As one museum visitor commented in the late eighteenth 
century:  
 If I see wonders which I do not understand, they are no wonders to me. Should 
a piece of withered paper lie on the floor, I should, without regard, shuffle it 
from under my feet. But if I am told it is a letter written by Edward the Sixth, 
that information sets a value on the piece, it becomes a choice morceau of 
antiquity, and I seize it with rapture. (Vergo 9) 
 
Here the museum visitor’s rapture-inducing object is rendered rapturous because it 
has been given a context, one that may mean little to a subsequent visitor for whom 
Edward the Sixth (and the history he exemplifies) means nothing. Similarly, the 
Brontë Parsonage may evoke, as one visitor wrote ‘the presence of the Brontë 
family’ while another visitor might simply appreciate the museum’s ‘lack of 
gimmicks’ (BPM visitor comments 2011, 2009). This illustrates some of the 
problems of subjectivity but it also points to the value of gathering subjectivities in 
the form of narratives that can be read alongside each other.  
 Despite the inherent subjectivity of affective experiences the idea that material 
objects help connect us to absent people and historical events is widely represented 
and reflected in cultural and communal narratives. In 2013 when the US pop singer 
Kelly Clarkson purchased Jane Austen’s gold and turquoise ring at an auction at 
Sotheby’s an export ban was placed on the ring and a ‘Bring the Ring Home’ 
campaign to keep it in Britain ensued. Eventually an unnamed benefactor and 
‘Austen fans around the world’ raised £152,450 to ‘save it for the public in the UK’ 
(L. Bury). No contextualizing narrative about the affective power of beholding a 
writer’s things or the value of the ring (or Austen things) in relation to community 
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access (or national identity) was necessary in news reports around the sale and 
campaign (though the fact that the ring was one of only three pieces of known 
Austen jewellery was regularly cited). Instead, the idea that Austen mattered, and 
that having access to her things mattered, was implicit. The fact that the ring was 
eventually sold to the Jane Austen Museum for the exact same amount of money it 
was sold to Clarkson for suggests that the ring holds some sort of value that is not 
merely fiscal – else the ring as pure commodity would have been sold for the best 
price without any concern for its whereabouts or ‘life’ after the sale.  
 The Austen ring narrative is useful because it demonstrates the value of those 
things whose own thingly biographies have coexisted with the biographies of 
individuals who become cultural figures. Even now, in an age of ubiquity, it seems 
that some objects, regardless of their monetary value or our ability to reproduce 
them, rise above other objects and things of their type. Contemporary newspapers are 
full of such examples reporting on the sale or auction of objects ranging from 
Madonna’s bra, the hat worn by Princess Beatrice to the royal wedding, a black 
Asprey bag once belonging to Margaret Thatcher, to John Lennon’s sunglasses. That 
these twentieth century examples can be read comfortably alongside the sale of 
Victoriana – Emily Brontë’s geometry set, Queen Victoria’s underwear, and the 
chronometer used on the HMS Beagle when Darwin worked on it – implies that the 
idea of things as conduits between an individual and ‘others’ (and an individual and 
historical events) is not an uncommon phenomenon and that the value of, and desire 
for, objects associated with certain people or events is part of a perceptible cultural 
practice.7  
                                                 
7 Two contrasting examples may serve to support this point further: 1) in 2010 a $10 000 reward was offered by Reebok Canada 
for the return of the stolen stick and gloves worn by the game-winning goal-scorer Sydney Crosby in the Canadian men’s gold 
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 Over the past seven years my research has revealed ample corollaries between the 
Victorian age and ours, whether it’s the penchant for autographs and hair-collecting 
in the late Romantic and Victorian eras aligned with similar tendencies now (in a 
2011 charity auction on e-Bay a lock of the pop-star Justin Bieber’s hair netted just 
over £25,000) or the way we describe a thing’s ability to presence – as per the 
anecdote about Queen Victoria reported by the Hon. George Peel to Harold 
Nicholson. Peel alleged that on a trip to Italy during her long mourning for Albert, 
Queen Victoria, sitting in her carriage in the Piazza del Duomo ‘stopped the carriage, 
fumbled in her corsage and drew out a locket’ which she then proceeded to hold up 
to the recently restored façade of the Duomo. ‘The Lady-in-Waiting afterwards told 
Peel that it was a miniature of the Prince Consort’ and that she ‘thought it would 
interest him to see how the Duomo looked after being repaired’ (Hibbert, Queen 434-
435).  
 This ascription of psychical powers to things such as a locket, the idea or sense of 
animate connections between the dead and their things is not confined to the 
Victorians. In 2010 Prince William suggested a similar sense of feeling when on his 
engagement to Kate Middleton he gave her the sapphire and diamond ring that had 
belonged to his late mother Princess Diana, saying in an on-camera interview that the 
gesture was ‘my way of making sure my mother didn't miss out on today’ (‘Prince’).  
 While the Victorian era forms the locus of this investigation, it should be noted 
here that the use of resonant objects as a presencer or remembrancer abides in many 
                                                 
medal Olympic hockey game against the US (Reebok 2010). It isn’t just that a reward was offered; the theft of the objects 
illustrates their importance. 2) In 2009 when the wrought iron Arbeit Macht Frei (work sets you free) sign was stolen from the 
concentration camp memorial site Auschwitz a ‘nationwide search for [the] symbol of suffering’ ensued and a ‘state of 
emergency’ was declared in Poland. The theft was called ‘an act of war’ by the Holocaust museum (Auschwitz BBC) and ‘an 
attack on the remembrance of the Holocaust’ (Quinn, Aushwitz). This is not to equate two profoundly disparate events – it is 
simply to illustrate the abiding and cross-cultural value of resonant things. Wrought iron signs and hockey sticks are made from 
fairly ubiquitous materials that can be procured and shaped or made with relative ease; but as authentic objects, objects that 
have served as witnesses to unique events or individual lives these things are singular and irreplaceable.   
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cultures and that part of the work I hope to have done is to have established a 
framework for studies in resonant materiality in any time period or across epochs.  
Peter de Bolla’s study of affect and art and what he calls the ‘poetics of wonderment’ 
led him to a feature of affective experiences of art that he calls ‘mutism’ – the feeling 
of ‘being struck dumb’ (3). My thesis, likewise, has looked for those facets of 
affective encounters with a writer’s things that might, echoing De Bolla, be called 
‘features’ of the resonant material encounter, features which I have identified as 
autographic ascription, authenticity, contiguity, metonymical fitness, equipmentality 
and stasis – aspects that contribute to the ‘fitness’ of things to serve as 
remembrancers.  
 
‘Alive! Absolutely ace!’ ‘It feels as if the family are still here.’ 
– Brontë Parsonage Museum visitor comments (2009) 
 
While published books and life writing form the majority of sources in this thesis I 
feel it is important to acknowledge the influence – and power – of the off-hand 
comment or anecdote as it relates to this field of inquiry. Over the years I have 
observed hundreds of visitors as they’ve made their way through the museums that 
form the locus of this study, I have asked strangers on their way out of the museum 
what objects impressed them most and why, I have chatted at length with curators 
about their own sense of the resonant objects in their care. I have learned to 
acknowledge the degree of trust involved in acts of curation, exhibition and 
visitation. When one custodian admitted that they wondered what they’d do if they 
accidentally hoovered up their famous writer’s hair, and then said sheepishly that 
they’d probably replace it with a lock of their own, I saw how fragile, how tenuous 
the whole enterprise of resonant materiality is. Bruce Hood’s experiments with Paul 
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Rozin’s contagion theory demonstrate that we can ‘make’ an object resonant in the 
same way that we can make an object taboo – simply by lying about it. When asked 
to touch a black fountain pen reputedly belonging to Albert Einstein, those in Hood’s 
audience obliged and generally exhibited ‘reverence and awe’ toward the object 
(which was not Einstein’s pen) (Hood 22). When asked to wear a cardigan that he 
said belonged to Fred West (the serial killer) volunteers willing to touch the object 
dwindled significantly and a sense of revulsion was evident, leading Hood to 
conclude that ‘[t]he repulsion to the cardigan could reflect a common supernatural 
belief that invisible essences can contaminate the world and connect us together…’ 
(23).  
 Seeing the couch where Emily Brontë is alleged to have died is powerful in part 
because of this sense of an event that echoes over time. As one visitor to the Brontë 
Parsonage in 2011 wrote: ‘I liked being slightly scared by thinking someone died on 
the sofa’; another, mentioning the front room of the museum, wrote ‘…[it] gives me 
a chill to think of the sisters writing in there!’ (BPM visitor comments 2011). These 
anecdotal or jotted responses matter because affective experiences are subjective, and 
as such are unique clues to a larger shared experience, an experience of the kind that 
de Bolla describes in Art Matters when trying to untangle the similarly ambiguous 
apprehension of affective art work: an encounter that he acknowledges partakes of a 
kind of betweenity – part physical, part mental – an experience we don’t yet have a 
way to discuss in everyday terms: 
 This state of  ‘in-between-ness,’ as it were, part physical and part mental, in 
the orbit of the emotive yet also clearly articulated or potentially articulatable 
within the higher orders of mental activity, is one way of describing wonder…. 
 Although the observation that we have very few words, hardly any at all, for 
talking about affective experiences certainly seems accurate, it does not follow 
that such a lexicon is beyond invention. (3-4)  
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Being ‘slightly scared’; having ‘a chill’; calling a place ‘Alive’ are ways of 
describing an encounter with a place and with things that reads as both physical and 
mental. In each case one has been altered or moved from what might be described as 
a less engaged or visceral state into a heightened one. This affect is palpable in the 
museums themselves – through visitor reactions and even, in some cases, their lack 
of reactions, especially in those cases where visitors move through the environment 
without deep engagement but then become struck by one particular thing. 
 
The ‘resonant’ objects referenced in this thesis are from collections found in The 
Brontë Parsonage, Carlyle’s House, The Dickens Museum, Sir Walter Scott’s 
Abbotsford, William Wordsworth’s Dove Cottage, his Museum and Rydal Mount, 
Charles Darwin’s Down House and John Ruskin’s Brantwood. A list of these 
museums along with their locations, the dates they were inhabited by the author(s), 
the year the house was formally opened to the public, their average annual visitor 
figures (when confirmed), the context of their ownership (private/Trust) and the most 
recent year of substantial renovations can be found on Table 1 at the end of this 
Introduction. The museums are listed chronologically by the date they were occupied 
by the writer(s), and not in order of reference or importance in this thesis. The Keats 
House Museum and the Freud Museum have been included on Table 1, as they will 
be referenced on occasion.  
 It should be noted that whilst this thesis is grounded in the Victorian era and 
focuses on Victorian writers and things inhabiting houses (later reformulated as 
museums) between 1837 and 1901, two of the literary figures discussed here pre-date 
the era (John Keats died in 1821, and Sir Walter Scott died in 1832), and all the 
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authors, biographically, span eras (Wordsworth, Dickens, Thomas and Jane Carlyle, 
Charlotte, Emily and Anne Brontë, Charles Darwin and John Ruskin were all born in 
the Georgian era). Rather than employ the ‘long-nineteenth century’ approach, this 
thesis intends to focus on the Victorian era as a particular epoch with its own 
tendencies and trends, in part because of the influence of Queen Victoria on a 
number of elements in this thesis including the keeping and wearing of locks of hair, 
and the employment of mementos such as clothing in her mourning. It should also be 
noted that while the majority of these museums did not open in the Victorian era (see 
Table 1), many of these locations were already sites of pilgrimage in the Victorian 
era, and all but Keats’ House, Scott’s Abbotsford and Wordsworth’s Dove Cottage 
are meant to exemplify or ‘capture’ the Victorian lives of their inhabitants; 
inhabitants who were influential figures in the Victorian era itself.  
 
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggest that a culture’s 
conceptual systems can be revealed through its use of language. They identify some 
of the dominant metaphors employed in the English language and demonstrate how 
the words we use (often unknowingly) reflect a range of concepts – from our values 
(as evidenced by spatial metaphors such as the orientation that ‘up’ is good compared 
to feeling ‘down’) to our ontological predispositions (evidenced by our use of 
container metaphors – we are ‘in’ a field even if it is not bounded). In this way 
Lakoff and Johnson reveal the hidden structures of meaning in everyday language 
providing a model for this thesis’s assertion that language is a valuable repository for 
an understanding of resonant encounters with things. 
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 Elaine Freedgood in The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian 
Novel suggests in her analysis of the vital life of things in Victorian novels that 
‘critical cultural archives have been preserved, unsuspected, in the things of realism 
that have been so little or so lightly read’ (1) an idea that suggests that things 
(fictional and real) are, like words, valuable archives.  
 As a writer I have a predisposition to looking at words and things as vital 
informing entities, to reading things, events and people through how they are 
described. This is borne from the belief that those descriptions – whether in letters, 
novels, poems, diaries or comment books – are revealing. While one of the 
fundamental ways we encounter things tends to be through the concepts we meet 
them with, sometimes, in our own narratives hidden aspects of things can come to the 
fore. 
 Admittedly, the role of the writer as a cultural commentator holds a unique kind 
of allure for me. Still, it is not a role that I sentimentalize. I do not see the role of ‘the 
writer’ as ‘mystical’, and the work is not ‘sacred’. I believe that imaginative acts are 
to be celebrated, especially when deemed successful, but as a practitioner I know that 
books and careers are the result of complex processes and procedures, and 
disciplined, often wrenching, work. Having given over a hundred readings and 
interviews, and having read a drawer’s worth of reviews about my own books I 
understand how much of a work’s affect and meaning comes from a writer’s 
subconscious mind even as that same mind works diligently on theme and subtext 
and the myriad surface elements of a poem, story or novel. In excavating creative 
and life-writing for what the writing says about the world of things rather than 
approaching the work as a mere reflection of ideas we already hold about resonance 
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and material objects, the possibility of new and less pre-fabricated realizations 
increases. One of the great pleasures of writing is that sometimes your work knows 
more than you do, which is why Victorian writers – crafting whole worlds through an 
acuity with language that surpasses the average person’s, and cherished in part for 
their ability to communicate effectively about the beliefs, concerns and cultural 
tropes of their day – might have more to say about things than we, or even they, 
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Chapter One: The Writer’s House/Museum   
 
This thesis asserts that certain categories of things in a writer’s house/museum are 
especially fit for the task of provoking and evoking a sense of encounter with the 
absent individual for whom they have come to stand. Both the nature of this 
encounter and the ‘how’ of this encounter – Bill Brown’s ‘how the thing things, and 
how it things the world’ (How 936) must therefore be addressed.  
 This chapter will begin by establishing the physical ground or setting in which the 
things central to this thesis are located. Beginning with a brief overview of literary 
pilgrimages this chapter will contextualize literary tourism historically in order to 
support the idea that house/museum tourism is a mode of encounter conducive to a 
special kind of contact with a writer and their work.8  
 As I am arguing that there are six influential elements that structure or figure 
resonant encounters with a writer’s things, those elements must be defined. This 
chapter looks at three of those elements beginning with autographic ascription (the 
ascription of a thing to the writer in question i.e. Emily Brontë’s writing desk, 
William Wordsworth’s spectacles, Thomas Carlyle’s pen) which will be read via 
Mary Douglas’s essay ‘The Genuine Article’; authenticity which will be read via 
Anne Trubek’s A Skeptics Guide to Writers’ Houses and Judith Pascoe’s ideas on 
‘authenticating narratives’; and contiguity – inherent in the first two elements – 
                                                 
8 My use of a forward slash between house and museum in this thesis (‘house/museum’) is due to the fact that some of the sites 
considered in this thesis call themselves ‘houses’ and some ‘museums’ (see Table 1) though it is also intended to signify the 
indication of a choice (for the visitor) in terms of the perception of the space considered regardless of its formal designation. 
One can, in this model, see a particular location primarily as a house, or primarily as a museum while simultaneously sensing a 
strong connection between the abutted designations. While some houses/museums ‘feel’ or are laid out more like houses and 
some ‘feel’ or are laid out more like museums, there is, inevitably, in the larger environment of each site an interplay between 
the two modes of representation (though not necessarily in an either/or fashion). All of the museums this thesis focuses on were 
once homes to the writers who form the museum’s focus, as such a heightened sense of both the lived and the preserved / 
displayed life is inevitable. For simplicity’s sake as the thesis progresses the term ‘house’ or the term ‘museum’ may be used to 
designate the house/museum setting, instances which will be telling in their own right as they will inevitably reflect perceptual 
modes of engagement with aspects of the site. 
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defined here as three different kinds of encounter and read alongside George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. 
 Finally, in this chapter, the concept of ‘resonance’ in relation to meaningful 
encounters with a writer’s things will be established. Informed by etymological 
readings of the word and Stephen Greenblatt’s definition of resonance in his essay 
‘Resonance and Wonder’ this definition will inform subsequent readings of worlding 
and presence. Once these three aspects of the figural elements of resonant 
experiences – and the concept of resonance itself – are clarified, a study of worlding 
things and categories of things related to the writer’s house/museum collections can 
begin. 
 
I – Sites of Encounter 
 
One of the things all writers’ houses/museums have in common is the idea of the 
literary text. The fact of authorship is, after all, the central reason the writer’s 
house/museum exists in the first place. Each of the authors considered in this thesis 
produced a body of work that garnered readers – and not just in their respective 
lifetimes, but also across the generations that followed. As Harald Hendrix suggests 
in Writers’ Houses and the Making of Memory, writers’ houses ‘attract readers that 
feel the need to go beyond their intellectual exchanges with texts and long for some 
kind of material contact with the author of those texts or the places where they 
originate’ (1). This sense of encounter or communion with a writer through their 
work – and the desire to further that sense of encounter – is one of the reasons 
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writers’ houses are so popular.9 As Mike Robinson asserts in his introduction to 
Literature and Tourism:  
As creative people, some writers become great sources of inspiration to their 
readership, who are not content merely to read and collect their works. They 
may also want to visit the writers’ homes, in order to connect with the space 
where ‘great’ books came into being, to walk where the writers walked, to see 
what the writers saw. (xiii) 
 
This suggestion, that a visit to a writer’s house can generate a strong sense of 
connection to a work through contact ‘with the space’, is one of the reasons to visit a 
writer’s house: to see where a treasured novel was ‘born’ and to encounter the 
material world that surrounded or supported its creation. This desire to connect with 
the world of the book means connecting with the world inhabited by its writer. Visits 
to writers’ houses/museums are therefore also about the writer as a person. If the 
house or the ‘home’ is one of the places where we are most ourselves in the world, it 
follows that it would also be one of the places that holds or contains some trace of 
that truest self, even in that self’s absence. To borrow Gaston Bachelard’s phrase 
from The Poetics of Space, such a house is a ‘domain of intimacy’ (12).10  In a 
writer’s house/museum this sense of intimacy with the house’s former inhabitant is 
heightened because of the imagined intensity of the creative act: here is where the 
author’s great work was written – an idea often supported visually by desks and 
                                                 
9 See Table 1 for the average annual visitor numbers for many of the houses/museums considered in this thesis. Note that 
houses/museums such as Scott’s Abbotsford (undergoing an eight million pound renovation and due to reopen in July of 2013) 
while only attracting around 25 000 visitors in recent years attracted as many as 80 000 people a year at its peak in the late 
Victorian era (Wade). The Brontë Parsonage attracted 73, 408 visitors in 2012 (Hart) and Dove Cottage averages 70 000 a year 
while Ruskin’s Brantwood and Dickens’s House average around 30 000. Dickens’s House also recently underwent a substantial 
3.1 million pound renovation (in 2012) and expects to see visitor numbers rise to 45 000 in 2013 as a result (Huet). To put these 
numbers in context, a survey of 1547 museums by the British Tourist Authority in 1990 determined that the average annual 
attendance of all the museums surveyed was 48 000 though 83% of these attracted less than 50 000 visitors annually (Hooper-
Greenhill 61).  
10 In The Poetics of Space Bachelard suggests that the domain of intimacy is a domain in which psychic weight is dominant and 
that domains of intimacy are never repellent (12). This supports notions of the ‘here’ of the genesis of a great work as being a 
particularly compelling and potent location. While Bachelard’s work on the house as a domain of intimacy and on the power of 
daydream and reverie in houses and in relation to houses does not focus on the writer’s house in particular, Bachelard does 
provide a brief description of the ‘deep sympathy’ that can occur in the writer/reader relationship. In an introduction that 
focuses in part on poetic images Bachelard suggests that an aspect of ‘the joy of reading appears to be the reflection of the joy 
of writing, as though the reader were the writer’s ghost’ (xxvi). For more on the sense of cohabitance that can occur between 
readers and writers see Georges Poulet’s ‘Phenomenology of Reading’ in which Poulet suggests that in the act of reading ‘I am 
thinking the thoughts of another’ (1322) ‘…a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world, which is being 
thought in me just as though I did not exist’ (1323). 
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chairs, pens, papers and copies or drafts of the writer’s work. As Mike Robinson 
suggests: ‘Writer’s homes as focal destinations provide tangible connections between 
the created and the creator, allowing tourists to engage in a variety of emotional 
experiences and activities. For literary pilgrims, however we may choose to define 
them, here lies the potential for intimacy, authenticity… (15).11 In the writer’s 
house/museum some of the most tangible of Robinson’s ‘tangible connections’ are, 
as this thesis will show, the writer’s material things: the quill pen that once connected 
the writer to the page and which now connects the visitor to a creative act in the past 
– images of the writer at work (in the form of conjured images or supporting 
drawings and photographs) which are powerful because they are so intimate – 
personal yet professional – the individual in the act of becoming the ‘writer’ they 
would later be known to be. 
 Simon Goldhill’s 2011 literary travel book Freud’s Couch, Scott’s Buttocks, 
Brontë’s Grave is, in some ways, a mediation on Robinson’s use of the word 
‘potential’ as quoted above: ‘For literary pilgrims, however we may choose to define 
them, here lies the potential for intimacy, authenticity…’ (Robinson 15, emphasis 
added). An adventure-tale of sorts (Goldhill is described as a ‘guide’ undertaking a 
‘pilgrimage’ on the book’s cover flap) Freud’s Couch, Scott’s Buttocks, Brontë’s 
Grave begins with Goldhill describing himself as someone who is generally inured to 
the affective power of the very settings he is seeking out:  
                                                 
11 See also Goldhill of his planned itinerary to Scott’s, the Brontës’, Wordsworth’s, Freud’s etc. houses: ‘Each of these houses 
fired the imagination of its visitors. Each was taken as a fundamental expression of the writer and the writer’s creative works: to 
visit them was not just an act of curiosity but to uncover an insight into the writer’s self, a sign of the writer’s self-expression, 
and to experience an encounter of serious significance for the visitor’s self’ (15). While I would argue that Goldhill is 
generalizing the visitor’s investment (‘serious significance for the visitor’s self’) to increase the dramatic revelation of his own 
skepticism (insomuch as I have met, during my research years, many visitors who have gone to a writer’s house/museum out of 
mere curiosity, and on more than one occasion to get out of the rain) his suggestion that one of the fundamental attributes of a 
visit to a writer’s house is the attainment of ‘insight into the writer’s “self”’ supports one of the dominant narratives surrounding 
literary tourism.  
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I love books, need books, but I have little interest in authors and their things…. 
I have never visited a grave, at least not the grave of anyone famous. I have 
looked at autographs without breaking down…. As I came across stories of 
people weeping uncontrollably at the sight of Freud’s couch, I became more 
and more baffled by the phenomenon I was about to trace. (15-16)  
 
In tracing the phenomenon of literary tourism, however, Goldhill mistakenly 
suggests that literary pilgrimages began as a result of the cult of the author and the 
nineteenth century’s ‘media revolution’ in book production and circulation: 
  Where very successful books in the eighteenth century had circulated in 
thousands, in the nineteenth century hundreds of thousands of copies of hot, 
new novels flooded the market and were eagerly devoured. One consequence 
of this media revolution is that writers became superstars….  
  It is not by chance, then, that in the nineteenth century we find a new 
phenomenon: the tour to visit writers’ houses. The birthplace, the grave, the 
house where the writer lived, or even where the writer was now living – all, for 
the first time, became sites of pilgrimage. (7-8)  
 
While Goldhill’s suggestion that developments in the literary market contributed to 
the ‘phenomenon’ of literary pilgrimages – a fact supported by the corresponding 
increase in tourism to writers houses in the Victorian era12 – he is wrong about the 
novelty of literary tourism (‘new phenomenon’ ‘for the first time’) thereby falsely 
ascribing the draw of sites of encounter (of making contact with a space and the 
things that define it) to the contingencies of an era and technological (or 
‘media’)/consumer relations. In his essay ‘The Early Modern Invention of Literary 
Tourism: Petrarch’s Houses in France and Italy’ Harald Hendrix notes that the poet 
Petrarch engaged in an early version of literary tourism in the 1340s visiting sites 
associated with Virgil near Naples (15). He also states that as early as 1544 German 
                                                 
12 To give a context to what literary tourism looked like in the century: Robert Burns’s (1759-1796) birthplace in Alloway was 
said to be drawing visitors from as far afield as the United States as early as 1817 (Robinson 13). By the 1840s – still during 
Wordsworth’s lifetime – it was believed that Wordsworth (1770-1850) was receiving around 500 visitors a year at his Rydal 
Mount home (Robinson 13). By the middle of the nineteenth century, Stratford, Shakespeare’s birthplace, was welcoming 
around 3000 visitors annually (M. Rosenthal 35). Sir Walter Scott’s Abbotsford could be seen as part of an organized tour by 
the late 1840s, and as Ann Rigney notes, not only was the railway starting to transport people closer to outlying areas where 
writers lived, railway companies were also publishing books instructing travelers on how to use the railway to get to ‘the homes 
and haunts’ of figures such as Scott and Burns (Rigney ‘Abbotsford’ 84, 85). By the end of the nineteenth century the Brontë 
Museum (not yet located in the Parsonage) was receiving approximately 3000 visitors annually (Robinson 147). Between July 
26, 1895 and April 26, 1896 3,800 visitors were recorded at the newly opened Carlyle House (CH Catalogue 25).  
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students were said to be recording their visits to Petrarch’s house by leaving their 
signatures on the fireplace in what was believed to be his bedroom (241) (an act that 
parallels the etching of signatures on the glass of Shakespeare’s window or on the 
walls at what is reputed to be his house in Stratford-upon-Avon – signatures that 
include Thomas Carlyle’s, Charles Dickens’s and Sir Walter Scott’s). Hendrix states 
that eventually Petrarch’s home in Arquà was turned ‘into a commemorative place of 
worship, making it into the oldest still existing museum dedicated to a poet we know 
of in Western culture’ (23). All of this circa 1546 – centuries before anyone knocked 
on Wordsworth’s door begging for an autograph. In Literature and Tourism Mike 
Robinson supports Hendrix’s assertion that sites of encounter with literary figures 
have a long history, stating that ‘personality-based tourism goes back many centuries 
and accounts for the preservation and/or design of a wide range of sites and 
attractions, including literary museums’ (xvi).  
 Of course what a house adds to our understanding of an author’s books or their 
life in that house is quite complex. For Ann Rigney, Sir Walter Scott’s house was 
‘the material embodiment of the writer’s life’ (‘Abbotsford’ 81), a reading of co-
determination supported by Christine Alexander’s suggestion in ‘Myth and Memory: 
Reading the Brontë Parsonage’ that the children’s study in the parsonage contributed 
to the ‘fixing of the writing identity’ – an identity that began in the small study’s 
formative space ‘before expanding to other parts of the house’ (103). As Harald 
Hendrix notes, this kind of shaping works both ways: ‘besides being shaped by 
writers, houses shape the writers dwelling in them’ (4).  
 Ultimately a house – as an informed and informing thing – is a material record: 
the wear marks on the floor in the turret at Ruskin’s Coniston house and the addition 
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of Carlyle’s upstairs study tell us something about the lives lived there – a telling that 
is made possible by the sense that the house was a material witness to the writers’ 
lives, even if what was witnessed (feelings, creative acts and so on) was itself 
immaterial. As Bachelard notes of houses in general: ‘…if I were asked to name the 
chief benefit of the house, I should say: the house shelters daydreaming, the house 
protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in peace’ (6). This abstract sense 
of the writer dreaming, of the writer at work will be explored further in chapter five 
through a consideration of the writer’s desk and tools, though it is important to note 
here, at the outset, that the house as a larger entity or enclosure is the location of not 
only the kind of daydreaming that might lead to a work like Wuthering Heights or 
Rob Roy or Nicholas Nickleby, but also the location of the kind of daydreaming that 
informs who one is in a larger sense.  
  
 
Fig. 2. Emily Brontë’s diary paper, 26 June 1837 © The Brontë Parsonage 
 Museum, Haworth  (Dinsdale, White frontispiece). 
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Emily Brontë’s diary paper of the twenty-sixth of June 1837 (Fig. 2, above) is 
evidence of the way a writer’s house shelters the daydreaming writer in that it 
replicates in both text and image the writer as a daydreaming individual in an 
environing world. The text tells us, among other things, that Anne is writing a poem, 
that Charlotte is working in Aunt’s room and Branwell is reading to her, and that 
Tabby is in the kitchen. The sketch shows both Emily and Anne at work on a book 
and paper-strewn table against the backdrop of the drawing room. This is everyday 
life, it a record of the daydream both in the form of the reading going on upstairs, and 
the writing downstairs, but also in the form of Emily’s own thinking, for as the diary 
paper (written with the intention that it will be read four years later) notes, the girls 
themselves are wondering about the future. On the lower part of the paper Emily has 
written: ‘I wonder where we shall be and how we shall be and what kind of a day it 
will be then’.  
 Writers’ houses/museums as such contain (and are containers of) these 
daydreams, daydreams of the sort that make art and constitute human beings. This is 
one of the main draws for the literary tourist – the house as a site that has the 
potential to bring the visitor into a special kind of contact with the writer and the 
writer’s influential environs. All writers’ houses have this in common – they are sites 
of encounter that are both personal and professional, that locate and embody both the 
human being and the cultural figure they would come to be. 
 
II - The Autographic Object 
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One of the first factors to structure the experience of the writer’s house/museum is 
the knowledge that one is entering a house or museum ascribed to a particular 
individual or set of individuals. In entering the house/museum and paying the fee a 
visitor is bringing whatever degree or kind of knowledge they have about the 
author(s) and books in question to their meeting with the author’s domestic/museal 
site and things. In this way the conceptual aspect of the writer’s house/museum – of 
the house/museum as belonging to or being about the Brontës or the Carlyles – is one 
of the most prevalent and immediate informing structures of the writer’s 
house/museum experience. Of equal importance for this thesis is the fact that the 
things within the house/museum also tend to be read through the lens of the 
individual(s) to whom they were once ascribed. A reading of autographic objects as a 
determinate factor in resonant encounters with a writer’s things is therefore useful – 
not because resonant encounters with things depend on the autographic designation 
(far from it, one can have a resonant encounter with a fake, prop, or replica; with a 
plastic bag billowing in a church graveyard, with any ‘thing’ at all) but because 
autographic ascription orients the resonant encounter and the worlding experience 
(the sense of connection, of access to the past described in chapter two) to a 
particular time, place and human being.  
 
Haworth Parsonage was home to members of the Brontë family from 1820 to 1861. 
It contains the largest collection of Brontë-related material in the world including 
furniture, books, manuscripts, letters, and drawings as well as hundreds of personal 
items – from Charlotte’s wedding bonnet, Emily’s Christening mug, Anne’s Biblical 
sampler, to locks of all the family members’ hair. Over seven million visitors have 
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been to see the museum’s collections over the course of its eighty-five year history 
(Dinsdale, Laycock, Akhurst 5); and the museum currently admits around 75,000 
visitors a year (73,408 in 2012) (Hart). The Parsonage Museum is exceptional for the 
sheer volume of authentic things both on display and in storage, which is to say that 
while it does supplement its collection with reproductions or objects ‘of the sort’ that 
the Brontës owned, by and large the artefacts found in the house belonged to the 
Brontë family.13 The curators also diligently distinguish between those objects with 
certain provenance and those with ambiguous or unverifiable provenance i.e. 
‘Bonnet worn by Charlotte’ versus a dress ‘said to have been worn by Charlotte’ 
(Dinsdale and White 29, emphasis added). As stated in the souvenir guide to the 
museum: ‘The Brontë Parsonage Museum seeks to separate myth from reality and to 
present the known facts about the family’ (Dinsdale and White 5) and ‘[t]he majority 
of the rooms in the original Brontë part of the house are set out in as close an 
approximation as possible to their appearance in the Brontës’ day, and most of the 
objects and furniture on display actually belonged to the family’ (12). These objects 
– ones that ‘actually belonged’ to the Brontë family and which therefore constituted 
part of the Brontë family’s domestic world – are ‘autographic’ objects: objects that 
have been raised to a special status through their association with, and ascription, to 
the family. 
     In her essay ‘The Genuine Article’ (published in The Socialness of Things: Essays 
on the Socio-Semiotics of Objects) the anthropologist Mary Douglas begins her 
consideration of the semiotics of objects and gift systems by referring to Nelson 
                                                 
13 In those cases where they do use reproductions, as with the beds (none are originals as very little of the bedroom furniture has 
survived) they have based the bed designs on sketches made by the children (one by Branwell and one by Charlotte) and had the 
furniture made locally (Dinsdale and White 32). The implications of this move, and particularly the implication of the 
sacrosanct or higher / more authentic value of the ‘locally made’ might be read as a way of positioning the furniture in as close 
a relation as possible to the original beds, as if some form of contiguity is possible via geographical proximity.  
  50 
Goodman’s investigation into the distinction between ‘autographic’ and ‘allographic’ 
entities in Ways of Worldmaking and Languages of Art. She notes that we only ask if 
something is a genuine or authentic object if it is the type of thing wherein its 
continuous history (what I refer to elsewhere as ‘the thing’s biography’) would be a 
factor in its authenticity (12). For these ‘autographic’ objects (she later uses a 
Stradivarius violin as an example) ‘the idea of authenticity is somehow central to 
their value’. An ‘allographic’ object on the other hand has a value that ‘does not 
depend on its historic uniqueness’ (12). Citing Goodman’s comparison of paintings 
and photographs as singular and multiple symbol systems, Douglas notes that 
Goodman uses paintings (as unrepeatable entities) to signify the autographic, 
whereas photographs (as reiterations from a negative) – and not unique as such – are 
deemed ‘allographic’ (12). For Douglas, in her examination of the classification and 
flow of material objects, ‘autographic objects’ in keeping with Goodman’s broader 
distinction, become those things that are considered authentic or genuine – ‘the 
genuine article’ (11) / the real thing – objects arising out of a particular history, 
whereas an ‘allographic object’ is one regarded largely as a type, one that ‘does not 
require uniqueness, nor guaranteed continuity from the time it issued from its 
maker’s hands’ (12).  
 Douglas’s reading of Goodman’s terms is useful because she recognizes the 
ascriptional component of the two categories, describing, for example, how cultures 
with different relationships to art forms such as painting and music might undertake 
‘a collective decision about the kind of prestige and the amount of originality 
allowed to the various stages of production’ a perception that may contribute to the 
assignation of what kind of object a painting or piece of music is (13-14). Douglas, in 
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applying the idea of the autographic to things, then draws a rather humorous analogy 
around a ‘pot of blue woad’. Here, the continuous and unbroken history of 
possession (having had the pot of woad handed down in the family versus buying it 
at the flea market) ‘rescues it from the anonymous miscellany… and turns it into an 
autographic product’ (16). Ultimately, Douglas states ‘[t]he autographic object 
cannot be separated entirely from people as can the other kind’ (17).  
 Douglas’s essay (which proceeds to consider autographic objects in relation to gift 
systems and the flow of gifts in the Wik-Mungkan community) and her assertion that 
an autographic object can be socially or culturally determined provides this thesis 
with a useful departure point for a consideration of two different categories of things 
in writers’ houses/museums. Building on Douglas and Goodman’s key distinctions I 
call objects that are deemed unique and irreplaceable due to their association with the 
absent writer ‘autographic’ and objects that are comparatively generic and 
replaceable (a ‘prop’ hat ‘of the type’ worn by Darwin) ‘allographic’. It is important 
to point out that even though Goodman’s example of autographic and allographic 
things in relation to art forms and aesthetics (a painting versus photographs) raises 
issues of origin and production (related in Goodman’s case to the number of ‘stages’ 
involved in an art form) (Douglas 19; Goodman, Languages 113-115) in the case of 
the writer’s house/museum the production (or reproduction) / origin of an object and 
the role of production in its classification is not a central concern – which is to say 
that whether Wordsworth’s chair was unique and therefore of a generally unrepeated 
kind or type (as the chair designed for Freud was) versus made amongst hundreds of 
‘like’ models, matters less for my purposes than the ascription of autographic status 
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to a chair because of its connection with an individual (‘Wordsworth’s chair’ or 
Dickens’s chair’).  
 In my use of ‘autographic’ what constitutes autographic status is the belief that 
part or all of the object’s ‘life’ parallels the life of the person with whom the object is 
associated; a shared biography usually supported by some form of provenance. This 
is to read what Douglas refers to as ‘historical continuity’ in a new way in that, for 
my purposes, the continuity of these objects’ biographies generally either proceeds 
from the moment the object became associated with the figure whose relationship to 
it rendered it autographic (i.e. from the moment the chair became Wordsworth’s or 
Dickens’s) or refers to a period of unbroken ownership (i.e. a workbox that was 
Charlotte Brontë’s when she was alive, but which may have passed through other 
hands either before or after her period of ownership). Thus, in this reading of the 
allographic / autographic distinction William Wordsworth’s rather typical chair was 
arguably allographic until it became unique in status as his, just as Charlotte Brontë’s 
workbox was arguably allographic until it was deemed irreplaceable through its 
connection with her. Anne Brontë’s pebbles, gathered in Scarborough, were likewise 
allographic (exchangeable with other pebbles) until they were presented as ‘her’ 
collection. Emily Brontë’s Christening mug on the other hand (a relatively plain 
white china cup with ‘Emily Jane Brontë’ inscribed in gilt cursive around the centre) 
was arguably autographic almost from the beginning of its ‘life’ (figuratively and 
literally), unless such mugs were made blank, sold as such, and inscribed later.    
     It is important to note here that things as such do not always remain categorically 
the same: allographic and autographic objects as Douglas employs the idea can 
transition perceptually from one kind to another (14). Such transitions can be (and 
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often are) readily experienced in the museums themselves when an object (such as a 
top hat or a sofa) is associated with a literary figure through the context of a museum 
and is only, after the initial encounter, signed as, or signaled to be a ‘replica’ or ‘of 
the type’ – at which point the viewer might subconsciously change their sense of the 
thing’s category, ascribing a generic, repeatable quality (allographic) to something 
that minutes before was regarded as resonant and unique (autographic). As section 
four of this chapter will show contiguity is often the determining factor in such shifts 
– the visitor thinking they are looking at a synchronous object that connects them to 
the individual and era to which they believed it was ascribed, only to discover that it 
is remote either in terms of time (a replica) or space (not connected to the individual 
or location / brought in). 
     In relation to the kinds of resonance this thesis is concerned with, the transition of 
an object’s status from allographic / indefinite (a sofa, or a hat) to autographic / 
definite ‘the sofa Emily Brontë died on’ or ‘the bonnet worn by Charlotte Brontë on 
her wedding day’ will almost always be ascriptional, meaning it will inevitably be 
determined by, or ascertained by the viewer – usually via an authenticating narrative 
from an authoritative source such as a tour guide, guidebook, museum sign or other 
such text, though the museum setting itself can imply autographic status. This is not 
to say that the object is not in actuality dual: a chair or a dress may still be of a 
reproducible or generic type (not highly individuated from others made in tandem 
with it; made from one plan or model) and hence still a carrier of allographic traits 
even as it is deemed autographic, rather it is to suggest that as soon as it is given 
autographic status (in our case because of its association with a particular figure 
whose own biography makes the object and its biography matter) our sense of its 
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significance renders it autographic (and irreplaceable) and its uniqueness or lack of 
uniqueness as a ‘made thing’ becomes, by and large, secondary to its association 
with a ‘famous’ person. Thus, the association between a thing and a person (or, more 
correctly: the thing and the person) is one of the most obvious contributors to the 
resonance or aura of the things considered in this thesis. Again, as Douglas suggests, 
‘[t]he autographic object cannot be separated entirely from people as can the other 
kind’ (17). Here, however, the person is not ‘the maker’ as in Douglas’s example of a 
Stradivarius violin, but the person with whom the object lived. 
      This is not to say that a thing’s autographic status or its evocativeness is 
something wholly conjured by the viewer. While Douglas acknowledges the role of 
the community in making something autographic through the ‘readiness of the public 
to confer authority’ and the ‘decision taking in the community of users about the 
distribution of prestige and reward’ (14) I would argue that two significant factors 
play into the ascription of autographic status to resonant things: 1) community 
agreement in the form of provenance or authenticating narratives (narratives that 
affirm the thing’s association with an individual and which are related to what 
Douglas calls ‘continuous context’ or ‘continuous history’) (16); and 2) the fitness of 
the thing to be seen as autographic. This is to read Douglas’s original assertion that 
communities make things autographic as a part of a larger dynamic, and to suggest 
(and as Douglas does glancingly in the latter part of her essay when considering 
exchange or gift rituals) that things also make communities or, in this case, that 
certain things demand autographic status even as we go about ascribing it.14 
Narratives of encounter in this thesis demonstrate that just as certain types of objects 
                                                 
14 It is possible, of course, to insist that every object is inherently autographic, with it’s own genuine history, life story and 
identity, which is to see something more encompassing than ‘production’ as determinant of autographic ascription – a 
suggestion of infinite individuation consistent with Heidegger’s observation in What is a Thing? that every thing is ‘this thing 
here’ or ‘this particular one’ occupying its own location and set apart from other such things (11; 14-26).  
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have a fitness to the task of presencing absent individuals, so too, do they have an 
autographic nature; that, in fact, an autographic nature is one of the factors that 
contributes, as chapters three to six will show, to the use of certain types of things as 
remembrancers.  
      
III – Authenticity  
 
Tied to the issue of a thing’s autographic status is the perception of the thing as 
authentic. In the writer’s house/museum the concept of authenticity is predominantly 
based on contiguity – the notion or sense that the thing in question actually lived 
alongside or had contact with the writer for whom it has come to stand. Accordingly 
‘authentic’ objects in writers’ houses/museums tend to be understood as those objects 
that have been declared autographic by ascription and which are contiguous to the 
writer and their lifetime. They are objects that seem to have retained, on the whole, a 
sense of integrity, so that even if the object has been modified or changed (as some 
of the houses/museums themselves were) what is essential in the thing remains. 
Authentic objects furthermore, are objects that cannot be replaced, objects whose 
histories matter. 
     Authenticity as such is signaled in many ways in the house/museum. First of all 
through the encultured context of the museum setting itself and any number of 
already-formed, generalized concepts of a ‘museum’ – concepts that might include 1) 
the belief that the objects contained within such structures have some kind of value 
(whether cultural, historical, artistic or monetary); 2) the belief that the objects have 
been procured, selected, or curated by a collective with specialized knowledge – and 
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more specifically by a collective that believes said objects have relevance or value 
for the larger (visiting) collective; 3) a belief that the house/museum as a museum of 
sorts (versus a shop) deals in objects that have a special status which warrants their 
protection or conservation; and finally 4) a belief that the museum space as such is 
unique, marked off from other spaces not only architecturally (by doors, walls, locks 
and limits on access) but also by the process of admittance or ‘going in’. This is not 
to suggest that house/museum visitors are not actively creating their own experiences 
of these museums, or that concepts of ‘museums’ do not vary significantly, it is 
simply to suggest that, in Britain, those sites of encounter deemed ‘museums’ might 
carry within their very ascription a sense of ‘authentic’ encounter. As Sarah Tetley 
and Bill Bramwell note in ‘Tourists and the Cultural Construction of Haworth’s 
Literary Landscape’:  
 Too much tourism research has assumed that people are not in active 
negotiation with their material and symbolic environment, but are passively 
shaped by it. It is contended here that when people visit a literary destination 
they make their own sense and value, their own knowledge, albeit negotiated 
within a myriad of influences. (157) 
 
The writer’s house/museum designation is one of these myriad influences. More 
overt signs that might influence a visitor’s sense of the authentic within the 
house/museum setting tend to come in one of three forms: verbal (via tour guides, 
staff, curators, audio guides); textual (guidebooks, signs, interpretative panels, labels, 
articles or books on the site)15 or contextual (this includes the use of display cases, 
pedestals, spot lights, roped barriers, alarms, monitors or guards and so on). As Anne 
Trubek notes in her book A Skeptic’s Guide to Writers’ Houses: ‘We were allowed to 
                                                 
15 In Museums and their Visitors, Eilean Hooper-Greenhill divides textual encounters in museums into text that orientates or 
gives practical information, and knowledge-based text ‘concerned with specific subject matters’ (124). She divides the latter 
category further into text experienced within the museum space and ‘text that may form part of this experience, but which have 
the potential to be read in another place at another time i.e. leaflets, guides, catalogues, teachers’ packs and books’ (125). The 
work of the writers themselves, biographies, articles and so forth would obviously contribute significantly to one’s sense of 
authentic encounter in the house/museum as these narratives would fill-in or contextualize aspects of both the writers’ lives and 
the spaces they inhabited. 
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sit on the furniture’ (48) a permission in a house/museum visit context that signaled 
that the furniture was not the real thing.  
     Verbal and textual narratives in a house/museum are some of the most direct ways 
to establish a sense of authenticity for the visitor – the sense that the things one is 
encountering are ‘real’; that they lived with the writer in question. These assertions 
or testimonies whether coming in the form of a label (‘Memorial Ring with Lock of 
Sir Walter Scott’s Hair’ as at Abbotsford); a guidebook (‘A painting of the 
Wordsworths’ dog Pepper, a gift to the family from Sir Walter Scott’ (Dove Cottage 
1)); or a guided tour are all overt indicators of what is real or of value. Such 
indicators assert which objects have been in contact with the writer(s) while also 
serving as subliminal pointers to what matters most in the setting.  
 While context plays a vital role in affective or resonant experience, context can 
sometimes be misleading, especially in those cases where objects that are perceived 
to have life stories that parallel the writer’s turn out to be anachronistic or allographic 
(such as the chaise longe in the Keats’ Museum which is unrelated to Keats but 
located where his chaise longe once was). As Eilean Hooper-Greenhill notes in 
Museums and their Visitors:  
Although museums and galleries are fundamentally concerned with objects, 
these objects are always contextualized by words. Museums are in fact perhaps 
as much concerned with words as they are with objects, although in many 
ways, because of the focus on the material object, the words have become 
invisible. (115) 
 
It is partly for this reason – the way words contextualize and direct readings of, and 
encounters with, material things – that textual and verbal narratives matter, for not 
only do such ‘authenticating narratives’ establish or confirm aspects of an object’s 
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life history or provenance when the context is not clear, they also confer autographic 
status through their assertion of synchrony. 
     In The Hummingbird Cabinet: A Rare and Curious History of Romantic 
Collectors, Judith Pascoe examines the growing interest in collecting and collections 
in the Romantic era, an activity that included the acquisition and display of literary 
artefacts and artefacts associated with historical personalities. In discussing artefacts 
related to Napoleon she raises the issue of the authenticating narrative, describing 
how both texts and individuals can support the case for authenticity, as when 
Napoleon’s carriage went on display in tandem with Napoleon’s former coach driver, 
Jean Hornn, whose presence served to support the carriage’s authenticity (98-100). 
Pascoe notes that ‘[w]here there is a Napoleonic teapot or tongue scraper there is an 
authenticating narrative ready to lash itself to history’ narratives that seek to 
corroborate or prove through a ‘mixture of hard fact and innuendo’ that something 
(she uses a piece of intestine reputed to be Napoleon’s as one example) is what a 
purveyor says it is (100). 
 Using Napoleonic artefacts as an example of the sorts of things needing 
authenticating narratives (other chapters focused on collections related to Shelley and 
Queen Charlotte), Pascoe notes that ‘[a]s the moment of acquisition of a particular 
object recedes further and further into the distant past, the conscientious collector or 
curator strives ever harder to tease out the bits of corroborating evidence that will 
definitively confirm the object’s unique status’ (100).  
 The writers’ museums considered in this thesis are, of course, full of such 
authenticating narratives, narratives that strive to provide ‘corroborating evidence’ 
that confirm ‘the object’s unique status’ – evidence that might be outwardly visible 
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in the form of those museum texts intended to guide or inform the public (such as the 
one describing the provenance of the horse hair sofa at the Parsonage) but which 
would also exist in the more private form of a museum’s catalogue data-base and 
archival files; files that document the facts of an object’s life-story in as much detail 
as possible.  
 Pascoe, for her part, is less interested in the use of authenticating narratives for 
institutional purposes, and focuses instead on the kinds of authenticating stories 
traded amongst collectors, ones that are likely to be imbued with half-truths or 
misrepresentations; stories that can mix ‘hard fact and innuendo’ or be bolstered by 
tangential associations (100-101). While Pascoe’s use of the idea of an authenticating 
story is interesting – in part because it forefronts the role of anecdote and personal 
accounts in establishing or ‘faking’ provenance – the role of authenticating narratives 
isn’t analyzed at length in the book. While she does describe some of the ways 
authenticating narratives can be delivered (as in Jean Hornn’s physical testimony of 
the authenticity of Napoleon’s carriage as its former coach) the effect of 
authenticating narratives on the apprehension of objects, or the various forms that 
authenticating narratives can take (verbal, textual, contextual i.e. as testimony, 
anecdote, text, display label, etc.) aren’t considered.  Still, Pascoe’s arguments – that 
the trade in relics represented a kind of ‘material longing’ (3), that the Romantics had 
a preoccupation with authenticity (see esp. 23), and that narratives play a role in 
establishing the credible or documentable continuous history of an authentic 
collectible (see esp. 100) are useful because they suggest that many of the dynamics 
of Victorian resonant encounters with things were already established before the 
Victorian era. In much the same way that visitors to the Dickens Museum today have 
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sometimes managed to pinch a bit of Dickens’s desk leather for themselves, so too 
did visitors help themselves to bits of Napoleon’s carriage in the form of its interior 
lining (109). But where many of the relics Pascoe studies float freely through the 
world from one collector to another or one special display to another, the objects in 
this thesis tend to be grounded in a location that itself imbues the things under its 
roof with an air of the authentic. With this in mind a reading of authenticity that is 
grounded in the setting of the writer’s house/museum is prudent. 
 
Anne Trubek’s A Skeptic’s Guide to Writers’ Houses, published in 2011, deals with 
the question of authenticity and settings repeatedly. Although it is a book about an 
American woman’s trips to the houses of American writers (Whitman, Twain, Poe, 
Emerson etc.) – visits that are, therefore, occurring in a significantly different 
cultural, political and socio-economical environment16 – Trubek’s attention to the 
question of authenticity affirms the role of both the setting and the autographic things 
within it in enhancing one’s sense of resonance. Trubek’s book is also valuable 
because her deconstruction of encounters with things that fail to resonate reveals a 
set of assumptions about what ought to happen or what she believes a visitor expects 
to experience in these spaces of encounter. Which is to say that even as she refutes 
                                                 
16 Trubek’s literary travelogue offers something most of the literary travelogues set in the UK do not: clearly articulated 
examples of how the locations and houses fail to resonate. This kind of criticism provides a useful framework for considering 
the slippage that can occur in houses stuffed with the questionable or inauthentic. That said, it should be noted that Trubek’s 
concerns go beyond the literary: she frequently delves into considerations of American identity and of the socio-economic 
environments the writers houses are set in, for example, of Mark Twain’s Hannibal she notes: ‘Hannibal was not like my 
fantasy of it or of our mythic depictions of small-town America’ (36) (see also 15,29,35,36,47,76,135,142). This is likely due in 
part to Trubek’s assertion that writers’ houses/museums ‘are not timeless gems tucked away from the hustle and bustle of the 
world. They are complicated and complicating parts of the landscape of the present’ (69) a statement that seems less true for the 
writers’ museums considered in this thesis, all of which contribute to local economies and all of which are valued cultural 
markers in their respective landscapes; landscapes that are generally associated with or congruently identified with the writers 
who lived there. Trubek, for the most part, seems focused on the kind of incongruities that might impede any sense of an 
authentic experience i.e. the jail adjacent Whitman’s home, the replica cabin at Walden Pond, a Hemingway museum house that 
she notes ‘contains few actual Hemingway possessions. Like Key West, the Hemingway house is sincerely fake’ (71). 
Congruency is exceptional enough that she notes it when she finds it i.e. ‘The house’s aura of New England aristocracy gives it 
a grace that sits well with Emersonianism…. The museum fits the museumed…’ (50). For contrasting examples in British 
house/museum culture one has to look no further than the travel sections of major newspapers to see that in the UK ‘literary 
landscapes’ do exist conceptually and that writers’ house/museum tourism is not uncommon or exceptional. 
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the accessibility of the dead author in these (mostly failed) settings she is 
acknowledging a set of expectations around a museum visitor’s sense of encounter 
with some aspect of the once-living author, especially that of a sense of connection 
or nearness that might approximate intimacy, and of objects as evocative/worlding 
forces. Her very refusals ‘I felt no spirit, no ghosts, and no aura’ (21) actually 
acknowledge the dominant narrative, which is to say the kind of affective 
experiences that can and do happen in museums that get it right.  
 For Trubek – a self-described skeptic who sees writers’ houses as attempting ‘to 
do the impossible: to make physical – to make real – acts of literary imagination’ – 
the literary pilgrimage (and the ‘astoundingly sincere’ curators) provoke ‘a knee-jerk 
cynicism’ (5). Accordingly, her trips to a number of American writers’ houses are 
predominantly disappointing. But it is not her overt cynicism that is revealing (Simon 
Goldhill’s UK literary travelogue of the same year is also written from a somewhat 
cynical standpoint), rather what Trubek’s book demonstrates more than any other 
first-person account on the topic is how a discrepancy in the house/museum setting 
between the authentic and the inauthentic can affect the experience. 
     The first house Trubek writes about (and the first one she visited) was Walt 
Whitman’s. In relation to Whitman’s house in Camden – ‘this desolate city’ (21) – 
she writes: ‘I felt no spirit, no ghosts, and no aura. His boot-soles did nothing for me. 
I could not conjure up any lines, imagine him composing on the right armrest of his 
rocking chair, or even speculate on American indifference to its native voices, then 
or now’ (21). This is one of the reoccurring themes in the book: the ways in which 
the houses fail to properly or convincingly evoke the dead writer or the relations 
(world) that come with the writer’s life and things, and the ways in which even 
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relatively convincing depictions actually strike false notes or offer simplified 
narratives. Of the Twain house in Hartford she writes: ‘[h]is house museums cannot 
get him right…. Their misreadings are poignant’ (41). But it isn’t just the Hartford 
museum that gets it wrong, she also criticizes the trend of ‘false historical markers’ – 
narratives that commemorate events from fictional works i.e. a sign on a street in 
Mark Twain’s Hannibal, Missouri that states: ‘This was the home of Becky Thatcher, 
Tom Sawyer’s first sweetheart’ – which is impossible, given that Becky was a 
fictional character of Twain’s (34). Of this confabulation she states: ‘When writers’ 
houses veer over the line into trying to factionalize fiction, as it were, without any 
awareness they are so doing, they become overly sincere. They take the concept of 
historic preservation too literally and too far, and end up preserving fiction alongside 
fact…’ (33).  
 This inconsistent terrain, one in which the authentic is often met by, or superseded 
by, the inauthentic, is one of the factors that most obviously elides with, or seems to 
contribute to, Trubek’s flat experiences of writers’ houses. This is supported by the 
fact that the words ‘replica’ or ‘fake’ appear numerous times in her book. Of 
Emerson’s museum she writes: ‘The room we were in was a replica, with a replica of 
the circular table, at which Emerson wrote…. Replica bookshelves line the entire far 
wall, and replica wheat-looking wallpaper pops from behind the fireplace’ (48). Of 
Thoreau’s replica cabin (built in 1985): ‘I never went to the replica house’ (54). Of 
Hawthorne’s house: ‘In the Sky Parlour is the standard writers’ house fake 
manuscript on top of the standing desk that Hawthorne used’ (64) – a description that 
seems to imply that the fake manuscript (or the fact of its fakeness on top of the 
desk) mars any possible sense of an authentic encounter with the real standing desk. 
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 Interestingly, Trubek also, in the Emerson chapter, uses an inverse term for replica 
– ‘nonreplicated’ – a term that echoes one of the autographic/allographic distinctions 
raised by Douglas (in that autographic things are not replicas) – but which also, 
strangely seems to deny authenticity even as it asserts it. For example: ‘The Emerson 
family still owns the place, and they keep some of his nonreplicated stuff here: his 
walking sticks, his dressing gown, and his hat, which sits on a peg in the foyer’ (48-
49). It is this cluster of nonreplicated stuff, this ‘authentic’ stuff sitting in an 
authentic context that she ultimately finds affective: ‘I stared long and hard at 
Emerson's hat on that peg, and, I must admit, felt chills’ (49).  
     These distinctions – between the effects of replicated versus non-replicated things 
on the author – is useful because embedded within these experiences is a sense of 
both affect (chills) and affective absence (I felt no…) and the role of the 
authenticating narrative in the encounters. Fake things often appear ‘fake’ – but 
replicas usually need to be distinguished for us, as was the case in the Emerson house 
where Trubek went on a guided tour. In those environments where fake and replica 
and ‘real’ are mixed (especially those that favour fakes and replicas) settings become 
problematic: the sense of a setting’s pastness, of past events, and of residual presence 
is interrupted; narratives that might begin in the imagination –‘this is where X 
happened’ – are broken up. Of course, settings are made of things and the things 
themselves contribute to the visitor’s sense of encounter. As Trubek asserts: 
‘sometimes the things a writer's house proffers fail to align with our romantic images 
of the author. At Emily Dickinson’s house, the bedside chamber pot smashes many a 
hoped-for reverie’ (108). This ‘smashing’ prevents the object from worlding, though 
in this case the break comes from the perception of the thing’s lack of fitness in 
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relation to the expected cultural and biographical narratives. Here the thing evokes 
the author but the contiguity is of the wrong sort, bordering on the taboo and 
therefore interrupting a sense of encounter with the individual with whom it is 
associated.17 
 In the end, Trubek’s most resonant experience occurs in the Dayton, Ohio house 
of the poet Paul Laurence Dunbar (1872-1906). In the chapter on Dunbar’s house she 
describes how:  
     On the day Paul died, [his mother] Matilda closed the door to Paul’s study. 
She never let anyone inside for the thirty years she lived in the house 
afterward…. All the dishes and all the furnishings throughout the house are 
original, down, hauntingly, to Paul's toothbrush and mug in the upstairs 
bathroom, and Matilda's needle and thread. Paul's funeral flowers are still in the 
house, and they were the first things Matilda looked at in the morning and last 
thing at night.  
     In her will, Matilda left directions for how to preserve Paul’s effects…. So 
Paul’s bedroom looks exactly as it did in 1906. (122)  
 
For Trubek the setting is ‘not reconstructed, not set up “as if he were living here 
today”’ (122) it is an authentic place that has not been interfered with or filled with 
false things as so many of her other houses had been. Dunbar’s toothbrush and mug 
facilitate a sense of everydayness, of the lived life. She states, unskeptically: ‘I love 
the Paul Laurence Dunbar House in Dayton, Ohio. I love it because it is full of just 
the longing that I am seeking in these small museums’ (123). For Trubek the 
preservation of the house without intervention (its contiguity), and the act of 
memorialization and the sense of vigil that preservation signifies provide the 
unbroken narrative she is looking for. She notes that she ‘can trace a direct line from 
the house’ to those people (among them Matilda Dunbar – Paul’s mother) with 
                                                 
17 In her article ‘I want to see Emily Dickinson’s chamber pot’ Laura Miller argues for the positive humility in the chamber pot. 
She states: ‘For me, it’s the mundanity that gives most writers’ houses their charm. I don’t much care if all the objects are 
authentic, especially if the originals were pretty generic and undistinguished to begin with. In a way, the humbler, the better – 
and nothing is humbler than the interchangeable’. For Miller the ‘thrill’ comes from the work created in the space, the idea that 
‘[m]asterpieces can happen anywhere’ and that while ‘Dickinson may have been incandescently brilliant and gifted’ she needed 
a chamber pot like everyone else  (L. Miller). Interestingly here Miller seems to resign herself – ‘I don’t much care’ – to 
allographic copies of allographic things, which implies that she still values the sense of an accurate and authentic atmosphere. 
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whom she associates it (123). This direct line exists because the setting is authentic, 
because her experience of the house/museum wasn’t broken up by, or marred by 
fakes, replicas, or false ascriptions to fictional events (as in the Twain case). 
Trubek’s own narrative of encounter supports this, as noted earlier she describes how 
‘all the furnishings throughout the house are original, down, hauntingly, to Paul’s 
toothbrush and mug…’ (122 emphasis added). To be haunted is to feel a presence; a 
presence evoked in this case by a setting that exudes authenticity; a setting enlivened 
by the resonant effect of autographic things; things that lived alongside the writer. 
 
IV – Contiguity 
 
As one of the dominant factors in resonant encounters with a writer’s things 
contiguity will be discussed in various ways throughout this thesis. Still, a brief 
analysis of what is conceptualized by contiguity is necessary as it informs the 
concept of encounter.   
 Contiguity as narratives of encounter in this thesis suggest, is both about touch 
and being touched, meaning it is about both the physical and affective aspects of 
contact or nearness. Contiguity should thusly be understood in three ways: 1) as the 
‘condition of touching or being in contact’ (OED) – a definition that foregrounds 
actual physical touch; 2) contiguity as an instance of proximity or nearness, a contact 
that might, for example, be predominantly visual but palpable in a bodily sense as in 
‘[c]lose proximity, without actual contact’ (OED) and 3) as contact in an abstracted 
sense: contiguity as inhabitance; as immersion in an environment or atmosphere in 
which a sense of correspondence (of being in contact with ‘X’) comes to the fore. 
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This last definition is intended to encompass the feeling of being in proximity to, or 
in contact with, the site of a past event or past events, such as the place where the 
great novel was written, or where the author’s death occurred, as per a visitor’s 
comments in the guest book at the Parsonage in 2011: ‘I liked being slightly scared 
by thinking someone died on the sofa’.  
 As later chapters will show, one of the reasons human beings tend to utilize 
material objects as remembrancers is because the idea of contact or contiguity makes 
them especially fit for the task of evocation. In many cases remembrancers bear the 
marks or trace of contact or cohabitation with the person with whom they were most 
deeply associated. This sense of material marking – evident, for example, in 
Dickens’s description of Scott’s hat, or in the worn spot on the floor at Brantwood 
where John Ruskin liked to stand and look out at Coniston’s waters – can create a 
special sense of access to a person or an event locatable as having occurred there. 
 
Contiguity: cases one and two 
 
Writers’ houses/museums tend to discourage physically touching the objects. While 
some of the museums in this study allow a greater degree of access to the things 
themselves – you can touch Sir Walter Scott’s desk and chair, and Thomas Carlyle’s 
for example – others limit access to things through the use of closed displays such as 
cabinets or cases, or via barriers such as stanchions and ropes. Darwin’s and Freud’s 
studies, filled with hundreds of original – and pocketable – objects, are, unlike the 
former examples, made inaccessible. (Dickens’s desk in the first floor study of his 
museum was, until recently, wholly accessible: wedged up against a wall without a 
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barrier to protect it so that not only could one touch it or its chair if one wished, but 
the likelihood existed that in moving around other visitors one might bump up 
against it – as I did. A stanchion with cables was recently added to protect it.)  
 Ultimately, all of the museums considered here offer varying (and sometimes 
changing) degrees of access, some foregrounding the ‘house’ aspect of the 
house/museum and some the museal. In the renovated Dickens Museum, there are 
booklets instead of barriers in the rooms, each text establishing the context or aspects 
of the provenance of the various pieces, under which a notice reads ‘Please do not 
touch. Even clean hands will damage these special objects’.18 The taboo on touching 
in the writer’s house/museum is therefore twofold: in touching the things there is the 
potential for the things to become worn or effaced, but also implied in the taboo is 
the sense that these objects have retained some sense of contiguity with the author, 
that they were last (or mostly) held or touched by the writers in question. Especially 
in the case of those objects set off in displays and made remote through cases, 
stanchions etc. there is the intimation that some manifestation of the author’s hand on 
the thing remains. These aspects of contiguity – touching and proximity to the trace 
of touch – foreground the first and second definition of contiguity: contiguity as 
physical touch and contiguity as an instance of proximity or nearness to that contact. 
In this analysis contiguity in the second sense (nearness) presences the author’s body 
in its contiguous – or physical – first sense in the form the author’s relations with the 
object in question.  
                                                 
18 These signs are useful reminders but what is most striking in an immersion environment is how much the objects ask to be 
touched. I am not particularly affectively invested in Dickens but I found the age and wear of his Rosewood table very moving. 
It dates back to the 1820s and is leather-topped and cracked and worn and once resided in Dickens’s library. The desire to touch 
the table was overwhelming, as was the case with Scott’s chair and Carlyle’s desk and Jane Carlyle’s screen all of which were 
marked by use and time.  
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 The ability of the untouchable (once-touched) thing to presence the author 
suggests that being close to the object and visually apprehending it may almost be 
preferable to an environment where everyone is allowed to handle it. In its remove 
there is a sense that what one is observing is the object seemingly preserved as it was 
in relation to the author her or himself. In touching something anyone can touch there 
is a sense of layered contact on or over the thing, the veiling or effacement of its 
connection with the individual with whom it was most profoundly associated. 
 In this way some of the most powerful contiguous encounters in a writer’s 
house/museum are based on being proximate to or close to the object as it was but 
not actually touching it.19 In such instances the power of contiguity lies in the 
historical biography of the thing and its bodily/material encounters with the now-
absent author; encounters preserved by the thing’s removal from circulation.  
 Virginia Woolf’s encounter with Charlotte Brontë’s things in the pre-Parsonage 
Brontë Museum supports this suggestion of the power of proximity and demonstrates 
that one can feel a sense of touch – in the form of being touched – without physically 
handling the object. In an article describing a visit to Haworth published in The 
Guardian in 1904 (an article that was not sentimental – Woolf called the museum a 
‘pallid and inanimate collection of objects’) Woolf (then Virginia Stephen, though 
the article was uncredited) described looking at Charlotte’s shoes and dress under 
glass, stating: 
But the most touching case – so touching that one hardly feels reverent in one’s 
gaze – is that which contains the little personal relics of the dead woman. The 
natural fate of such things is to die before the body that wore them, and 
because these, trifling and transient though they are, have survived, Charlotte 
Brontë the woman comes to life, and one forgets the chiefly memorable fact 
                                                 
19 It is interesting that in actually getting to touch these untouchable things (as I have sometimes been able to do in my research) 
one tends to have a powerful and direct sense of contact with the individual with whom they are associated. Logically I know 
Charlotte’s wedding bonnet has been held, moved, transported, cleaned and so forth by dozens if not hundreds of individuals 
but its autographic ascription overwhelms the abstract others who have likely touched it and makes me feel connected to her.  
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that she was a great writer. Her shoes and her thin muslin dress have outlived 
her. (Woolf Haworth) 
 
It is not uncommon that the word ‘touching’ – Woolf’s ‘the most touching case – so 
touching’ – is used for those experiences that seem to move us or connect us, even 
when no physical touching occurs or is allowed. This is the power of an encounter 
with authentic things, even at a slight remove. As things that mark Charlotte’s 
absence and as things that were marked by her (for Woolf, marking Brontë more as a 
woman than as a writer), Charlotte’s shoes and dress bring a figure ‘to life’.  
 Woolf’s ‘touching,’ her feeling touched, is contiguity based on an instance of 
proximity or nearness. In George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By 
the authors identify descriptions of this kind as a special case of metaphor, asserting 
that our everyday conceptual system is fundamentally metaphoric in nature and that 
this conceptual system and our varying articulations of concepts such as ‘up is good’ 
or ‘argument is war’ help to reveal our perceptions of everyday realities (3). This 
theory has significant ramifications in that, as the authors suggest, ‘communication is 
based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting’ (3) which 
implies that what we say has direct correlations to how we think conceptually. The 
authors suggest that within the words we use is our concept of what we are 
discussing, which implies that when we say we were ‘touched’ by something in those 
cases where no physical touch occurred, we are describing (metaphorically) not what 
the situation was like (a simile) but rather, how it was for us: as if contact was made. 
Lakoff and Johnson’s reading of conceptual metaphors in this case provides a clue as 
to how affective encounters with resonant objects might be read: as a form of 
contact.  
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 Lakoff and Johnson identify two special cases of metaphor that are applicable to 
Woolf’s narrative and others in this thesis like it. They are: 1) ‘seeing is touching; 
eyes are limbs’ and 2) ‘emotional effect is physical contact’ (50). Their examples of 
‘seeing is touching; eyes are limbs’ include: ‘I can’t take my eyes off her. He sits 
with his eyes glued to the TV. Her eyes picked out every detail of the pattern. Their 
eyes met…’. Examples of ‘emotional effect is physical contact’ include: ‘I was 
struck by his sincerity. That really made an impression on me. He made his mark on 
the world. I was touched by his remark’ (50). Touch in this way – being ‘touched’ – 
is not always a physical act but rather, an affective encounter figured through 
metaphor – an analysis that enlarges the concept of ‘contiguity’ in resonant 
encounters. 
 
Contiguity: case three 
 
What does it mean when visitors to a writer’s house/museum leave comments 
describing the house/museum as ‘atmospheric’ – a word that appears numerous times 
in the Parsonage visitor’s comment book: ‘Very atmospheric’; ‘Atmospheric and 
deeply moving’; ‘Loved the atmosphere’; ‘Fascinating, authentic, atmospheric; can 
feel the presence’; ‘Atmospheric, authentic and spiritual’.20 Here ‘atmospheric’ likely 
refers to the tone or ‘feel’ of the house/museum setting and the abstract way the 
things within it signal – or are felt to be imbued with – a sense of time, place, and 
person for the visitor.21 Returning to Margaret Gibson’s Objects of the Dead – her 
                                                 
20 From the Brontë Museum Visitor Comments Summary: April 2010, April 2011, March 2011, July 2011 and July 2011 
respectively. 
21 Rebecca Chesney’s ‘The Brontë Weather Project’ undertaken during a yearlong residency at Haworth (from Sept 2011) plays 
conceptually with ideas around weather, atmosphere and resonance. Chesney had locals collect weather data every day for a 
year and compared those patterns to descriptions in the Brontë novels. Rather than just examining the weather of the past, she 
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study of objects related to death and commemoration – Gibson notes that ‘[e]ven 
without the presence of grief, objects can “create an atmosphere of vague 
solicitation” such that we become aware of living in and amidst things that have 
histories beyond present knowledge and the powers of recollection’ (183). This 
‘atmosphere of vague solicitation’ wherein objects exude a sense of pastness, of their 
own biographies and stories, relates to the idea of contiguity in the third (abstract) 
sense: contiguity as inhabiting, as immersion in an environment or atmosphere in 
which a sense of correspondence (being in contact with ‘X’) comes to the fore. The 
question, however, of what one is inhabiting becomes problematic: The space where 
she wrote? The room where he slept? The house where they lived? All of these are 
possible, both in their concrete delineation but also in a larger more abstracted sense 
– the kind that infuses Wordsworth and the Lakes, the Brontës and the moors.  
 In Metaphors We Live By Lakoff and Johnson also suggest that one of the 
metaphors that informs our conceptual life is the container metaphor.  They state: 
We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the 
surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. 
Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. 
We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are 
bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and 
an outside. Rooms and houses are obvious containers. Moving from room to 
room is moving from one container to another, that is, moving out of one room 
and into another. We even give solid objects this orientation, as when we break 
a rock open to see what’s inside it. We impose this orientation on our natural 
environment as well…. But even where there is no natural physical boundary 
that can be viewed as defining a container, we impose boundaries–marking off 
territory so that it has an inside and a bounding surface–whether a wall, a 
fence, or an abstract line or plane. There are few human instincts more basic 
than territoriality. (29)22 
                                                 
sought correspondences between past weather and contemporary weather in the same location. The implication in much of her 
work is that the atmosphere in Haworth now is connected to the atmosphere of Haworth in the Brontës’ lifetimes.  
22 The idea of the ontological model of containment also appears in Dan Miller’s Stuff in relation to what he describes, in his 
reading of clothes in Trinidadian culture, as the Western depth ontology. Employing Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphor reading 
technique he describes phrases that support the dominance of the depth ontology, examples that also support the container 
ontology: 
We possess what could be called a depth ontology. The assumption is that being – what we truly are – is located deep 
inside ourselves and is in direct opposition to the surface. A clothes shopper is shallow because a philosopher or a saint 
  72 
 
Here Lakoff and Johnson are suggesting that depth ontologies are not only about how 
we see ourselves but also reflective of how we see and spatialize the world. This 
means that a sense of contiguous inhabitance might be bounded in an abstract non-
physical way: one is in the middle of a great story; one is in Wordsworth’s Lake 
District – two examples that reflect Lakoff and Johnson’s suggestion that we impose 
boundaries on locations without physical barriers. This idea of the container 
metaphor informs aspects of contiguity. If we read places as spatialized and 
ourselves as in them, then we are ‘in’ the same places that the absent writer has been. 
This can take the form of being ‘in the Lake District’ or ‘in Carlyle’s house’ or of 
‘standing in the spot where Dickens wrote Great Expectations’. This container 
ontology gives spaces a sense of delineation and location making them spaces that 
can be shared despite the passage of time. 
 
V – Resonance 
 
On 1 October 1852 Thomas Carlyle wrote a letter to his good friend Lady Ashburton 
describing his visit to the room in Wartburg where Marin Luther (1483-1546) had 
lived when translating the Bible, and to Friedrich von Schiller’s (1759-1805) house 
in Weimar. Of Luther’s residence he wrote:  
[H]is old room is still there, unchanged, his old oak-table, the very floor he 
walked upon; the window he looked out of (into sheer abysses, over lonely 
mountains, into uncertainties, immensities and eternities),–poor old fellow: I 
felt that there was not probably in the Earth a more truly sacred spot than that 
                                                 
is deep. The true core to the self is relatively constant and unchanging and also unresponsive to mere circumstance. We 
have to look deep inside ourselves to find ourselves. But these are all metaphors. Deep inside ourselves is blood and 
bile, not philosophical certainty. (16-17) 
Here, Miller, using the depth metaphor to clarify how Westerners understand being, also employs the container metaphor: ‘deep 
inside ourselves ‘ is both ‘deep’ and ‘inside’.  
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same; and I did my worship (being in a sleepless excited condition) with great 
fervour there. We were next in Gotha, and then– three days in Weimar itself, 
Schiller's old writing-table (the correct image of your model at The Grange, or 
rather vice-versa) is still there; his little poor harpsichord and beside it poor bed 
where he died, picture of his face when dead: that room also is rather 
memorable to me. (CLO)  
 
What is it about writers’ houses that create for some visitors such an affective sense 
of a past world and its former inhabitants? What does it mean when visitors to the 
Brontë parsonage use the word ‘aura’ to describe the feeling in the house, or 
‘atmospheric’ or ‘Alive!’ or write ‘I was touched’ in the comments book, or ‘[i]t 
brought me closer to them’? What does it mean that for some people the museum 
experience is so resonant they describe the house as having an ‘overwhelming 
aura’?23  
 These ideas – of experiencing an atmosphere, of feeling ‘closer’ to the past, of 
encountering something ‘sacred’ with contiguous powers (something ‘unchanged’, 
‘same’, ‘still there’ to use Carlyle’s words) are aspects of ‘resonance’ a mode of 
encounter alluded to frequently in narratives surrounding meaningful things even 
though the word is seldom defined or interrogated.24 This section will develop a 
concept of resonance as related to writers’ houses/museums and writerly things in 
order to ensure that the term is grounded conceptually as a kind of encounter. The 
Oxford English Dictionary definitions of the word and Stephen Greenblatt’s 
                                                 
23 From the Brontë Museum Visitor Comments Summary: April 2010, July 2010, December 2009, August 2010, February 
2010, July 2011.  
24 Anecdotal examples of resonant encounters are often provided in texts without critical reflection on the encounter. Pascoe, for 
example, often describes resonant encounters without foregrounding the term, as when she references an encounter between a 
Harvard senior named Woodberry and the poet Shelley’s notebook (shown to him by Edward Silsbee, the Shelley enthusiast). 
She quotes Woodnerry as saying ‘I can still feel the thrill in my fingers, as they moved over lines where Shelley’s hand had 
hovered…’ (10) – an encounter that bears some of the traits (contiguity in particular) that this thesis associates with resonant 
experiences. Broadly speaking, it is not uncommon across texts for words like ‘resonance’ ‘aura’ ‘atmosphere’ etc. to be 
employed without an accompanying definition or any kind of sustained phenomenological deconstruction. For examples of 
definition-oriented techniques in relation to abstract terms see Sherry Turkle’s reading of objects as ‘uncanny’ in her 
Introduction to Evocative Objects, and Salman Akhtar’s reading of encounters with ‘sacred’ objects in Objects of Our Desire 
(see esp 76-87) wherein he defines the term ‘sacred’ and considers the components that form the ‘gestalt of sacredness’ (77) 
describing, for example, a psychoanalyst friend’s feelings of ‘respect, humility and near-awe’ whenever he shows someone the 
handwritten letter of Sigmund Freud’s which he owns (85).  
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exploration – and definition – of resonance in his essay ‘Resonance and Wonder’ 
will form the basis of this consideration. 
 
Reinforcement, Prolongation, Reflection 
 
The word resonance comes from the Middle French ‘résonnance’ and its primary 
definition relates to the reverberation of sound. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the noun resonance in the first case as: ‘1.a. The reinforcement or 
prolongation of sound by reflection or by the synchronous vibration of a surrounding 
space or a neighbouring object. Also: a sound, or quality of sound, resulting from 
this’ (OED). The first use of the word ‘resonance’ in English dates from 146025 and 
the use of the word to reflect a quality of sound is still common today. Definition 1.b. 
refers to ‘[t]he property of an object of giving rise to this phenomenon’ – as in a lute 
(from 1669); ‘the cavity of the mouth’ (from 1875); ‘the body of the violin’ (1920) 
(OED). 
 The second definition of resonance is less focused on the auditory and is the one 
most obviously relevant to the idea of resonant experiences in writers’ 
houses/museums. I will explore this second definition briefly and then return to 
definition 1. Resonance, n. definition 2:  
Corresponding or sympathetic response; an instance of this. In later use also: 
the power or quality of evoking or suggesting images, memories, and 
emotions; an allusion, connotation, or overtone. (OED)26  
 
This second definition of resonance references ‘an instance’ (or experience) of what 
might be termed an ‘affinity’: a ‘corresponding’ (from L. together, with each other + 
                                                 
25 ‘a1460 Knyghthode & Bataile (Pembr. Cambr. 243) l.787 The Clarioner, Trompet, and Hornycler, With horn & trompe of 
bras and clarioun..; The firmament thereto making resoun Or resonaunce’ (OED). 
26 I have set this definition off to highlight it for ease of reference. 
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to answer (OED)) or ‘sympathetic response’ between entities – which is to suggest a 
congruity between what occurs in the first instance and what occurs or is felt as a 
result of that instance (a response which itself becomes its own instance). The second 
part of definition 2: ‘the power or quality of evoking or suggesting images, 
memories, and emotions; an allusion, connotation, or overtone’ reflects the use of 
‘resonance’ to describe a felt or evocative instance, one that is connected to or 
dependant on some external / originating stimulus. This definition, by leaving the 
issue of what is doing the ‘evoking’ open-ended, suggests that a resonant feeling can 
arise from a variety of stimuli (a written work, a thing, a comment, a landscape or a 
setting etc.) and that what the stimuli can evoke can also vary, though it may include 
‘images, memories, and emotions’ which, taken together may comprise feelings, 
experiences, or events.  
 In the dictionary’s examples of historical usage for definition 2, the 1828 citation 
comes from Thomas Carlyle’s essay ‘Burns’ on the poet Robert Burns (1759-1796) 
originally published in the Edinburgh Review and republished later in Carlyle’s 
Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. In ‘Burns’ (an essay on Burns’ life, value and 
work – and on the qualities ideally found in a poet) Carlyle describes Burns as 
having ‘a resonance in his bosom for every note of human feeling; the high and the 
low, the sad, the ludicrous, the joyful, are welcome in their turns to his “lightly 
moved and all-conceiving spirit”’ (Carlyle, Critical 271).27 Carlyle’s use of the term 
‘resonance’ here seems to reflect the idea of a ‘corresponding and sympathetic 
response’ – especially one of an emotional nature. Here we have the idea of Burns’s 
great power of empathy, of how as a poet his range of understanding made him able 
                                                 
27 For other references to this idea of sympathetic feeling in the ‘Burns’ essay see also 277: ‘Burns, indeed, lives in 
sympathy…’; 279 (of the poem ‘Macpherson’s Farewell’): ‘…who, except Burns, could have given words to such a soul; words 
that we never listen to without a strange half-barbarous, half-poetic fellow-feeling?’; and 281: ‘Apart from the universal 
sympathy with man which this again bespeaks in Burns…’.   
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to grasp a wide variety of emotions and feelings: ‘the high and the low, the sad, the 
ludicrous, the joyful…’ (271). But Carlyle’s use of resonance also seems to carry the 
metaphorical suggestion that as a ‘poet of special insight’ (263) Burns was himself a 
medium for reflecting or echoing back or relaying those notes of human feelings – 
which is to read ‘resonance in his bosom’ doubly: as a sympathetic feeling that 
corresponds to the same feelings in others and as a auditory resonance: as if his body 
(‘bosom’), being, or work is akin to those instruments (objects) that physically give 
‘rise to this phenomenon’ of resonance (OED). 
 Whether this metaphoric reading is agreeable or not, Carlyle’s use of resonance in 
this nineteenth century example is useful in that it still carries within it a sense of the 
auditory definition – ‘for every note of human feeling; the high and the low…’ (271 
emphasis added) which suggests that there might be something to learn by returning 
to the auditory element of the word in relation to its later use as a term that describes 
the evocation of images, memories, and emotions. While definition two fits with this 
thesis’s use of ‘resonance’ in relation to the power of things and settings to evoke or 
suggest ‘images, memories, and emotions’, folding-in the sound-related definition of 
resonance in relation to writers’ houses/museums allows other aspects of the concept 
of resonant encounters to come to the fore. Which is to argue that the word 
‘resonance’ is itself an especially fit term for affective encounters, in that it carries 
within it sets of concepts that can inform how resonant experiences in writers’ 
houses/museums might be understood. Again, the first definition of resonance is: 
1.a. The reinforcement or prolongation of sound by reflection or by the 
synchronous vibration of a surrounding space or a neighbouring object. 
Also: a sound, or quality of sound, resulting from this. (OED emphasis 
added)  
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The concepts of ‘reinforcement’, ‘prolongation’, and synchrony (L. together + time) 
are especially useful here in that they relate to a number of the dynamics at work in 
the writer’s house/museum, for example: how the house/museum setting attempts to 
create a sense of the prolongation of the former occupant’s inhabitance – as when a 
visitor writes ‘Dickens appears to live in these very rooms’28– an illusion that is often 
supported by the use of ‘as-in-life’ displays which can range from a set table, to a 
made or turned-back bed, to open books and writing implements and texts left out as 
if their author will shortly return to them.  
 The concept of reinforcement in a writer’s house/museum environment is most 
evident through the use of signs, texts, tours or other narratives that reiterate the 
visual cues of the setting (such as the sign next to Sir Walter Scott’s clothes that 
reads ‘Clothes Worn by Sir Walter Scott’) though it can also be experienced through 
the knowledge or belief that the things one is looking at existed both in the world of 
the writer’s then and in the visitor’s now – each thing reinforcing the fact of the 
writer’s former presence through its history/biography and material survival. This is 
a kind of synchrony – the things of the past now present with the viewer, a kind of 
access that can create a sense of a knit now-and-then-ness. ‘It was beautiful’ one 
visitor to the Dickens Museum wrote in 2014, ‘to experience and imagine the 
atmosphere of a long time ago…visiting the past’. Another visitor called their 
Dickens Museum experience ‘a step back in time’.29 This idea of not just imagining 
the past but of experiencing a sense of the past is part of the resonant encounter – 
because resonance (as a reflection or reverberation) springs from something already 
                                                 
28 Dickens Museum comment book, 19 June, 2014. 
29 Dickens Museum comment book 24 June and 23 June 2104 respectively. 
  78 
in existence; it isn’t pure imagination or pure conjuring, but an experience, echo or 
reflection from a preceding (and still palpable) source. 
 If resonance as an auditory phenomenon reinforces or prolongs the sound 
emanating from its source, so too does the writer’s house/museum reinforce or 
prolong some sense of the life or lives at its source – except that the reverberation or 
echo in the museum (the one vibrating off ‘a surrounding space or a neighbouring 
thing’ (OED) isn’t auditory, it is something akin to the second definition, an 
evocation of images, memories and emotions, ‘vibrating off’ things – an effect that 
this thesis describes as ‘worlding’. 
 
‘The power of the object’ 
 
The second definition of resonance employed in this thesis comes from the literary 
critic Stephen Greenblatt’s essay ‘Resonance and Wonder’. Two versions of this 
essay were published: one version in 1990 in the Bulletin of the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences, and a second version (with the same title) in 1991 as a chapter 
in Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Displays.30 In the 
Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences essay Greenblatt considers 
the differences between resonance and wonder and relates these modes of encounter 
to both the aims and procedures of new historicism and to then-contemporary 
museums. While the variety of topics considered in this essay are too wide-ranging 
to make the work wholly applicable here (Greenblatt is writing about new 
                                                 
30 The Exhibiting Cultures version is preoccupied with a more formal register of museum (especially the ‘art museum’) than the 
earlier version is. The latter chapter-version also does away with the part of the definition of resonance that references metaphor 
and metonymy – as well as with the specific autographic example of Cardinal Wolsey’s hat (found at the very start of the 
Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences version). For these reasons the Bulletin of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences version will form the basis of this discussion. 
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historicism as a critical practice, literary art, painting, sculpture, everyday objects, 
museum-display practices, and what I call ‘autographic’ things) Greenblatt’s 
definition of resonance and his use of an autographic object to introduce his essay are 
useful for how they frame resonance as a particular kind of encounter – one that can 
occur through contact with individual things. To be clear, there is a crucial difference 
between Greenblatt’s subject matter and the subject matter at the centre of this thesis. 
Throughout ‘Resonance and Wonder’ Greenblatt’s emphasis is on those things that 
have cycled through a variety of historical contexts (unlike those objects in a writer’s 
house/museum which are largely seen as remaining in their original or most 
meaningful context). In this section I will posit that Greenblatt’s reading of 
resonance in transposed conditions provides a framework for a reading of those 
things with cultural contiguity, arguing that if resonance can be found in things taken 
out of context, then perhaps those things perceived as remaining in context over time 
are even more powerful loci of resonance, evoking in the viewer, as Greenblatt 
suggests, the ‘cultural forces’ from which those objects have emerged (19). 
 Greenblatt’s 1990 essay begins with his consideration of a red priest’s hat that 
once belonged to Cardinal Wolsey (c. 1473-1530) on display in the library at Christ 
Church, Oxford (a college Wolsey founded). A note card describing the hat’s 
provenance explains that the hat had come into the University’s possession in the 
eighteenth century via a theatre company. For Greenblatt, even without sufficient 
context (what company it was, if – or how – the hat was used by them, when it went 
on display etc.) the hat, in his words, ‘nonetheless evokes a vision of cultural 
production that I find compelling’. He goes on to write that ‘[t]he peregrinations of 
Wolsey’s hat suggest that cultural artifacts do not stay still, that they exist in time, 
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and that they are bound up with personal and institutional conflicts, negotiations, and 
appropriations’ (11). For Greenblatt, the hat, ‘a bit of red cloth stitched together’ is a 
‘material referent’ to large and complex narratives, to a biography and to events that 
adhere to the life of the person who wore the hat (11). Still, he imagines that ‘[b]y the 
time Wolsey’s hat reached the library at Christ Church, its charisma must have been 
largely exhausted…[though] the college could confer upon it the prestige of an 
historical curiosity, a trophy of the distant founder’ (12). Greenblatt refers to the hat 
as a ‘trivial relic’ (13) though he also admits that ‘in its glass case, it still radiates a 
tiny quantum of cultural energy’ (12).  
 In beginning with the hat Greenblatt is laying the ground for a discussion about 
new historicism. He uses the material object of the hat and its biography as an 
analogy for his central topics – literary criticism, and the difference between 
resonance and wonder in relation to texts. He calls books ‘[t]he display cases with 
which I am most involved’ (13) and proceeds to read Wolsey’s hat as analogous to 
texts, which also partake in, and are affected by, social practices and ‘historical 
transactions’ (13).31 This leads him to an analysis of the positions usually undertaken 
by new historicist writers (14-19), positions that help ‘describe an interest in the 
kinds of issues I had been raising – in the embeddedness of cultural objects in the 
contingencies of history’ (14). For Greenblatt, a reading of some of the seemingly 
ephemeral or marginal aspects of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream is 
enhanced by a consideration of the way certain objects and rituals might have been 
read differently over time, an approach that demonstrates that meanings and relations 
aren’t fixed (13).  
                                                 
31 Greenblatt’s analysis of objects both in texts and as analogies for texts and his interest in their historical transactions is 
connected to his practice, expressed in Practicing New Historicism, in reading culture as a text (Practicing 15-16) and reflects 
his assertion that ‘intriguing enigmas of particular times and places’ can reside in signifying systems such as texts (Practicing 
14).    
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   In starting with the red hat Greenblatt was embodying his argument about texts. 
He acknowledges later that sometimes material things are more tractable as models: 
he calls his literary example from A Midsummer Night’s Dream ‘an appropriately 
tiny textual equivalent of Wolsey’s hat’ (13) and notes that ‘[i]t will be easier to 
grasp the concepts of resonance and wonder if we think of the way in which our 
culture presents to itself not the textual traces of its past but the surviving visual 
traces, for the latter are put on display in galleries and museums…’ (19). This 
statement suggests that not only are visual traces (or ‘things’) more easily understood 
as models of the resonant than linguistic or textual things, but that ‘display’ may play 
a role in increasing the ease with which one might apprehend resonance – as if 
displayed things garner, or demand, a certain kind of attention through their remove 
from everyday contexts and their immediacy. Here, Greenblatt’s interest in Wolsey’s 
hat – and in the issue of display he raises – relates to the dynamics of contingent 
forces on things like Wolsey’s hat, and to texts like Shakespeare’s being read from a 
contemporary (and slant) standpoint. After describing his encounter with Wolsey’s 
hat he states:  
…I am fascinated by transmigrations of the kind I have just sketched here –
from theatricalized rituals to the stage to the university library or museum–
because they seem to reveal something critically important about the textual 
relics with which my profession is obsessed. They enable us to glimpse the 
social process through which objects, gestures, rituals, and phrases are 
fashioned and moved from one zone of display to another. (13)  
 
Here, a critical difference between Greenblatt’s study of resonance and historical 
trace and my material things is evident: he is interested in things and texts that have 
undergone informing and informative ‘historical transactions’; that have undergone 
transpositions, or have shifted ‘from one zone of social practice to another’ (14) – 
things such as Wolsey’s hat: an emblem of Wolsey’s religious affiliation and 
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position at one point in time, and a theatrical prop at another. In the very beginning 
of his paper Greenblatt specifies that the Cardinal’s hat ‘was not a direct bequest’ 
(11) which may be what contributes to the exhaustion he describes in Wolsey’s hat – 
a hat worn down for centuries post-Wolsey by the contingencies of history (in the 
form of a theatre troupe in unknown contexts). Which is to suggest that perhaps 
resonance as Greenblatt describes it in relation to Wolsey’s ‘largely exhausted’ hat 
works like sound resonance – that in order for resonance to noticeably occur, the 
primary force or effect cannot be obscured, cannot, as it were, bend around corners, 
and encounter obstacles. If the contingencies of history can muffle resonance so that, 
as in the hat’s case, only ‘a tiny quantum of cultural energy’ remains (12) then it 
stands to reason that those things that have not been shaped or marked by a variety of 
historical transactions might radiate or contain a more concentrated kind of cultural 
energy, or at least a sense of resonance that is oriented more specifically in one 
direction.32  
 For Greenblatt, an awareness of the traffic of things and of changing social 
practices (whether ritualistic or linguistic) can lead to informative and informing 
fields of inquiry. In his analysis of the approach undertaken by new historicist critics 
he identifies previously marginalized aspects of texts or culture as worthy of 
consideration: ‘…new-historicist critics are interested in such cultural expressions as 
witchcraft accusations, medical manuals, or clothing, not as raw materials but as 
                                                 
32 An interesting comparison to Greenblatt’s reading of Wolsey’s hat can be found at the institution to which I am submitting 
this thesis. For 150 years, the University of Edinburgh has ceremonially tapped its new graduates on the head with a cap 
reputedly made from John Knox’s breeches. As with Wolsey and Christchurch there is contiguity between the institution and 
Knox (an education reformer whose statue – wearing a similar cap – can be found on University grounds). But unlike Wolsey’s 
hat, which is seen as having lost resonance because of its peregrinations, the Knox material has accrued resonance through 
travel. In 2006 a piece of fabric embroidered with the University’s emblem was sent into space with an Edinburgh graduate (the 
astronaut Piers Sellers) and then, after his – and its – return, sewn into the Geneva bonnet (‘One small step’). This story was 
told to me at my MSc graduation ceremony and it imbued the capping aspect of the day with a profound – and superadded – 
resonance, one that incorporated ideas of limitless future horizons into already existing ideas of history and tradition. Whereas 
Wolsey’s travels have diminished resonance, the bonnet’s travels have added to its resonance. 
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“cooked” – complex symbolic and material articulations of the imaginative and 
ideological structures of the society that produced them’ (19). This statement 
anticipates Elaine Freedgood’s reading of the calico curtains in Mary Barton 
(Freedgood, Ideas 55-80) and Dan Miller’s reading of clothing in Trinidadian culture 
(Miller, Stuff 12-41) instances where the value of things like curtains or clothes – of a 
hat like Wolsey’s – are elevated to the level of symbol, metaphor and ‘cultural 
archive’ (Freegood 1) while also supporting the idea of ‘material articulation’ – the 
idea that objects can contain, speak to (and reveal) a kind of cultural knowledge that 
may normally be hidden or unexplored.  
 Greenblatt’s eventual definition of resonance (which appears a third of the way 
into his essay) supports this assertion that things and texts can communicate aspects 
of culture to the viewer. He states: 
By ‘resonance’ I mean the power of the object displayed to reach out beyond 
its formal boundaries to a larger world, to evoke in the viewer the complex, 
dynamic cultural forces from which it has emerged and for which–as metaphor 
or, more simply, as metonymy–it may be taken by a viewer to stand. (19-20)  
 
This definition asserts that a displayed object or thing has the power to exceed its 
mere physical form and to provoke a feeling or set of concepts and relations in the 
viewer. What is evoked might be some sense of the object or thing’s own context or 
biography (the world/culture ‘from which it has emerged’) or something figured 
through its metaphoric or metonymical qualities. For Charles Dickens, Sir Walter 
Scott’s hat was a metonymical thing: it resonated both a sense of Scott (for whom it 
stood) and the events of Scott’s last days. It extended itself in that it ceased to simply 
be a hat or a tool for wearing. This is to suggest similarly, that in seeing Charlotte 
Brontë’s wedding bonnet the viewer may be met by what the bonnet signifies 
(concepts from the culture that we meet the bonnet with), as well as by the bonnet’s 
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metaphoric or metonymical properties (the bonnet as a stand-in for Charlotte on her 
wedding day; for her short-lived happiness and so forth).  
 In this definition Greenblatt is suggesting that resonance occurs dynamically 
between things (‘the power of the object displayed to reach out…’) and beings (‘to 
evoke in the viewer’) and that part of resonance is the perception of a thing as more 
than its formal boundaries or physical self. This definition supports key themes in 
this thesis, specifically, the idea of a thing’s power (‘the power of the object’); the 
role of stasis (via display); the assertion of a thing’s agency (its ability to ‘reach out’ 
and ‘evoke’) along with its ability to ‘world’ – to evoke events or individuals from 
the past – in particular those events the thing itself was witness to (in the culture 
‘from which it has emerged’).   
 Ultimately where Greenblatt’s interest in resonance differs from this thesis’s 
interest is in relation to contiguity. His interest in transpositions (in texts, things or 
rituals that have been subverted or repositioned or infused with other entities or 
practices) is more complex than the kind of transposition (of equipmental use) 
considered here. The objects in this thesis are, for the most part, things that have not 
shifted zones, they are things that have been integrated back into their original 
environment, or, at least, into an environment deeply associated with the person with 
whom the thing was once affiliated.33 This may explain why Greenblatt’s definition 
doesn’t emphasize the power of the material thing’s physical form in the resonant 
encounter – because the things he is thinking of in this essay have trafficked through 
a variety of contexts which means that there would be little sense of how or by whom 
                                                 
33 Interesting case studies involving the travels and shifting zones of autographic things can be found in Proust’s Overcoat 
(Foschini, 2010) which details the perfumer Guerin’s interest in Proust’s things and his recovery of Proust’s overcoat which 
was worn for years by an acquaintance of the family on his Sunday fishing trips. See also ‘Fort, Da: The Cap in the Museum’ 
by Lydia Marinelli which details the theft (and eventual return) of Freud’s hat from his museum. In both of these cases the coat 
and hat were not shed of their autographic status though they would, for a time, have appeared to others as everyday objects. 
  85 
a tear on Wolsey’s hat was caused – whether by him or by an actor in a play, a 
costume handler, or an antiques dealer. Antithetically, part of the power of the 
Charlotte Brontë bonnet’s material form – the ghostly veil, its embroidery, the 
bonnet’s fastened flowers, its delicacy and agedness – comes from the sense that it 
has existed predominantly in relation to her; that its physical form is a material trace 
of not only the culture from which the bonnet arose, but her life and bodily 
movement through the world and the time that has passed (ageing the bonnet) after 
her death.   
 Toward the end of his essay Greenblatt furthers his consideration of the effect of 
resonance. In describing the multifaceted, multi-contextual kinds of displays one 
sometimes encounters (one where, for example, a painting is supported by ‘the 
display of the palette, brushes, and other implements that an artist of a given period 
would have employed’) he describes how sometimes even contextual objects 
(‘placed only to provide a decorative setting for a grand work’) can ‘take on a life of 
their own, make a claim that rivals that of the object that is formally privileged’ (22). 
He states:  
For the effect of resonance does not necessarily depend upon a collapse of the 
distinction between art and non-art; it can be achieved by awakening in the 
viewer a sense of the cultural and historically contingent construction of art 
objects, the negotiations, exchanges, swerves, exclusions by which certain 
representational practices come to be set apart from other representational 
practices that they partially resemble. A resonant exhibition often pulls the 
viewer away from the celebration of isolated objects and toward a series of 
implied, only half-visible relationships and questions. How have the objects 
come to be displayed? What is at stake in categorizing them as being of 
‘museum quality’? How were they originally used? What cultural and material 
conditions made possible their production? What were the feelings of those 
who originally held these objects, cherished them, collected them, possessed 
them? What is the meaning of my relationship to these same objects now that 
they are displayed here, in this museum, on this day? (23) 
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What Greenblatt’s reading of resonance here suggests is that resonance can be 
achieved in a variety of ways – even through an awareness or reading of the complex 
dynamics involved in the set-up or presentation of an exhibit – a resonance that can 
include, or be found in, the unknown contingencies and constructions of the 
environment. While there are texts that explore these constructions at length in 
relation to writers’ houses/museums (see especially Anderson, Hendrix, Goldhill and 
Trubek) this thesis is concerned with resonant objects that seem, for the most part, to 
adhere to, or amplify, a single or larger narrative: the life of the writer. Greenblatt’s 
analysis of the ‘resonant exhibition’ is useful however because it acknowledges that 
things, even outside of contiguous contexts or even when not ‘the focus’ of the 
display or exhibit, can ‘world’ – can create a sense of affective engagement with 
another time, the time inhered in the thing’s biography. Greenblatt also suggests that 
things can raise questions about themselves, questions about origin and use and 
relations, questions like ‘What were the feelings of those who originally held these 
objects, cherished them, collected them, possessed them?’ thereby pulling the viewer 
toward ‘half-visible relationships’ that may transport the viewer affectively into 
some sense of contact with those we deem to have been in orbit around these objects, 
those we deem these objects to have been in relations with.34  
  Ultimately one of the conundrums that Greenblatt’s reading of resonance raises 
is the question of different degrees or registers in resonant experiences. For him 
                                                 
34 Greenblatt’s suggestion in this quote that resonance ‘does not necessarily depend upon a collapse of the distinction between 
art and non-art’ is also interesting because it relates to the role of display and exhibition in creating resonance and in creating a 
felt-sense of something we might categorize as more-art-like than not. This idea, of how display makes a tool or a piece of 
equipment into something else, something more-art-like, is discussed in chapter five wherein I argue that display and stasis play 
a powerful role in shifting a visitor’s sense of the ‘with-which-to’ dynamic of an object which contributes to a thing’s modality 
as a ‘with-which-to-remember-the-past’ which contributes to a thing’s resonance. Greenblatt’s emphasis on the larger 
exhibition and the relationships between things, a relationship that can pull ‘the viewer away from the celebration of isolated 
objects and toward a series of implied, only half-visible relationships and questions’ is also interesting because it seems to set 
up a dichotomy: the singular thing and the setting – a dichotomy this thesis hopes to trouble through a reading of Heidegger’s 
‘Analysis of the Structure of Experience’ in chapter two.    
 
  87 
Wolsey’s hat only ‘radiates a tiny quantum of cultural energy’ (12) whereas the State 
Jewish Museum in Prague is, for him, ‘[p]erhaps the most purely resonant museum I 
have ever seen…’ (23). If auditory resonance can vary in kind and degree it follows 
that the same might be true of affective resonance. While Greenblatt’s discussion of 
resonance lays the foundations for an understanding of resonant experiences with 
texts or things in general, one of the differences between his transposed models and 
my contiguous models may be one of amplification. If, as Greenblatt suggests, only a 
‘tiny quantum of cultural energy’ can be found in Wolsey’s hat after its travels, 
might an even greater amount of cultural energy be found in those things viewed as, 
or established as, contiguous? Might the individual looking at Charlotte Brontë’s 
wedding bonnet, free of the sort of travels Wolsey’s hat underwent, feel they have a 
greater kind of access to the past and to Charlotte herself? The supporting narratives 
in this thesis suggest that the answer is yes: that the concepts we meet things with 
(that ‘this is Charlotte Brontë’s wedding bonnet’), the authenticating narratives that 
come with things (ones that usually emphasize contiguity or which omit the kinds of 
‘travels’ Wolsey’s hat underwent) and the thing’s own mode of showing forth its 
qualities contribute powerfully to a sense of resonant and meaningful encounter with 
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Chapter Two: Worlding Things 
 
This chapter will explore the phenomenological aspects of encounters with writerly 
things by reading Marion Harland’s 1898 description of encounters with the 
Carlyle’s things in The Haunts of Familiar Characters in History and Literature 
alongside Martin Heidegger’s concept of ‘worlding’ and a fictional account of an 
environmental experience with things in Charlotte Brontë’s novel Villette. This 
chapter will demonstrate that house/museum settings have the ability to effectively 
gather and exhibit (or ‘world’) a powerful sense of both the absent writer and the 
absent writer’s life – an encounter that is generated through provocative and 
meaningful things. This chapter seeks to unsettle any potential perceptions of 
resonant encounters in writers’ houses/museums as purely subjective in order to 
establish that affective experiences are brought about by individuals and 
environments together. Heidegger’s assertions that all things exist in a set of 
relations, and that environments can ‘world’ will then serve as a departure point for 
an analysis of the role of stasis in resonant encounters, a theme that will be 
developed in relation to tools in chapter five. 
 
I  – The Haunts of Familiar Characters  
 
In 1898, one year before she wrote Charlotte Brontë at Home, Marion Harland 
(1830-1922; pseudonym of Mary Virginia Hawes) published a book called The 
Haunts of Familiar Characters in History and Literature. In it she describes visits 
with her daughters to a number of sites including Robert Burns’s cottage, the 
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Brussels locations associated with Charlotte and Emily Brontë (and Charlotte’s novel 
Villette) and the Carlyle’s house on Cheyne Row.  
 Marion Harland’s description of the Cheyne Row house begins in the kitchen, due 
to her assertion that it is ‘the thought of Jane Welsh Carlyle, more than the fame of 
her husband, [that] has brought us to No. 24’ (65). In writing about both the Carlyle’s 
kitchen and the larger house Harland places an emphasis on the authentic things she 
encounters, noting, for example, that ‘[t]he dresser is the same in which Jane Welsh 
arranged her crockery with the help of Bessy Barnet, her one maid-servant, in the 
leafy month of June, 1834’ (65).35 A number of kitchen anecdotes follow, 
incorporating a mixture of quoted sources and hypothetical imaginings. Harland 
describes, for example, how ‘[t]he notable housekeeper must have had unrecorded 
battles with dough and circumstance over the ugly table and the sulky-looking sink in 
the days when she “got up at half-past seven to prepare the coffee and bacon-ham for 
breakfast”…’ (66). Here, the hypothetical ‘must have had’ – and the assertion of the 
hypothetical via the acknowledgement that the imagined battles are ‘unrecorded’ – is 
juxtaposed with an unsourced quote that specifies household habits both in terms of 
time (half-past seven when the maid got up) and diet (what the Carlyle’s drank and 
ate for breakfast). Amidst these imagined and factual-seeming anecdotes sits an ‘ugly 
table’ and a ‘sulky-looking sink’, two objects, along with the dresser, that not only 
establish the setting (then and in Harland’s ‘now’) but which also, as tools for 
storing, making, washing etc. played a role in the events she describes. Harland, 
standing in that very same setting is, it seems, watching such housekeeping scenes 
unfold before her very eyes. This becomes evident when she describes how: ‘[t]he 
vision of the trig [sic] figure stepping briskly from table to range and dresser is 
                                                 
35 June 1834 is the date the Carlyle’s took possession of what was then No. 5 Great Cheyne Row. 
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suddenly struck from the imagination by something the custodian is saying: “He used 
to smoke in the kitchen every night. His chair stood here,”…’ (66).  
 What is interesting about Harland’s chapter is the powerful effect of nearness, of 
sensing through the staying power of things and the contiguity of place, a proximity 
to past events and those involved in such events. Harland describes this presencing in 
a way that, as this section will demonstrate, is interestingly Heideggerean: in 
referencing a vision of Jane brought on by a comment on her tour of the house she 
writes ‘[t]he picture of the dainty mistress of the home… comes to the front again…’ 
(67). This ‘comes to the front’ is the kind of presencing enabled by the setting in the 
form of a set of relations / material things. This is evidenced further by the fact that 
over the seventeen pages of Harland’s text there are over a dozen references to 
particular things that existed in both the Carlyle’s lifetime (in their domestic sphere) 
and in the time of Harland’s visit almost two decades after Thomas’s death  – a list 
that includes various items of furniture, a clock, Jane’s screen, Thomas’s skylight, 
and grape vines. There are also a half-dozen references to spots or locations where 
specific kinds of events took place i.e. where Jane ‘lashed “a gypsy’s tent…” and sat 
under it with her work’ (79) or where Tennyson sat when he visited (66). These are 
noted frequently throughout by the use of locating words such as ‘here’ as in: ‘[h]ere 
they sat and talked…’ (of Thomas and Jane in the parlour) (68). It is, accordingly, 
both the ‘here’ of the environment and the things of the house that create a sense of 
the Carlyles and their world; an effect that, borrowing from Heidegger’s ideas around 
meaningful environments and unfragmented relations, I will call ‘worlding’. 
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II – Worlding  
 
‘Worlding’ is a Heideggerean term that relates to how the world (existence in all its 
relations) comes to presence. To say the ‘world worlds’ (Heidegger, PLT 180) or the 
‘thing things’ (PLT 172) is to evoke a special kind of phenomenological description 
of being-in-the-world. The use of the phrase ‘it worlds’ (of the environment) (TDP 
58) appears as early as Heidegger’s 1919 lecture ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the 
Problem of Worldview’. In Heidegger’s early use of the word Timothy Clark 
suggests that Heidegger was invoking something akin to ‘being’, noting that ‘world’ 
does not refer to any specific location but to ‘that presupposed and disregarded space 
of familiarity and recognition within which all the beings around us show 
themselves, are for us’ (16). This sense of world foregrounds its relational aspects – 
suggesting that ‘world’ is that way of being which is our own and which 
encompasses all that we are and encounter as individual selves going about life, 
existing and coexisting with things and other beings who come to the fore in our 
daily doings. Clark elaborates on this early notion of world further by suggesting:  
Heidegger’s concept of ‘world’ is close to the common meaning of the term 
when we talk about ‘the world’ of the Bible, or the ‘world’ of the modern 
Chinese or modern English – i.e. the fundamental understanding within which 
individual things, people, history, texts, buildings, projects cohere together 
within a shared horizon of significances, purposes and connotations. (16)  
 
This inheres to the concept of ‘world’ all that there is within a given set of relations: 
all that there is within the Victorian world, the world of the Carlyles and so forth. 
Crucially, nothing is left outside of this world, it includes both the concrete (the 
smoking jacket Thomas Carlyle was wearing as he sat on a stool in the yard at 
Cheyne Row smoking; the grass underneath his feet) and the abstract (the thoughts 
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he was having, the feel of the breeze on his face, the intended recipient of the letter in 
his pocket) – as such world is not separable from being and the relations of being.  
 Heidegger’s 1950 essay ‘The Thing’, given as a lecture some thirty-one years 
after his 1919 lecture’s references to world, is notable for numerous examples of a 
more complex kind of descriptive noun/verb interplay. For example: ‘If we let the 
thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking 
of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let ourselves be concerned by 
the thing’s worlding being’ (PLT 178). In this context Heidegger is suggesting that 
by meeting things with a certain comportment or care (Clark describes this 
comportment as ‘attunement’: ‘a general unthematized sense of things as a whole’ 
(18)) we gain access to aspects of the thing in an unconcealed or unveiled manner – 
the thing thusly things (in its unveiledness) and signals its relations and world. 
Rather than a mere appearance we are encountering a manifold. 
 Worlding as I am employing it in this thesis incorporates aspects of both 
Heidegger’s concept of world as the ‘world of the Brontë’s’ or the ‘Victorian world’ 
– and ‘world’ as what things can do: reveal an apprehension or sense of 
unfragmented relations and significances. When a visitor to a writer’s house/museum 
becomes attuned to a thing – to Sir Walter Scott’s quill pen, for example, this thesis 
suggests that the quill pen worlds a set of relations in a complex and, again, 
unfragmented way: relations that do not bracket time, that foreground meanings; 
relations that bring ‘Scott’s world’ to the fore in an affective or expansive manner.  
 What is most appealing about Heidegger’s concept of world for the purposes of 
this thesis is that it does not polarize or make ‘grammatical’ a set of causal effects: I 
encounter a thing / I perceive it / I understand it to be such-and-such. Rather, as the 
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next section will show, it reveals that we are always already in a world of things, 
relations and significance. This suggests that affective encounters are whole 
encounters, manifolds in which things, beings and ideas interrelate in a way that best 
exemplifies the co-determinate relations contemporary thing theory seeks to 
explicate. Accordingly Heidegger’s concept of world deserves further clarification – 
a path that I believe is most clearly (and concisely) traversed by a consideration of 
Heidegger’s early use of the concept of ‘worlding’.  
 In 1919 Heidegger presented a lecture course at The University of Freiburg, which 
was later translated into English by Ted Sadler in Towards the Definition of 
Philosophy as ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’.  Although 
this was an early lecture in Heidegger’s career a number of the concerns that arise in 
Being and Time – the question of what ‘is’, of the ever-present ‘I’, and of how we 
phenomenologically encounter the world – are evident here, as is Heidegger’s 
interest in trying to suggest a way out of the circular (and therefore self-fulfilling) 
nature of theoretical knowledge (see especially 14-24 and 74-76). Ultimately this 
lecture begins to work toward a new understanding of phenomenology via a 
(re)consideration of the structure of experience – especially experience as it occurs in 
relation to environments, or, the world of things.  
 It is in Part Two, Chapter One of the lecture (a chapter called ‘Analysis of the 
Structure of Experience’) that Heidegger begins to elaborate most concretely on how 
one encounters an environment. Using his lectern and the room he is lecturing in as 
examples, Heidegger reminds his students that one does not encounter things (such 
as a lectern) as a set of properties (i.e. as a colour, angle, shape) but ‘in one fell 
swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation’ (57). Things, he notes, never stand alone but 
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are, like the lectern ‘in an orientation, an illumination, a background’ (57). He 
elaborates on these points in the following way: 
In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an 
immediate environment [Umwelt]. This environmental milieu (lectern, book, 
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, 
motor-car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects which are then 
conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and 
immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented 
apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and 
always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it 
worlds’ [es weltet]…. (58)36 
  
In this section of the lecture, Heidegger lays out a number of important ideas that 
contribute to the suggestion that things and environments have a ‘worlding’ 
character. First of all, he presents his students with the idea that the material world or 
landscape is not seen as, or perceived as, a set or sets of properties (colours, angles, 
shapes), but rather as signifying things belonging to (or entangled in) a larger setting 
or environment. The lectern is not just a brown box, rather it is seen as meaningful: 
as a place from which he would lecture – it is part of a classroom, a place of learning 
and so forth. Second, Heidegger suggests that there is an immediacy to such 
encounters, and that part of the dynamic of the encounter is that it is ‘immediately 
given’ which is to say instantaneous and not bound-up in a conceptual or theoretical 
comportment (a point Heidegger makes repeatedly throughout the lecture, see esp. 
59-60; 67-70). Third, he suggests that the milieu before the observer (the ‘I’ to whom 
the something is meaningful) is always worlding or exuding some kind of 
signification ‘everywhere and always, everything has the character of world’ (58). 
What is ‘given’ is therefore both material (in the form of the lectern and the things in 
the ‘environmental milieu’ that may have associations or relations with the lectern 
                                                 
36 See also Being and Time: ‘What we encounter as closest to us… is the room; and we encounter it not as something “between 
four walls” in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the “arrangement” emerges, and it is in this 
that any “individual” item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered’ 
(98).  
  95 
such as the blackboard) and immaterial in that things like lecterns can also signify 
‘learning’, ‘teaching’, and so forth.  
 It is important to note that Heidegger acknowledges that what is given in 
environmental relations can vary and does not need to be culturally or equipmentally 
correct to be meaningful. This point, elaborated on below, is useful in relation to the 
writer’s house/museum because it posits that affective experiences of the 
house/museum are equally valid whether the person experiencing the ‘worlding’ 
quality of the environment is apprehending something akin to a factual narrative (as 
Harland seems to feel she is) or encountering a less narrative-driven sense of 
presence, or something even more ambiguous (as in the environmental experience in 
Villette discussed in the next section of this chapter). 
 In order to support his argument that the significance of what is given in an 
environment is always meaningful even if it varies, Heidegger presents his students 
with an anecdote involving two strangers who might visit the classroom and who 
might find it foreign or strange. After discussing the lectern Heidegger has his 
students imagine first a ‘farmer from deep in the Back Forest’ encountering the 
lectern and then a villager from Senegal ‘suddenly transplanted here from his hut’ 
(57). Having noted earlier that he and his students do not see the lectern as ‘[b]rown 
surfaces, at right angles’ or ‘[a] largish box with another smaller one set upon it’ (or 
even process their knowing of it through such stages) but rather as a lectern ‘at which 
I am to speak’ or ‘from which you are to be addressed’ (56-57) he goes on to suggest 
that the farmer from the Black Forest might see something he identifies as ‘the place 
for the teacher’ which, for Heidegger, means that the farmer ‘sees the object as 
fraught with meaning’ (57). The Senegal native, unfamiliar with such things as a 
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lectern, might instead see the lectern as ‘something to do with magic, or something 
behind which one could find good protection against arrows and flying stones’ (57) 
or even perhaps as ‘a bare something that is there’ (58). Regardless, Heidegger 
insists that all the varying encounters or instances of apprehension share a common 
trait. For even if the strange equipment encountered by the Senegal villager did not 
signify specifically, it still would have ‘a meaning for him, a moment of 
signification’ (58). Heidegger concludes that regardless of the differences, ‘[t]he 
meaningful character of “instrumental strangeness”, and the meaningful character of 
the “lectern”, are in their essence absolutely identical’ (58).  
 What Heidegger appears to be suggesting is that always and everywhere things 
are perceived as part of a set of relations and that these relations and significances are 
related to, are innate to, the ‘I’ who perceives the milieu. Similarly, in Harland’s case 
(and, as I will demonstrate, in the scene from Charlotte Brontë’s Villette) the 
apprehension of an ‘ugly table’ (Harland, 66) can be read as part of a set of relations, 
a set of relations that can be imbued with a wide variety of possible significations i.e. 
the kitchen table as a kind of equipment may signify food preparation, signify, 
perhaps, bread, and Bessie doing the work (as was the case for Harland), which could 
also bring to the fore the idea of sustenance and Jane’s health and Thomas smoking 
by the hearth and his struggles with his work and Nero, the Carlyle’s canine 
companion begging for scraps.37 Which is to say that things, as part of a series of 
references, provide us with environing experiences, and in doing so have the 
                                                 
37 This gesture of expansion, of things giving into a larger system of references (as in my model of progression from the 
Carlyle’s kitchen table to Jane’s health and Nero’s hunger) is a technique employed by Heidegger (and by Graham Harman in 
explaining Heidegger’s relational model) as a means of illustrating the material worlding of the world as it colludes with (or is 
enmeshed with) Being. See Heidegger’s examples of the bridge (PLT 151-152), jug (PLT 166-72) and temple (PLT 40-42) and 
Harman’s example of the house (HE 62). What makes the 1919 lecture more useful than these examples at this juncture of the 
thesis is that here he is beginning to articulate a set of new ideas for himself (Figal 5) and, as such, his ideas are being laid out in 
a more direct manner than in his later works where he incorporates ideas like the four-fold into his thinking.  
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qualities of what Heidegger in his 1919 lecture calls ‘world’. Again, as Heidegger 
states: ‘[l]iving in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, 
everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that “it worlds”…’ 
(58).38  
 One last point relevant to this thesis needs to be made in relation to the worlding 
nature of environments and things, and that is that in Heidegger’s worlding concept 
the encounter is not static: even if the students are physically still and the lectern is 
fixed firmly in place the environment is worlding – it is a place of experience, an 
‘environing’ (versus ‘environed’) world wherein an ‘I’ with a whole range of 
experiences is in encounter with things (68). Again, for Heidegger the apprehension 
of a simple lectern is a lived experience, one that does not occur in isolation even as 
the lectern – to use Ms. Harland’s term: ‘comes to the front’. As noted earlier, 
Heidegger states that ‘[i]n the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to 
me from out of an immediate environment’ (58 emphasis added). Heidegger’s ‘given 
to me’ is important in relation to the things this thesis is considering because it 
suggests that the material things are involved in the giving. As the philosopher 
Graham Harman notes in his analysis of Heidegger’s 1919 lectures there is a 
difference between the German and English approach to communicating the idea that 
something exists: ‘When we want to say in English that something exists, we say 
“there is” or “there are” such things…. In German they say es gibt, which literally 
means “it gives”’ (HE 22).39  This ‘giving’ illuminates how worlding encounters are 
                                                 
38 For Heidegger’s post-1919 explanation of his different uses of ‘world’ see esp. Being and Time pages 91-93.   
39 Because Heidegger, in this 1919 lecture, suggests that ‘givenness’ has a theoretical comportment that de-vivifies our 
experience of things and that givenness is ‘quite probably a theoretical form’ (69) this thesis will maintain its description of the 
environing world as a world that resonates or ‘gives forth’. In the 1919 lecture Heidegger states ‘…for something 
environmental to be given is already a theoretical infringement. It is forcibly removed from me, from my historical “I”; the “it 
worlds” is already no longer primary…. Thus “givenness” is already quite probably a theoretical form, and precisely for this 
reason it cannot be taken as the essence of the immediate environing world as environmental’ (69). In this section Heidegger 
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formed: through things that give and beings that encounter them in a receptive 
comportment. As Heidegger notes:  
In this experiencing, in this living-toward, there is something of me: My ‘I’ 
goes out completely beyond itself and resonates along in this ‘seeing,’…. More 
precisely: Only through this particular ‘I’ resonating along does it experience 
something environmental, does it world. Wherever and whenever it worlds for 
me, I am somehow fully along with it. (Figal 35)40   
 
For Heidegger the experience of things and the relations that come with things and 
environments always comes from the perspective of an ‘I’, but crucially, an ‘I’ 
encountering a thingly environment – an ‘I’ resonating along with the world of 
things.  
 
III – Villette 
 
This section of the chapter will concern itself with the relationship between worlding 
things and resonance through a consideration of how affective experiences of things 
are described: first by considering the narrative surrounding an affective encounter 
with worlding things in Charlotte Brontë’s 1853 novel Villette, and then by returning 
to Harland who in The Haunts of Familiar Characters in History and Literature 
describes a tour of the locations in Brussels that held associations with both Charlotte 
Brontë herself (who studied there for a year with her sister Emily in 1842 and again 
on her own in 1843-1844) and Villette’s (fictional) heroine Lucy Snowe.  
 The purpose of this two-pronged approach is to get closer to the worlding or 
resonant experience of places and things as it is described both indirectly (as in the 
case of Villette where the intention of the scene Charlotte Brontë pens is arguably as 
                                                 
seems to be drawing the listener’s awareness to the fact that paring off the experienced encounter in any way is already a 
reduction. 
40 For its conceptual clarity I have chosen to quote this passage of Heidegger’s 1919 lecture using the Sadler / Veith translation 
from 2009 (versus the earlier Sadler translation of 2000). 
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much about establishing a setting and forwarding the plot as it is about any kind of 
deconstruction of the worlding-through-things experience) and directly (i.e. by 
Harland who is, on the whole, writing consciously about literary pilgrimages and the 
resonant experiences her haunts provoke). These narratives both illustrate the 
worlding experience – the scene in Villette doing so in a way that has points of 
contact with aspects of Heidegger’s 1919 lecture, in particular his suggestion that a 
sense of ‘there is’ permeates all encounters (TDP 54-55) and his suggestion that what 
is immediately given in our encounters with things is the lived experience of those 
things (66). In the same way that Harland’s encounter with the kitchen furniture in 
the Carlyle’s house called to the fore a past world and a set of relations, so too does 
the furniture in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette. As with Harland’s experience at the 
Carlyle House, objects are presented which ‘straddle’ two different times: the 
apprehending present and the apprehended past – objects that act as a catalyst toward 
the remembrance of past events and sets of relations; things that world. 
    Charlotte Brontë's (1816-1855) novel Villette (1853) was her last major 
publication. It is considered strongly autobiographical (Byatt xiii) and concerns the 
experiences of an Englishwoman named Lucy Snowe who becomes a teacher at a 
pensionnat in a town called Villette (a pensionnat that is widely believed to be 
modeled on the pensionnat of Monsieur Héger, which Charlotte and Emily attended 
in Brussels). In the scene under consideration, which begins Volume II of the book, 
Lucy is coming back to consciousness in a strange environment after fainting on the 
street in an unfamiliar neighbourhood. The chapter begins with the line ‘Where my 
soul went during that swoon I cannot tell’ (191) after which Lucy describes her sense 
of being disembodied, a state that is resolved with some difficulty: ‘[t]he divorced 
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mates, Spirit and Substance, were hard to re-unite: they greeted each other, not in an 
embrace, but in a racking sort of struggle’ (191). As she is coming to consciousness 
Lucy describes how:  
 At first I knew nothing I looked on: a wall was not a wall–a lamp not a 
lamp. I should have understood what we call a ghost, as well as I did the 
commonest object: which is another way of intimating that all my eye rested on 
struck it as spectral. But the faculties soon settled each in his place; the life-
machine presently resumed its wonted and regular working.    
 Still, I knew not where I was…. (191–192)41  
 
As she begins to get her bearings she notices through the arrangement of objects in 
the room (and the kinds of objects that they are) that she is in ‘an unknown room in 
an unknown house’ (192). But soon particular pieces of furniture begin to appear. 
Lucy’s evocation of the furniture she surveys is worth quoting at length, not only 
because it describes an environment that is determined by the things within it but 
also because her description imbues the things in the setting with a kind of 
dynamism, for it is the things themselves that play a role in starting to locate her. She 
‘gazes’ at these pieces of furniture (her ‘old acquaintance’) but they also seem to be 
worlding back at her – as Lucy says ‘“auld lang syne” [times long past] smiled out of 
every nook’ (193). In this encounter things come to the fore in a dynamic way – they 
grow familiar. This passage reveals the role that things in an environment can play in 
giving forth a sense of world – not just in the present sense as a set of relations (i.e. 
where one is located) but also in the sense of a set of memories, for as the narrative 
continues Lucy states: 
                                                 
41 This awareness of an ‘is’ (a something – even if spectral – rather than a nothing) corresponds to Heidegger’s description, in 
his 1919 lecture course of what precedes the particular and begs the concrete. This is most evident in the passage where he 
suggests: ‘[i]t is asked whether there is something. It is not asked whether there are tables or chairs, houses or trees, sonatas by 
Mozart or religious powers, but whether there is anything whatsoever. What does “anything whatsoever” mean? Something 
universal, one might say, indeed the most universal of all, applying to any possible object whatsoever’ (TDP 54). This sense of 
an essential ‘there is’ seems, for Heidegger, to correspond to why we turn to material things to ground ourselves in an 
environment: vis-à-vis how ‘…in attempting to grasp the meaning of “something in general”, we return to individual objects 
with particular concrete content’ (54). In the next part of the scene Lucy notes concrete objects and uses them to ground herself. 
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 …I gazed at the blue arm-chair, it appeared to grow familiar; so did a 
certain  scroll-couch, and not less so the round center-table, with a blue 
covering, bordered with autumn-tinted foliage; and, above all, two little 
footstools with worked covers, and a small ebony-framed chair, of which the 
seat and back were also worked with groups of brilliant flowers on a dark 
ground.  
  Struck with these things, I explored further. Strange to say, old acquaintance 
were all about me, and ‘auld lang syne’ smiled out of every nook. There were 
two oval miniatures over the mantelpiece, of which I knew by heart the pearls 
about the high and powdered ‘heads’; the velvets circling the white throats; the 
swell of the full muslin kerchiefs; the pattern of the lace sleeve-ruffles. Upon 
the mantel-shelf there were two china vases, some relics of a diminutive tea-
service, as smooth as enamel and as thin as egg-shell, and a white center-
ornament, a classic group in alabaster, preserved under glass. Of all these 
things I could have told the peculiarities, numbered the flaws or cracks, like 
any clairvoyante. Above all, there was a pair of handscreens, with elaborate 
pencil-drawings finished like line-engravings; these, my very eyes ached at 
beholding again, recalling hours when they had followed, stroke by stroke and 
touch by touch, a tedious, feeble, finical, school-girl pencil held in these 
fingers, now so skeleton-like.  
  Where was I? Not only in what spot of the world, but in what year of our 
Lord? For all these objects were of past days, and of a distant country. (192–
193) 
 
Here we see how material things signal the past and in doing so double Lucy’s sense 
of place. These things that comprise her environment, while visibly in front of her, 
seem also to arise out of the place of memory, serving to locate her and dislocate her 
simultaneously. The things give her a sense of who she is (help unify her after her 
disembodied state) while also locating a version of herself in the past as evidenced 
by both her acts of remembrance (‘[o]f all these things I could have told the 
peculiarities’) and her question ‘in what year of our Lord?’ (193). This double 
encounter or simultaneous sense of experiencing two places in different instances in 
time (the apprehended past and visible present) demonstrates how material objects 
can presence a sense of an other world, whether imagined (as we will see shortly in 
relation to Harland’s trip to Brussels) or remembered.  
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 What is striking in the phenomenological sense of this spectral or ghostly 
encounter with things is the vitality with which the materiality of the objects 
(described in great detail throughout the scene) seem to presence their previous 
context, a vitality that calls into question the reality in the present tense as 
experienced by the protagonist. Lucy, in the following pages, uses the words 
‘mystery’ and ‘dream’ to describe her confounded state; she offers an analogy of 
transport by comparing her experience to the Arabian Nights’ character ‘Bedreddin 
Hassan, transported in his sleep from Cairo to the gates of Damascus’ (194). Later, 
still struggling to come to terms with the presence of those things she once knew so 
intimately (‘I could have…numbered the flaws or cracks’ (193)) she thinks ‘[t]hese 
articles of furniture could not be real, solid arm-chairs, looking-glasses, and wash-
stands – they must be the ghosts of such articles…’ (195); but then Lucy accepts that 
they are actually there, stating: ‘I knew–I was obliged to know–the green chintz of 
that little chair; the little snug chair itself, the carved, shining-black, foliated frame of 
that glass… – all these I was compelled to recognize and to hail…. Bretton! Bretton! 
and ten years ago shone reflected in that mirror’ (196). 
     Lucy Snowe’s encounter with the past through things offers a useful analogy to 
the worlding or resonant effect of writers’ houses/museums. In these settings things 
‘straddle’ time, they are recognized as having two existences: as objects in the here-
and-now and as objects connected to another life or past events. Accordingly they 
can ‘world’ and transport, they can un-tether the viewer – as when Marion Harland’s 
awareness of the curator recedes when she is imagining or reconstructing past events 
at the Carlyle’s – which is a way of foregrounding the presence of the past. 
Ultimately what things like Lucy Snowe’s fictional furniture and the material 
  103 
remains in the writer’s house/museum do is to make dynamic the-past-within-the-
present, a kind of simultaneous-yet-dual worlding akin to the dual worlding in 
Charlotte Brontë’s Villette scene – an instance of transport as Lucy describes it, one 
that allows the past to shine ‘in that mirror’ (196).  
 Marion Harland’s narrative of her trip to the Carlyle house is a good example of 
the ability of the writer’s house/museum and its things to world: the kitchen table 
worlds a sense of the domestic life of the Carlyles; the garden worlds Jane’s presence 
and her activities within it. But Harland also wrote a short chapter called ‘Villette’ in 
which she and her daughters go to Brussels ‘because Brussels is “Villette”’ (288). 
This narrative provides further evidence of the way an environment can world a set 
of relations, one that is even more complex than Lucy Snowe’s. For where Lucy was 
cognizing two sets of relations in a kind of overlap: the shadowy sense of her 
unknown present world in tandem with her known past world – here we have three 
narratives in dynamic tandem: the Harlands in an environment aware of their own 
present, the evoked world of the real Brontë sisters, and the evoked world of the 
fictional Lucy Snowe. This multi-faceted worlding reflects one of the possible 
dynamics of the writer’s house/museum in that what tends to be worlded in the 
writer’s house/museum is not only the author’s life and self, but their imaginary 
fictional worlds as well – an idea expanded on in chapter five through a look at the 
writer’s desk as a space of creation.   
 For Harland the real-world setting of Brussels is ‘a locality familiar to the mind’s 
eye’ (280) and Pensionnat Héger evokes, not only the shadowy presence of Charlotte 
and Emily who studied there, but also the setting of the novel: ‘[h]ow well we know 
it all. And how present and vivid is the reproduction here in the marble-paved room’ 
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(288). The setting as such conflates a number of events: Charlotte and Emily’s time 
in Brussels, Charlotte’s later writing of the novel (Harland writes of ‘comprehending 
that it “came” to her here’ (295)) and Lucy’s (fictional) life and all the events 
contained within it. At one point Harland conflates the real Charlotte with the 
fictional Lucy by stating ‘in Lucy and Charlotte’s time…’ (292). Later she describes 
how while walking she and her daughters lose the real-life historical figures of the 
authors to the two fictional ones: ‘We lost Charlotte and Emily as soon as we struck 
upon Dr Bretton’s track and somehow felt the presence of the pale mute shadow 
[Lucy]…’ (285). For Harland the larger setting worlds not only the two Brontë 
sisters, but a number of scenes from Charlotte’s novel. Harland describes how ‘[t]he 
belief that we are following John Bretton’s “frank tread” and Lucy’s soundless 
footsteps takes fast hold of us. Without attempting to analyse the sensation, we 
quicken our pace…’ (283).  
 Visiting a writer’s museum can be like this too: a way of attempting to follow in 
the footsteps or feel ‘the presence’ of the writer who lived there. As the Freud 
Museum’s guidebook notes, this sensation can often take the form of an ‘absent 
presence’ (20 Maresfield 50) – a felt encounter generated by an environment: by the 
things that are left behind by the absent individual as well as by those pockets of 
landscape or settings where the writer has been. Harland, for her part, extends this 
sense of a felt-presence even to Lucy, Charlotte’s fictional protagonist, writing of 
Lucy that ‘nowhere are her being and her presence a more vital actuality than in the 
garden...’ (292). In this reading of resonance even the imaginative world of the writer 
can, to revisit Greenblatt’s definition, ‘reach out beyond its formal boundaries to a 
larger world’ (19); here even the fiction of Charlotte’s imagination becomes 
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incorporated in the worlding of resonant things and places, the ‘here’ of the garden 
that inspired Charlotte’s scenes in Villette, worlding both the writer and the world of 
the novel that she’d written. In this way Harland’s narrative is useful not only 
because it reinforces those tropes that tend to be associated with affective encounters 
i.e. the imagination (‘the mind’s eye’ (280)); the vivid nature of the encounter (288); 
a felt presence (285); beliefs and sensations (283), but her trip to ‘Villette’ (she states 
very clearly that ‘Villette is not fiction as far as the setting of the story is concerned’ 
(293)) demonstrates that affective encounters that world the writers can also world 
their works.  
     Earlier in this chapter I described Harland’s experience at the Carlyle House as 
one of sensing through the staying power of things and the contiguity of place, a 
proximity to past events and those involved in such events. Harland’s affective 
experience expands on this statement by serving as a reminder that bound up in the 
setting of the writer’s house/museum is the writer’s work, known to whatever degree 
by the visitor and therefore adding, to varying degrees, to the resonant ‘worlding’ 
encounter. While Mike Robinson suggests that ‘[i]n the case of literary tourism we 
are, as tourists, looking for evidence of the writer’s real life, perhaps to use 
symbolically for inspiration or as an addendum to our reading’ (xvi) Harland 
demonstrates that the inverse is also true, the work can sometimes be more resonant 
than the biography – a useful reminder that aligning the life story of things with 
writerly biographies is only one part of the dynamic. Resonance as such is a 
multifaceted experience, it worlds a manifold of worlds – historical, literary, and 
imagined.  
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IV – ‘Being-for’ and the Museum Setting 
 
The focus of this last section is on stasis, one of the dynamics I am suggesting is 
fundamental to resonant encounters in writers’ houses/museums. This section will 
lay the foundations of an argument that will be returned to in depth in chapter five of 
this thesis, namely that the ‘display’ aspect of the house/museum setting contributes 
to the resonant power of the things within them by changing how those things are 
viewed. Employing Heidegger’s consideration of ‘equipment’ in Being and Time and 
his concept of art in his essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, this section will 
suggest that through the forefronting of the museal environment a visitor’s usual 
sense of a thing’s ‘being-for’ is complicated, and that within that state of ambiguity 
two things are likely to happen: 1) the thing is likely to be registered as a displayed 
artefact and/or a work of art and 2) the thing’s ‘being-for’ is likely reconfigured.  
     Taken on a thing-by-thing basis many of the objects in a writer's house/museum 
can be understood to be equipment – which is to say that as actual equipment (chairs 
to sit in, spectacles to see with, pens to write with, cups to drink from) and as 
categorically ready-to-hand equipment in a Heideggerean sense, most of the 
everyday things that populate the museum have a sense of being-for.42 Heidegger's 
famous example of the ready-to-hand occurs in Being and Time when he uses the 
hammer as an example of a tool. For Heidegger:  
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure 
(hammering with a hammer, for example)…. In dealings such as this, where 
something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ 
                                                 
42 ‘Ready-to-hand’ is the term Heidegger uses for the type of being possessed by tools. Tools are the kinds of things that are not 
forefronted in our consciousness until they break, cease to function with their usual efficiency, or go missing (BT 95-107, esp. 
103-104; Harman, HE 176). In this way a hammer is a tool, a teacup is a tool (its purpose is to hold a liquid, such as tea), a 
dress is a tool intended to clothe us, keep us warm, allow us to enter into society within the conventions expected of us and so 
on).  
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which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less 
we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, 
the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unveiledly it is encountered as that which it is–as equipment. (98)  
 
Here, Heidegger is furthering his idea of sets of relations through affirming his 
lectern model: when we see a hammer we do not generally see brown wood with a 
metal head but rather an object with which to bang nails or build a shelter or mount a 
hook for a painting to hang from. For Heidegger our relationship with things is most 
natural or primal when we engage with them in terms of their in-order-to-do-‘X’-
with aspect. The hammer recedes from our perception in its use; it is only when the 
hammer fails us, when it breaks or does not perform as intended that it becomes 
conspicuous. 
     Heidegger’s idea of being-for is problematized in a museum setting wherein the 
equipmental nature of equipment is beyond our reach. As Heidegger noted above, in 
using a tool for its purpose we are in synch with it, ‘the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become ’ (98) – but in the 
museum setting we can not generally grab hold of things and therefore cannot use 
them in the way they were intended – as tools – to be used. In museums tool-use is 
suspended by the act of display and/or severed through the elevation of the 
equipment to ‘art’ or ‘artefact’. In the display dynamic the act of display suspends 
use, as when a tea set belonging to the Wordsworths or a dog collar belonging to the 
Brontë family’s pet is removed from circulation as a tea set or as a collar for a dog 
and held in a cabinet in a kind of display-stasis. In these cases a change of status 
occurs (through a new reading of environmental relations): the tool becomes 
something more akin to ‘art’ in that the equipment is rendered ‘aesthetic’ (for 
looking) and loses its former felicity of purpose in order to be viewed. Take for 
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example, the small Brontë notebooks (or juvenilia) which were created as booklets 
to-be-read (with all of the picking up, putting down, holding, page flipping and 
assimilation that reading implies) and which now, as rare/autographic objects, are 
predominantly looked at in isolation, either as closed objects or as staged objects 
open to a page in a Book of Kells fashion, as if the regard of the markings and script 
fulfills the object’s purpose.  
 Whether the object’s removal from tool-use is seen primarily as ‘static-making’ or 
‘aesthetic-making’ (or both) depends on the context of each displayed thing (how the 
setting shows it forth or establishes the parameters of regard) and on the viewer. For 
one viewer a dress as a thing may predominantly be a tool for covering oneself, 
while for another a dress may be a work of art. Accordingly, Charlotte Brontë’s silk 
dress displayed in a glass case in the centre of a room in the Parsonage 
house/museum may be ‘suspended from use’ for one person (taken out of its usual 
frame of reference or assignment), be a work of art for another, or may shift in 
apprehension from one kind of status to another depending on the aspect from which 
it is viewed (comportment) and what elements are, or are not, noticed. In both cases 
the being-for of the dress as clothing (to clothe, to cover, to decorate, to signify etc.) 
is effaced because the dress as a displayed artefact signifies something that is not to 
be worn but is rather to be regarded.  
 In this model of encountering things it might seem that an object (stripped of its 
purpose) could be reduced to a kind of present-at-hand thing: a thing that, for 
Heidegger, is physically present but largely conceptualized / stripped of its mystery. 
But the house/museum setting already makes such a reduction improbable in that the 
setting itself implies or contextualizes such things as having a ‘being-for’ something 
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– even if the ‘being-for’ is read by visitors as a ‘being-for-seeing’. As Graham 
Harman suggests, part of Heidegger's concept of historicity or ‘foreconception’ 
involves the fact that ‘[b]efore looking at things for ourselves, we have already heard 
about them, and we tend to interpret them in the same way as others…. A purely 
original, independent judgment is impossible’ (HE 33).  
 In this way encountering an object in a writer’s museum – whether it is a chair, 
teacup, dress, or pen, we often come not only with assumptions about the being-for 
or tool nature of these things but with assumptions about the being-for nature of the 
house/museum itself. It follows then that the suspension of the original being-for of 
the equipment in a museum is not a shock as such (as when one picks up a hammer 
in Heidegger’s model to find it has failed in its use). Still, as Heidegger says of a 
damaged or an unsuitable tool, in its unusability ‘equipment becomes conspicuous’ 
(BT 102) which means that even in the writer’s house/museum setting unusable tools 
are conspicuous to a degree (it is, I would argue, shocking to see a braid of hair in a 
glass case, and disorienting to see a dress ‘standing-up’ as if filled with a human 
form that is not actually present) but as museal objects they are also already 
understood as having a different ‘being-for’ – a being-for that involves the 
embodiment of the immaterial (the absent individual for whom they stand and the 
world of the past) – a being-for that is for seeing and, as many of the narratives in 
this thesis attest, also for presencing: a dynamic that can involve both memories / 
narratives and a sense of somatic encounter.  
     Already we have seen how autographic ascription, authenticity and contiguity 
contribute to the resonant power of things. Suddenly, in those scenarios, added to 
everyday tools such as tables, teacups, umbrellas and pens is an element of the 
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significance of the person who used or touched them. This renders the tool special by 
association, but it does not change the status of the tool. In Bruce Hood’s experiment 
he passed a cardigan that allegedly belonged to the serial killer Fred West around an 
auditorium and asked people touch it. He also passed a pen around claiming that it 
was Einstein’s pen in order to consider the different responses to things associated 
with appealing figures (Einstein) or taboo figures (Fred West). In both these cases 
the things are still a tool first – an article of clothing, a writing implement – a unique 
or valuable tool with deep associations, yes, but as a held thing, passed along hand to 
hand they are things that are not removed from the arena of their use (Hood 
challenges people to wear the cardigan and any one of the people handed the pen 
could write with it).  What writers’ houses/museums do is provide a setting in which 
a tool becomes, through displacement from the everyday natural setting in which the 
tool functions – a worlding entity, an artefact or a work of art. As Harman notes, for 
Heidegger: 
…pieces of art are works, not just tools or present-at-hand physical lumps. The 
essence of art is that it shows the truth of beings set to work. What artworks 
reproduce is not things, but rather the essence of things. Normally, equipment 
is used invisibly and silently until it breaks down or otherwise attracts our 
notice. Only in artworks does the equipmentality of equipment come to the 
fore. While tools tend to be invisibly immersed in the world, in the artwork the 
tool’s entire world becomes visible along with it. (HE 110) 
 
This idea, that art’s work, or one of its functions, or part of its being-for is 
illumination or the revelation of essence will be returned to in chapter five in relation 
to Dickens’s desk and chair and how two artworks featuring his desk and chair 
illuminate aspects of worlding. In this instance it is enough to note that Harman is 
suggesting that artworks can bring aspects of a tool’s essence to the fore, a dynamic 
borne from the heightened visibility of a tool that one would normally use without 
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deep consideration. I am suggesting that a similar dynamic happens in the removal of 
a tool from use and its placement on display in the writer’s house/museum. In such 
cases the essence of the thing becomes foregrounded – the thing ceases to be ready-
to-hand and in that stasis is seen more profoundly, which I am suggesting allows the 
tool as a thing to become ready-to-hand as a remembrancer.  
 If Harland had simply encountered a table in a house (versus the Carlyle’s table at 
the Carlyle House) she may not have raised it in her regard beyond the general 
setting and either its present-at-hand reduction or ready-to-hand nature, she might 
have looked past it or set her bag on it. As a tool or piece of equipment it would have 
recessed into the environment and its set of relations, but as a tool or piece of 
equipment read as an artefact the table’s ability to world comes into being. It’s 
being-for as a tool (which Bessie made bread on) is noted in tandem with its being-
for as a tool capable of provoking and presencing the past and those who abided in 
the past alongside the table. Similarly, if a manuscript page is severed from its use as 
a draft or document and framed as ‘art’ (autographic/literary art or aesthetic art in 
that its markings matter) it becomes a tool for provocation, evoking the hand and 
writer who drafted it and other associated relations; in short: it ‘worlds’. 
 The placement of tools in stasis facilitates the transition of a tool’s being-for. It 
removes the object from its common associational tool-use. Harman suggests that 
‘[o]nly in artworks does the equipmentality of equipment come to the fore’ – 
referencing Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes in his 
essay ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art’ (HE 110) but I would argue that the 
equipmentality of equipment that comes to the fore in writers’ museums is 
(extending Harman’s suggestion) while related to the essence of the things 
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themselves (the being-for of the dress for wearing) also a springboard toward a 
different dynamic, one in which memories and narratives are stored in things.  
     This chapter began by asserting that a sense of encounter or communion with a 
writer can be manifested through an environment of worlding things. Things, 
removed from their original tool-use preserve not only a sense of the person with 
whom they were associated in their ‘equipmental’ life; they also, through exclusion 
from the circuit of use, fulfill a new purpose – becoming tools for remembrance. This 
is one of the most important ways the setting of the writer’s house/museum 
contributes to the resonant power of things, and one of the ways specific kinds of 
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Chapter Three: Hair   
 
Locks of hair were powerful remembrancers in the Victorian era. As a part of the 
body that was severable, pliable, portable and enduring hair was especially fit for the 
task of evoking the absent or dead individual to whom the hair once belonged. 
Reading locks of hair from the Wordsworth Trust collection alongside letters from 
William, Mary and Dora Wordsworth, the first section of this chapter will 
demonstrate that, in the nineteenth century, locks of hair were utilized as physical 
reminders that could evoke the absent individual for whom they stood while also 
materially figuring bonds through a medium that would outlast the individuals 
signified. 
 Section two will read the anthropologist Edmund Leach’s essay ‘Magical Hair’ 
alongside hair binding narratives in Villette and Wuthering Heights in order to 
demonstrate that hair, as a material remain, was a tool that could be both 
representational (something that ‘says’) and instrumental (something that ‘does’). 
 Section three will examine hair’s instrumentality in the context of the writer’s 
house/museum. As a non-circulating / displayed fragment and an autographic remain   
hair presences the absent individual in a different way than it would have in its 
original context. Whereas many of the locks of hair in these collections may 
originally have signified or cemented bonds of love, or represented the grief of 
severance at death and a longing for connection, in the writer’s house/museum locks 
of hair are both bodily archives and bodily witnesses – providing the viewer with a 
different sense of connection, one in which the absent individual is figured as a 
present-absence, evoking both the physical fact of their life and their death. 
  114 
 
I – Wordsworth’s Hair 
 
The Wordsworth Trust collection has over seventy samples of hair43 many attributed 
to Wordsworth himself though some are attributed to family members or individuals 
from their larger social circle.44 These samples take a variety of forms: some are 
locks, some plaits, some strands or even trimmings – a good number of those 
attributed to Wordsworth himself are smoothed locks tied with ribbon or thin slips of 
silk.45  
 There are so many locks of William Wordsworth’s hair in various public and 
private collections that it seems dubious one man (with so little hair on his head in 
his later years) could have produced such a large sampling. An undated newspaper 
clipping archived at the Wordsworth Trust’s Jerwood Centre suggests as much. Filed 
with a small ambrotype glass reproduction of Wordsworth and a lock of his (alleged) 
hair (catalogue item 1994.37), the article, entitled ‘Lock of Hair and Miniature’ 
focuses on the auctioning-off of a lock of hair purported to be Wordsworth’s from 
the property of a Rev. G. C. Fletcher of Grasmere. It contains the following 
summary:  
Explaining the low price of the relic, an antique dealer told a Gazette reporter 
that it was due to the fact that there would be no ready market for it. ‘Some 
time ago,’ he said, ‘there was a great sale in lockets containing what were 
reputed to be strands of Wordsworth’s hair and in this way much more hair 
                                                 
43 For comparison’s sake, The Brontë Parsonage collection lists 48 samples of hair (47 human, 1 canine). Of these, 28 of the 
samples are attributed to the Brontës, 20 are unattributed. 19 of the samples are worked (meaning: plaited, plaited and bound, or 
set in some form of jewelry; 13 mounted or framed (including J81 which is a mounted and framed collection of 7 locks from the 
family) and 16 are unworked (meaning: a simple cutting bound with silk or of the type placed in an envelope). 
44 The Wordsworth archive is a good indicator of the range of exchange common in his lifetime. While there are many samples 
of beloved family members’ hair, there are also samples from the family’s larger social and familial circles. Examples of hair 
samples belonging to those who were not immediate members of the Wordsworth family include 2003.79.96.42 (Herbert 
Coleridge’s hair); WLMS Moorsom /28/15 (a lock of a Joshua Stanger’s hair); WLMS Moorsom/28/13 (a lock of a Margaret 
Emily Spedding’s hair), WLMSS11/11/5 (an envelope containing the hair of the four Stewart siblings).  
45 GRMDC.E68a purple ribbon; GRMDC.E68b red ribbon; GRMDC.E72b red ribbon and black thread; GRMDC.E73a blue 
silk in pink tissue paper; GRMDC.E73b black thread and blue ribbon; GRMDC.E5 tied with blue wool; 2002.19.12 envelope 
and so on. 
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than the poet could ever have had on his head was sold to souvenir hunters. 
Therefore, even this lock, which has been treasured by the Fletcher family 
from the days when Wordsworth was a regular guest at their home, would be 
treated with distrust by buyers.’ (‘Lock’) 
 
According to the clipping, the miniature and the lock were purchased anyway, for £1 
18s by a Mrs. Bailey of Grasmere, the two objects and the newspaper article 
eventually finding their way to the Jerwood Centre where they were acquired in 
1994. 
 To be clear, Wordsworth was not ungenerous with his hair. When an old friend, 
Basil Montagu, wrote to Wordsworth requesting a lock of his hair, Wordsworth 
obliged, writing in his reply of 1 October, 1844: ‘I send you the lock of hair which 
you desired, white as snow, and taken from a residue that is thinning rapidly’ (C. 
Wordsworth 411). Edwin Paxton Hood’s 1856 biography of Wordsworth 
(Wordsworth: A Biography) also documents the ‘traffic’ in Wordsworth’s hair, 
describing how James Dixon, one of three servants at Rydal Mount, took advantage 
of his position as Wordsworth’s barber. Paxton Hood states that Dixon ‘who was to 
the poet gardener, groom, and something more, a loving and faithful, and watchful 
heart, cut his master’s hair, but the locks were never thrown away from that 
venerable head, but have found their way into hundreds of hands in every part of the 
Empire’. Dixon also apparently kept ‘a quantity of cards with the poet’s autograph, 
and thus he sometimes comforted those who failed to see him, by either a lock of his 
hair, or a dash of his pen’ (471). 
     Real human hair, whether properly ascribed or not, is an authentic thing, it is also 
the most inherently autographic and contiguous object considered in this thesis. Even 
when viewed apart from its person (as in those slim grey locks from Wordsworth’s 
head) hair tends in its fragmentary/severed form to reference its absent source, which 
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implies that conceptually hair is never severed completely from its context; that some 
sense of affiliation or contiguity (to the known or abstracted individual) remains. 
 The locks of hair in the Wordsworth Trust collection, both in terms of their 
number and the variety of ways (formally, informally) in which they are configured, 
support this chapter’s assertion that hair was used materially to establish, signify and 
maintain a bond between individuals, whether separated by distance or death. This is 
evidenced by a letter written by Wordsworth’s sister-in-law Priscilla (née Lloyd) in 
which she asks her father for some hair with which to remember her dead siblings (P. 
Wordsworth ‘Letter’) as well as by the gold-mounted mourning brooch containing a 
plait of William’s nephew’s hair and inscribed ‘In memory of / J. Wordsworth / who 
departed this / life on the 18th of / Augt. 1846’ (Mourning Brooch). 
 Hair tokens, like the ones Priscilla requested and like John Wordsworth’s, were 
not uncommon in the Victorian era and were often distributed widely depending on 
how many family members or friends might wish to receive such a token. As 
Elizabeth G. Gitter notes in ‘The Power of Women’s Hair in the Victorian 
Imagination’ the ‘literary fascination with the magical power of women’s hair 
coincided in Victorian everyday life with an intense popular preoccupation with hair 
and hair tokens…. fashioned, as if through alchemy, from the plaited hair of family 
members, lovers, and friends, living and dead’ (942).  
 While hair tokens that commemorated the dead were often imbued with feelings 
of loss, grief and longing, the exchange of hair tokens between the living tended to 
function as reminders or symbols of friendship or love. In a letter written in 1832 to 
her step-daughter Jemima Quillinan, Dora Wordsworth Quillinan (William and 
Mary’s daughter) noted that she was still wearing a locket with Jemima’s hair in it, 
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stating: ‘as further proof that you are not forgotten I must tell you that at this moment 
I have round my neck a lock of your hair which I cut off your little bit of a head, as it 
was, ten years ago & which has been worn by me ever since’ (D. Wordsworth 
‘Letter’). Dora’s letter demonstrates that the use of hair as a ‘presencing’ device or 
‘remembrancer’ could occur in relation to those living, for Jemima was not dead, 
simply distant; a distance that the apprehension of the lock diminished: the locket 
and hair likely calling Jemima to mind both when Dora consciously considered them 
and when the hair locket presenced itself on her body – a ‘proof’ that her step-
daughter was ‘not forgotten’. Here, hair is a positive remembrancer, a ‘touchstone’ 
that calls Jemima to mind.  
 Hair tokens used this way – singly – were therefore a reminder of an absent 
individual, though locks of hair were frequently combined: plaited or bound to signal 
a bond or a union between two or more individuals. This is the case with the 
comingled locks of William and Mary Wordsworth’s hair (Wordsworth box, Fig. 3 
below) – an object that serves as a concrete example of the way locks of hair were 
sometimes used in the era: as both a symbolic representation of a couple’s love and 
affection and as the embodiment of a communion. 
 
 
Fig. 3. William and Mary Wordsworth's hair in silver box, GRMDC.H120. Photograph: 
 Giovanna Rocchi ©The Wordsworth Trust Museum, Grasmere.  
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The Wordsworth’s hair, catalogue item GRMDC.H120, is a decorative rectangular 
silver box that may possibly have been used as a snuffbox; it is 70mm long, 49mm 
wide and 12mm high. A floral pattern and a decorative cross are etched on the lid 
and the box opens via two small hinges on one side. Inside, framed behind glass are 
two locks of hair belonging to Mary and William Wordsworth (WT archive). Mary’s 
hair takes the form of a larger fair-haired plait wound numerous times into an oval 
shape, inside which William’s smaller (and whiter) lock (bowed into something 
resembling a pretzel-shape) is nestled.  
 How the hair came to be bound in the box is uncertain, but aspects of William and 
Mary’s correspondence affirm that both of them were invested in the idea of 
togetherness both in life and after it. This is evidenced by repeated expressions of 
longing and their dissatisfaction around the idea of separation46 as in William’s 
assertion to Mary, in a letter written in June of 1812, that their recent period of 
separation has led him to understand the strengths of their marriage: ‘How I long, 
(again must I say) to be with thee; every hour of absence now is a grievous loss, 
because we have been parted sufficiently to feel how profoundly in soul & body we 
love each other; and to be taught what a sublime treasure we possess in each others 
love…’ (Darlington 229). Or Mary to William: ‘…only I must say longings to have 
you by my side have this day been painful to me beyond expression…’ (219), or 
William to Mary: ‘…for you never I think are out of my mind 3 minutes together 
                                                 
46 See in particular Darlington’s The Love Letters of William and Mary Wordsworth pages 33, 60, 62, 81-2, 162-2, 183, 210, 
219, 229. These letters explicitly mention loss or separation. Mary’s hair was also a topic in their letters. In 1810, one day 
before her fortieth birthday, Mary wrote a letter to her husband lamenting the outward signs of aging: ‘…tis true I am losing my 
teeth and my hair is becoming grey – these, the two great ornaments my Youth had to boast of, (my hair especially I prized, 
because thou once ventured to speak in admiration of it) I must own are upon the wain  – else I think I am as good as ever…’ 
(Darlington 78). Whether the ‘admiration’ Mary was referring to was expressed in William’s poem ‘She Was a Phantom of 
Delight’ or in some private comment is unknown, although the poem in which Wordsworth wrote of a woman with ‘eyes as 
stars of Twilight fair; / Like Twilight’s, too, her dusky hair’ is a likely candidate, as it was written two years into their marriage 
(Wordsworth, Selected 34).  
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however I am engaged, but I am every moment seized with a longing wish that you 
might see the objects which interest me as I pass along, and not having you at my 
side my pleasure is so imperfect that after a short look I had rather not see the objects 
at all’ (62). These letters and others like them suggest that, whatever the vagaries of a 
marriage, there was a strong sense of affection between the couple and that their time 
apart made them palpably aware of how much they missed each other. For William, 
Mary’s absence brings him to an awareness of both their spiritual and bodily love. 
For Mary, William’s absence is described in an embodied fashion wherein his 
absence is traceable to a specific location (by her side – a spatial identification also 
present in William’s letter), an absence that causes her ‘pain’ just as William’s 
longing ‘seizes’ him.  
 This longing to be together is affirmed in a letter of Mary’s written in 1810, 
though here she takes the idea of separation one step farther: ‘Well! next Saturday 
but one & we meet to part no more for any length of time – till a sod separates us, & 
that separation I trust will be for no great length of time’ (81-2). This idea of two 
kinds of separation, the one in life, and the one after the death of one of the partners 
(‘till a sod separates us’) and the theme of a desire to bridge the distance and be 
together both now and eternally reflects in language the kind of bond expressed 
materially by the comingling of their locks of hair. In this way the twining or nestling 
of hair is both an emblem and a material and synecdocal47 manifestation of an 
                                                 
47 Synecdoche is ‘a special type of metonymy’ wherein the part stands for the whole (Preminger 840). In Metaphors We Live By 
Lakoff and Johnson also identify synecdoche as a special case of metonymy. Interestingly they differentiate metonymy from 
metaphor by noting that metaphors are ‘principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another’ with understanding as 
the main function of the construction whereas metonymy has ‘primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one 
entity to stand for another’ (36). This referential function means that a lock of hair as a ‘part’ points to, or refers to its absent 
whole. While definitions of synecdoche note that the figure usually features an inherent relation (either of entity or concept) 
between the part and the whole (Preminger 840) – as in the inherent relation between a lock of hair and the body it sprang from 
– Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that linguistically ‘which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are 
focusing on’ (36). They note, for example, the use of ‘good heads’ for smart people has special correspondences between the 
part singled out and the attribute being described: ‘[l]ike metaphors, metonymies are not random or arbitrary occurrences, to be 
treated as isolated instances’ (37).  As ‘a tangible part of one’s self’ (Bell 7) a lock of hair is not an arbitrary fragment in 
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embodied desire – a gesture, if made by the couple, that expresses an abiding 
connection between two individuals. A gesture, if made by others, reflecting the 
bond of the couple in life and how it was understood they might like to be 
represented eternally.  
 As with most of the locks in the Wordsworth collection (and across the collections 
of the writers’ houses/museums considered here) the Wordsworth’s hair is not overly 
‘worked’. This implies that the locks did not serve a decorative function. Similarly 
the lack of an inscription or notice (as on the box holding Dora Wordsworth’s plait, 
examined later in this chapter) reduces the likelihood that the hair was placed in the 
box for predominantly commemorative or public purposes. Because the nestled locks 
do not take the form of hair jewelry (especially in those forms associated with 
women: lockets, brooches, bracelets, rings) it’s possible the silver box belonged to a 
man; that perhaps William took it with him on his travels in order to presence Mary. 
(The authenticating narrative for the object includes the fact that the donor – a 
relation of the family’s – always referred to it as ‘Wordsworth’s snuffbox’.) It’s also 
possible that the locks were pressed together after the Wordsworths’ deaths (William 
in 1850 and Mary in 1859) to preserve some sense of them as a couple.48 In either 
case, the presence of Mary’s hair and the predominance of her coil make the object 
seem less like a Wordsworthian ‘literary souvenir’ and more like a romantic or 
familial token: the coiled locks encased behind glass (now doubly encased – in that 
this item is displayed prominently at the Wordsworth Museum) serving as a visual 
                                                 
constructions for remembering and binding – it is a part of the loved body that can be seen, touched or held even when the body 
cannot; it is a part of the body that outlasts it. Phillipe Ariès refers to hair as an ‘incorruptible fragment’ (Hour 462). As Robert 
Bartlett suggests in his essay ‘Symbolic Meanings of Hair in the Middle Ages’, one of the reasons hair ‘is a particularly fertile 
and powerful bearer of meaning’ is because it ‘is an exceptionally malleable body part. It has almost the same range of 
possibilities of treatment as clothing – it can be shaped, dyed, removed – but it emerges from the body and is thus organic in a 
way that clothes are not…’ (43).  
48 The box and hair were acquired by the Trust through Wordsworth’s grandson Gordon Graham Wordsworth who came into 
possession of it through Mrs Buller Little whose family was related to Mary Wordsworth née Hutchinson’s family 
(‘Wordsworth Box’ WT object card). 
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semiotic of an eternal union – an eternal union William himself sought to evoke 
when, in a letter to Mary, he suggested that their letters be ‘deposited side by side as 
a bequest for the survivor of us’ (Darlington 60), an allusion to the material world’s 
ability to both outlast and symbolically unite individuals via those objects that are 
deeply associated with them.  
 The comingling of the Wordsworth’s hair for personal or familial use, and Dora’s 
use of a lock of her step-daughter’s hair as a reminder of her establishes that hair was 
used materially to signify a bond between individuals. But hair, as the next section of 
this chapter will demonstrate, was more than just a signifying object – it was also 
something that could ‘do’. 
 
II – Things that Say and Things that Do 
 
In his 1957 essay ‘Magical Hair’ the social anthropologist Edmund Leach sought to 
address some of his concerns with recent psychoanalytic readings of anthropological 
rituals or symbolic behaviours concerning hair. His focus was on the psychoanalytic 
analysis of hair that Charles Berg had employed in a 1951 publication entitled The 
Unconscious Significance of Hair. Berg’s reading of hair symbolism used 
anthropological examples of rituals involving hair and haircutting (predominantly 
from Frazer’s The Golden Bough published some sixty years before) but he used 
these to support the idea that hair could be seen cross-culturally as a representation of 
genitalia and was often employed as such because of issues of repression. In his 
essay, Leach, without dismissing the value of psychoanalytic readings as informative 
frames of reference, argues that the ritual use of hair (styling, oiling, cutting, etc.) is a 
  122 
conscious mode of symbolism established through cultural contexts and not some 
manifestation of individual repression. Although he does not disavow the possibility 
that certain practices might be born in part from cross-cultural ideas and associations 
(conscious or subconscious) around issues such as purity, impurity etc. his position 
was one that sided, by and large, with conscious meaning-making on the part of 
groups or individuals. This means that in relation to hair as a thing Leach prioritized 
human agency as a determinative factor in hair rituals, stating: ‘In the 
anthropologist’s view, ritually powerful human hair is full of magical potency not 
because it is hair but because of the ritual context of its source, e.g. murder, incest, 
mourning etc. It is the ritual situation which makes the hair “powerful”, not the hair 
which makes the ritual powerful’ (159).  
 What is most useful in Leach’s argument in relation to this thesis – beyond his 
assertion that rituals involving hair occur across a variety of cultures and that 
anthropologists suspect ‘that human hair has some universal symbolic value’ (160)49 
– is his differentiation early in the essay between two kinds of symbolic behaviour 
(public and private) as well as his differentiation between the kind of symbolic 
behaviour that ‘says something’ (as communication content) and the kind that 
‘arouses emotion and consequently “does” something’ (147). 
     Leach’s definitions of acts of public and private symbolism revolve logically 
around acts that are committed in front of an audience or for the purpose of display 
(public or social acts wherein the groups might ‘share a common set of conventions’) 
                                                 
49 Leach acknowledges: 
It is quite true that ethnography reveals an almost world-wide distribution of hairdressing rituals. These rituals are 
particularly prominent in mourning ceremonies but occur also in other rites de passage and even in rites of a less 
personal nature. There is substantial though not complete consistency between the hair rituals of different cultures, and 
it has been a common postulate among anthropologists that human hair has some universal symbolic value. 
Discussions of hair symbolism were fairly prominent in the early debates concerning animism and magic. The general 
consensus was that hair stands for the total individual or for the soul, or for the individual’s personal power (mana). 
(160)  
This statement supports the synecdochal reading of hair in this thesis, as in ‘the part for the whole’. 
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and those committed more privately between one or two individuals 
(private/subjective acts) (148). His analogy for symbolic behaviours that say or do 
(which he originally equates with public (say) vs. private (do) rituals) is worth 
noting. He suggests:  
 If a sovereign wears a crown at a state function, this ‘says’ something, it asserts 
that ‘this is the King’. In contrast, when at a coronation, oil is poured on the 
sovereign’s head, this ‘does’ something: it ‘makes him a King’. In this latter 
case we are dealing with what is ordinarily referred to as magic; the magical act 
alters the situation in a mystical rather than in a material sense. (151) 
 
For Leach the anthropologist’s responsibility is to the observable, public act. He sees 
psychoanalysis as concerning itself with the relatively unknowable private act, a 
position that ‘assumes that the potency of these symbols is derived from something 
innate in every particular individual’ (159). What Leach acknowledges in his 
conclusion is that even though he regards psychoanalytic methodology as suspect, 
‘both the psychological and the sociological analyses lead to closely similar 
interpretations of the “meaning” of particular symbols’ and that ‘each is “correct”, 
but only when considered within its own frame of reference’ (161-162). For Leach, 
those areas of cross-disciplinary agreement in relation to hair rituals cannot be 
homogenized through unifying ideologies or the anthropologists’ societal approach 
and the psychoanalysts’ personal approach. Instead he suggests ‘a bridge between the 
two frames of reference’ (162), frames of reference that I believe the anthropologist 
Daniel Miller attempts to bridge in his recent work on material culture when he 
advocates for a ‘simultaneous commitment to the extremes of particularity and of 
generality’ (Miller 9, emphasis added, see especially Stuff 7-9; 22).  
     Similarly, thinking about things that can both ‘say’ and ‘do’ is crucial. Leach 
acknowledges in ‘Magical Hair’ that there can be a conflation, that ‘[s]ymbolic 
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behaviour not only “says” something, it also arouses emotion and consequently 
“does” something’50 (147) a simultaneous saying and doing that is demonstrated by a 
scene in Charlotte Brontë’s novel Villette. 
 In the novel Villette, Charlotte Brontë uses the binding of hair as a motif to signify 
a connection between individuals. In the scene in question, Paulina – observed by the 
novel’s protagonist and narrator, Lucy Snowe – sits between her father and her 
fiancée Graham under a tree on the grounds of the palace at Bois l’Etang. To make 
peace between them she fashions an amulet of their hair bound with hers. This scene 
is worth quoting at length because it shows clearly that the amulet Paulina makes is 
not only imbued with power by Paulina’s verbal assertion but also perceived to enact 
a new state of affairs in the trio’s relationship. Even Lucy (observing) notes that 
through Paulina’s act of binding the hair a new relationship is ‘rendered’ – that of 
unity. The scene is told from Lucy’s point of view. Lucy sees the trio and notices 
Polly, how:  
  …with the tiny pair of scissors, glittering in her lap, she had severed spoils 
from each manly head beside her, and was now occupied in plaiting together 
the gray lock and the golden wave. The plait woven–no silk-thread being at 
hand to bind it–a tress of her own hair was made to serve that purpose; she tied 
it like a knot, prisoned it in a locket, and laid it on her heart.  
  ‘Now,’ said she, ‘there is an amulet made, which has virtue to keep you two 
always friends. You can never quarrel so long as I wear this.’  
  An amulet was indeed made, a spell framed which rendered enmity 
impossible. She was become a bond to both, an influence over each, a mutual 
concord….  
  …I watched the father, the daughter, the future husband, now united–all 
blessed and blessing. (505-506) 
                                                 
50 We can see these two modes at work in a letter written by a young woman named Emily Palmer to her brother William in 
1852. Emily had just received a ring from their sister Laura which contained hair from their recently deceased sister Dorthea: 
 Dear Laura…has given us each a ring of our Do’s hair with a small pearl in the middle. I am so fond 
of it. We chose a ring – and I am glad for 3 reasons. First because always wearing it – helps me 
always to think of her – 2nd because a ring seems to be [a] bond of love – 3rd it being round – a 
circle reminds one how one’s love and communion with her may and will last for ever if we don’t 
lose it by our own fault. Then the Pearl ‘Purity’ pleases me so much. (Jalland 298-9; see also Lutz 
134).  
In her letter Emily privileges the fact that the ring ‘helps’ her remember Do and the symbolically resonant details (the 
symbolism of rings as a bond, the infinite nature of the circle, the pearl) follow. This reflects Dora Wordsworth’s emphasis on 
the functional role of her stepdaughter’s hair – as a remembrancer first, rather then as a symbolic piece of jewelry. 
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The question of agency in relation to resonant things is one that will reoccur in 
different guises in every chapter of this thesis. In the case of Villette two readings of 
the hair’s role in establishing the ‘mutual accord’ between Paulina’s father and future 
husband are suggested: in one the binding of the trio’s hair is symbolic – a 
representation of a situation, and, in the other, hair is a constitutive or determining 
force.  
 The reading of hair as a determining force comes predominantly from Polly’s 
assertion that the amulet51 has the ‘virtue’ to make a certain condition exist – though 
the assertion can be read as a veiled instruction, which relocates the agency to 
Paulina. In giving their locks the men have already submitted to her will which 
means that it’s unlikely they would (given their respective love for her) challenge her 
dictum. In asserting the amulet’s power Paulina relieves herself of having to tell the 
men directly what to do, she locates the authority in the object and lets the binding 
act as a surrogate for her demand.  
 In this case the bound locks are symbolic in so much as they are material things 
that represent conditions enacted by Paulina and agreed to by the men. Still, even in 
their symbolism they perform a function – through the locket’s actual physical form 
and presence on her body Paulina is relieved of a responsibility in future dynamics. 
All she has to do is wear the amulet in order for the men to be ‘always friends’ 
because having instructed them in such a way and having tied the instruction 
materially to the amulet the wearing of it acts as a reminder to the men who, if they 
want to respect her wishes, must behave accordingly. Having submitted to her in the 
making of the amulet all that would need to happen in the future is for the amulet to 
                                                 
51 The term ‘amulet’ is generally associated with an object used for protection and preservation i.e. when worn as a charm 
(OED). 
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be seen in the midst of a conflict, thus calling to mind the agreement made and 
thereby ending any potential conflicts. Here the binding symbolically puts the men in 
their place in relation to the dynamics of the situation (they are tied to each other and 
Polly is what binds them) but the act of being bound together in a 
material/synecdochal form and the agreed-upon transfer of power to the hair amulet 
(a transfer of power that is given because of the hair’s fitness to represent the trio and 
bind them) is what enacts an understanding and the resultant change. This makes the 
amulet a constitutive force in the peace making; this also makes the hair a tool. 
 In ‘Magical Hair’ Leach ascribes the power of things like hair to the willingness 
of the individuals to be so affected, a position that Leach acknowledges ‘poses for 
the anthropologist an essentially psychological problem: Just where does the 
emotional content of symbols come from, and how is it that some symbols are more 
emotionally loaded than others?’ (147). This is not a question he attempts to answer, 
perhaps because, as he states in relation to the anthropological position, he sees the 
context as the actor or signifier, not the hair. Implicit in his question, and most useful 
for the purposes of this thesis, is a secondary query: if the emotional content of a 
symbol is weak then how can it be effective? If the emotional content of a symbol is 
strong (‘more emotionally loaded’) and can therefore effect change in those engaging 
with it, then is there not some aspect of change that is induced by the object in 
question? And if so, is that power of induction totally put onto the thing by the ritual 
context or does it come, in part, from those qualities that are inherent in/to the thing 
in question? 
 In keeping with Leach’s open-ended query about emotional content, I’ll return to 
his analogy about the making of the king in which he asks: ‘In this instance, for 
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example, what is there about “pouring oil on the head” which makes the act 
appropriate for “making” a king?’ (151). In this question Leach focuses less on the 
material object of choice (‘oil’) and why it might be the vehicle or tool most ‘fit’ for 
‘making’, than on the act of ‘pouring’ – the subject-oriented / human-enacted 
framing, or what he refers to as the human context. This foregrounding of human 
agency and determinism can be challenged by the anthropologist Daniel Miller’s 
assertion in Stuff (2010) that ‘[i]t is now clear that in material culture we are 
concerned at least as much with how things make people as the other way around’ 
(42). This is not to say that Leach is wrong and that the ‘making’ of the king isn’t 
determined by human will and agreement, it is only to suggest that his insistence on 
the human actor’s agency doesn’t leave room for the question of what makes a thing 
(in his case oil) the right tool or agent for the making.  
 If things ‘do’ – if they are perceived as agents for doing-with, as tools able to 
fulfill our ritualistic needs (to feel close to, to connect with, to remember) then, as 
this thesis suggests their ability to do so comes in part from them. Oil is used to make 
a king because it has qualities (overt or intuited) that make it more fit for the task of 
consecration than leaves or wood or nails. Hair is used to evoke memories and to 
presence the absent because in the Victorian era it was more fit for the task than 
other objects (which explains why its popularity as a remembrancer declined after 
the advent of photography). Which is to say that it is because hair is biologically and 
visually contiguous, because it is an actual part of the entity from whom it sprang, 
that it is a fit tool for remembrance: for binding, connecting and conjuring. 
 One more example from literature will be useful in elaborating on aspects of the 
distinction between things that ‘say’ and things that ‘do’. In both Charlotte Brontë’s 
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Villette and Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights hair bindings are used to enact a set 
of human relations. In Villette it is a bond between Paulina, her father and future 
husband – all living. In Wuthering Heights the binding is intended to enact a 
comingling after death. Wuthering Heights, in this way, doesn’t bridge Leach’s 
differentiation between the kind of symbolic behaviour that ‘says something’ (as 
communication content) and the kind that ‘arouses emotion and consequently “does” 
something’ (Leach 147) as in the Villette scene, rather the scene in Wuthering 
Heights – of a hair binding that is intended to be private – affirms that hair in the era 
was not always employed as a tool that could enact through saying, rather, it was 
sometimes perceived as something that had the power to ‘do’. 
 Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights was published in 1847. Set in the Yorkshire 
moors, it concerns the love affair between Catherine Earnshaw and her former 
childhood friend, Heathcliff, a homeless boy taken in by Catherine’s father when 
they were young. Because of Heathcliff’s social status Catherine cannot marry him 
and instead marries Edgar Linton. Out of spite Heathcliff, having found wealth, 
elopes with Edgar’s sister Isabella. Eventually Catherine dies, having given birth to 
Edgar’s daughter. Throughout the novel there are intimations that Catherine is near – 
haunting the farmhouse and Heathcliff.  
 In recounting the story of Heathcliff and Catherine’s relationship to an enquiring 
Mr. Lockwood, the narrator of the novel, Nelly, describes an event that took place 
just after Catherine’s death – a scene in which Heathcliff removes Edgar Linton’s 
hair from the locket around the recently-deceased Catherine’s neck only to replace it 
with his own lock (205). This crucial scene where Heathcliff casts Linton’s hair out 
of Catherine’s locket serves no emblematic or symbolic purpose within the scene if 
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part of the function of a symbol is to be read by others. Catherine was ready for 
burial and already draped (Heathcliff had to move ‘the drapery about the corpse’s 
face’ to access the locket) which means that it’s unlikely anyone would have known 
Heathcliff had replaced Linton’s hair with ‘a black lock of his own’ had Nelly not 
discovered Linton’s discarded lock (205).  
 What kind of intention can be drawn from Heathcliff’s actions? He is not a 
sentimental character. It’s possible Emily Brontë wanted to appease her readers’ 
disappointment at Catherine’s death and the lovers parting by providing some sense 
of their eternal communion – an outcome already alluded to through Heathcliff’s 
‘sudden paroxysm’ wherein he states ‘I know that ghosts have wandered on earth’ 
after which he begs (the already dead) Catherine to ‘[b]e with me always – take any 
form – drive me mad! only do not leave me in this abyss, where I cannot find you!’ 
(204).52 It’s also possible Brontë wanted her readers to believe that in placing his hair 
in the locket some element of his person, some synecdochal iteration would go with 
Catherine to the grave, a sentiment Brontë subverts wonderfully by having Nelly 
twist Linton and Heathcliff’s locks together in the locket, a binding that may 
represent compromise for Nelly, but which ultimately represents the continuity of the 
love triangle as it was in life, one that induces (in this reader at least) a sense of 
discomfort, of the wrong kind of psychological contamination, of an eternity mired 
in the somatic kind of conflict that entangled the trio in life.     
 This perception of a lock of hair as an eternally connecting force is evidenced in 
the real-life diary of the painter John Horsley (1817-1903) whose wife Elvira died on 
                                                 
52 For an interesting reading of Heathcliff’s actions in relation to his lock of hair see Deborah Lutz’s suggestion that Heathcliff’s 
desired union is more flesh-based than ethereal. She also suggests that in taking a fragment of his body and melding it to hers 
that Heathcliff ‘desires his presence to linger, synechdocally, in the place she is, somewhere on the other side of death’ (131). 
Lutz’s reading supports a belief in the connecting fragment as one whose sympathetic connection to its former host can enact or 
maintain a union, a fact bolstered by Lutz’s fleeting reference to ‘a much older fabric of belief – sympathetic magic’ (132).  
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1 December 1852. In Death in the Victorian Family Pat Jalland recounts how before 
burying Elvira: 
They hung round her neck a little red velvet bag containing locks of hair 
from John and the children, so that she could take to the grave some earthly 
reminders of her family. John recalled in his diary how his dying wife had 
planned this a month earlier, calling in the children one by one, cutting off 
locks of their hair, wrapping each in a note stating the name and date. (214) 
 
In this example the hair of the living is being used to link the living with the dead for 
the dead, as if the children’s hair – even in its cut state – would somehow remain 
linked to their ongoing vitality, a vitality that – the scenario seems to imply – will 
remain meaningful to their dead mother, perhaps connecting her to them from across 
death’s divide.  
 The taking of the locks of hair to the grave – and narratives like Wuthering 
Heights that employ hair as a material synecdoche of the self – a synecdoche that 
reflects laws of sympathetic magic (what befalls Heathcliff’s lock befalls him) 
supports the idea in the Victorian era that locks of hair created a sense of connection, 
of being together, a ‘communion-through-things’ – one that transcended (as Bruce 
Hood suggests in Supersense) common-sense boundaries.53 As Elizabeth G. Gitter 
                                                 
53 Sir James Frazer’s (1854-1941) anthropological thirteen-volume opus The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion was 
published over a period of years beginning in 1890. One of the remarkable aspects of a contemporary reading of certain parts of 
Frazer’s text – in particular those dealing with the idea of sympathetic magic and hair as a remain– is that there is some 
consistency between how Frazer suggests hair was viewed anthropologically in other cultures and how it was conceptually 
employed in Victorian social practices. In chapter 21 section 6 of The Golden Bough, in a section entitled ‘hair tabooed’, Frazer 
notes that: ‘For the Savage believes that the sympathetic connexion which exists between himself and every part of his body 
continues to exist even after the physical connexion has been broken, and that therefore he will suffer from any harm that may 
befall the severed parts of his body, such as the clippings of his hair or the parings of his nails’ (231–232). In section 8 he 
furthers this idea by stating: 
The notion that a man may be bewitched by means of the clippings of his hair, the parings of his nails, or any 
other severed portion of his person is almost world-wide, and attested by evidence too ample, too familiar, and 
too tedious in its uniformity to be here analyzed at length. The general idea on which the superstition rests is that 
of the sympathetic connexion supposed to persist between a person and everything that has once been part of his 
body or in any way closely related to him. A very few examples must suffice. They belong to that branch of 
sympathetic magic which may be called contagious. (233)  
Here Frazer is describing a belief that he suggests can be found widely across cultures, that of ‘sympathetic connexion’ a 
‘superstition’ wherein some sort of incorporeal tether or relation remains between things formerly joined – such as hair and the 
person, or nail trimmings and the person – even after those things have been severed. Frazer calls the belief a superstition 
though the sociologist/anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), writing just after the turn of the century, classified the law of 
‘sympathetic contiguity’ as a kind of magic. For Mauss, writing in A General Theory of Magic, contiguity is one of the three 
principal laws of sympathy, the other two being similarity and opposition (79). Of the law of contiguity he states: 
The simplest expression of the notion of sympathetic contiguity is the identification of a part with the whole. 
The part stands for the complete object. Teeth, saliva, sweat, nails, hair represent a total person, in such a way 
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noted in ‘The Power of Women’s Hair in the Victorian Imagination’ the leap from 
anthropological ideas of ‘sympathetic connexion’ to Victorian hair practices was not 
so great (942).54 This leap is not such a leap however, for essential to both is the idea 
of contiguity, a contiguity that transcends the distance between the part and the 
whole; that transcends absence or death. 
 
III – Hair’s Fitness as a Remembrancer 
 
As the previous two sections have demonstrated contiguity is one of the fundamental 
aspects of hair’s power as a symbol and a tool for remembrance. The fact that hair 
comes from the body, that it is durable and portable, that it is a part of oneself that 
can be shared make it fit for the task of evoking the absent individual for whom the 
hair stands, and for figuring bonds materially.  
 This last section will examine hair in the context of the writer’s house/museum 
demonstrating that as a non-circulating fragment and an historical autographic 
remain hair presences the absent individual in a different way than it would have in 
its original context. Beginning with a reading of a large plait of Dora Wordsworth’s 
hair from the Wordsworth Museum this section will illustrate that locks of hair can 
                                                 
that through these parts one can act directly on the individual concerned, either to bewitch or enchant him. 
Separation in no way disturbs the contiguity; a whole person can even be reconstituted with the aid of one of 
these parts: totum ex parte [part of the whole]. It is not necessary to give examples of beliefs which have become 
so well known by now. The same law may be expressed in another way: the personality of a being is indivisible, 
residing as a whole in each of his parts (79-80). 
54 In ‘The Dead Still Among Us: Victorian Secular Relics, Hair Jewelry, and Death Culture’ Deborah Lutz also correlates relic 
keeping with the desire for an on-going connection: ‘a desire to see death as not permanent, in that material remains might be 
proof that the loved one still exists somewhere, somehow’ (129). While Lutz acknowledges the role of sympathetic magic in the 
synecdochal reading of hair as ‘a part that could stand for the whole’ she also identifies religious and spiritual trends in the era 
as a contributing factor in the popularity of relic keeping:  
Spiritualism’s rise in the 50s and 60s contributed to the mid-century popularity of hairwork and secondary relics like 
clothing, jewelry, and bedrooms…. To many Evangelicals, and even more clearly to the Spiritualists, the dead 
remained tangibly among us. Spiritualists believed not only that the worlds of the living and the dead, the absent and 
the present, were permeable, but that the dead hovered close, and the lines of communication might be kept open. 
(133) 
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be read as both bodily archives and bodily witnesses – providing the museum viewer 
with a different sense of connection, one in which the absent individual is figured as 
a present-absence, evoking the physical fact of their life along with their death. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Dora Wordsworth Quillinan's plait, GRMDC.E59. Photograph: Giovanna Rocchi © 
 The Wordsworth Trust Museum, Grasmere. 
 
One of the most telling observations during my numerous visits to the Wordsworth 
Museum involved two women who’d come into the museum to pass time before 
meeting others for lunch. They seemed to have no interest in Wordsworth at all and 
moved quickly around the room chatting socially with each other and only paying 
cursory attention to the objects in the cases they passed by. Then one of them 
stopped and shrieked ‘Oh my God, look at the hair!’ and the second woman came 
over and together they stared at Dora Wordsworth Quillinan’s rather large plait of 
hair in its wooden box (GRMDC.E59) (fig. 4, above). My sense, from where I stood 
nearby taking notes, was that they were both fascinated with, and slightly repulsed 
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by, the hair. For them the context of the hair (the historical associations, connection 
to Wordsworth) seemed secondary to its jarring sensory presentation, for Dora’s plait 
is an unusually large one, cut from her head, as the box’s inscription indicates, the 
year she died (most likely at the time of her death). The inscription reads: ‘Dora’s 
hair / cut off by her own desire / for her husband / E.Q. 1847’ (‘Plait’). 
 Dora’s plait is striking not only for how it signals overt sensory information (the 
fair colour of the hair, the individual thready strands unified in waves of plait), but 
also for its ability as a fragment to visually signal other kinds of objects in a 
metaphoric and visual way. A plait of hair boxed as Dora’s is, is an unusual object to 
encounter, an object severed from its full context and usual relations – not only in 
terms of its setting, but also in terms of time. As such it offers up the possibility of 
other associations. For me the plait carries qualities similar to that of sleeping 
animals, burrowing things curled up in a small enclosure. This signals, for me, a 
sense of life under the surface of the plait that is created by the sensory similarities 
between the plait and my experience of, or understanding of, a category of mammals 
such as squirrels. I also remember associating the box with a coffin the first time I 
saw the object, a miniature coffin that made the plait feel like a full form. Obviously 
such associations are subjective and as such they will vary (there is also, arguably, an 
equally serpentine quality to the thickness and weave of the plait) but in each case 
these associations will be provoked by the sensory material attributes of the thing 
itself. Which is to say that things can, and sometimes do, provoke us in ways that 
could be called ‘metaphoric’ and that those apprehensions, no matter how 
  134 
subconscious, can not only shock us, but impact our sense of a material thing’s 
power and meaning. In such cases hair can signal more than itself.55   
 In ‘The Dead Still Among Us: Victorian Secular Relics, Hair Jewelry, and Death 
Culture’ Deborah Lutz describes the sensory dynamic of hair as capable of evoking 
both reverie and shock. 
To pore over the relic is to fall into the reverie of memory, to call to mind 
the absent being. The object disappears and becomes pure symbol, pointing 
only outside of itself. Yet the texture, its somewhat shocking substantiality 
as a thing, as an actual piece of that person, can call one back from reverie 
to feel its bluntness, its weighty, obstinate ‘thingness,’ its non-symbolic 
quality which refers to nothing but its own presence. (136) 
 
Here Lutz is describing the way a thing, like a plait of hair, can evoke both a sense of 
the absent individual from whom it came and also its own obdurate reality. Rather 
than a symbol that ‘says’ the plait is – a body part, remain, a post-mortem relic.  
 Hair in this way presences itself, showing forth and exuding certain qualities – 
qualities that may not be limited to visual attributes such as colour, length, volume, 
sheen, luster / health, or aromatic ones such as perfumes or body oils or dust, but also 
tactile ones such as softness, sleekness or brittleness (or the literal and figurative  
‘bluntness’ Lutz describes). These sensory qualities add a layer of dynamism to hair 
that other objects may not show forth as readily. A chair, while still evocative and 
individual, can tend toward the allographic – an object made autographic by 
ascription – whereas hair is always autographic, its qualities are not qualities that can 
be replicated elsewhere the way a manufactured chair’s qualities might be. As an 
autographic thing that is always individual and which signals its individuality via its 
                                                 
55 See Nadia Seremetakis’s The Senses Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture for a description of how the sensory 
aspects of an artefact can provoke involuntary memory, a memory which itself might evoke senses. She states: ‘As a sensory 
form in itself, the artifact can provoke the emergence, the awakening of the layered memories, and thus the senses contained 
within it. The object invested with sensory memory speaks; it provokes re-call as a missing, detached yet antiphonic element of 
the perceiver’ (10-11). Seremetakis’ idea of the role of sensory perception in engaging with an artefact, and the evocation of 
senses within layered memories is useful because it considers the affective or sensuous element of encounters and illustrates the 
role of the physical attributes of the object in affective experiences.  
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materiality hair can presence the individual more directly and profoundly than other 
things that might have less contiguity or fewer identifying qualities.  
 One crucial difference here is the factor of time. Hair taken from someone no 
longer remembered or not visually represented through photographs or other such 
documents (drawings, paintings etc.) tends to signal the idea of an individual more 
than an individual themselves. This ‘pointing-to’ still creates a sense of a present-
absence, though the body and being represented is more abstract than they might 
otherwise be.     
 
Hair as archive 
 
The idea of hair as an archive of the individual from whom it sprang is not just a 
metaphorical concept. On a visual level a cutting of someone’s hair taken in youth 
may record or archive something of his or her physical appearance when said lock 
was cut. A cutting taken later in life may reflect the changes that come with age as 
Wordsworth’s later white locks reflect his advanced years. Hair also carries a host of 
information about the life of the individual from whom it sprang and can be used to 
identify not only one individual among millions, but also an individual’s ancestry or 
elements of their biography – as was the case when Marie Antoinette’s hair was 
DNA-tested in order to definitively prove that the mummified heart in the royal crypt 
at St Denis was indeed Louis the XVII’s (it was) (Hosford 12), and as was the case in 
2007, when some of the Brontë family’s hair was analyzed for information about the 
family’s general health and diet, leading to test results that contrasted ‘some of the 
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myths’ about the family’s poor health and eating habits (‘Bad Hair Days’).56 Hair, in 
this way, can be read as a material synecdoche or extension of the actual (not 
figurative) self and as a unique identifier and vital archive. 
 Hair remains are also an archive in another way in that they may also place a 
person bodily in a particular context, location or time. In this way the horrific ‘hair 
room’ at Auschwitz (a glassed-in display where hair cut from the heads of thousands 
of individuals is amassed) is a material archive (and public document) that attests to 
the former presence and ongoing non-presence of the individuals represented 
(perhaps made identifiable) by their remains. By extension, if, as an archive of the 
self, hair remains can place individuals in a particular location they can also place 
them within a cultural and historical context. The analysis of the Brontë family’s hair 
(undertaken by Dr Andrew S. Wilson at the University of Bradford in 2006) for 
example, places them within a population ‘where dietary sources are more 
seasonally-defined than for modern UK populations’ (A. S. Wilson 3). The samples 
also indicated that two the locks were likely taken at ‘different times of the year’ 
(those of Mrs Brontë and Maria), and that ‘Mrs Brontë’s diet was least rich in protein 
or vegetables’ (3) – the kind of information one would expect to glean from a diary 
or an eyewitness rather than a strand of hair.57 Which is to say that hair can ‘archive’ 
numerous aspects of a life (aspects other than presence), for example the ‘prodigious 
quantity’ of women’s hair George IV collected, hair ‘of all colours and lengths, some 
locks with powder and pomatum still sticking to them’ (Bury 44; see also Pascoe 59-
                                                 
56 Two types of DNA can be examined in hair: the more comprehensive nDNA (nuclear DNA) can be tested if the follicle is 
attached, while mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA) can be tested from the shaft even if the follicle is absent. 
57 The conceptual artist Cornelia Parker was present in the Bradford lab during the work on the hair. She later wrote ‘A proposal 
to the Greater London Authority’ in which she suggested the following: ‘I want to propose a tiny enhancement to Nelson’s 
Column, adding a little more body to his hair by inserting real strands of the famous Brontë sisters’ hair into the fabric of his. 
Doing so would link the two iconic names in a literal and physical way, infusing the monument’s structure with an authentic 
bodily relic…. Together they could share a vista’ (‘Nelson’). This idea of fusing the inanimate with the still-animate hair 
supports several of this chapter’s suppositions around vitality and the binding powers of locks – both symbolically and 
psychically. 
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60) – here hair documents certain habits and indulgences in a way that textual 
archives may not.  
 While the presence of, and implications surrounding, the existence of DNA in hair 
were unknown in the Victorian era, I would like to suggest that hair was still 
conceptualized as an identifying marker and as an archive of the self. Sir James 
Frazer’s reports of hair as a magical substitute for the individual support this, as does 
a scene in Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities – a scene in which a few strands of 
hair identify Lucie Manette as her mother’s daughter. 
 A Tale of Two Cities was published in weekly installments in 1859. It concerns 
the lives of a group of individuals before and after the French Revolution (1789-
1799) in particular a Dr Manette (who has been imprisoned in France), his daughter 
Lucie Manette, and her eventual husband Charles Darnay. The hair-related scene in 
question takes place in chapter six, ‘The Shoemaker’, when Lucie Manette is taken to 
meet her father, presumed dead but in actuality imprisoned in the Bastille since she 
was a child. At first Dr Manette is disassociated: not recognizing his daughter after 
so many years he asks if she is the gaoler’s daughter. She says ‘no’ and sits beside 
him. Dickens then writes: ‘Her golden hair, which she wore in long curls, had been 
hurriedly pushed aside, and fell down over her neck. Advancing his hand by little 
and little, he [her father, Dr Manette] took it up and looked at it’ (51-2). Shortly after 
this Dr Manette:  
 …laid down his work, put his hand to his neck, and took off a blackened 
string with a scrap of folded rag attached to it. He opened this, carefully, on his 
knee, and it contained a very little quantity of hair: not more than one or two 
long golden hairs, which he had, in some old day, wound off upon his finger.  
 He took her hair into his hand again, and looked closely at it. ‘It is the same. 
How can it be! When was it! How was it!’ (52)  
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The strands of hair were Lucie’s mother’s – strands that had found their way to his 
sleeve and which he begged to be allowed to keep in prison by saying to the guards 
‘You will leave me them? They can never help me to escape in the body, though they 
may in the spirit’ (52). For Dr Manette, the likeness between mother and daughter’s 
hair is the first sign or proof that helps him to begin to understand not only who 
Lucie is (his daughter), but also that time – eighteen years – has passed. But first 
Lucie’s hair so resembles her mother’s that he has to reorient himself: ‘His hands… 
went up to his white hair, which they tore in a frenzy. It died out, as everything but 
his shoemaking did die out of him, and he refolded his little packet and tried to 
secure it in his breast; but he looked at her, and gloomily shook his head. ‘No, no, no; 
you are too young, too blooming. It can’t be’ (52).  
 This moment is interesting because the implication here is that the hair seems the 
same to him, that it signals that this woman is his wife (interesting, if we bear in 
mind that the hair, genetically, would carry similar markers) – a confusion that 
disorients the Dr in time: ‘you are too young’, he says. Lucie eventually replies to his 
confusion, in a long speech meant to help him come to terms with the past through 
connections with her in the present, eventually saying: ‘If you touch, in touching my 
hair, anything that recalls a beloved head that lay on your breast when you were 
young and free, weep for it, weep for it!’ – a speech meant to allow him to access his 
past through both intellectual knowledge and bodily touch (53).   
 Hair in this fiction replaces the paper archive: it is its own document, one that 
furnishes recollection and asserts familiarity to the extent that Lucie is shortly 
thereafter recognized and accepted as his daughter. In this scene Lucie’s hair is a 
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metonymical device: a part that stands for the whole he does not know, but comes 
slowly to know through the part and its resemblance to his remembrancer.  
 Hair, and Lucie’s hair in particular, is employed repeatedly as a motif in A Tale of 
Two Cities.58 Book the Second is called ‘The Golden Thread’ a reference to the 
strands of hair that Dr Manette carries, and Lucie’s hair as metonymical for her, as 
well as the bonds she (and her hair) have established. Dickens asserts early in the 
book (of Dr Manette) that ‘[o]nly his daughter had the power of charming this black 
brooding from his mind. She was the golden thread that united him to a Past beyond 
his misery, and to a Present beyond his misery…’ (86). More overtly in chapter 
twenty-one Dickens writes: ‘Ever busily winding the golden thread which bound her 
husband, and her father, and herself, and her old directress and companion, in a life 
of quiet bliss, Lucie sat in the still house…’ (209). Indeed, each of those mentioned 
above has a scene with Lucie where her hair is used as a motif and where her hair 
comingles with another’s or is stroked or touched by another. Chapter twenty-one 
continues, mentioning a few paragraphs later that even though time had passed, 
Lucie was again ‘[e]ver busily winding the golden thread that bound them all 
together, weaving the service of her happy influence through the tissue of all their 
lives…’ (209). Here hair binds and weaves – much as the hair binding in Villette 
binds and weaves those whose hair is bound. In Dickens’s novel Lucie’s hair not 
only creates or adds symbolically to the tenor, tone or symbolism of the book’s 
themes – hair that says – but it also serves as an archive, becomes its own document 
of authenticity, a thing which connects Dr Manette to his past, to his late wife, and 
                                                 
58 See especially (in relation to Lucie’s hair) 34, 35, 51-54, 86, 96, 104, 144, 193 (in which Mr Lorry, on Lucie’s wedding day 
‘laid the bright golden hair against his little brown wig, with a genuine tenderness and delicacy…’ and 194 after Lucie’s 
marriage to Charles Darney when ‘in due course the golden hair that had mingled with the poor shoemaker's white locks in the 
Paris garret, were mingled with them again in the morning sunlight, on the threshold of the door at parting’ also 207, 208, 287, 
351. 
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then to his son-in-law (‘…the golden thread which bound her husband, and her 
father, and herself’ (209) – hair that does. What Lucie’s hair helps configure is a set 
of incorporeal or abstract relationships. She and her hair (with its magical power to 
evoke the past and recall her father to life) are the tangible thing that binds the 
relationships. 
     There is another useful example in A Tale of Two Cities of the difference between 
hair that ‘says’ and hair that ‘does’. When Lucie’s son is dying Dickens employs the 
boy’s hair symbolically. In the death scene he describes his hair as a halo, writing: 
‘Even when golden hair, like her own, lay in a halo on a pillow round the worn face 
of a little boy…’ (210). Here we see two things: hair used as confirmation of 
maternity or of likeness (‘like her own’) and hair as a halo. The latter use, of hair as a 
halo, is symbolic: it says, to return to Leach’s early distinction, that the boy is good, 
angelic, blessed and so forth, a symbolism meant to convey or signify something to 
those witnessing the moment (which includes Dickens’s readers). Lucie’s hair, and 
her mother’s strands are, on the other hand, described as threads. Thread as a thing 
has performative associations, is a tool that we associate with connecting, binding 
and so forth, which reflects Dickens’s use of it. Gitter suggests similarly that Lucie’s 
hair with its ‘beneficent powers’ make her a kind of ‘angelic Arachne’ (944), which 
implies the use of the thread as a weaver’s tool to make with. Lucie’s hair therefore 
predominantly does, whereas her son’s hair predominantly says.   
 
Hair as witness 
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Hair, by its very presence, evokes its own biography. The biography may not be 
made explicit to the observer, but the idea of a biography – that a history is contained 
within the thing itself, that the thing has had ‘experiences’ of the world (readable or 
not) – is always implicit. This kind of biographical principle can be applied to all 
things in existence, but in relation to hair it has a double-life. First there is the 
‘living’ biography – that of the hair on the head as a symbiotic thing belonging to / 
springing from the body – and then there is the biography of ‘after’ e.g. after the final 
cutting when the lock of hair begins to exist as a thing unto itself. In this way hair is 
an archive privy to – and presencing – two distinct biographies, a co-dependant one 
and an independent one, biographies that speak to hair’s capacity to witness.  
     In ‘Bracelet, Hand Towel, Pocket Watch: Objects of the Last Moment in Memory 
and Narration’ Mona Körte deconstructs the phenomena of the ‘object of the last 
moment’ (110) in relation to the former Kindertransport children who were sent, for 
their safety, to the United Kingdom from Germany and German-annexed countries at 
the start of the Second World War. In her essay she describes how the objects the 
Kindertransport children were given by their loved ones before being sent away 
became a support for memory, and how, later, ‘with greater distance from events’ 
they acted ‘as a bridge to memory or a bracket for an event’. Using objects of the last 
moment such as the bracelet, hand towel and pocket watch of her title, she goes on to 
suggest that ‘[f]eelings of love, childhood, and home attach to the object, revealing in 
a flash entire thematic clusters’ (110). A ‘thematic cluster’ as Körte describes it is not 
just a memory of an event fixed in time, it is also the larger sets of relations that 
adhere to the event – such as the feelings of love, childhood and home in Körte’s 
example.  
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 Echoing Marius Kwint, who suggests in his Introduction to Material Memories, 
that objects can ‘serve memory’ by constituting a person’s picture of the past, by 
stimulating memory and by forming a record of the past (2), Körte stresses the role 
of the object of the last moment in stimulating remembering:  
By preserving and caring for the object one remains loyal to it, perhaps, 
because there is an intuitive awareness that memory is constantly reshaped by 
the demands of the present. Remembering means renewing in the present the 
affect that is tied to the image or object; as such these mementos become aids 
to mourning. (111-112) 
 
She takes this idea of imbuing a thing with a set of feelings and memories (or of 
renewing memories via a thing) one step further however in suggesting that:  
There may well be a ‘knowledge’ of the object; the objects were, after all, 
there at the last moment and may have witnessed something that can be 
revealed at the appointed moment…. As objects of mourning they extend 
their message through time. Symbolically compressed within them are entire 
thematic clusters, making them, in a double movement, keepers of memory. 
(120) 
 
Here, the coming-to-fore of the past (the worlding) is connected to a non-subjective 
kind of knowledge, a knowing in the thing that might add to what the subject brings 
to it, a knowing that might be revealed by the object in question in the form of a 
physical mark or presentment or tangible (the knowing, for example, about the 
Brontë’s health that was in the hair that witnessed their lives), or via an apprehension 
that provokes an instance of stirred and new (versus renewed) remembrance.  
 Christiane Holm’s essay  ‘Sentimental Cuts’ alludes to the idea of witness as well, 
noting that one of the specific qualities of cut hair is that it is ‘a witness of the hidden 
story’ (140). This concept of the animate nature of even cut hair can also be found in 
Deborah Lutz’s Victorian Literature and Culture essay on materiality and the 
artefacts surrounding death when she suggests that ‘[f]or the Victorians, artifacts of 
beloved bodies still held some of the sublime, fetishistic magic of those outmoded 
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holy relics of bygone days. Not only does death bring the tragedy of turning people 
into things – of subject into object – but it might also start inanimate objects to life’ 
(129).59 This idea of an animate object opens up the possibility that the thing that 
survives the absent individual must now bear the task of narrating their story, of 
attesting to their having-been. Hair understood as a witness or keeper of memory 
makes the seemingly inanimate seem animate: a presencing thing with its own 
resonance. In Victorian culture hair was often taken at death as Dora Wordsworth’s 
likely was: hair marked by that moment of separation. The cut hair, which was 
present at the moment of its own separation from the body, is thus a witness to its 
own last moment and, as part of the biological entity, an intimate witness to (even 
subject to) the moment of bodily death. The fact that it endures when the body is 
shuttled away makes hair one of the few surviving or material witnesses to both the 
individual’s death and their biological life. 
 In ‘Shakespeare’s Hair: Staging the Object of Material Culture’ Jonathan Gil 
Harris addresses the importance of apprehending objects in the context of the 
‘present’ without reducing them to a static present-tense only existence. He argues 
that instead objects ‘also possess a more dynamic, diachronic dimension’ (484). He 
links this to Arjun Appadurai’s idea that ‘objects possess “life histories” or “careers” 
that invest them with social significance and cultural value’ (Harris 485, Appadurai 
34). Harris’s assertions in relation to the diachronic nature of things points to one of 
hair’s more concealed aspects: its temporal multiplicity.  
 The plait of Dora Wordsworth’s hair in the Wordsworth Museum in Grasmere 
illustrates the phenomenon of temporal multiplicity in a way that also evokes 
                                                 
59 The object-narrator genre in pre-Victorian and Victorian literature provides an interesting example of narratives told from the 
point of view of a witness-thing. For more on this genre see The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects and It-Narratives in 
Eighteenth Century England, ed. Mark Blackwell, Lewisburg: Associated University Presses, 2007.  
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worlding. Although Dora’s plait ‘cut off by her own desire’ is always apprehended in 
the first instance in the present tense, its presence also evokes both a sense of general 
pastness (for on seeing the plait one recognizes that this is the hair of a person who is 
not-present-now or, who may be, as in Dora’s case, no longer living) and of a 
specific past event or events. In the case of this specific artefact, at least three other 
events in time are implied: most overtly the year ‘1847’ (cited on the hair boxes’ 
inscription as the year in which the hair was taken) and more obliquely the moment 
when Dora’s plait was severed and the moment it was placed in the box that contains 
it. Various kinds of understanding will result from seeing such an object. As with any 
object the plait’s biography will be apprehended to various degrees based on the 
individual viewer’s knowledge of hair, the Victorian era, the Wordsworth family etc., 
but such knowledge is conceptual. What the hair radiates in this instance is not 
biography; rather, what it radiates is a sense of its own abidance – of its being and 
having been.  
 Following on from Körte’s use of the idea of thematic clusters, I am suggesting 
that hair, as a thing with visual and inherent markers related to time, evokes, what I 
will call ‘abiding time’ – a term, through its rootedness in the word ‘abide’ that is 
intended to carry within it (as per the definitions of ‘abide’ and ‘abiding’) ideas of 
lingering, remaining, expectation, encounter, dwelling, persisting, and continued 
existence. (See especially ‘abiding’ n. definition 4: ‘Continuance, duration, 
permanence, enduring; an instance of this’ (OED). ‘Abiding time’ as I conceptualize 
it can have a powerful affective component, can evoke some sense of a continuance 
of presence, as well as a complex kind of dwelling that is not wholly past (severed) 
but enduring even in its pastness. In this way ‘abiding time’ refers to the evocation of 
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a multiplicity (or cluster) of events in which numerous encounters or moments in 
time are layered or woven together, in a less-than linear model.   
 In her essay ‘Memory and Objects’ Juliet Ash describes one aspect of this time 
dynamic in relation to the apprehension of her late husband’s ties. For Ash the ties 
are ‘memory objects’ which ‘can, and do, have powerful repercussions in terms of 
visual and emotional affectivity’ (219). Ash describes how in perceiving such objects 
there can arise the sense ‘of the simultaneously existing presence and absence of a 
person’ (221). She states:  
   The mind works as much in a projected dissimilitude as it reacts with what 
is presented to be seen. However much memory knows the absence, death 
even, of a person, even so there is, within that knowledge, the assumed pre-
existence of that person in their absence.  
   The associative memory of an absent person, stimulated through the 
viewing and/or sensing of an existing item of clothing, requires us to be 
imaginative about the past, about the object or person when they did exist, 
and that process is positive, not sentimental, although the contemplation is of 
and for absence – possibly death. (221-222) 
 
This idea of being imaginative about the past and the object and person echoes the 
idea of both Körte’s thematic cluster and ‘abiding time’, which is to say that things 
can evoke aspects of, or moments from their own biography (the hair on the head, the 
tie on the beloved and so on) along with a whole range of possible associations or 
relations: images, feelings and meanings; which, taken together, evoke a complexity 
of time and, therefore, ‘world’.  
 In relation to hair, hair – like other objects associated with the beloved in ‘life’ – 
evokes through its very material presence the hair as-it-was (or might have been) in 
different temporal contexts. This is in part because locks or plaits of hair are not 
normally perceived as ‘whole’ when they are apart from the body, because as 
fragments they infer an absent whole and therefore a corresponding state of ‘before’ 
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– a ‘before’ when the hair was on the head of the living person. By virtue of its cut-
ness, of its having-been-severed hair may also speak to the moment of cutting. 
Christiane Holm’s essay  ‘Sentimental Cuts: Eighteenth-Century Mourning Jewellery 
with Hair’ is one of the few published essays on hair to examine ‘the very moment of 
the cutting’ which she believes ‘gives the hair a new status’ – a status which imbues 
the dead hair with a kind of ‘temporal semantics’ in that the lock or cutting as cut 
‘embodies as materialized time an epoch that is absolutely past’ (140).  For Holm 
‘[t]he cut edge of the hair in the material medium of remembrance marks the act of 
remembrance as the very moment when its natural status was transformed into a 
cultural status, and when the present presence of the body is anticipated as a future 
absence’ (140).  
 This idea of a thing marked by, and signifying, time via its fragmentary and cut 
form demonstrates some of the ways a thing like hair can world. But as the letter 
Dora Wordsworth wrote to Jemima Quillinan about Jemima’s own lock shows, hair 
doesn’t only radiate temporal multiplicity in relation to the before and after of life 
and death: locks taken long before death for the sole purpose of a providing a sense 
of nearness or remembrance also resonate multiple instances of time: ‘as further 
proof that you are not forgotten I must tell you that at this moment I have round my 
neck a lock of your hair which I cut off your little bit of a head, as it was, ten years 
ago & which has been worn by me ever since’ (D. Wordsworth ‘Letter’). Here a 
number of temporal instances are evoked in relation to the instance of perception. In 
one sentence Dora gives us the present tense via the wearing of the locket ‘at this 
moment’ of writing, the instance of the cutting which evokes both the exact moment 
of cutting and more generally 1822 (‘ten years ago’) and an ongoing continuity 
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implicit in ‘worn by me ever since’ – a continuity that encloses all the years in 
between the cutting and the unfolding now. In this letter the perpetual presence of the 
locket and its perpetual ability to recall Jemima signals a fluid kind of time, one that 
reads as more thematic than chronological. This is one of the qualities that makes 
hair a fit remembrancer: it abides even as it marks time.  
 Hair, and locks of hair in particular, can embody and ground the myriad emotions 
and memories that thoughts of the absent individual can evoke in the perceiver of the 
remain. Whether those feelings are about loss, grief, joy, or pride, whether imagistic, 
sensory or narrative –– hair as a ‘remain’ can provide a locus from which, and in 
which, these associations can be accessed or placed. Locks of hair can provide a 
sense of nearness. One of the ways they evoke a sense of nearness is through having 
been near or contiguous to the now-absent individual. For Heidegger nearness was a 
kind of apprehension, a dwelling in Being rather than a spatial construct. Heidegger 
thought that nearness could not be encountered directly but rather could be 
manifested through attending to the material. He said ‘[w]e succeed in reaching it 
rather by attending to what is near. Near to us are what we usually call things’ (‘The 
Thing’ 164). For the Victorians, locks of hair provided a sense of nearness, of 
dwelling-with; hair symbolized for some, and functioned for others, as a medium 
through which a kind of magical / cognitive nearness could be achieved. Hair’s 
fitness for the task of presencing the absent individual arises in part from its special 
ability to facilitate such encounters and to presence the absent individual in the 
complexity of time. This is especially true in the writer’s house/museum where hair’s 
obdurate and lasting qualities – and the fact of it as a bodily remain – serve as a locus 
for the absent individual from whom the hair came. 
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Chapter Four: Clothing 
 
As a material extension of the self, hair can easily be read as a synecdoche of the 
body or being (Rosenthal 2; Rifelj 85; Harris 483; Lutz 132). Like hair, clothing is a 
‘material remain’ (Harlow 1) – though it is a ‘remain’ that was not an inherent part of 
the body. For Deborah Lutz in ‘The Dead Still Among Us: Victorian Secular Relics, 
Hair Jewelry, and Death Culture’ hair is a primary relic and clothes are secondary 
relics (132). While bodily fragments might be more easily read as vestiges of, or 
conduits to, the absent individual (largely due to their long and ingrained associations 
with the individual from whom they sprang), the object of clothing has a sort of free-
floating life, one that is often times independent of the person who wears it. This 
independence, however, is complicated, because clothes, even when off the body, 
still bear traces of the individual. As Margaret Gibson writes in Objects of the Dead: 
Mourning and Memory in Everyday Life: ‘Clothing engages a range of sensory and 
memorial experiences linking the body of the bereaved to the body traces of the 
deceased. The bereaved will often smell the clothing of the dead, looking for traces 
of the body in things like shoes, dresses and jumpers’ (118). Her assertion that 
clothing is a ‘link’ reflects the deeply held connection between clothes and the dead, 
one that makes clothes as near primary a relic for remembrancing as a lock of hair.   
 This chapter will build on the previous chapter by picking up and developing the 
themes established in the hair chapter and applying them to clothing – themes related 
to contiguity, metonymy, tool-use, fitness, remembrance, and display. It will begin 
with a reading of a caricature of a pair of Thomas Carlyle’s trousers and proceed, as 
in the hair chapter, to consider clothing in a Victorian context via a reading of the 
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everyday actuality and significance of objects of clothing in Thomas and Jane 
Carlyles’ letters and Jane Carlyle’s journal. Through a consideration of how the 
Carlyles wrote about clothing three key elements of my argument will be developed: 
first of all, that clothes were well-considered objects that functioned as ‘equipment’ 
both practically and aesthetically; second, that certain items of clothing, when 
strongly associated with the wearer, could take on metonymical qualities; third, that 
such associations (between people and things) made objects of clothing effective 
remembrancers. The second and third parts of this chapter will assert that empty or 
unoccupied clothes are especially fit for presencing the absent wearer, and that as a 
material remain clothes have the ability to act as archives of both bodily knowledge 
and historical knowledge. Through a reading of the ‘Old Clothes’ chapter of Thomas 
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus and Charles Dickens’s ‘Meditations on Monmouth Street’ 
(from Sketches by Boz) this chapter will demonstrate that objects of clothing can, and 
have been, read as material witnesses to events experienced by the individual who 
once wore the clothing. In these cases – where clothing metonymically represents the 
individual or the present-absence of the individual – the clothing remains can 
sometimes be enlivened or personified to the degree that the object itself is regarded 
as a locus of knowledge. This change in a piece of clothing’s status from ‘equipment’ 
to  ‘remembrancer’ will be returned to in section three through a consideration of the 
effect of the removal of objects of clothing from the circuit of use and on the 
resultant dynamics of display. Referencing the ‘Symbols’ chapter of Carlyle’s Sartor 
Resartus and John Harvey’s Clothes the last section of this chapter will return to the 
idea that clothes are particularly fit remembrancers because of their evocation of both 
an historical past and an absent body.  
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I – The Carlyle’s Clothes 
         
 Fig. 5. Elizabeth Paulet’s caricature ‘Hero worship reduced to faute de mieux’ (Ashton, 179).  
 
Jane Carlyle’s friend, Elizabeth Paulet (1806-1879), sometimes sent Jane caricatures 
in the post.60 One such caricature, entitled ‘Hero worship reduced to “faute de 
mieux” [for want of something better]’ (fig. 5, above), depicts two men in a gallery-
like room being shown a pair of Thomas Carlyle’s trousers by a third gentleman 
while Carlyle himself is depicted on the far side of a distant window smoking in the 
garden (CLO 10.1215/It-18450920-JWC-TC-01).61 Three aspects of this sketch are 
especially interesting: the scale of the trousers compared to the three men in the 
foreground (they almost run the full length of the body of the man who is holding 
                                                 
60 As noted in CLO lt-18431201-JWC-HW-01: ‘I had a precious batch of caricatures from Mrs Paulet lately professing to be 
“illustrations of Miss Jewsbury's late matrimonial speculation”—in my life I have seen none cleverer—they would have made 
old Pestrucci himself…’; and CLO lt-18450405-JWC-JW-01: ‘…but the greatest consolation of all has been a packet of 
caricatures from Mrs Paulet which made me laugh till the tears ran down—…’; see also CLO It-18450920-JWC-TC-01. 
61 Further references to Duke University’s Carlyle Letters Online (CLO) will be cited as ‘CLO’ when the date of the letter is 
given within the text, or ‘CLO’ followed by the D.O.I when the date is not established. From this citation forth the first part of 
the DOI (10.1215) will be omitted, as it is a code that is consistent across all the Carlyle letters. The second part of the DOI 
incorporates the date of the letter and the correspondents, thus ‘It-18450920-JWC-TC-01’ refers to 1845 September 20, Jane 
Welsh Carlyle to Thomas Carlyle. 
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them up); the juxtaposition of the trousers ‘on display’ and the art-filled room they 
are displayed in; and the reactions of the men – one with his arm extended toward the 
trousers, the other holding spectacles up to his face – both seemingly expressing 
some kind of sincere regard for the object brought before them. While Paulet’s 
sketch clearly has a satirical element it also conveys quite directly the perceived 
congruity between a person’s self and those items of clothing worn by them. If the 
embodied form is the idealized encounter (Thomas Carlyle himself) then the next 
best thing – the ‘faute de mieux’ – is that which is closest to the body, that which 
has, and knows, the body’s form; that which the wearer has touched intimately, and 
that which might therefore, in turn, be touched by others. In this way clothing can be 
read as an intermediary: as that which represents or ‘stands in for’ the wearer, 
perhaps carrying their scent or some sense of the residue of their days. This idea – of 
the affective power of clothing as a stand-in for the absent self – is the central topic 
of this chapter. 
 Even though it is a play on hero-worship, Elizabeth Paulet’s caricature captures 
elements of many of this thesis’s themes: the larger-than-life representation of the 
trousers speaks to how amplified those things we associate with beloved figures can 
become; the juxtaposition of the trousers in the art-filled setting speaks to the 
trouser’s transition from one type of equipment to another – for as soon as the 
trousers are removed from their usefulness and held aloft to be looked at (like a piece 
of art or an artefact) they cease to be equipment for wearing and become something 
worthy of consideration, study or regard. The absurdity of the caricature is, of course, 
Carlyle’s presence at the back of the scene, the nearness of the man himself. Were 
Carlyle not in the sketch, or were the sketch made some fifty or one hundred years 
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after Carlyle’s death (and his figure therefore ghostly and inaccessible), the image 
would probably not evoke such a strong sense of irony or the ridiculous. The trousers 
in the sketch would more likely be regarded as a rare and valuable material remain of 
a regarded historical person; an ‘object of the dead’ (Gibson, Objects 14) that can 
serve as a point of access to the past – to both Carlyle himself and to the world he 
lived in. 
 
Thomas Carlyle often thought of clothing in a very pragmatic way although he was 
not immune to the pleasures of a nicely fitting hat or well-made things. Of a pair of 
‘brown-grey socks’ that Thomas, in a letter to his mother, enthuses ‘are as they 
before were the best foot-clothing I ever had’ he adds the satisfied query: ‘Is not this 
minute enough?’ (CLO It-18341023-TC-MAC-01). The contents of The Carlyle 
Letters, edited by the University of Edinburgh and Duke University, indicate a 
notable degree of preoccupation with both the practical aspects of clothing and the 
pleasurable. This section intends to provide a brief overview of the everyday 
actuality and context of clothes in the Carlyles’ lifetime and to explore 
simultaneously, through a consideration of Thomas and Jane’s hats, caps and other 
wearables, a number of examples of clothes functioning as tools, as metonyms and as 
remembrancers; themes that will be developed throughout this thesis. 
     Many of Thomas and Jane Carlyle’s letters, and a significant proportion of Jane’s 
1855-1856 journal entries, reference clothing, evidence of the attention they paid to 
the time-consuming tasks related to procurement or repair, as well as their concerns 
around the efficiency of clothes in relation to the weather or the way their clothes 
represented them. A number of entries also contain aesthetic commentaries about 
  153 
others – for example, Jane has left to posterity two wonderfully detailed descriptions 
of the clothing worn by Count Alfred D’Orsay on his visits62 – while others 
demonstrate how objects of clothing were sometimes employed in figurative 
language (as in Thomas’ frequent use of ‘old clothes’ as a metaphor to represent 
worn-out ideologies). Thomas’s mother Margaret, still living up in Scotland, was 
often the recipient in autumn and winter of letters from Thomas in which he enquired 
about her wardrobe or gently reminded her to clothe herself adequately for the 
weather. Over a dozen letters expressing concern about her warmth survive, many, 
like the letter of 18 February, 1842 expounding the value of a suitable wardrobe: 
‘Good diet and warm clothing: these two are the most important points of all’ 
(CLO).63 Still, in a number of letters, as well as in Jane’s journals, clothing is also 
shown in a pleasurable light – as when Thomas writes of ‘a cloak (of brown cloth 
with fur neck), a most comfortable article…warm as pie’ (CLO It-18341224-TC-
MAC-01) or when Jane writes of taking ‘a last look at myself in my new grey gown, 
and smart lilac cap… I looked a decidedly presentable woman – for my years!’ (It-
18580804-JWC-TC-01). 
     Thomas’s sister Jean made some of his clothing, she also sometimes procured 
items from Scotland for the couple. In October of 1841 a Glengarry Cap arrived in 
the mail from Jean and Thomas wrote on the fifth to thank her, acknowledging both 
its usefulness and pleasing aesthetic: ‘I tore open the package, and disclosed our new 
Glengarry! Its fits excellently well, is much approved of in regard to appearance; and 
                                                 
62 See Jane’s letter to her mother Grace of 7 April 1839, and her notebook entry from 13 April 1845 (CLO). 
63 Of Thomas’ letters written between 1832 and 1861 a significant number are concerned with temperature and comfort. See, for 
example: 31 Aug 1832; 2 October 1838; 15 Aug 1839; 14 Nov 1840; 20 Sept 1845; 16 Nov 1846; 9 Jan 1847; 18 April 1851; 
24 April 1851; 17 July 1852; 24 Feb 1853; 16 April 1858; 30 Oct 1859; 19 May 1861. Those expressing concern for his 
mother’s warmth include: 21 Jan 1838; 10 March 1844; 5 Dec 1844; 12 Oct 1844; 31 Dec 1843; 18 Feb 1842; 7 Jan 1841; 2 
Feb 1839; 24 Dec 1834 and 22 Jan 1832 where he also expresses concern for father’s warmth / adequate clothing. In a letter to 
his sister Jean on 29 January of 1838 he advocates flannel clothing for his nephew, then states succinctly: ‘Above all things I 
must insist on heat. My astonishment is how children ever live at all considering how they are clad’ (CLO). 
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indeed will altogether fulfil very well the function of a winter-cap’ (CLO). He then 
noted in a letter to his mother on the twelfth that ‘Jean lately sent me a braw 
Glengarry Cap, of the gray color, from Dumfries: will you therefore apprise Alick 
that he need not send me the one I talked of; –unless indeed he have already got it, in 
which case I will not let it go to waste’ (CLO). A letter from Thomas to his sister on 
30 October, 1859 goes on at some length as to his instructions for ‘another clothing 
operation’ in which he implores Jean for ‘a new pair of socks…best stuff and 
structure you can get, plenty of spring, plenty of size, I will pay your Artist whatever 
she can earn by taking pains upon them’ (CLO). Letters such as these are evidence 
that clothing – its functional comfort and its aesthetic – mattered to the Carlyles, a 
suggestion furthered by a series of letters Thomas wrote to Jane from Wales in 
August of 1850 concerning ‘one point of business’ – the procurement of a bathing-
cap (CLO It-18500805-TC-JWC-01).  
 When Thomas Carlyle was in Wales in 1850 he sent instructions to Jane around 
the acquisition of a bathing cap to be sent ‘by return of post’ and to be got where ‘Rd 
got his… in Albemarle Street (Piccadily)’ an operation that required detailed 
directions in regards to finding both the shop (run by ‘an excellent old umbrella 
maker, – mender &c, from whom the article in all varieties is to be obtained’) and the 
right item: ‘the biggest… an elastic runner both before and behind, so that they will 
ply to any head…’. Thomas assured Jane that she would ‘manage it to perfection’ 
(CLO It-18500805-TC-JWC-01) a fact confirmed a week later when he writes on the 
13th of August:  
I have all but forgotten again to say how well the bathing cap serves; which 
cost you such a splutter of whitewash! The cap does admirably, – except that I 
shall certainly tear the strings one day, they are so fine and small, and you will 
have to put a pair of cotton tape ones in instead: – but it saves me completely 
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from the water; wd hold the biggest head in Wales, I do think, with a ramilies 
wig on it, and is really an excellent article…. (CLO)  
 
A bathing cap seen in this light is signified predominantly as equipment (in this case, 
one with a potential fault in the form of the too-fine strings). The bathing cap is a 
useful article and effective tool because it fits the subject (Thomas) and serves the 
purpose of keeping his head dry when he ‘bathes’ off the coast. Thomas himself had 
clearly articulated his need for it, noting that he was bathing daily he added ‘I have 
too much hair at present; and when the head gets fairly wetted, I hardly get it dried 
again under 3 or four hours [sic] of combing and exposure’ (CLO). In an age when 
hair had to dry naturally bathing caps were useful tools, especially when rules of 
etiquette would have frowned upon being seen with wet hair away from the beach 
and when strong associations between the head, weather and illness were common.   
     Clothing of course is equipment in a number of ways – ways that are both 
functional and ideological. Clothing not only acts as a buffer between the wearer and 
the weather, it can also hold and arrange the wearer’s body, and help constitute a 
person’s identity; it makes the wearer presentable (or not) within or without social 
groups. Clothing can reveal facts or assumptions about the wearer – size, gender, 
age, even the ‘labour history of the body’ (Gibson, Objects 105) – and also, for the 
keen observer, how a wearer might feel about themselves. As John Harvey notes in 
Clothes: ‘Clothes may be metaphors for our own feelings, but also they may be 
wishful feelings we want other people to have for us’ (13). This is clothing as image 
or impression-making equipment. Take, for example, Jane Carlyle and William 
Thackeray’s descriptions of Charlotte Brontë. Jane wrote a quick and dismissive 
description of meeting Charlotte Brontë at the Thackerays: ‘I also met Jane Eyre 
(Miss Brontë)… extremely unimpressive to look at –’ (CLO lt-18500704-JWC-HW-
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01) whereas Thackeray described Charlotte more cordially as a ‘tiny, delicate, 
serious, little lady, with fair straight hair, and steady eyes… dressed in a little barège 
dress with a pattern of faint green moss’ (Footnote, CLO lt-18500704-JWC-HW-01). 
Here, Charlotte Brontë’s clothes fail to inspire Jane Carlyle; they fail – to employ 
Jane’s root word – to impress her or to press upon her consciousness whereas 
William Thackeray’s description is more fulsome and charitable. Of course, what 
Charlotte Brontë wanted her dress to do is unknown, it’s possible the barège may 
have been chosen for its relative safety, in the hope that it would neither draw 
attention nor invite ridicule. This is one of the difficulties with the semiotics of 
clothing: the tendency is to want our clothes to say us, but clothes as such are always 
saying us to someone who might disagree with, or misunderstand, what is being said. 
As John Harvey notes, we depend on clothes, but sometimes clothes can betrays us, 
they ‘can be treacherous companions, perhaps the more so because they touch us 
closely, because they touch our skin’ (4).  
 Clothes in this way can fail to meet a variety of litmus tests – as equipment they 
can be wrong aesthetically but they can also fail functionally. Jane Carlyle writes 
humorously about one such technical failure. In late October 1856 she was taking a 
walk with the artist Robert Tait. Tait would soon begin A Chelsea Interior, an 
intimate painting of Thomas ‘in a full-length checked dressing gown’ and Jane 
‘neatly dressed’ in their sitting room (Ashton 1), a painting that currently hangs in 
their Chelsea house/museum. Describing the walk Jane noted in her journal on the 
thirty-first: 
The only other incident of today was ‘a—what shall I say?’—prosaic one 
‘upon my honour.’ While taking a few minutes walk with Mr Tait, under 
Umbrellas (‘for the good of my health’ he said) I became sensible of a growing 
impossibility about my legs, which perplexed me exceedingly, and then of a 
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white line betwixt my black dress and the mud. Was it?—could it be?—oh yes 
decidedly it was my—flannel-petticoat coming down! But in the gloaming, it 
(the petticoat) did not perhaps catch Mr Tait's artist-eye; and I got out of it (not 
the petticoat but the difficulty) in making believe to stand still voluntarily, and 
send him away voluntarily. What I did then I pass over in modest silence. 
(CLO) 
 
Here we see, in a Heideggerean sense, the failed equipment of the petticoat come to 
the forefront of consciousness. This is like Heidegger’s description of the hammer in 
Being and Time: we have dealings with things and use them as equipment, 
equipment that we tend not to notice in any kind of relief until said equipment fails 
(Heidegger Being, see esp. 97-107). Here too, in Jane’s description, there is a sense 
of a failure or breech: the breech of the equipment and the breech of etiquette or of 
personal/societal boundaries. The fact that Jane had to remove Tait from her presence 
to resolve the situation implies that the various breeches (of equipment and decorum) 
were not to be shared, but also implied in this narrative is the fact of the petticoat as a 
kind of liminal object. Petticoats, after all, were not external garments intended for 
visual consumption; they were usually worn (as a contemporary slip might be) 
between outer garments (those visible/public components of dress) and 
undergarments (those considered most private/worn against the naked body) thus 
inhabiting a realm that is not quite public, but also not shockingly private; one that is, 
perhaps, while representative of womanhood, safe enough to joke about in a journal 
even as the dictates of etiquette demand ‘modest silence’ or some form of discretion 
in relation to the particular resolution of the event. 
     Clothing in this way is equipment – even if, as with the petticoat, it is equipment 
in the service of warmth or of creating a shape for the purposes of being 
fashionable, or a means of projecting modesty, ensuring cleanliness and so forth. 
But unlike Heidegger’s hammer, which is largely inconspicuous in its use, the 
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petticoat is equipment that tends always to signify in a complex manner even as it 
functions. For Heidegger the tool recedes from the forefront of consciousness until 
it breaks down or ceases to function; Jane’s petticoat may have done as much for 
her until it stopped ‘working’ but generally clothes do not recede, they ‘fashion’ or 
assist as tools in a kind of self-identification or projection, they help speak 
(truthfully or not) of the self to others.64 If Jane’s petticoat was a simple tool it’s 
unlikely she would have noted so exuberantly in her journal of November seventh 
that ‘Geraldine and I are going to have scarlet Petticoats!’ – a petticoat that she 
notes disappointingly three days later ‘came home, about a quarter of a yard too 
short’ (CLO). Clothes, Harvey notes, are often chosen to amplify elements of 
ourselves: ‘we have an outfit, or a set of outfits, that are us. No one else will use 
quite the same combination: so we have a fabric “self”…’ (71). It is to this idea of 
the fabric self that this chapter now turns, beginning first with a consideration of 
Carlyle’s relationships with his caps and hats (a relationship that can be read as 
metonymical) and then moving to a brief consideration of Harvey’s idea that not 
only do clothes help create our identity, but that within this dynamic the garment 
while having ‘its identity’ can also ‘move us with a delight close to love’ – a kind 
of affection that means that the feeling for the garments is (or can be) ‘a feeling for 
the person’ (18). 
 
 
                                                 
64 As Byrde in Nineteenth Century Fashion notes: ‘In the nineteenth century the appearance of a man’s or woman’s clothes was 
regulated not only by fashion but also by the rules of social etiquette. For anyone who wished to stand well in society it was 
essential for clothing to be appropriate to the person’s station in life, to the occasion, and to the time of day’ (110). In Dress and 
Identity: An Introduction Mary Harlow notes that ‘…the subtlety and nuances of meanings encoded in dress are rarely simple 
and require a range of analytical tools to unpick even in a shared cultural context. This problem is enhanced if the observer is 
distanced by culture and time’ (1). For a consideration of the semiotics of clothing see John Harvey’s Clothes, Daniel Miller’s 
chapter on clothing ‘Why clothing is not superficial’ in Stuff (12-41) and Harlow’s Dress and Identity. For a detailed 
consideration of the etiquette of dress (including clear examples of the expectations across classes in relation to such matters as 
gender, age, occasion, station, etc.) see Penelope Byrde’s excellent Nineteenth Century Fashion. 
  159 
Metonymy and the Fabric Self 
 
            
Fig. 6. Thomas Carlyle in his ‘wide-awake’ hat (Chesterton and Hodder Williams 10). 
   
In a letter written on 16 July 1848 to Helen Welsh, Jane Carlyle, thanking her cousin 
‘for your kind remembrance of me and my poor birth-day’ mentions a present of a 
pair of ‘beautiful sleeves’. She writes:  
…the sleeves almost frightened me for a moment, for there seemed to be some 
touch of witch-craft in them – I had got home a new black-silk polka spencer! 
(God help me!) from the dressmaker – and she had made the sleeves half-short 
– and at the very instant your packet came, I was sitting looking at it ‘in a state 
of mind’ (Capt Sterlings phrase) saying to myself ‘Oh dear me I must make 
white sleeves for it, the first thing, and how am I to shape them’?! Certainly 
there are secret affinities in people and things that no mortal will ever get to the 
bottom of! (CLO) 
 
Here, the affinity Jane seems to be most obviously referencing relates to the 
coincidental good fortune of a pair of sleeves arriving just when she is trying to 
resolve the issue of the too-short sleeves of her spencer [a close fitting jacket]; a gift 
that is obviously timely, and well-considered. But Jane's statement about ‘secret 
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affinities’ does not limit the affinities to those between people (as in those between 
Helen – who seemed to have some foresight in her choice of gift – and Jane the 
happy recipient), instead she states that ‘there are secret affinities in people and 
things’ (emphasis added) an inclusion that implies that not only was there an affinity 
in the thought of the gift but in the gift itself, the right kind of sleeves for the right 
kind of outfit; sleeves that would remedy Jane's problem, that would work as 
performative tools but which also, perhaps, had a certain fitness to her personality, 
style or sense of identity; her ‘fabric self’. It is this rightness of things for people that 
constitutes one aspect of the fabric self and of the resultant metonymy that can come 
from the identification of an item or items of clothing with a particular individual.  
     This sense of the fitness of an item of clothing and its rightness for, or identity 
with, its wearer is certainly the case with Thomas Carlyle and his ‘wide-awake’ hats. 
Wide-awakes were wide-brimmed hats with a low crown, quippishly called a ‘wide-
awake’ because (according to Punch magazine) the hat had ‘no nap’ (Byrde, TMI 
185). Although he also wore caps of various sorts, and straw and even fur hats, the 
wide-awake was Carlyle’s preferred hat for most of his adult life, a notable fact given 
that the majority of the men in his circle and in society would have been wearing top 
hats for formal and societal occasions – a difference evident in a photograph of an 
elderly Thomas (in a wide-awake style hat) sitting on a set of steps with his brother 
Dr. John Carlyle and an unknown gentleman (both in top hats) and his niece Mary 
Aitken (in a bonnet).65 In a letter to Lady Ashburton on 22 November 1851 Thomas 
demonstrates a playful self-awareness as to the effect of his choice of hat:   
                                                 
65 For more on Thomas Carlyle’s unconventional choice of headwear see Thea Holme’s The Carlyles at Home esp 104-106. 
Further proof of the wide-awake’s status as a less-than conventional hat can be gleaned through the scarcity of its mention in 
retrospective books on hats in the era. While the top hat in its various incarnations throughout the nineteenth-century is given 
ample consideration in many books on men’s fashion and men’s accessories the ‘wide-awake’ rarely garners more than a 
paragraph. For examples, see Lester and Oerke’s 2004 Accessories of Dress: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, Hilda Amphlett’s 
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I go to buy a new ‘wide-awake,’ namely, and have to meet my wife for that 
important object, at the stroke of half-past 3 in Croucher's reading room! A new 
wide-awake; think what a chivalrous-looking old fellow I shall be when you 
see me next,–– if it please the pigs!– Seriously I have never had another kind of 
hat that was in the least comfortable for me; and in these last days to wear the 
old hard cylinder proves entirely insupportable. (CLO)  
 
The wide-awake, as Penelope Byrde noted in The Male Image: Men's Fashion in 
England 1300 to 1970 was normally worn in the country or for informal occasions 
(185) – this is likely the reason for Carlyle’s ‘pig’ reference. Playfulness aside, 
Carlyle also calls the hat an ‘important object’ and devotes more than a quarter of his 
short letter to his discussion of it. Thomas’s preference for wide-awakes (over the 
‘hard cylinder’ top hat) was so established by 1851 that Jane teases him about them 
in the letter written on 3 December of that year. She’d recently gifted Thomas with a 
waistcoat made to his measure, and in a letter she noted of the waistcoat ‘it is 
decidedly fast; but a man with three wide-awakes may do with a waistcoat 
fastissimo!’ (CLO).  
     For Thomas the wide-awake was a practical hat but he was also aware of it as an 
aesthetic object, or, rather, as an object of questionable aesthetics: in a letter to his 
sister Jean he describes how in the blowing rain he will put on ‘an oldish “Kossuth 
wide-awake” (not an ugly hat at all), and defy the weather…’ (CLO It-18530429-TC-
JCA-01) and in a letter to Lady Ashburton from Berlin in October of 1852 he 
describes how, on a tour that involved numerous stops at literary houses, ‘Goethe’s 
House was opened by favor; nay the reigning powers (seeing us in the Newspapers) 
invited poor Neuberg and me to dinner; and we went in spite of my “shocking bad 
                                                 
Hats: A History of Fashion in Headwear, and Penelope Byrde’s The Male Image: Men's Fashion in England 1300 to 1970. 
Byrde, who gives the wide-awake the most attention, describes it as a popular informal hat, ‘[l]ower-crowned, wider-brimmed 
and softer hats…  normally made of felt or straw’ (185). Whereas very few images of Carlyle depict him with a top-hat (as in 
the youthful 1833 lithograph of Carlyle holding a top hat by Maclise (NPG D2019)) a large number of the surviving images of 
Carlyle depict him wearing a wide-brimmed ‘wide-awake’ style hat; these images (made from or taken in over a dozen different 
sittings or settings) range from photographic prints to pen and ink sketches, paintings and a medallion.  
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hat” (a dusty wide-awake, which I hid dexterously below stairs)…’ (CLO It-
18521001-TC-LA-01). In this way the object that is useful equipment (protecting his 
head from dust) is also insufficient ‘societal’ equipment that Thomas has to hide.66       
     That Carlyle identified with his wide-awake is apparent through his use of the hat 
as a metonym in a letter to Jane on 30 July 1853. Jane was returning to London at a 
time when the cabmen were on strike and Thomas wrote to say that he intended to 
‘be on the ground for you, on Monday with a Neat Fly’. He then instructs her to 
‘[n]ame the hour, therefore; and keep it;–and look well out for the brown wide-
awake, as it will for you’ (CLO). In this letter Thomas first identifies the hat as a 
unique marker, as if it might be distinguishable within a large crowd of people. Then, 
in the second part of the sentence he personifies the wide-awake metonymically, 
stating that it will look for Jane. This self-identification is strong evidence of 
Thomas's perception of an affinity between himself and his hat. Another example of 
this strong sense of identification can be found in a letter written by Jane to Ellenor 
Ruding in which she references a photograph of Thomas, commenting that ‘Mr. C 
“rather likes it” he says; because “the hair (his own hair) is black in this one!” By 
hair he must mean hat, for I’ll be hanged if there is a hair on his head seen; his head 
being completely covered by a wide-awake. [T]he wide-awake is certainly as “black” 
as could be wished!’ (CLO It-18621102-JWC-ERU-01).67  
                                                 
66 Walkey and Foster note in Crinolines and Crimping Irons: Victorian Clothes: How They Were Cleaned and Cared For: ‘Out 
of doors, some sort of headgear was essential at all times…’ (74) and Hilda Amphlett in Hats: A History of Fashion in 
Headwear notes the impact of ‘the grimy surroundings of industry’ on the need for practical choices in headwear (144). Byrde 
in The Male Image: Men's Fashion in England 1300 to 1970 states that ‘[h]ats and other head coverings were originally worn 
for practical reasons. They protected the head and shoulders (including the neck, eyes and ears) from the weather and from 
knocks and blows (for example when riding or fighting)’ but she also adds that ‘[f]rom an early date, however, a symbolic and 
decorative significance was attached to the placing of a covering or ornament on the head and the wearing of a hat has 
continued to be regarded as a mark of authority or respectability’ (172). 
 
67 Jane also sometimes personified clothing or drew analogies between herself and objects of clothing, for example in her 
journal on the 26th of November 1855 she writes: ‘Spent the after-breakfast in sewing a beautiful row of steel buttons up the 
front of my old dressing-gown! Partly out of tender interest in that dressing-gown, which “has seen better days,” – like myself, 
and partly out of justice towards the buttons, which have “waited seven years” – to be found a use for’ (CLO). Here we see the 
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 In these instances Thomas metonymically lets the hat stand for his self (as in the 
letter to Jane about the Fly) or integrates the hat into his being as a part of himself (as 
in Jane’s anecdote about the black hair). As Byrde notes in her survey of the male 
image in fashion, it was sometimes the case that ‘[c]ertain articles of clothing 
became popularly associated with individual characters or were consciously adopted 
by them as a personal device’ (174). Harvey suggests something similar in Clothes 
when he describes how in the ‘social or cultural or communal imagination’ there are 
‘figures whom we recognize by their clothes’ (120); and instances where ‘personages 
are fused with their clothes: when they appear in other dress, they are less than fully 
themselves…’(121). This association between Thomas and his wide-awake – and the 
fact that the association was also held by others – is again supported by a letter 
written by Jane to Thomas on 16 July 1858 in which she relays a story; she writes: ‘I 
could swear you never heard of Madame Blaize de Bury! But she has heard of you! 
…you might offer a modest thanksgiving, for the honour that stunning Lady did you 
in galloping madly all round Hyde Park in chase of your “brown wide-awake” the 
last day you rode there!’ Jane then goes on to detail the impetus of the event: how 
Madame Blaize de Bury had once asked George Cook to introduce her to Carlyle and 
how George, upon meeting her in the park on the day in question ‘said “I passed Mr 
Carlyle a little way on, in his brown wide-awake”’ after which ‘[t]he Lady lashed her 
horse and set off in pursuit, leaving her party out of sight – and went all round the 
park at full gallop looking out for the wide-awake!’ (CLO). What’s most interesting 
about this anecdote (other than how it illuminates the heights of Carlyle’s fame) is 
the way Jane references the wide-awake as a stand-in for Carlyle (‘in chase of your 
                                                 
buttons ‘waiting’ to be useful (to fulfill themselves) and Jane’s ‘tender interest’ in a gown that she associates (via simile) with 
herself. 
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“brown wide-awake”’ and ‘looking out for the wide-awake’) when the word ‘you’ 
would have sufficed (‘in chase of you’ and ‘looking out for you’ or even ‘looking out 
for you and your hat’). Instead the hat stands-in metonymically for the man wearing 
it.  
     Items of clothing that become identifiable with an individual often have a sense of 
shared biography, which is to say that there’s a sense that the object’s biography 
mirrors the individual’s. As section two will discuss this sense of shared biography 
can sometimes take the form of an item of clothing having witnessed or been present 
at a significant event, but sometimes shared biographies come from a sense of 
longevity, of contact or touch over a long period of time. In two letters to his sister 
Jean (written on 1 May 1861 and on 26 November 1862) Thomas describes his use 
of the hat in his post-ride ritual. In the first letter he describes how after riding he 
makes a ‘try for sleep (often successful, in a quietish place I have contrived; a cape, a 
rug, and your quilt covering the body of me, an old wide-awake lightly my head, and 
all made perfectly dark)…’. In his letter of the following year he writes of riding ‘my 
good old Fritz… almost every afternoon; then a pipe with suspicion of brandy-and-
water; – after whh, half an hour of real sleep; well packed under your quilt on the 
sofa, with old wide-awake (worn light as duffel) set on the side of face and head’ 
(CLO). There is tenderness in Thomas’s description of his naps, of the pleasure (and 
literal comfort) afforded by a particular arrangement of coverings. There is in this 
way an intimacy sensed between Carlyle and his hat, not just that it served him 
during the ride and again during his sleep (and inevitably at other points in between), 
but rather a sense of real physical closeness that transcends the average kind of 
relationship experienced with one’s equipment. This closeness engenders a sense of 
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affinity between Thomas and his hat. For example, it is almost certain that the hat 
Carlyle napped under would carry some element of the scent of the world and also 
his own scent, would reflect the shape of his head, be an object he touched regularly. 
Carlyle’s letter details elements of the feel of the hat – that it is exactly right –‘light 
as duffel’ – that it makes the world ‘perfectly dark’. Harvey in Clothes raises the 
issue of this kind of intimacy:  
Because our world is so eye-obsessed we may not talk so much about feel, but 
even if we seldom talk about it, still, for nearly all our clothing, feel is close to 
everything. Our clothes are the closest companions we have; they touch us all 
day and perhaps all night…. There is no aesthetics of touch, but there should 
be…. (102-3) 
 
It is this element of contact, of feel or touch – that one can touch or be close to 
something that was ‘one of the closest companions’ of another human being – that 
makes clothes an effective remembrancer. Charles Dickens, touring America, 
‘complained that his very coat was being torn to shreds by people reaching out to 
touch him, or to grab some cloth as a souvenir’ (Rose 157). This aspect of a 
closeness that has both a physical reality (via touch) and a psychological vitality (via 
affinity or metonymy) is a key element in the use of clothes items as remembrancers.    
 
Clothes as Remembrancers  
 
In a letter to Thomas not long before their marriage Jane wrote: ‘I have gotten a 
neck-kerchief for you. You will be forced to think of me every time you put it on– ’ 
(CLO It-18250921-JBW-TC-01). Here she is clearly owning up to her intention with 
the gift: that the sight of it, the handling and wearing of it, would bring her to mind, 
serve as a reminder of her very self in her absence. Similarly, on 1 May, 1830 
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Thomas writes to his brother John (whose nickname is Doil) of a ‘hair cap’ (fur cap) 
that he says he will ride with ‘when wind is up’. He adds ‘[b]ut as for the Cap, I will 
prize it above all caps, and think when it hangs on the cloakpin that I hear the voice 
of poor Doil, saying Brother remember me! Yes, my brave Doil, I will remember 
thee, and thy true heart, so long as memory lives within me’ (CLO). Here, in light 
and teasing ways, Jane and Thomas Carlyle acknowledge two dynamics that can 
contribute to the resonant power of clothes: the act of giving with the intention or 
hope of remembrance (as expressed by Jane in her gift of the neck-kerchief) and the 
dynamic of overt association (via Thomas’ allusion to how he imagines the sight of 
the cap will evoke a kind of ventriloquist plea from the cap for remembrance from 
his brother).  
 Such associations between clothes and people work in a variety of ways. For 
example, in the early years of their marriage after Jane wrote to Thomas of a cough 
she caught on account of leaving her bonnet behind on a rainy evening ‘for fear of 
spoiling the arrangement of my hair’ – a cold that was ‘obliging me to wear a cap (a 
proper punishment for my fit of vanity)’ (CLO It-18231112) Thomas wrote back: 
‘As for the cap, I do not mind it: you had on a cap the first time I saw you, and 
nothing could become you better. You were the loveliest creature! I shall never 
forget that summer’s evening while I exist’ (CLO It-18231113-TC-JWC-01). In this 
particular act of remembrance, Jane’s complaint about wearing a cap in their present 
tense, leads Thomas to think about another cap, one that forms part of his original 
(and preserved) memory of her; an object that has earned his categorical affection (or 
indulgence) because of its association with her body at their first meeting – a key 
event in their lives.  
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 Such associations between material objects (such as the caps and the neck-
kerchief) and the living with whom the object is associated can help generate 
memories (as evidenced by Carlyle’s recollection); and memories such as these often 
become constituent parts of the more dynamic kind of remembering that happens 
when the beloved is no longer present or accessible. In 1854 after Thomas Carlyle’s 
mother died he described in his journal how he had:  
…a vision of the old Sunday mornings I had seen at Mainhall, &c. Poor old 
mother, father, and the rest of us bustling about to get dressed in time and down 
to the meeting-house at Ecclefechen. Inexpressibly sad to me, and full of 
meaning. They are gone now, vanished all; their poor bits of thrifty clothes, 
more precious to me than Queen’s or King’s expensive trappings…. (Ashton 
345)  
 
 Here Carlyle is mourning the beings, the bodies and even the clothes they wore. 
As Gibson notes in Objects of the Dead ‘[w]e come into this world naked and in 
most cultures we leave with some form of covering’ – in this way clothes, worn 
throughout our lives, become fundamental aspects of self and memory. Gibson notes 
that ‘[v]isual memories of deceased loved ones often involve specific memories of 
clothing or styles of dress’ (104). 
 Juliet Ash, writing about the bereavement she was experiencing after the death of 
her husband, describes a contemporary version of the kind of remembrance Carlyle 
alludes to in her essay ‘Memory and Objects’: ‘Clothes, their smell and texture, 
remind the spectator of the past-presence of the person to whom they belonged, their 
inhabiting them, a moment when they wore them – or a moment in which they 
removed the item of clothing. The garment becomes imbued with the essence of the 
person…’ (219). This imbuing or essence is what Judith Clark (a costume curator 
and Professor of Fashion and Museology at the London College of Fashion) calls 
animismo. In The Concise Dictionary of Dress (co-written with Adam Phillips) she 
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states: ‘I believe in what the Italian stylist and journalist Anna Piaggi calls the 
animismo…of an object. What she is referring to is not the essence of an object but 
its afterlife, or rather, the afterlife of the previous owner carried within the object’ 
(112). This sense of clothes-as-containers of some residual essence of the former 
wearer (the essence Clark suggests is ‘carried within the object’ – emphasis added) or 
of clothes as evidence of that self via the clothing’s ‘material remain’ will be 
explored in section two. 
 
II: Old and Empty Clothes 
 
In J.R Planché’s introduction to his History of British Costume (1834) the author 
states:  
 The true spirit of the times is in nothing more perceptible than in the tone given 
to our most trifling amusements. Information of some description must be 
blended with every recreation to render it truly acceptable to the public. The 
most beautiful fictions are disregarded unless in some measure founded upon 
fact. (xi) 
 
Planché is referring to the perception of clothes as ‘trifling amusements’ but he is 
also suggesting that clothes as material objects have a factual existence – an actuality 
‘founded upon fact’. Noting that Sir Walter Scott, in his 1820 novel Ivanhoe, had 
mistakenly endowed the twelfth century’s Richard Coeur de Lion with sixteenth 
century armour, he affirms that:  
 …the taste for a correct conception of the arms and habits of our ancestors has 
of late years rapidly diffused itself throughout Europe. The historian, the poet, 
the novelist, the painter, and the actor, have discovered in attention to costume 
a new spring of information, and a fresh source of effect. Its study, embellished 
by picture and enlivened by anecdote, soon becomes interesting even to the 
young and careless reader; and at the same time that it sheds light upon 
manners and rectifies dates, stamps the various events and eras in the most 
natural and vivid colours indelibly on the memory. (xi-xii)  
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It is curious to wonder if Thomas Carlyle read Planché’s book around the time his 
first and only novel Sartor Resartus – a fictional conceit about clothes – was 
appearing in serialized form in Fraser’s Magazine, for the Carlyles owned a copy of 
Planché’s History of British Costume – a volume that still sits on a bookshelf in the 
Cheyne Row house today. For while Planché is describing the value of authentic 
costume – costume as a ‘spring of information’ and a ‘source of effect’ – he is also 
alluding to the way clothes can ‘world’: shedding light on manners, clarifying 
epochs, and fixing ‘various events and eras…on the memory’ (xi-xii). 
 
Sartor Resartus (the ‘tailor re-tailored’) is Thomas Carlyle's only work of fiction. It 
was published periodically in Fraser’s Magazine between November of 1833 and 
August of 1834 and has been interpreted as both ‘a symbolic autobiography’ 
(Damrosh 1807) and ‘a work of imaginative fiction’ with ‘doctrinal kernels’ 
(McSweeney viii).68 As a novel Sartor Resartus employs a conceit that Carlyle 
acknowledged in a letter to Fraser in May of 1833 ‘will astonish most that read it, be 
wholly understood by very few; but to the astonishment of some will add touches of 
(almost the deepest) spiritual interest, with others quite the opposite feeling’ (Carlyle, 
Sartor 228). The book’s conceit was, in essence, a ruse, in that Carlyle’s periodical 
pieces mimicked an extensive book review in which an ‘Editor’ (of British origin) 
was grappling with a ‘remarkable Treatise’ entitled Die Kleider ihr Werden und 
Wirkin or Clothes, their Origin and Influence, by a German author named Diogenes 
                                                 
 
68 Carlyle himself also used the term ‘doctrine’ in describing the text and acknowledged that the text was ‘put together in the 
fashion of a Didactic Novel; but indeed properly like nothing yet extent. I used to characterize it briefly as a kind of “Satirical 
Extravaganza on Things in General”; it contains more of my opinions on Art, Politics, Religion, Heaven Earth and Air, than all 
the things I have yet written. The Creed promulgated on all these things, as you may judge, is mine…’ (Carlyle, Sartor, 
Appendix, 227–228).  
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Teufelsdröckh (Carlyle, Sartor 6). For those familiar with the Greek and German 
languages, the author – whose name translates into ‘Born-of-God Devil’s-excrement’ 
and who hails from Weissnichtwo or ‘Know-not-where’ (McSweeny 250) – is 
obviously fictional, but Carlyle embeds this conceit within the text, which may be 
one of the reasons why he expected the novel would be ‘wholly understood by very 
few’.  
 Sartor Resartus is interesting when read alongside Planché’s commentary because 
even though Sartor is a satirical novel, a meta-fiction with polemical underpinnings, 
it does, in places, do what Planché advocates: take clothes seriously; look at costume 
as ‘founded upon fact’ and as a ‘spring of information’ and ‘a source of effect’ – as a 
material object capable of shedding light on the culture and era under consideration. 
While clothing in Sartor Resartus is, in many instances, used as a metaphor, symbol 
or emblem, clothing as an actual physical thing (described in realistic detail) grounds 
many parts of the text.69 For example, in imagining his mysterious author (the 
protagonist of the book, Herr. Teufelsdröckh) the ‘editor’ of the serial states that: 
‘His Life, Fortunes, and Bodily Presence are as yet hidden from us, or matter only of 
faint conjecture’. The editor then declares: ‘of his wide surtout; the colour of his 
trousers, fashion of his broad-brimmed steeple-hat, and so forth, we might report, but 
do not’ (21).  
 Of course, here Carlyle, in the guise of the editor narrator, is reporting, is clothing 
                                                 
69 Inspired in part by Jonathon Swift’s 1704 parody A Tale of the Tub (in which coats are used to represent religious attitudes), 
clothes in Sartor Resartus often represent or act as metaphors for various doctrines, cultural dynamics or societal roles. For 
example, in the chapter entitled ‘Church Clothes’ Carlyle has the Editor state: ‘Church Clothes are, in our vocabulary, the 
Forms, the Vestures, under which men have at various periods embodied and represented for the themselves the Religious 
Principle…’ (162) and ‘the Church Clothes are first spun and woven by Society…’ (163), and ‘those same Church Clothes have 
gone sorrowfully out at elbows: nay, far worse, many of them have become mere hollow Shapes…’ (164). Here, it is not the 
literal costume (a vestment that is never presented concretely in the chapter) that is spun by some collective or that is ‘wearing 
out,’ but the doctrine(s). In other instances Carlyle’s use of clothes as representational of station i.e. ‘the gold-mantled Prince or 
russet-jerkined Peasant’ (45) is related to larger ideologies i.e. those supported by humanist statements such as ‘Was not every 
soul, or rather every body…naked, or nearly so last night…’ (49). Despite this, a notable amount of attention is paid to 
accurately describing various types of clothing, see especially chapters 5 and 6: ‘The World in Clothes’ (28-33) and ‘Aprons’ 
(34-36). 
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the absent body in the reader’s mind, and clothing it in a particular set of garments 
even as he says he isn’t: a wide men’s jacket contemporary to the era, trousers, a 
particular kind of hat. Here, as elsewhere, clothes are clothes first: the ‘surtout’, 
‘trousers’, and ‘steeple-hat’ are all nouns intended to signal a material actuality, 
words meant to clothe the absent subject. This section’s focus will be on that exact 
dynamic: on the use and fitness of clothes to make present an absence and on clothes 
as conjuring things. Beginning with Carlyle and Sartor Resartus and the ‘Old 
Clothes’ chapter of the book (Book III Chapter 6) and Charles Dickens’s 
‘Meditations In Monmouth-Street’ (in Sketches by Boz) this section will focus on the 
fitness of clothing to evoke the absent wearer and the apprehension of clothing as a 
material remain that can hold both bodily knowledge and historical knowledge. Once 
this reading of clothes as archives is established the idea of clothes as material 
witnesses to events experienced by the individual will be explored.  
 
Clothes as Material Remains 
 
What we can infer about Carlyle biographically or politically from Sartor Resartus 
(especially in relation to the more bildungsroman-like Book II) is beyond the 
purview of this thesis, but what Sartor Resartus says about clothes, and particularly 
about clothes as emblematic or emptied-out things (in the chapters ‘Symbols’ and 
‘Old Clothes’) is of interest because it is in these sections that we see clothes 
described as material remains that function both emblematically and archivally –
echoing Teufelsdröckh’s assertion that ‘[r]ightly viewed no meanest object is 
insignificant; all objects are as windows, through which the philosophic eye looks 
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into Infinitude itself’ (56). Most usefully both Carlyle in Sartor Resartus’ chapter 
‘Old Clothes’ and Dickens in ‘Meditations In Monmouth-Street’ present clothes as 
resonant and powerful things that make present the absent individual, and both use a 
real-life setting – nineteenth-century London’s Monmouth Street where used clothing 
was sold – to demonstrate the effect of the empty garments and accessories. Both 
authors also employ literary devices that help to create a sense of the dynamism of 
the ‘Empty or… Cast Clothes’ (Carlyle, Sartor 182) – devices such as simile, 
metaphor and personification all of which reinforce the connection between the cast 
clothes and the bodies that once inhabited them.  
     Monmouth Street in London was renowned in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century for its resale clothing shops, many of which were run by Jewish dealers 
(Wheatley 554). The area was quite poor and crime was not uncommon. Dickens’s 
‘sketch’ of the street in Sketches By Boz – his first published book, based on a 
collection of essays and stories that appeared in a variety of magazines and 
newspapers from 1833 to circa 1836 (Walder ix) – describes the area (in a slightly 
ironic tone that later begins to border on sarcasm) as ‘the only true and real 
emporium for second-hand wearing apparel… venerable from its antiquity, and 
respectable from its usefulness’ (96). Referring to Monmouth Street as ‘the burial-
place of fashions’ Boz (the narrator) notes that ‘the times… have changed, [but] not 
Monmouth-street’ (98). Both Dickens and Carlyle’s pieces of writing present a 
squalid place, but ‘Boz’ tempers the idea of the street through using a dichotomous 
mix of complimentary and base language. For example, he describes watching the 
‘engaging children as they revel in the gutter, a happy troop of infantine scavengers’ 
(96). Carlyle presents a similar dichotomy but through the use of two narrative 
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voices. Teufelsdröckh is reported to have declared enthusiastically in his book on 
clothes ‘often have I turned into their Old-Clothes Market to worship. With awe-
struck heart I walk through that Monmouth Street with its empty Suits…’ (183) a 
sentiment that the editor calls ‘overcharged,’ noting more cynically of Londoners 
‘[w]e too have walked through Monmouth Street; but with little feeling of 
“Devotion”’ (184). Carlyle’s use of the street over the course of his chapter is both 
metaphorical and factual (and he winks slyly to the reader to say as much when he 
notes that ‘there exists nothing like an authentic diary of this his [Teufelsdröckh’s] 
sojourn in London; and of his Meditations among the Clothes-shops only the 
obscurest emblematic shadows’ (184)), still, emblematic or not, Monmouth-Street 
was a real place and Carlyle’s use of it to describe out-worn ideas (in Sartor and in 
his letters) was in part derived from the fact that the street, dedicated to the resale of 
old, used, and out-of-fashion clothing, provided him with a useful basis for his 
metaphor.70  
 
Monmouth Street  
 
In the voice of Teufelsdröckh, Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus describes a trip to 
the old clothes market on Monmouth Street: 
‘Often, while I sojourned in that monstrous Tuberosity of Civilised Life, the 
Capital of England; and meditated, and questioned Destiny, under that ink-sea 
of vapour, black, thick, and multifarious as Spartan broth; and was one lone 
Soul amid those grinding millions; – often have I turned into their Old-Clothes 
                                                 
70 Monmouth Street and ‘used-clothes’ were often employed by Carlyle as a metaphor for worn-out doctrines, as in a letter to 
Jane written on 18 August of 1845 in which he criticizes James Martineau as ‘doomed to… look at this Divine universe thro’ 
distracted Jew-Greek spectacles, and a whole Monmouth Street of “ou’ cloe!”’ (CLO). For further Monmouth-street references 
and allusions see his letter to Jane of 30 April 1842; his letter to Edward Everett of 4 May, 1846 regarding ‘the dingy fetid 
Monmouth Street’; to Emerson on 17 July 1846 (‘Good heavens, will the people not come out of their wretched Old-Clothes 
Monmouth-Streets, Hebrew and other; but lie there dying of the basest pestilence…’ (CLO); his letter to Lady Ashburton of 28 
February, 1852; to William Sterling of 9 November, 1852 and the more complimentary and literal letter of 15 July 1846 in 
which he says of a balmy summer evening that it makes ‘even Monmouth-Street, le jeune Monmouth-Street, sport’ (CLO). 
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Market to worship. With awe-struck heart I walk through that Monmouth 
Street, with its empty Suits, as though a Sanhedrim[71] of stainless Ghosts. 
Silent are they, but expressive in their silence: the past witnesses and 
instruments of Woe and Joy, of Passions, Virtues, Crimes, and all the 
fathomless tumult of Good and Evil in ‘the Prison called Life.’ Friends! trust 
not the heart of that man for whom Old Clothes are not venerable….’ (Carlyle, 
Sartor 183)  
 
Charles Dickens describes the same area in Sketches By Boz:  
 
We love to walk among these extensive groves of the illustrious dead, and to 
indulge in speculations to which they give rise; now fitting a deceased coat, 
then a dead pair of trousers, and anon the mortal remains of a gaudy waistcoat, 
upon some being of our own conjuring up, and endeavouring, from the shape 
and fashion of the garment itself, to bring its former owner before our mind’s 
eye. We have gone on speculating in this way, until whole rows of coats have 
started from their pegs, and buttoned up, of their own accord, round the waists 




Fig. 6. ‘Monmouth Street’ by George Cruickshank, from Sketches by Boz (Dickens 97). 
                                                 
71 An assembly or council, the highest council of the ancient Jews. Two explanatory notes in this passage (after ‘broth’ and 
‘called’) have been omitted.  
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While both Carlyle and Dickens employ ironic tones in their descriptions of 
Monmouth Street both also evoke the present absence of the former inhabitants of 
the clothing that lines the street and hangs in its shops.72 Carlyle describes (via a 
simile) the visual of the street full of hanging and empty clothes as an assembly ‘of 
stainless Ghosts’ (183) and calls the street (metaphorically) a ‘supernatural 
Whispering-gallery’ (184). Dickens prepares the reader for the fantastical leap his 
narrator will take in imagining the former wearers of the clothes re-inhabiting them 
through the use of both metaphor and personification, declaring early on in his piece 
that ‘[w]e love to walk among these extensive groves of the illustrious dead, and to 
indulge in the speculations to which they give rise; now fitting a deceased coat, then 
a dead pair of trousers, and anon the mortal remains of a gaudy waistcoat…’ (98). 
Here the ‘illustrious dead’ image works in two obvious ways: the clothes themselves 
are the ‘illustrious dead’ (dead because they are out of fashion) but dead too because 
in many cases they are the fabric self of dead or unrecoverable individuals, their 
hanging and lifeless form also ‘deceased’, also a ‘mortal remain’.  
 This use of figurative language to refigure the absence the empty clothes 
presences is informative in that in order for a simile or metaphor to work a certain 
degree of congruity must be present. As a verbal way of expressing a relation 
between ideas, images or things in a condensed fashion (Preminger 490) metaphors 
                                                 
72 Both Carlyle and Dickens use an ironic (or slightly facetious) tone in their work, one that could be read as allowing them to 
avoid direct sentiment while still raising the subject of how clothes presence the dead. In Carlyle’s chapter the Editor mocks the 
German author’s enthusiasm and naïveté through relaying his hyperbolic sentiments and peppering them with what might be 
deemed an excessive use of exclamation marks, for example, of the ‘Jewish Highpriest’ [clothes-seller] the Editor records 
Teufelsdrockh as having written: ‘Reck not, ye fluttering Ghosts: he will purify you in his Purgatory, with fire and with water; 
and one day, new-created ye shall reappear. Oh! Let him in whom the flame of Devotion is ready to go out, who has never 
worshipped, and knows not what to workship, pace and repace, with austerest thought, the pavement of Monmouth Street…’ 
(183). In Dickens’s piece the narrator employs a facetious tone at the start through mixing high and low references for a 
privileged audience, for example, of the locals he states ‘their habitations are distinguished by that disregard of outward 
appearance and neglect of personal comfort, so common among people who are constantly immersed in profound 
speculations…’ (96). For more on narrative tactics and irony in these works see ‘“Shadow-Hunting”: Romantic Irony, Sartor 
Resartus, and Victorian Romanticism’ by Janice L. Haney and ‘The Narrator in Sketches by Boz’ by Julian W. Brislow.  
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(and similes) work best when the images or ideas brought together have some form 
of overlap, congruity, or fitness. In Carlyle’s case where the street of empty clothes 
evokes ghosts it is the shape of the body (the absent body and the fabric material 
remain) that overlaps. For Teufelsdröckh empty clothes are both ‘Shells and outer 
Husks of the Body’ – external forms that are ‘the pure emblem and effigies of man’ 
(182). In Dickens’s use of dead clothes it is the pastness and uselessness of the items 
that generates a kind of synchrony: the clothes are no longer vital, have no life or 
relevance – as with the anonymous former inhabitants whose time has come and 
gone.  
     It is this tension or duality – the presencing emptiness of the clothes and the 
material absence of the person that marks both pieces even though Carlyle’s tactic is 
ultimately one that foregrounds the clothes themselves and Dickens’s is to 
foreground the former wearer. For example, in Sartor Resartus Carlyle celebrates the 
materiality of the thing (while also employing personification) when he has 
Teufelsdröckh attest to the purity of the clothing without the complexity of the 
individual:  
 That reverence which cannot act without obstruction and perversion when 
the Clothes are full, may have free course when they are empty….  
 What still dignity dwells in a suit of Cast Clothes! How meekly it bears its 
honours! No haughty looks, no scornful gesture; silent and serene, it fronts the 
world; neither demanding worship, nor afraid to miss it. The Hat still carries 
the physiognomy of its Head: but the vanity and the stupidity, and goose-
speech which was the sign of these two, are gone. The Coat-arm is stretched 
out, but not to strike; the Breeches, in modest simplicity, depend at ease, and 
now at last have a graceful flow; the Waistcoat hides no evil passion, no riotous 
desire…. (182) 
 
Here Carlyle presents clothing that retains the form of the body but not the muddled 
complexity of its inhabitant. Dickens chooses instead to bring the dead back to life 
through repopulating the clothing with the dead to whom the clothes belonged, a 
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‘conjuring up’ that leads to Boz’s being ‘struck’ and ‘convinced’ by a series of 
impressions the clothes generate (98-99): 
This was the boy’s dress.  It had belonged to a town boy, we could see; there 
was a shortness about the legs and arms of the suit; and a bagging at the knees, 
peculiar to the rising youth of London streets.  A small day-school he had been 
at, evidently.  If it had been a regular boys’ school they wouldn’t have let him 
play on the floor so much, and rub his knees so white.  He had an indulgent 
mother too, and plenty of halfpence, as the numerous smears of some sticky 
substance about the pockets, and just below the chin, which even the 
salesman’s skill could not succeed in disguising, sufficiently betokened.  They 
were decent people, but not overburdened with riches, or he would not have so 
far outgrown the suit when he passed into those corduroys with the round 
jacket; in which he went to a boys’ school, however, learnt to write—and in ink 
of pretty tolerable blackness too, if the place where he used to wipe his pen 
might be taken as evidence. (99) 
 
Unlike Carlyle’s Teufelsdröckh whose focus in the above section is on the material 
remain of the clothes as things in-and-of-themselves, Boz, in using the clothes to re-
figure the former inhabitant, uses clothes as conjuring things – as an archive of both 
bodily and historical knowledge. As Boz states ‘There was the man’s whole life 
written as legibly on those clothes, as if we had his autobiography engrossed on 
parchment before us’ (99). Here the material archive presences the former wearer, a 
technique Boz applies not only to the detailed reconstruction of the life of the young 
man described above, but also to numerous other characters whose clothes he sees. In 
every instance it is the clothes that hold the key to the biography, giving us, as with 
the boy, a body derived from the clothing’s shape (i.e ‘the full symmetry of a boy’s 
figure’ (99)) but also information about his life and habits – what kind of school he 
went to, the ‘blackguard companions’ of his later years and so on (100).  
 This ‘filling-in’ of a life from the marks and wear of a variety of sets of clothing 
‘ranged outside a shop-window’ (98) mimics the way visitors to a writer’s 
house/museum might ‘fill-in’ or ‘read’ the text of the surviving garment. In the case 
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of Thomas Carlyle’s smoking cap or Sir Walter Scott’s gloves, or Dickens’s court 
suit, we might sense the corporeal actuality that filled those items. This is the case 
with Charlotte Brontë’s going-away dress wherein the outline of her small frame is 
evident in the empty garment, a garment that allows visitors to observe her sense of 
style, imagine her form, her habits, and, because of the context of the dress (known 
to have been worn on her honeymoon) imagine related events from her life.73 
Teufelsdröckh suggests a similar correspondence in the ‘Old Clothes’ chapter of 
Sartor Resartus when he notes of a hat that ‘[t]he Hat still carries the physiognomy 
of its head…’ (182). Here, as with Carlyle’s smoking cap in its case in the upstairs 
study of the Cheyne Row house, the shape of the wearer’s head is still palpable, and 
as such it offers up clues, allows the stranger viewing the hat to conjure some aspects 
of the wearer. As a material remain clothes are what’s left of the body’s form. As 
Virginia Woolf noted on her visit to Haworth ‘Her [Charlotte’s] shoes and her thin 
muslin dress have outlived her’ (Woolf, Guardian). Crucially, they outlive her in a 
particular way, through presencing some sense of her physical form and the events of 
her life. Boz, for example sees ‘a jolly, good-tempered, hearty-looking pair of tops 
[boots]’ and conjures ‘a fine, red-faced, jovial fellow of a market-gardener’ declaring  
‘…we knew all about him; we had seen him coming up to Covent-garden in his 
green chaise-cart, with the fat, tubby little horse, half a thousand times…’ (102). He 
also conjures a ‘coquettish servant-maid’; a ‘very smart female, in a showy bonnet’; 
a ‘very old gentleman with a silver-headed stick’ (102) and so forth. In each instance 
the former inhabitant of the clothing or footwear is given a presence and a life – a 
                                                 
73 As the Parsonage Museum guide book notes in a section on Charlotte’s dresses: ‘From her surviving dresses, we can estimate 
that Charlotte was less than five feet tall and possibly as small as 4’9” or 4’ 10” tall (1m 45cm)…. As a young girl, her clothes 
sense was described by Ellen [Nussey] as very old-fashioned. Later in life, she favoured simple, elegant clothes’ (29). These 
suppositions are the result of both narrative evidence and the physical remains of the clothes themselves. As one visitor to 
Haworth notes in the comment book ‘I liked the shoes – fascinatingly small’ (July 2011), others mention Charlotte’s dresses, 
another describes the clothes as ‘evocative’ (May 2011). 
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sense of being-in-the-world that makes the absence that the clothes signal 
imaginatively present. 
 
Clothes as Witnesses 
 
The idea that clothes can be material witnesses to people’s lives is not limited to the 
nineteenth century. In a 2013 Guardian newspaper article on a new French exhibit 
on Napoleon and Europe, Maev Kennedy describes how Horatio Nelson’s uniform 
‘viewed as a sacred relic of English history’ was sent to join the exhibition in Paris. 
Kennedy describes how the coat was:  
 …soaked in blood on the day that saw one of the greatest naval victories, at 
Trafalgar, over the combined fleets of France and Spain, and the disaster of the 
death of the vice-admiral. The hole in the shoulder was pierced by the musket 
ball of a French sniper perched high in the rigging of the Redoubtable.  
 The sniper’s bullet passed through Nelson’s chest and lodged near his spine, 
paralysing him and leaving him drowning slowly in his own blood. (Kennedy 
‘Nelson’) 
 
This description is telling because, while Nelson’s chest and spine and death are 
clearly described as his, the fatal shot is experienced not just by Nelson, but by the 
coat whose ‘shoulder’ is ‘pierced by the musket ball’. Nelson’s body may be buried, 
but evidence of the fatal shot in the form of a ‘hole in the left shoulder, and some of 
the gold on the epaulette torn away’ remains (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). This distinction 
between what an item of clothing experienced and what its wearer experienced is 
useful because while it limits the experience of the bullet passing through Nelson’s 
chest to Nelson, the experience of the shot in the shoulder belongs both to Nelson 
and to his coat. His coat was not only there when he was fatally wounded, but it 
experienced, first-hand, the event, becoming damaged and blood-soaked in the battle.  
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 Interestingly however, according to the Guardian article (metonymically titled 
‘Nelson engages the French again as uniform goes on show in Paris’), Nelson’s death 
wasn’t the only thing the uniform witnessed. In describing how the coat has ‘blood 
on the sleeve and the hem’ Kennedy describes how it is believed they ‘got stained as 
he [Nelson] stooped to find [his secretary John] Scott dying on the deck at his feet’ 
an hour before Nelson himself was shot (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). Here again the coat is 
described as an impacted witness to an event; a witness so involved and marked by 
the event that, as in Boz’s imaginings, various aspects of the event can be read 
through the clothes’ particular markings; a kind of access granted by and through the 
material remains of the coat.  
 But Kennedy’s article isn’t just useful for how her writing supports the reading of 
the coat as a witness; it’s also useful because of what she reports others as saying 
about the coat, and for the authenticating narratives that come with the uniform. For 
example, Kennedy reports that: ‘The uniform was sent back to England, with his 
blood-soaked silk stockings and the breeches that had been cut off to spare him pain 
when he was carried below deck…’ (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). The uniform was then 
given to Nelson’s brother William. The story goes that Nelson’s mistress Emma 
Hamilton, ‘excluded from all the ceremonies, including the funeral – wrote to the 
family begging for a loan. A neighbour’s child, Lionel Goldsmith, remembered all 
his life being taken to see the uniform laid out on the bed she had shared with 
Nelson…’ (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). This anecdote prefigures the movement of a material 
remain from use to display, an idea that will be considered in section three of this 
chapter, but it also mirrors the stories about how Queen Victoria had Albert’s 
clothing laid out for him regularly after his death (Hubbard 200) albeit with one 
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crucial difference – in Albert’s case the clothes signified him and his body; making 
present an absence, in Nelson’s case the clothes signified both him and his body and 
a very particular heightened event – his violent death and the battle of Trafalgar. In 
this way certain clothes, especially ones that have been present at events with a high 
degree of what might be called ‘psychic residue’, seem most susceptible to being 
read as material witnesses. As Kennedy reports in the Guardian article, both Amy 
Wilson, the costume curator at Greenwich who escorted Nelson’s uniform to France, 
and Nicky Yates the conservator ‘unconsciously referred to the coat as “him” as they 
moved it carefully from the packing crate into the display case’ (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). 
This is metonymy of the highest order; the transposition of self to shell; the kind of 
transposition that seems to come more readily when the object has witnessed 
something dramatic.  
 This idea of witnessing things harkens back to Mona Körte’s suggestion in 
‘Bracelet, Hand Towel, Pocket Watch: Objects of the Last Moment in Memory and 
Narration’ that an ‘object of the last moment’ can take on a ‘special role in the 
remembrances and narratives’ of the recipient (110). As an object of the last moment, 
Nelson’s coat exemplifies the complexity of associations, the thematic clusters that 
Körte describes, for tied up within the uniform is not only the battle, the death, the 
politics of the larger war and the Nation (of which Nelson himself became an 
emblem), but also Nelson’s mistress’s love for him and his legacy.74  
                                                 
74 Displaying objects with such complex historical associations (and emblematic resonance) seems to require careful 
consideration, as was made clear by Emelie Robbe, the Paris curator of the exhibit displaying Nelson’s uniform. Robbe is 
quoted in the Guardian article as saying: ‘We have placed the uniform of Napoleon so that he looks towards the uniforms of the 
emperors of Austria and Russia, who he absolutely crushed…. But at his back, there was always the shadow of Nelson, and so 
we have placed him there’ (Kennedy ‘Nelson’). This quote is further evidence of the metonymy inherent in the uniform (‘placed 
him there’) while also suggestive of the complexity of the uniform as an emblem or symbol.  
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     While clothing present at or involved in dramatic events or remarkable occasions 
may be more easily ‘read’ as a remembrancer, Dickens’s ‘Monmouth Street’ sketch 
and Carlyle’s chapter on ‘Old Clothes’ both describe clothing as material reminders 
of, and witnesses to, everyday lives. Writers’ museums embody both these kinds of 
experiences – a fact evidenced by Carlyle’s smoking cap and Dickens’s court suit – 
one an object that would have been used regularly in relation to Carlyle’s smoking 
ritual and therefore associated in his biographical narrative with the garden and Nero 
and thoughtfulness, and the other an object supposed to have been present at a 
particularly powerful (and unrepeated) moment in British literary history – Charles 
Dickens’s one meeting with the Queen.  
 
III: The Temporal Past and the Absent Body 
 
One of the amusing components of Elizabeth Paulet’s caricature of Carlyle’s trousers 
‘Hero worship reduced to “faute de mieux”’ is the possibility that Carlyle (depicted 
as a silhouette sitting out in the garden) might, at some point, actually be in want of 
that particular item of his clothing. One of the effects that Carlyle’s presence in the 
sketch has is to generate the sense that the trousers on display hang there almost 
dually – as both practical wear or equipment and as a makeshift monument or 
material representation in want of the real thing. In this section I will consider the 
effect of the removal of objects of clothing from the circuit of use and the resultant 
dynamics of display. Referencing the ‘Symbols’ chapter of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus 
and John Harvey’s closing chapter (in Clothes) on ‘dream clothes and future clothes’ 
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I will argue, as I did in relation to hair, that clothes are particularly fit remembrancers 
because of their evocation of both a temporal past and the absent body. 
     Dickens’s Monmouth Street sketch and Carlyle’s chapter on old clothes 
demonstrate that clothing removed from the circuit of an individual’s use and 
displayed emptily can be a potent conjurer of the person with whom the object(s) of 
clothing may be associated. But it is worth noting that the perception of emptied-out 
clothing on display as an object for potential re-circulation (such as those items 
hanging along Monmouth Street which are displayed in order to be purchased and 
utilized by others) differs from that of those items of clothing removed permanently 
from the circuit of use and put on display as an artefact or a work of art. Objects in 
this latter category, such as those items found in the writers’ museums considered in 
this thesis, no longer circulate as pieces of equipment accessible in a way that reflects 
their original utilitarian use, rather, these items of clothing are now static or 
preserved things; material embodiments of both a temporal past and a once-present 
human being.75 
 The idea that an article of empty clothing has the ability to presence or evoke not 
only the absent individual but events in which the clothing was worn is supported by 
the practice in writers’ museums of associating items of clothing with events on 
museum labels and in souvenir guides. Charles Dickens’s ‘court suit’ becomes not 
just any suit, but the one made in 1870 and ‘believed to have been worn for his only 
private audience with Queen Victoria on 9th March the same year’ (Dickens Museum 
label, 2013). Charlotte Brontë’s wedding bonnet and veil become ‘…the only items 
of her wedding clothing to have survived’ (Parsonage label, 2011); her silk going-
                                                 
75 Lydia Marinelli’s essay ‘Fort, Da: The Cap in the Museum’ about the theft of a cap of Freud’s from his Vienna Museum 
begins by referencing the superadded quality that can come from an autographic object’s removal from the circuit of use. The 
essay begins by noting ‘Simple headgear can hardly be seen as an enticement to commit a crime. In order to awaken criminal 
energy, a cap must go through a series of transformations: only so ennobled can it become the object of a crime’ (117).   
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away dress becomes the one she wore when she left on her honeymoon tour in 1854 
(Dinsdale, Laycock and Akhurst 20). Similarly Freud’s overcoat becomes not just a 
coat worn on a daily basis as an instrument to keep him warm or dry, but, as the sign 
at the Freud Museum notes, ‘the overcoat Freud wore on his journey from Vienna to 
London in 1938’ an event that was particularly resonant because of the dangers he 
faced in fleeing Nazi-occupied Austria (Freud Museum label, 2013).  
 
 Fig. 7  Fig. 8  
Fig. 7. Charles Dickens’s Court Suit, Charles Dickens Museum, London, photograph by the 
 author with permission. 
Fig. 8. Charlotte Brontë's Wedding Bonnet © Brontë Parsonage Museum, Haworth 
 (Dinsdale, White 41). 
 
 Implied in such labeling is an act of witness as described in the previous section 
i.e. this court suit or this bonnet was there when. But embedded within encounters 
with objects that have experienced particular events is the fact that such objects of 
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witness (i.e. Dickens’s court suit, Charlotte’s bonnet, Freud’s overcoat) were 
themselves in contact not just with a person in the historical instance, but were, rather 
acting or functioning in tandem with a person whose whole biography existed within 
them. This is implied for example in the label for Dickens’s court suit, which goes on 
to add additional context to the author’s meeting with Queen Victoria. Not only did 
Dickens meet Queen Victoria on the ninth but also, during that meeting, according to 
the museum label, Queen Victoria ‘thanked Dickens for showing her photographs of 
the American Civil war battlefields he had acquired during his tour there’ (Dickens 
museum label, 2013). In this instance the label as an authenticating narrative works 
not only to place the suit at a particular event, but also to add a narrative context that 
extends the encounter beyond a connected series of instants. Implied in this label is 
not only Dickens in his court suit in that moment, but Dickens’s experience on his 
tour, and by extension, his life up until that moment in the court suit. Which is to say 
that the court suit itself is always already encountering a Dickens within whom a 
whole biography (right up and into the unfolding present) is inhered.  
 Clothes attached to particular events are therefore still clothes that have 
encountered people with whole histories – whether the clothes have been part of that 
history or not. Clothes understood in this way might be read as threshold objects – 
objects whose encounter with a whole biographical being ceases at the moment their 
contact with that being is permanently severed. When Charlotte Brontë wore her 
going-away dress it was a Charlotte Brontë whose whole life (art, hopes, dreams, 
failures, successes) was in encounter with the dress and the event it was required for. 
After her honeymoon the dress remained hers whether it was worn or not because 
within the dress, even if closeted away, was the possibility of further encounters or 
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contact; a possibility that could only be severed by the giving away of the dress, its 
destruction, or the death of Charlotte herself. This severance, for an autographic 
object such as Charlotte’s dress (severed most likely by her death), is one threshold; 
the placement of the dress into the stasis of a museum display case (which effectively 
brings the dress’s own biography to a halt through its removal from circulation in 
both place and time) is another.76 
     This question of the object of clothing’s own biography is one that is often 
overlooked even though it can contribute to the temporality of the object. When 
objects such as Lord Nelson’s uniform do circulate after severance with the former 
wearer (as his recently did between museums) the merging of the uniform’s ongoing 
biography with Nelson’s (as when the uniform is metonymically referred to as ‘him’) 
supports a sense of not only the on-going present-absence of a ‘Nelson’ figure 
(represented by the presence of his uniform), but also a continued temporality in the 
form of experiences had by the material and metonymical thing. While in truth most 
articles of clothing in writers’ museums did circulate ‘out in the world’ after their 
respective authors’ deaths (Charlotte Brontë’s going-away dress, for example, wasn’t 
purchased until 1907 – fifty-two years after her death) such elements of the thing’s 
biography rarely figure prominently in the public narrative even though the object 
biography is often central to issues of provenance.77 When such material biographies 
do figure, as with Lord Nelson’s uniform – purchased forty-five years after Nelson’s 
                                                 
76 Museum displays do, of course, change, and accordingly clothes items can be moved about, put on loan, placed in storage etc. 
While climate controls in museums help to preserve textiles and slow down rates of decay clothing does of course ‘age’. In 
referring to the object of clothing’s placement in ‘stasis’ I am attempting to delineate between two kinds of existence for the 
object: its more dynamic narrative-life (as a thing that moves through the world and has encounters) and its more static display 
life. 
77 Lydia Marinelli’s essay ‘Fort, Da: The Cap in the Museum’ references this fact through her description of the suppression of 
the post-Freudian biography of a cap belonging to Freud. The tweed cap in question was the one worn by Freud on his escape 
from Vienna and then, later returned to Vienna to the new Freud Museum as a gesture by his daughter Anna. The cap originally 
left on display in the entry (without a case or other kinds of security) was stolen in 1977, worn by the thief for a couple of years 
(during which time it, as Marinelli notes, ‘regained its functional value’ (119)) before being returned to the museum by the 
thief. According to Marinelli ‘[a]ll these events left no visible trace on the item or its presentation. The name of the new owner 
was not added to its small identifying card, since this might have given rise to unpleasant questions’ (120).   
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death by Prince Albert in order to save it from being sold to a waxworks museum 
(Kennedy ‘Nelson’) – it is usually because the narrative that supports the provenance 
adds, as with Nelson’s uniform, new dynamics of historical or cultural interest – such 
as Emma Hamilton’s affection for the uniform, and its eventual purchase by the 
Prince. However in both cases – regardless of whether an item of clothing’s 
biography is deemed to be static or on-going (as when an object like Nelson’s 
uniform circulates physically between museums thus accruing its own series of 
encounters or events) – displayed clothing as such is no longer regarded as 
equipment in the traditional ‘worn’ way in which most articles of clothing are 
originally intentioned, the objects instead become artefacts or works of art, and 
through that further frame of reference, are employed anew as repositories of 
memory. 
 
In the ‘Symbols’ chapter of Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus, Carlyle’s protagonist 
Teufelsdröckh draws a correlation between symbols, time and a work of art. He 
begins this process by first distinguishing between those kinds of symbols that have 
both extrinsic and intrinsic value, and those that only have extrinsic such as coats of 
arms and flags. He remarks: ‘Have not I myself known five hundred living soldiers 
sabred into crows’ meat, for a piece of glazed cotton, which they called their Flag…’ 
(168).78 It is important to note here that Carlyle’s use of the word ‘symbol’ in this 
                                                 
78 Under the category of symbols that only have extrinsic value Teufelsdröckh includes not only the Flag, but also: ‘…the 
stupidest heraldic coats-of-arms; military Banners every where; and generally all national or other sectarian Costumes and 
Customs: they have no intrinsic, necessary divineness, or even worth; but have acquired an extrinsic one. Nevertheless through 
all these there glimmers something of a Divine Idea; as through military Banners themselves, the Divine Idea of Duty, of heroic 
Daring; in some instances of Freedom, of Right’ (168-169). Lord Nelson's uniform provides an excellent example here. It 
would, according to Carlyle’s narrator, fall under the category of ‘national or other sectarian costumes’ because it is a costume 
that identifies Nelson as belonging to the British navy and, by extension, the British nation. (The fact that the Guardian article 
calls the uniform a ‘bloodstained relic of English naval history’ (Kennedy ‘Nelson’) implies that it is credible to read the 
uniform as such: a symbol of a nation and of particular historical battles.) It is also an object that has become associated with 
some of those traits Carlyle cites: ‘the Divine Idea of Duty, have heroic Daring; in some instances of Freedom, of Right…’ 
(169). 
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chapter often correlates to material things. A ‘piece of glazed cotton’ is as much a 
material thing as a flag; the difference comes from how the object is read and from 
what meanings have been superadded to its material reality. This idea of superadded 
meaning is Carlyle’s. In the voice of Teufelsdröckh Carlyle describes a process 
wherein certain symbols with intrinsic meaning attain new significance. This section 
is worth quoting at length because it supports a number of hypotheses that parallel 
arguments in this thesis: first of all that symbols (or things) that are intrinsically 
meaningful might have a ‘fitness’ that makes them worthy of consideration by the 
collective; second, that time can play a role in ‘superadding’ to a symbol’s ‘diviness’ 
(or resonance), and third, that resonant symbols can provide a window through time 
and render visible the incorporeal. As Teufelsdröckh states: 
 ‘Another matter it is, however, when your Symbol has intrinsic meaning, 
and is of itself fit that men should unite round it. Let but the Godlike manifest 
itself to Sense; let but Eternity look, more or less visibly, through the Time-
Figure (Zeitbild)! Then is it fit that men unite there; and worship together 
before such Symbol; and so from day to day, and from age to age, superadd to 
its new divineness. 
 ‘Of this latter sort are all true Works of Art: in them (if thou know a Work 
of Art from a Daub of Artiface) wilt though discern Eternity looking through 
Time; the Godlike rendered visible. Here too may an extrinsic value gradually 
superadd itself: thus certain Iliads, and the like, have, in three thousand years, 
attained quite new significance. But nobler than all in this kind are the Lives of 
heroic, god–inspired Men; for what other Work of Art is so divine?’79 (169) 
 
Captured within Teufelsdröckh’s rapturous declamation are three key ideas I will 
elaborate on below: 1) the idea that symbols with intrinsic meaning have a fitness 
that merits the kind of consideration one might find in a museum display (wherein 
objects are taken out of circulation so that men might ‘unite there; and worship 
together before such Symbol’) 2) the idea that such symbols can have meaning 
                                                 
 
79 I have retained the quotation marks to indicate that the text quoted is speech. 
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superadded through time and 3) the idea that all true works of art have within them 
both a sense of timelessness and of the God-like rendered visible (169). 
     The question of ‘fitness’ in relation to intrinsic meanings and clothes begs the 
pun: clothes, of course, are meant to ‘fit’ their wearer, there is a certain degree of 
satisfaction in a good ‘fit’. Thus clothes already have within them an intrinsic 
relation to the body and therefore an innate fitness for presencing the absent 
individual. This stasis of the frame of the former body in the museum setting is part 
of the potency of the displayed object. No longer circulating or ‘in use’ as clothing, 
the object, severed from tool-use, becomes instead an object of contemplation; a 
hanging absence. In the display model access to some semblance of the clothing’s 
attendant social and cultural clues are made available for consideration, but so too is 
the ghostly sense of the body. Especially for those items of clothing displayed on 
dress frames, forms, or hangers, the object of clothing can be read as a container that 
references the absent body in the form of a hollowed-out shape, gaping neck and 
wrists etc. Clothes as symbols – from the noun ‘symbolon, “mark”, “emblem”, 
“token” or “sign”…. an object, animate or inanimate, which represents or “stands 
for” something else’ (Cuddon, 885) – thus intrinsically represent or have a fitness for 
representing and ‘standing in for’ the body of the absent being their material remain 
or ‘fabric self’ marks. 
     The idea that meaning can be superadded to symbols through time and 
Teufelsdröckh’s assertion that within a work of art there can be found some sense of 
‘Eternity looking through Time; the Godlike rendered visible’ are two points worth 
considering together because time is major factor in the display culture of the 
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museums considered here, and it is this sense of time within the objects that 
contributes to an object’s readability as an artefact or a work of art. 
     As the previous section of this chapter has suggested, imbued within the survival 
of an object of clothing is the passage of time and the events the costume has 
witnessed. In Clothes, John Harvey notes of ‘truly old clothes’ that they 
…have a curious atmosphere when we visit them now, meticulously preserved, 
invisibly restored. It is partly because they are made by outmoded techniques, 
of yarn spun and woven by hand, with seams stitched by candlelight. But also 
they were once so close to their wearers that they are a little like ghosts. 
Pausing by them, we glimpse a vanished world.... (122)  
 
Comparing new and old clothes, Harvey suggests that ‘the big difference between 
gazing through time in one direction, and gazing in the other’ is that ‘[t]here are no 
fore-ghosts of people yet to be’. Of old clothes he notes that ‘[a]t times time itself 
seems woven in the fabric. New clothes are poised above the innumerable maybe-
futures, like a series of parallel universes, whereas old clothes are the past, although 
clothes are also changed, in their nature and value, by the passage of time’ (123). It is 
this sense of the past and of the passage of time as a series of events bridging ‘then’ 
and ‘now’ that is superadded to clothes in writers’ museums. 
     True works of art, according to Carlyle’s Teufelsdröckh manifest a sense of both 
‘Eternity looking through Time; [and] the Godlike rendered visible’. Time is, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, in the clothes – in the markings, event-encounters and 
pastness of the object and in its presencing-forth as both a metonymical thing and a 
witness. The ‘God-like rendered visible’ as Teufelsdröckh employs it could easily 
stand for those ‘divine ideas’ he associates with symbols (169) or for man’s soul, or 
those immortal qualities that may outlive us. In his chapter on ‘Natural 
Supernaturalism’ Carlyle’s protagonist provides us with one possible reading. Here 
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Teufelsdröckh asks of the dead: ‘Is the lost Friend still mysteriously Here, even as 
we are Here mysteriously… the real Being of whatever was, and whatever is, and 
whatever will be, is even now and for ever... believe it thou must; understand it thou 
canst not’ (198). The Godlike in this reading is the present absence of being, of even, 
prophetically, Carlyle’s own being as it resides in the ‘Here’ of his smoking cap in 
his former house in London and in the perceiver’s memory. Clothes in this way are 
potent remembrancers of the dead, both as material remains and as repositories of 
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Chapter Five: The Writers’ Tools 
 
The mahogany desk and walnut chair upon which Charles Dickens wrote a number 
of his later novels including A Tale of Two Cities (1859), Great Expectations (1860-
1861), and Our Mutual Friend (1864-1865) are on display in the study of the 
Doughty Street Museum named for him in London. Until very recently both were 
accessible to the public, which is to say that they were not – as with Darwin’s and 
Freud’s desks – located in a room that was cordoned off by a rope / partition. While 
visitors were cautioned not to touch Dickens’s desk and chair via signs and notices 
that read ‘Please do not touch. Even clean hands will damage these special objects’ 
the desk and chair were largely situated in a way that reflected their purpose – 
meaning that their identification as tools that could be used for the purpose of 
writing was still palpable.  
 This chapter will focus on those things acknowledged as tools central to, or used 
by, Victorian writers in relation to the material production of their work. While 
Dickens’s desk and chair will form the locus of this chapter it should be noted that a 
writer’s tools can include a wide-array of things: furnishings such as desks and 
chairs, travel desks, notebooks, pens, ink stands, blotters, paper, spectacles, and – in 
cases like Darwin’s or Ruskin’s – jars, vials, labels, shell collections, and dead 
specimens. As actual tools used in the production of these writers’ works (works for 
which these individuals are now commemorated or famous) these objects are 
especially apt models with which to read things as tools via Heidegger. As this 
thesis argues, part of what makes an object meaningful as a remembrancer in the 
context of the writer’s house/museum is its suspension or withdrawal from one kind 
  193 
of tool use (in Heidegger’s terms ‘the ready-to-hand’) and the opening-up or access-
making – through display, suspension or ‘stasis’ – of another kind of ready-to-
handness, one that is conducive to evocation or remembrance. However, in order to 
make the case for this shift in a thing’s modality, the thing’s original designation or 
state – as equipment for writing – must first be demonstrated. Reading Dickens’s 
desk and chair alongside Heidegger’s description of equipment in Being in Time 
(especially his ‘Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General’, pgs 95-
122) and some of Dickens’s own writing about furniture in Chapter XIV of The 
Uncommercial Traveller, this chapter will establish that a writer’s tools are a kind of 
‘ready-to-hand’ equipment and that, as equipment connected to a set of powerful 
references (the writer and the act of writing) they are key players in the creation of 
the kind of affective encounters or resonant experiences being considered in this 
thesis. 
 
I – Writers’ Tools and The Ready-to-Hand 
 
In ‘The Worldhood of the World’ (Part I, Division I, Chapter 3 of Being and Time), 
Heidegger begins his explication of the kinds or types of things we encounter in the 
world. This section of Being and Time and, in particular, Heidegger’s description of 
the ready-to-hand nature of equipment, is often referenced by contemporary 
philosophical thinkers on things, mostly notably by Bill Brown in his seminal essay 
‘Thing Theory’, Graham Harman in his book Tool-Being and in his essay ‘The 
Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented Literary Criticism’, Peter 
Schwenger in The Tears of Things: Melancholy and Physical Objects, and Steven 
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Connor at the start of ‘Thinking Things’ and, more obliquely, in his Introduction in 
Paraphenalia: The Curious Lives of Magical Things. Heidegger’s thinking about 
things as equipment is important because aspects of Heidegger’s consideration of 
things (those obdurate entities we bump into and encounter materially) inform this 
thesis’s understanding of resonant objects. Usefully, one of the things that 
Heidegger does with things is to situate them in the horizon of human care. As 
discussed in chapter two, Heidegger demonstrates that things are not free-standing 
entities that we engage with from some separate or regimental plane of perception, 
rather, things belong to larger sets of references and concerns, and as such, have the 
ability to world. (To put it another way: Heidegger suggests that things are not ‘mere 
things’ existing in some sort of unconnected free-floating manner, instead they are 
part of a series of relations and concerns that make present not just the landscape or 
mis-en-scene of the physical entities before us, but the whole ground from which we 
exist.) In order to establish that a writer’s desk, chair, or pen is a piece of equipment 
with its own sets of relations, Heidegger’s definition of the ready-to-hand must first 
be explained. 
 In ‘The Worldhood of the World’ Heidegger begins by stating that ‘entities within 
the world are Things’ (91) and that the things we encounter have, and are founded 
on, ‘substantiality’ (92). He suggests that while we can discover various things by 
looking at objects such as ‘houses, trees, people, mountains, stars’ (91) – however 
penetrating the discoveries, we are still unlikely to transcend a largely descriptive 
knowledge of the fully phenomenological world, or of Being.80 At this point 
Heidegger suggests a new tactic:  
                                                 
80 In his words (trans. Macquarrie and Robinson): ‘Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological 
Interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the ‘world’ (92 italics his) and ‘“Nature”, as the categorical 
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 Should we then first attach ourselves to those entities with which Dasein 
[Being] proximally and for the most part dwells – Things ‘invested with 
value’? Do these ‘really’ show us the world in which we live? Perhaps, in 
fact, they show us something like the ‘world’ more penetratingly. (92 
emphasis added)  
 
Here Heidegger is outlining his intention to use the things of the world that we 
‘invest with value’ – that we use or engage with out of our everyday concerns – to 
outline his case for a new reading of Being, a condition that he sees as the 
fundamental state of existence; a condition that he believes has been forgotten, 
overlooked, or misinterpreted by philosophy. What is most useful for this thesis in 
this epic existential project is that Heidegger – in attempting to reveal the world of 
things as tools or ‘markers’ that can help illuminate a larger set of intrinsic or 
existential relations – first undertakes an analysis of two different comportments of 
things: the ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘the present-at-hand’. As these terms, along with 
‘equipment’ and ‘gear’ will be employed throughout this chapter I will clarify them 
here. 
 As noted above, in Being and Time one of Heidegger’s aims is to move toward a 
more comprehensive understanding of the question and issue of Being. He does this 
through a series of propositions and arguments related to how Being is encountered. 
His method is phenomenological, a mode of engagement he outlines in Part II of his 
Introduction. In summary he states (and here we see early evidence of Heidegger’s 
use of repetition i.e. ‘the worldhood of the world’) that phenomenology means ‘…to 
let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows 
itself from itself’ (58). In other words he suggests a way of seeing that de-centres the 
subjective ‘I’ in order to see things as they are in themselves (as they show 
                                                 
aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make 
worldhood intelligible’ (94). These ideas are related to Heidegger’s suggestion that aspects of Being are best revealed not 
through standing back and ‘looking’ at the world (which is merely descriptive, like learning about a place through a postcard) 
but by how we are in the world in our everyday actions, encounters and Being. 
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themselves) rather than seeing things via a theoretical comportment. Later he further 
clarifies his method stating that: ‘We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-
world; with the phenomenal support which this gives us, something like the world 
must come into view’ (94). For Heidegger everyday Being in the world includes our 
encounters with everyday things. This is why he begins to look at the things of the 
world and how we encounter them. 
 In his analysis of encounter Heidegger observes that everyday Being-in-the-world 
includes our encounters (or ‘dealings’) with things or ‘entities within-the-world’ 
(95). Among such entities Heidegger cites encounters with vorhandenheit, which 
Macquarrie and Robinson translate as the ‘present-at-hand’. Present-at-hand is a 
term that means, essentially, that which we see objectively as a physical form in the 
world; a ‘what’ (67) or a present ‘thing’ that may not form our concern or be 
understood in the context of our dealings. Heidegger notes that things (and Beings) 
can, if disregarded, ‘be taken as merely present-at-hand’ (82) which suggests that 
whether we see a desk or a person as something merely present-to-hand (as a set of 
physical properties) or as part of a larger set of connections and relations is partly up 
to the observer. Das Zeug on the other hand – translated by Macquarrie and 
Robinson into ‘equipment’81 – is defined as ‘something-in-order-to’, a thing with an 
assignment or ‘structure’ that inherently incorporates an ‘assignment or reference of 
something to something’ (97).  
                                                 
81 While I retain Maquarrie and Robinson’s use of the word ‘equipment’ for the most part in this thesis I will also sometimes 
employ the translators’ footnoted acknowledgement of the ‘relatively specific “gear” (as in “gear for fishing”)…’ (97). This is 
in part because ‘gear’ (to my thinking) more vitally implies a connection between the thing and the person (gear-as-for or as 
engaged with) whereas equipment – again, to my thinking – can more readily be conceptualized as something apart from the 
event-context or the body. While I use these terms interchangeably gear seems to me to be used less and therefore may be more 
conducive to capturing the dynamic relationship between Thing and Being in an environment together – even if the object is 
physically distant. This preference for ‘gear’ will become most notable when considering images of Dickens at his desk. As 
Graham Harman notes in relation to his reading of Heidegger in Tool-Being: ‘The analysis of equipment is not a limited 
regional description of hammers, saws, toothpicks, and other technical devices. Rather, the famous tool-analysis holds good for 
all entities, no matter how useful or useless they may be. Beings themselves are caught up in a continual exchange between 
presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand…. It is vital that we not be misled by the usual connotations of the word “tool”’ (4). 
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 For Heidegger ‘equipment’ (his examples – wonderfully for the purposes of this 
thesis – include things such as an ‘ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, 
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room’ (97)) always already exist in ‘a totality of 
equipment’ (98). When we apprehend an object such as a hammer (his most cited 
example) it shows itself out of the totality of tools in the workshop, and when we 
take it into hand to hammer with it we change our relation to it. Now, instead of just 
apprehending it we use it. As Heidegger states ‘…the less we stare at the hammer-
Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our 
relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it 
is – as equipment’ (98). This encounter, Heidegger insists, is ‘not grasped 
theoretically at all…. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in 
its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be 
ready-to-hand quite authentically’ (99). This means that, in Heidegger’s analysis,  
‘ready-to-hand’ gear generally withdraws from view in order to be authentically 
usable (see especially 99, 102).  
 Applying Heidegger’s definition of the ready-to-hand to Dickens’s desk and chair 
one could say that in order for the desk and chair to be usable for ‘writing’ the desk 
and chair would have to withdraw from the forefront of Dickens’s perception and, 
so, logically, from his ‘concern’ (as the desk and chair I am currently using are 
withdrawing for me until I cast my attention purposefully onto them, an act which 
disrupts my actual concern – the ‘for-which’ of writing and thinking about this 
thesis). In this way the ‘ready-to-hand’ is not (when it is ready-to-hand) 
foregrounded as a materially obdurate or conspicuous thing. As Heidegger later 
notes, the spectacles a man might use to see a painting on the wall are 
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‘environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall’ (141), 
just as we are generally unaware of the street we use as equipment for walking (141-
142). With this idea of foregrounding in mind it is logical to hypothesize that 
Dickens (or Scott or Darwin etc.) would not have consistently encountered their 
desk and chair as ‘the point’ or the ‘main thing’ in-and-of-themselves (with a ‘for-
which’ involving pure contemplation of the furniture), but rather would have 
encountered them as ‘ready-to-hand’ things or ‘gear’ with-which they engaged as a 




The second aspect of Heidegger’s thinking about equipment that is useful for the 
purposes of this thesis is his suggestion that equipment or the ‘ready-to-hand’ is 
always already part of a larger set of references. Even while we are engaging with 
the hammer (or a pen and paper) Heidegger notes that what we are really concerning 
ourselves with in our dealings is the project we are undertaking and the end-result or 
‘that which is to be produced at the time’ (99). For Heidegger, ‘[t]he work bears 
with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered’ (99). Here 
Heidegger does not differentiate between the kind of Being that ‘equipment’ has (a 
desk and chair in our case) and the kind of Being that belongs to the ‘towards-
which’ or work of the equipment (in Dickens’s case, a novel):  
The work to be produced, as the ‘towards-which’ of such things as the 
hammer, the plane, the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs 
to equipment. The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing…; the clock 
is manufactured for telling the time. The work which we chiefly encounter 
in our concernful dealings–the work that is to be found when one is ‘at 
work’ on something… –has a usability which belongs to it essentially; in 
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this usability it lets us encounter already the ‘towards-which’ for which it is 
usable. (99)  
 
Here Heidegger is outlining the outward or encompassing nature of tool-use, a sort-
of cascading or interconnected towards-which that is encountered in equipment. The 
hammer relates to the nail, and to the wood, and to the building being built, and to 
the idea of shelter and winter and so on. In the Dickens example, the desk and chair 
gear facilitates (is usable for) Dickens’s ‘writing’ of a ‘work’ which itself has a 
‘towards-which’ quality – one that might be deemed communicating, telling, 
conjuring, storytelling and so forth. Using Heidegger’s model of a system of 
relations (see esp. Being and Time 120) and following David Cerbone’s 
interpretation of the series of relations of a hammer (‘A hammer = something with-
which to hammer in nails in-order-to hold pieces of wood together towards the 
building of something for-the-sake-of Da-sein’s self-understanding as a carpenter’ 
(Cerbone 40)) one could propose a series of relations around Dickens’s desk as 
follows: a desk is that with which one organizes other tools in order to write towards 
the creation of a narrative (or book) for the sake of communicating with others. 
Heidegger refers to this relational or ‘primordial totality’ as ‘be-deuten’, which 
Maquarrie and Robinson have translated as ‘significance’ (120). 
 Of course part of the significance of Dickens’s desk for the museum visitor is that 
it was his. There is an autographic quality that adheres to the desk, especially 
because of the context of the writer’s house/museum. This makes a double reading 
of Heidegger’s ‘references’ or relations possible: we could first read references or 
relations as Heidegger articulated them: that a thing such as a hammer or desk is 
always already part of a larger set of relations: to other tools, to intentions, outcomes 
and so on, but we could also read these references through the lens of Mary 
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Douglas’s notion of the ‘autographic’ – which is to suggest that as environing 
objects or tools, Dickens’s desk and chair can reference, among other things, the 
desk and Dickens’s shared biography: their time together, or coinciding life-history. 
In this reading the desk and chair are accordingly able to reference (or foreground) a 
specific relation – to Dickens himself – his body, his life, and the work once written 
with the still present / remaining tools.  
 To further this reading of the equipmental and ‘worlding’ nature of the desk and 
chair and to elaborate on what kind of ‘world’ might be referenced, a return to the 
objects themselves – to the furniture Dickens wrote with – is necessary. Through a 
consideration of both the things themselves and images of the desk and chair (Robert 
William Buss’s painting Dickens’s Dream and Luke Fildes’s etching The Empty 
Chair) two kinds of relations will be suggested: 1) the relation between the desk and 
chair and Dickens’s writing (the work he did there) and 2) the relation between the 
desk and chair and Dickens himself. 
 
II – Dickens’s Desk and Chair  
 
              
Fig.9. Dickens’s desk and chair at the Charles Dickens Museum, London © The Charles 
 Dickens Museum. 
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As important objects in the Dickens museum82 Charles Dickens’s mahogany desk 
and walnut chair serve to locate both a general sense of ‘where Dickens worked’ and 
also more specifically, as the museum’s signage indicates, the place where three 
great novels were penned. That the desk and chair were, at the time of the novels’ 
composition, situated some thirty miles away ‘in the bay window of the study at his 
home Gad’s Hill Place…’ (CDM display sign) is, it seems, not enough to disrupt the 
sense of location-association the desk and chair invite: the ‘here’ where he wrote, 
the ‘here’ where the books were written.83 Described in a 2009 newspaper article on 
the sale of the furniture as a ‘genuine piece of literary history’ (Osley) the desk and 
chair themselves (even though historically asynchronous to the study and house) 
become a key plane or space of literary or artistic creation – rising to the task of 
presencing both Dickens (his bodily self) and the work he did while seated at his 
desk. This makes Dickens’s desk and chair an interesting case study because of how 
strongly the desk and chair as furniture Dickens wrote on and sat on mark a site of 
production – of his imagination conjuring, and his hand scribing, the three works the 
museum emphasizes.  
 This sense of a connection, despite the furniture’s remove from Gad’s Hill, 
implies a kind of foregrounding or hierarchy, as if to say: This is the wood he sat on 
and leaned against and scribbled over, which matters more than the fact that this is 
                                                 
82 Dickens’s desk and chair, while central to the Doughty Street museum collection, are currently on loan to the museum. They 
were auctioned off by Dickens’s descendants for charity (The Great Ormond Street Hospital with which Dickens himself was 
affiliated) and purchased by the Irish collector Tom Higgins in 2008 for £433,250.00. Christie’s press release announcing the 
sale described the pieces as ‘two of the most important relics related to Charles Dickens ever offered for public sale’ (Christies).  
83 While Dickens’s desk and chair form the focus of this chapter, the trope of the writer’s desk and chair as gear necessary for, 
or part of the act of writing, occurs frequently across the museums considered in this thesis and in related images from the 
Victorian era – in particular for the male authors considered here (see figs. 11-16). The Brontë sisters did not have their own 
studies but had portable writing desks (Emily’s still surviving). In drawings the sisters are often depicted writing in the 
Parsonage’s domestic spaces, as in Emily’s 1837 diary paper (see Fig #2). The Dickens House Museum, in its museum guide, 
emphasizes the opposite case for its author – differentiating between the domestic sphere and the sphere of literary-production 
quite clearly.   
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not the exact room he wrote on this desk in; not the same air, not the descendants of 
the exact dust motes that surrounded him in the act of writing on this furniture. 
Implied in such a hierarchy is the furniture’s pivotal role in the creation of the work, 
a suggestion supported by the 2009 news article on the desk and chair in which 
Richard Osley, employing metonymy, writes: ‘… from this desk and chair came the 
magical characters of Great Expectations…’ and ‘[a]lso born on this hunk of 
mahogany and oak was Sydney Carton and the rest of the doomed protagonists of A 
Tale of Two Cities…’ – as if Dickens himself had little to do with the production at 
all.  
 This section, on Dickens’s desk and chair, will explore the powerful connection 
that has been drawn between Dickens and his ‘gear’ through a consideration of two 
works of art that feature Dickens’s desk and chair. If these ‘tools’ are capable of 
evoking whole sets of references and relations around Dickens’s written work and 
his life they must first become associated with him, connected to him – a sense of 
connection that is fundamental in the creation of resonance in the writer’s 




Robert William Buss’s (1804-1875) unfinished painting Dickens’s Dream (fig. 10, 
below), currently hanging in the Dickens Museum (facing Dickens’s actual desk), 
establishes the desk and chair as a vital site of literary creation and as a plane of 
references for the work created by the individual who works at the desk. It also 
provides us with a strong visual example of tool-use and worlding.  
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Fig. 10. Robert William Buss’s unfinished Dickens’s Dream (1875) © Charles Dickens 
 Museum, London. Web. <http://www.dickensmuseum.com>  
 
 In this painting Dickens is stationed on his chair in the midst of remembering, 
imagining, or conjuring a scene or narrative. Directly within his line of sight and 
perched on his knee is the figure of Little Nell from The Old Curiousity Shop. She 
seems to be regarding him as he regards her. Further to this particular conjuring or 
focus are other conjurings or scenes: over two-dozen small vignettes arranged 
ethereally around his study: on the carpet, the walls, in front of the windows. In one 
locale two dancing figures stand on a book on Dickens’s desk while at the opposite 
end of the desk a cluster of characters from Bleak House converse. This is an active 
painting. For all of Dickens’s repose (his eyelids are heavily hooded, but his eyes are 
open) a plethora of action is occurring. 
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 Buss, in this painting, seems to have been attempting to make visible the largely 
invisible act of writerly dreaming or conjuring – the dream-state surrounding the act 
of taking up gear such as a pen and paper. Most useful for the purposes of this thesis 
is the fact that Dickens is sitting in his desk chair and facing his desk, that he has, for 
lack of a better term, already arranged himself in relation to his gear or ‘plugged 
himself in to’ the tools whose ‘towards-which’ (the creation of a narrative) we can 
clearly see enacted. While the writer at his desk – and the writer’s desk itself – are 
fairly iconic images (see, for example, figs. 10-16 below) what Buss has done is 
portray a larger set of relations: relations between the writer, his gear, and the 
literary world created through the writer and gear together. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Charles Dickens by Daniel Maclise (1806-1870), oil on canvas, 1839, Tate, London; 
 on loan to the National Portrait Gallery, London © Tate, London. Web. 
 <http://www.npg.org.uk> 
 
Fig. 12. Charles Dickens by (George) Herbert Watkins,  albumen print, 1858  NPG © National 
Portrait Gallery, London. Web. <http://www.npg.org.uk> 
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Fig. 13: Sir Walter Scott, 1st Bt by Sir Edwin Henry Landseer,  oil on panel, circa 1824   © 
 National Portrait Gallery, London. Web. <http://www.npg.org.uk> 
 
Fig. 14. Sir Walter Scott in his Study (Castle Street, Edinburgh) by Robert Charles Bell, after 




Fig. 15. ‘Carlyle at work in the garret study’ © Carlyle House, London, photograph by author 
 with permission. 
Fig. 16. Carlyle working, a drawing by R. Tait © Carlyle House, London, photograph by 
 author with permission. 
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 The Buss painting is useful because it makes visible (and visual) the kind of 
thematic cluster that might be evoked in viewing the desk and chair in the writer’s 
house/museum: even though Dickens himself is gone, the site of the work he created 
(and the work itself) remains. In perceiving the desk and chair autographically as the 
site of Dickens’s work a viewer may have access to some sense of the act (or acts) of 
literary creation that occurred there even though Dickens himself is now absent. A 
visual analogy for this could involve picturing the Buss painting exactly as it stands 
but without Dickens in it. That the ‘spirit’ of the work might remain attached to the 
study and the furniture is already implied by Buss’s composition. Surely Dickens is 
not sitting there in that instant holding all of those different novels and scenes and 
narratives (and costumes and conversations) in his head at once – scenes that 
represent at least seventeen different works (Clack). No: he is looking at Nell and the 
rest of the figures are outside the immediate range of his concern. In this way, the 
work once done, the characters once created, might be said to dwell or linger – which 
means, in Buss’s visualization, that they have their own sort of after-life or resonance 
in relation to the site; one that does not require Dickens’s concentrated evocation to 
bring them to the fore of the desk and chairs’ set of environmental relations.  
 In The Afterlives of Walter Scott: Memory on the Move, Ann Rigney makes a 
similar observation in terms of how the site of the study at Sir Walter Scott’s home 
(Abbotsford) became connected to the sites of Scott’s literary work:  
The intimate connection between Abbotsford, Scott’s life, and his other 
creative activities meant that tie-in publications dealing with the ‘original’ 
sites in Scott’s novels and poetry were often supplemented by images or 
descriptions of Abbotsford as the site where the writing itself took place. 
The Land of Scott: A Series of Landscape Illustrations, illustrative of real 
scenes, described in the novels and tales, of the author of Waverley (1848) 
included a drawing of the study at Abbotsford alongside images of the 
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various sites that had figured in his historical fiction, as if the writer’s home 
were a natural extension of his writing. (148)  
 
This supports the general sense in the writer’s house/museum of ‘this is where it all 
happened’ but it also supports the idea that ‘these are the particular things it 
happened through or with’. One of the central motifs of a writer’s house/museum is 
the identification of those things that were employed as tools in the making. Hence 
labels such as ‘Pen with which CARLYLE wrote the last chapter of 
“FREDERICK”’ beside the pen in Carlyle’s House (CAR/Misc/34), or, of Sir 
Walter Scott’s armchair and desk at Abbotsford: ‘Armchair and Desk at which the 
later Novels were written and where he laboured to pay off the Debt, incurred in 
1826…’ (Abbotsford sign).  These labels whirl and world the things and the events 
together; they give contexts that require two components in the enacting: the 
individual and the gear. As Osley states in his article on the sale of Dickens’s desk 
and chair: ‘No wonder admirers of author Charles Dickens see much more than 
office furniture’ (Osley). This statement reflects aspects of Buss’s painting, as if 
what is seen in apprehending the gear is what the writer and the tools make together: 




In the book Ruskins’s Relics, published in 1903, the late John Ruskin’s (1819-1900) 
secretary W.G Collingwood begins Chapter I ‘Ruskin’s Chair’ by quoting a visitor 
to Brantwood – Ruskin’s home from 1872 until his death in 1900 (in a bed that is 
still on display): 
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‘This is all very well,’ said a visitor, after looking over the sketches and 
books of the Ruskin Museum at Coniston, ‘but what the public would prefer 
is to see the chair he sat in.’ Something tangible, that brings before us the 
person, rather than his work, is what we all like; for though successful 
workers are continually asking us to judge them by what they have done, we 
know there is more….We want to know their lives by signs and tokens 
unconsciously left… (3).  
 
What is interesting about this quote is the implication that the chair presences the 
person or the body. While I have treated the desk and chair as ‘gear’ working in a 
kind of tandem or agreement up until this point it is prudent to consider the chair 
(even the desk chair) as a separate entity in that, as Collingwood’s ‘visitor’ 
suggests, it seems to be the chair that makes tangible the person. 
 In Collingwood’s quote the (alleged) visitor is asking Collingwood for a 
particularly ‘fit’ stand-in for Ruskin. Not the sketches and books which might be 
reproduced or reproducible elsewhere, which might be one-off jottings, but rather 
the chair he sat in, the thing ‘that brings before us the person’ (versus the product), 
a person made even more viscerally present by the ‘signs and tokens unconsciously 
left’. In this chapter Collingwood then proceeds to describe a scene at Brantwood 
that echoes the Luke Fildes engraving of Dickens’s chair and desk, which I will 
examine in the section below. Collingwood notes: ‘In his study you see two chairs; 
one, half-drawn from the table, with pen and ink laid out before it, where he used 
to sit…’ (3). Here we see the half-drawn chair situated as if the body has just left. 
A chair that presences the body and the obdurate nature of the chair that has been 
held in stasis because it was last used by Ruskin, in stasis because it is positioned 
in such a way as if to indicate, perhaps a sad moment of assumption on Ruskin’s 
part that he would be using or needing the chair again. A tool left in use, left as if it 
would be returned to. (This motif can be seen again in a postcard of the Parsonage 
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dining room – fig. 17 below – in which writing materials ‘as if’ in use are located 
on a table around which chairs are pushed back – as if making room for or holding 
bodies, rather than being tucked up against the table to signify disuse.) 
 
 
Fig. 17.  Brontë Parsonage Museum postcard, dining room © Brontë Parsonage Museum. 
 
In Sir Walter Scott’s case we see the same reverence afforded to the chair again 
when Ann Rigney notes, in her deconstruction of the cultural iterations of Scott’s 
legacy, that Scott’s study is central to Abbotsford and that the well-worn chair he 
used (fig. 18, below) (located in the study) is an object that presences Scott’s 
physical being:  
Abbotsford is, in the first instance, a place you can visit in order to see 
where the famous Waverley works were written: the book-lined study is 
maintained as a shrine to the site of his literary creativity even though many 
of the major works were written elsewhere. When I first visited in 2005 
there were postcards on sale of ‘The Study’ with pride of place given to the 
chair upon which Scott sat when working at his desk (this chair is a 
recurrent topic in the representations of Abbotsford arguably because it is 
the closest one can get to the physical presence of the man himself in the act 
of writing). (Rigney, Afterlives 139) 
 
Here, Rigney is asserting that the chair is an important marker of the body of the 
writer in the act of writing. In Scott’s case the chair is especially resonant because of 
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its wear marks and tears and the way the leather folds and bears the effect of holding 
a body – evidence of use and of a long and involved relationship between the thing 
and the man who used it. 
 
              
 
 Fig. 18. Sir Walter Scott's chair in the study at Abbotsford, photographs by the author. 
 
 
 The power of the writer’s chair comes in part from the fact that the chair is 
regarded as fundamental for, and intrinsically related to, the act of writing in the 
nineteenth century and also because the chair is part of the physical site wherein the 
imaginative act occurred – a physical bolster that was a party to the production of 
the works created on the desk.84 The fact that Charles Darwin had casters from a bed 
attached to his chair so it could assist him to move more fluidly between the other 
tools arranged in his study (rather than leaving the chair as it was and getting up 
repeatedly) speaks to the role of the chair as equipment. The fact that the writers we 
are considering here were also culturally consecrated as ‘writers’ means that the 
chair they used for writing was one of the most logical material objects for a 
                                                 
84 Other than Charlotte Brontë’s dress and shoes the most resonant object for Virginia Woolf (then Stephen) at the Brontë 
Museum in 1904 was Emily’s stool: ‘One other object gives a thrill; the little oak stool which Emily carried with her on her 
solitary moorland tramps, and on which she sat, if not to write, as they say, to think what was probably better than her writing’ 
(Woolf, ‘Haworth’). Here the portable stool for engaging with the world as a writer (whether as a writer thinking or a writer 
writing) makes the stool a powerful locus of Emily’s creative self. 
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powerful material metonymy to take hold in.85 In the nineteenth century pens and 
paper might come and go, quills need to be changed, but chairs and desks once 
physically fit for the task of the writer’s work tended to be long lasting (see fig. 18 
above for the wear on Scott’s ‘elbow chair’): the chair has to work well as a tool in 
order for the writer to write while in it, meaning it must recede in the act of writing, 
a feat that is not universal to every chair but one which requires a certain congruity 
between the chair and the body writing in it. This fitness is one of the components 
that makes Fildes’ engraving, examined below, so ‘haunting’ because the chair is 
not just Dickens’s chair it is the chair that fit his body, the tool that his body could 
‘disappear’ with or recede into when his imaginative work took over.   
 
The Empty Chair  
                   
 
Fig. 19. Luke Fildes' The Empty Chair, Ninth of June, 1870, The Charles Dickens Museum, 
 London © The Charles Dickens Museum. 
                                                 
85 An interesting counter-example / comparison can be found in Freud’s (famous) couch: ‘possibly the most famous piece of 
furniture in the world’ (Kennedy ‘Interpretation’; see also 20 Maresfield 53). As the site of analytic treatment (in the form of the 
talking cure / free association therapy) the couch held or supported the bodies of innumerable patients. Where the writer’s chair 
has a sense of the daydreaming or working writer adhered to it (which is to say the reinforced sense of a singular individual), 
the couch has the opposite. In need of repair Maev Kennedy in The Guardian noted that it is now ‘sagging under the weight of 
more than a century of dreams, terrors, traumas and phobias…’ which implies a sense of the furniture’s multiplicity – as 
equipment for many and not just (as with Charles Dickens’s desk and chair) for one. That said the couch is still powerfully 
attached to Freud conceptually as equipment that he used to care for his patients. As Dawn Kemp, the acting director of the 
museum noted in the Kennedy article: ‘Many people visit the Freud Museum as a sort of pilgrimage, and the couch is the object 
they most associate with him’ (Kennedy ‘Interpretation’).  
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The Dickens Museum also highlights another image of Dickens’s desk and chair. 
The engraving The Empty Chair, Ninth of June, 1870 (fig. 19, above) by the artist 
Luke Fildes (1843-1927) is not only located in Dickens’s study, but it is also 
reproduced in one of the museum guides, and for sale (in a slightly modified 
version) as a postcard in the gift shop. The image, set in Dickens’s last home (Gad’s 
Hill) on the date of Dickens’s death, depicts the desk and chair in the window of his 
empty study. Museum signage (in the form of a small booklet placed in the room) 
describes the work’s context by stating that ‘[t]he desk and chair were honoured in 
this haunting engraving entitled The Empty Chair by artist Luke Fildes. Lamenting 
his death, it shows Dickens’s writing chair abandoned in his study’ (CDM display 
sign). Here we see the furniture personified as ‘honoured’ and ‘abandoned’, while 
the engraving is described as ‘haunting’. In this version of the engraving Dickens’s 
chair is pushed back and turned slightly in what might be described as a three-
quarter view so that the plane of the empty seat is prominently displayed, as if 
Dickens has just stepped away from his desk and no one has straightened the chair 
or tucked it back up against the desk as one might do when tidying. This position – 
one intentionally facilitated by Fildes86 – works to solidify the relationship between 
the desk, the chair and the author by presencing his bodily absence.  
 By removing all trace of Dickens’s body from the scene The Empty Chair, Ninth 
of June, 1870 (the date implies that the scene was apprehended or made on the day 
Dickens died) attests to the power of the desk and chair – as metonymical equipment 
                                                 
86 In a letter written to Howard Duffield (president of the Dickens Fellowship in New York) by W.H. Chambers on 28 
November, 1927, Chambers claims ‘Fildes told me that Dickens always[s] pushed his chair close up to his desk after writing 
and it was his, Fildes’ idea to place the chair where it is in the picture and so give it the title’ (Chambers, Ms 5227).  
  213 
– to evoke Dickens – even, in this case, in his absence.87 Here, the chair becomes a 
subject (as per the title of the engraving) in and of itself – an idea supported by a 
letter written some forty-eight years later (in 1918) by Luke Fildes to one of 
Dickens’s successors. In the typed letter Fildes is attesting to the identity of the 
chair, writing: ‘Dear Mr. Dickens, / When I saw the Chair again – so long since I 
made the drawing of The Empty Chair – I without hesitation recognized it’ (Fildes, 
Ms B369, CDM). Here the chair is clearly autographic and individual (Fildes 
doesn’t use ‘a’ and underlines his typed ‘the’) but it is also designated as a subject: 
capitalized to signify it is not a generic thing. Which is to say that as ‘the Chair’ 
Dickens wrote in the chair maintains some semblance of power even in (and to some 
extent, because of) the author’s absence. 
 Whereas the Buss painting foregrounds the worlding of Dickens’s work (that 
which is produced with the featured tools), the Fildes engraving emphasizes the 
opposite: the absence of Dickens and the absence of any work to come. These 
relationships: between the desk and chair and the written work and between the desk 
and chair and the writer’s body (absent or present) present just two of the many 
ways the gear contributes to the literary act and engages with its creator. While 
Buss’s image shows us the residual effect of the events occurring at the desk – how 
some sense of that work and those worlds reside around the gear – Fildes’ image 
                                                 
87 Fildes’s biography (written by his son) acknowledges that he apprehended the desk in a visit ‘soon’ after Dickens’s death 
based on ‘Dickens’s desk and chair as he had left them’ (L.V. Fildes 16) even though it is almost certain that he did not go to 
the house on the day in question. It is salient to note here that the museum foregrounds the connection between the desk and 
chair in the Doughty house space and the desk and chair in its larger biographical ‘life’. Means of promotion include the display 
of the two works of art discussed, as well as the placement in the museum of a (replica) wicker basket that matches the one in 
the Fildes engraving from Gad’s Hill – a suggestion that implies a kind of continuity of use or ‘sameness’ across sites. The 
museum’s Plan and Visitor Guide establishes (on the page that relates to the ‘Study’) that Dickens’s desk was a primary site for 
him, noting that ‘his writing day followed a strict routine. His writing time was between breakfast and lunch and there were no 
distractions that could pull him from his writing’ (emphasis mine). This assertion of the strength of the tether between Dickens 
and his work (and, by extension, his desk and chair in so much as they are repeatedly identified as the place where his writing is 
sited) is further supported by another quote in the museum’s booklet which notes that the ‘author drew much inspiration from 
exploring his surroundings and meeting people, so even when he was not at his writing desk his mind was creating new plots 
and characters’. This assertion does two things: it de-centralizes the site of inspiration (to the streets, the larger world) but it also 
relates that decentralization geographically to a centre – ‘even when he was not at his writing desk’  – a centre that is implicitly 
considered the focal point of production; a tool central to the physical manifestation of the work. 
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gives us the absent referent. The conspicuous nature of the absent referent is worth 
considering at length because in every case in the writers’ houses/museums 
considered here the authors are physically absent (in so much as they are, to put it 
bluntly, dead). How Fildes’ engraving works to evoke, or point to, the absent 
Dickens is important because, as the next section will show, tools (again, via 
Heidegger) can become conspicuous when they cease to be ready-to-hand – much 
like the desk and chair in the Fildes’ engraving, and much like the desk and chair in 
the museum itself.  
 
III – Conspicuous Tools 
 
When the desk drawer is jammed and won’t open, when the nib of the pen squirts 
out too large a blob of ink on the paper, or when the paper itself cannot be located 
these tools – the desk, the pen and the absent paper – become conspicuous. In 
Heidegger’s consideration of the un-ready-to-hand nature of equipment in Being and 
Time he suggests a scenario:  
When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most 
closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly 
adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, 
or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-
to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and 
establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings 
in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment 
becomes conspicuous. (102) 
 
One of the things Heidegger is referencing here is how in our relations with 
equipment use is often primary. To further my examples: the pen nib is rarely 
inspected before it is employed; the drawer is rarely regarded suspiciously before it 
is pulled and expected to open; the paper is usually expected to be residing in the 
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place where it was last. Part of the nature of tools is that they are expected to fulfill 
their purpose.  Still, for Heidegger there is a play that can occur in equipment. 
Things can be read as equipment while still not being the correct or fit equipment for 
our dealings. In a survey of one’s material environs for things fit for a purpose (such 
as unjamming the desk drawer) it may be possible that some things are seen as 
unusable (not fit for the task) while others may be so unfit as to be reduced 
conceptually to purely present-at-hand objects – objects we gaze across, fail to 
regard due to what Heidegger calls a ‘deficient mode of concern’ (103).88 In this 
way things are both the concepts we meet them with and things themselves – 
discrete entities with particular properties; entities that can malfunction, break, or go 
missing. 
 Heidegger briefly introduces three types or categories of the un-ready-to-hand in 
Part One, Division One, Chapter III of Being and Time. The first two are useful in 
reading the Fildes’ engraving. I will begin with the first type, which involves 
‘conspicuousness’ and then move to the second type, which involves what the 
translators call ‘obtrusiveness’ (Macquarrie 104). Put succinctly, the first type 
involves equipment that cannot be used or which does not fulfill its purpose; the 
second type involves ‘missing’ equipment; and the third type involves equipment 
which may be usable but which is not wanted and is, therefore, a kind of ‘obstacle’ 
or in the way (104). 
 
                                                 
88 While this section focuses on the unready-to-hand it is important to note that there is always a potential play within things, 
that things may be brought to the fore of consciousness for a moment and regarded differently: if paper is what’s needed, a 
discarded envelope with writing on it may or may not do, which is to say that it may come to the fore of concern and then be 
reduced, due to its lack of fitness, to a mere present-at-hand object. As Heidegger notes: ‘Pure presence-at-hand announces 
itself in such [conspicuous / unusable] equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something which one 
concerns oneself – that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back in repair’ (103).  
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Conspicuousness 
 
Part of the poignancy of Luke Fildes’s The Empty Chair, Ninth of June 1870 
engraving is how, contextually, it evokes the opposite of what Buss’s work evokes 
because in the Fildes’ work the desk and chair’s larger set of relations are disrupted. 
The ‘with-which to organize tools in-order-to write’ functionality is still there in 
Fildes’ engraving (we can see that we are looking at a desk and a chair for writing), 
but the larger implied assignment – furniture ‘with which Charles Dickens organizes 
his tools in order to write towards the creation of his books’ can no longer be 
fulfilled.89 Here, in the engraving, the gear hovers between an unusable tool and 
what might conventionally be called a symbol: a ‘thing’ standing in for some other 
thing, especially in that case where a material object might stand in for an 
immaterial or abstract idea or entity (in this case, Dickens).  
 Crucially however, the desk and chair are not just symbols in the form of a 
representation. Rather, they are depicted as tools that cannot be used (un-ready-to-
hand), because they have lost the explicit assignment (Dickens’s writing) that they 
have become inextricably connected to both materially (through their thingly life-
history) and in the popular imagination. To employ Heidegger’s terminology, the 
equipment here has become ‘conspicuous’ (102) although not, as Heidegger tends to 
suggest, through actual unusability (the chair can still be sat in, the desk written at) 
but rather through context and association, and, I would add, taboo. As Heidegger 
                                                 
89 Even though I have italicized ‘implied’ in reference to the larger implied assignment in order to acknowledge subjective 
readings of the set of references described it is interesting to consider that as furniture owned by Dickens the autographic nature 
of the with-which assignment is, to some extent, factually or ‘legally’ implicit. Dickens’s will (framed and hanging on a wall of 
the Doughty street museum) is evidence of this, demonstrating Dickens’s right to bequeath his property including ‘the little 
familiar effects from my writing table’ his private papers, library and various sums of money (‘Charles Dickens’s Will’ CDM). 
Similarly, an 1831 draft of Sir Walter Scott’s will ‘Rough Notes of Testamentary Dispositions’ in Alexander Macdonald’s 
hand, dated and signed by ‘WS’ at Abbotsford 7 January 1831, includes instructions to bequeath or bestow or ‘appoint’ 
(sometimes to creditors) ‘my furniture at Abbotsford including my valuable library paintings prints furniture medals rings arms 
and curiousities of every kind’ (Scott, Rough). A testamentary disposition that, wonderfully, includes the phrase ‘gear’, as in 
‘[m]y other moveable goods and gear’ (3).   
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notes in Being and Time, a work produced or the ‘towards-which’ of gear may have 
‘an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it’ (the shoe is ‘for’ the wearer) 
(100). In the case of Dickens’s desk and chair this is also true, as evidenced by how 
deeply connected the desk and chair and Dickens were in the popular imagination: 
all Fildes had to do is depict the gear without the author to whom they are assigned 
(an author who, as implied by the death date in the engraving’s title is not 
temporarily absent but gone forever), and for those who understand the context a 
sense of melancholy settles over the engraving; it becomes, as the museum text 
states, ‘haunting’ – a tenor evoked by the way that the furniture has become 
conspicuous. Here, in the Fildes’ engraving, the sense of the desk and the chair’s 
readiness-to-hand recedes, it ‘takes its farewell, as it were, in the conspicuousness of 
the unusable’ (Heidegger, B&T 104) – conspicuous because an intrinsic part of its 




The second special case of the un-ready-to-hand that Heidegger proposes relates to 
absence. This idea of the absent thing as un-ready-to hand is also useful here. In 
considering that which is missing as un-ready-to-hand Heidegger notes how 
sometimes that which is not present, not ‘to hand’ is akin to coming across the un-
ready-to-hand (103). Here Heidegger is referring to the kind of experience one might 
have looking for one’s errant car keys when late for work. The keys are not ready-
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to-hand because they are missing; they become ‘obtrusive’ in their absence 
(Macquarrie 104).90  
 While applying this point to Dickens himself – as missing ‘equipment’ for the 
writing of novels with a for-which that could incorporate variations of ‘being read’, 
‘being shared’, ‘being enjoyed’ – extends Heidegger’s argument in this section of 
Being and Time beyond its intended focus, I would argue that Dickens’s work (what 
he produces through writing), and Dickens himself, can be read together as a kind of 
‘for-which’ unity. A connection supported by one of the most common cases of 
metonymical usage: the author for the work (‘Have you read Dickens?’). As Lakoff 
and Johnson note in Metaphors We Live By, metonymical thought – such as the 
‘producer for product’ model described here (38) – is systematic, not random: 
Metonymic concepts allow us to conceptualize one thing by means of its 
relation to something else. When we think of a Picasso, we are not just 
thinking of a work of art alone, in and of itself. We think of it in terms of its 
relation to the artist, that is, his conception of art, his technique, his role in 
art history, etc. We act with reverence toward a Picasso, even a sketch he 
made as a teen-ager, because of its relation to the artist. This is a way in 
which the PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT metonymy affects both our 
thought and our action. (39) 
 
Here we see that the author-for-the-text / producer for product metonymy not only 
binds the author and the text but also worlds in a Heideggerean way Dickens’s sets 
of relations – his novels, his style, his epoch in history and so forth. As Lakoff and 
Johnson suggest this field of relations extends even to sketches made before the 
artist (in their case Picasso) was a (or ‘the’) famous artist. 
 What Lakoff and Johnson don’t express, however, is the way that things (like 
purposeful gear) can become bound up conceptually in metonymical structures. 
                                                 
90 This phrase wonderfully illustrates a fascinating dualism:  ‘because they are missing’ – ‘are’ as in the verb ‘to be’ paired with 
‘missing’ signifying that which is absent i.e. to be absent) as in a palpable being of not-being. If we apply this to Dickens in the 
Fildes engraving we could say ‘Dickens is absent’ which achieves again, the same kind of imagistic negative: a form or shape 
given to that which is palpably missing. 
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When we think of a Picasso we are less likely to link the work with an image of him 
in a field holding a butterfly net and more likely to link the work with an image of 
him employing those objects that facilitated the work – objects such as a paintbrush, 
canvas and easel. By extension the thing most likely to link Dickens the man and 
Dickens as a (metonymical) work are his writerly implements: his desk, chair, pen, 
paper etc. This to suggest that the metonymical concept of ‘producer for product’ 
can carry within it a material vitality or extensionality, one that links the producer 
and product through the medium of the equipment the producer employed in making 
the product. If, as Lakoff and Johnson suggest, in seeing ‘a Picasso’ we are not just 
thinking of Picasso’s work of art alone but rather thinking of it ‘in terms of its 
relation to the artist, that is, his conception of art, his technique, his role in art 
history, etc.’ then rolled into this thinking must be things, for what is technique 
without a medium? 
 In his paper ‘Porous Memory and the Cognitive Life of Things’ the philosopher 
John Sutton explores what he calls ‘cognitive artifacts’ in relation to some of the 
ways in which we materially conceptualize memory. He begins by describing ‘an 
exotic European fantasy of the early 1630s’ which held that local people in the 
South Seas had a sponge that could be used to carry messages over long distances. 
According to Sutton it was believed that ‘a message spoken into one of them would 
be exactly replayed when the recipient squeezed it appropriately’ (1). Sutton uses 
this analogy to explore how we sometimes scaffold memory through things. Using a 
sketchpad as one example of how a thing can be part of a cognitive dynamic he 
argues in support of the idea that ‘external cognitive scaffolding and tools of many 
varieties supplement our relatively unstable internal memories’ (2). It is this idea – 
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of a material scaffold – that I would like to import. As Sutton suggests of the artist’s 
sketchpad:  
The sketchpad here isn’t just a convenient storage bin for pre-existing visual 
images: the ongoing externalizing and reperceiving is an intrinsic part of 
artistic cognition itself. The artist and the sketchpad may be so tightly 
coupled that it’s possible to see them more as a single temporarily integrated 
system than as an agent operating on a distinct passive medium. (2)    
 
While this example might seem more readily analogous to the sheet of paper the 
writer writes and rewrites on91 I would argue that it can be extended to the desk and 
chair. For most writers the chair is a near-literal scaffold for their body and the desk 
a scaffold for their materials – paper and pens – and for the act of writing. What the 
desk and chair do, as useable tools, is disappear from the writer’s consciousness so 
that the imagined world can come to the fore. In such cases the material things work 
in an integrated fashion as gear that performs its function so well it ceases to be 
regarded as present (in Heidegger’s terms it is ready-to-hand). The desk and chair 
position the writer in such a way as to facilitate the work, and the paper and ink 
record it. This is one of the reasons writerly tools seem to hold such a strong sense 
of the writer’s absent presence – because they contribute to, and are part of, the 
creative act.   
 This reading of Dickens’s desk as a kind of equipment inextricably linked to 
Dickens and his work stems in part from a consideration of the poignancy, power 
(and popularity) of the Fildes engraving (an engraving that sold thousands of prints 
after it appeared in 1870 in The Graphic). In the Fildes’ engraving Dickens is 
                                                 
91 For an example of the enigmatic potential state of writerly blank paper see Clark Collis’s account in The Guardian of the 
novelist Jonathan Safran Foer’s collection of blank pieces of paper that famous writers would have written on next (a collection 
that includes paper from authors Susan Sontag, Paul Auster and Isaac Bashevis Singer as well as a blank card from Freud’s 
desk). In his essay ‘Emptiness’ Safran Foer describes looking at his blank page from Bashevis Singer’s unused typing paper. He 
states: ‘Looking at what? There were too many things to look at. There were the phantom words that Singer hadn't actually 
written and would never write, the arrangements of ink that would have turned the most common of all objects–the empty 
page–into the most valuable: a great work of art. The blank sheet of paper was at once empty and infinite’ (‘How We Work). 
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himself absent, the work he will create is also a gaping absence, but the desk 
remains and as a remain it signals both Dickens absent-presence (that of both his 
body and his mind) and the lacuna made by the work that will no longer come from 
this work-station. As the Dickens Museum 1990 souvenir guide states: ‘This 
engraving was done for The Graphic magazine’s Christmas number in 1870 
(Dickens having died the previous June) and lamented the fact that there would be 
no more Christmas “messages” from the author to his readers. It was accompanied 
by a description of Dickens’s study at Gad’s Hill as he had left it’ (10-11).  
 This idea of Dickens’s absence – his death, his study ‘as he had left it’ (11 
emphasis added) the image of the desk as uninhabited and the work or messages that 
will no longer be delivered – reflects Heidegger’s idea about the unready-to-hand. 
Heidegger writes:  
The more urgently… we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is 
encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive… does that 
which is ready-to-hand become – so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its 
character of readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as something just present-at-
hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. 
(103)  
 
This reading of obtrusiveness, of the thing that loses its sense of readiness to hand, 
that ‘cannot be budged without the thing that is missing’ can be applied to Dickens 
and his desk in Fildes work. Dickens’s absence is fundamental to the desk and 
chair’s appearance of unready-to-hand (borne from Dickens own unready-to-
handness) and this obtrusiveness is what makes the image ‘haunting’ (CDM 
signage) and an embodiment of lament (CDM SG 1990). Here, Dickens’s absence is 
palpable, a reading of a present absence that has resonances with Sartre’s analysis of 
‘Pierre’s’ absence in Being and Nothingness – an analysis of negation that has an ‘I’ 
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arriving fifteen minutes late to a café where he looks for Pierre with whom he has an 
appointment; Pierre, however, is not there (Bille, Hastrup, Sorensen 5; Sartre 40-43).  
 Sartre’s analysis of negation in Part One, Chapter Two of Being and Nothingness 
explores, in part, what it means to say ‘He is not here’ (41). While the ‘Pierre’ of 
Sartre’s analogy is eventually believed to have left the café, and to therefore have an 
actual presence elsewhere (unlike the deceased Dickens) – his absence in the café is 
still palpable because Pierre is the figure which is sought. As Sartre suggests: ‘When 
I enter this café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic organization of all 
the objects in the café, on the ground of which Pierre is given as about to appear’ 
(41). For Sartre, this ‘concern’ (Pierre) makes the other things and people in the café 
marginal or neutral: ‘I am witness to the successive disappearance of all the objects 
which I look at – in particular of the faces, which detain me for an instant (Could 
this be Pierre?) and which as quickly decompose precisely because they “are not” 
the face of Pierre’ (41). When it is realized that Pierre is ‘not here’ Sartre attests that:  
This does not mean that I discover his absence in some precise spot in the 
establishment. In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café; his absence fixes 
the café in evanescence; the café remains ground; it persists in offering itself 
as an undifferentiated totality to my only marginal attention; it slips into the 
background; it pursues its nihilation. Only it makes itself ground for a 
determined figure; it carries the figure everywhere in front of it, presents the 
figure everywhere to me. This figure which slips constantly between my 
look and the solid, real objects of the café is precisely a perpetual 
disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness on the ground of 
the nihilation of the café. (42) 
 
This reading of an experience of absence (or of that slippage between presence and 
absence) illuminates some aspects of the apprehension of Dickens’s absence in 
relation to his desk and chair, even though aspects of Sartre’s analysis are inversions 
of the house/museum scenario. For example: first of all, unlike Pierre, Dickens is not 
elsewhere – except insomuch as he may seem to reside in / be encounter-able 
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through his books. Second, whereas Sartre’s café is a glazed-over ground – the 
things and people falling away because they are not a concern / not ‘Pierre’ – the 
writer’s house/museum is a foregrounded ground, one that has the potential to hold 
the writer’s absence in every room and on every seat or sofa surface, at every empty 
table setting. Whereas Pierre’s absence is not located in a precise spot, the material 
things of the museum (and some of the attendant signage) create such spots for the 
visitor (‘here is the desk he wrote X text at’ or ‘here is the bed he died in’ or ‘this is 
the suit he wore to court’). Dickens is absent from his whole house/museum but he 
is especially absent in those locations where he was known or believed to once have 
been bodily present. The café pursues nihilation (totally receding from concern) 
whereas the house/museum pursues embodiment through things: through markers of 
absence. But like the café, the house/museum makes itself ground for ‘a determined 
figure’. As Sartre suggests: ‘it carries the figure everywhere in front of it, presents 
the figure everywhere to me’ (42).  
 Citing the philosopher Patrick Fuery’s suggestion that absence can be read as 
having two registers – primary absence and secondary absence, wherein the first 
case is pure absence without presence, and the second is ‘derived from, and defined 
by, its relational connection to presence’ (Bille, Hastrup, Sorensen 5) – and citing 
Sartre’s use of the café scene, the editors of An Anthropology of Absence, Bille, 
Hastrup, and Sorensen write that Fuery’s ‘secondary absence’ seems to apply to the 
social world (and to Sartre’s use of Pierre) because it is connected to notions of 
presence (5). While Dickens’s bodily presence is not possible in the way that 
Pierre’s is, his bodily presence is still marked by the shapes and things that once 
held it; it is therefore conceptually presentable or affectively presentable. In the 
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same way that the (now almost cartoonish) outline of a figure on the pavement after 
a crime-scene creates a negative space which illuminates, signifies and locates a 
former presence, so too do Dickens’s desk and chair in both his museum and in 
Fildes’s work illuminate his absence. In his house/museum and in his desk and chair 
Dickens is, perpetually, not there now. Again, as Sartre said of Pierre: ‘This figure 
which slips constantly between my look and the solid, real objects of the café is 
precisely a perpetual disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness on the 
ground of the nihilation of the café’ (Sartre 42). Dickens is the figure that slips 
constantly between a kind of ghostly or felt-presence and a near-concrete absence, 
Dickens ‘raising himself as nothingness’ or being raised as nothingness by things 
against a meaningful set of relations.  
 Of course, crucially in this scenario, no total negation is possible: for even as 
Dickens is raising himself, or is raised, as nothingness, as absent, as dead and gone, 
he is still always raising or being raised as himself – a self that carries with it all the 
attendant knowledge of Dickens that a visitor might bring to the encounter or gain in 
the environment. As Angus Wilson wrote of Fildes’ engraving in The World of 
Charles Dickens: ‘Luke Fildes’s “Empty Chair” was not, as we have come to think, 
a sentimentalism, but a fitting tribute to the void left by this untimely parting’ (297) 
– a void that I would argue is fitting because the chair locates it exactly. 
 What this description of Dickens’s absence and the gear’s conspicuous presence 
does is support the reading of the desk and chair as material objects that are still 
somehow connected to the person with whom they are associated even after that 
person is gone – a connection that is accentuated by the way the tool’s ready-to-hand 
nature recedes. The gear is meaningful as a representation in art and as gear 
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encountered in a house/museum because it forms an actual ground, one that 
designates or locates an act (writing) and a being (Dickens) deemed worthy of 
commemoration. Crucial to this location is a sense of residual and ongoing 
connection between a thing and a being. An analysis of Charles Dickens own 
writing about ‘haunted’ furniture in Chapter XIV of The Uncommercial Traveller 
further supports this idea of a residual connection between a person and their things, 
in the case of this narrative via the endurance of autographic ascription. 
 
IV – The Uncommercial Traveller 
 
Charles Dickens’s The Uncommercial Traveller is a series of tales published 
together for the first time in 1860. The tales are generally told in first-person or first-
person peripheral point of view from the perspective of a town and country traveler. 
Dickens alludes to the literary conceit of the series by stating up front: ‘Figuratively 
speaking, I travel for the great house of Human Interest Brothers’ (Dickens, TND, 
283) – thus alluding to his use of figurative language in the form of a metaphor, the 
house of Human Interest Brothers signifying ‘human interest’ stories. Many of the 
stories in The Uncommercial Traveller relay other people’s stories or encounters as 
told to, or happened upon by, the narrator. As the narrator states in his brief 
introduction: ‘I am always wandering here and there from my rooms in Covent-
garden, London–now about the city streets: now, about the country by-roads–seeing 
many little things, and some great things, which, because they interest me, I think 
may interest others’ (283).  
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 Chapter XIV of The Uncommercial Travller – entitled ‘Chambers’ – is of interest 
to this chapter for what it says about furniture and the person to whom the furniture 
belongs. This section of the writers’ tools chapter will employ Dickens’s narrative as 
evidence of the popular perception of the strong connection that can form between a 
person and their pieces of furniture, and how that relationship can carry forward 
through time.  
 In the chapter entitled ‘Chambers’ the narrator of The Uncommercial Traveller 
becomes aware of a series of chambers in London. At the start of the chapter the 
narrator relays a story about some of the occupants of Gray’s Inn Square before 
moving on to the Lyons Inn. Here he begins the story of a man who occupies 
‘chambers of the dreariest nature’ going on to describe how: 
 …his name, however, was not up on the door, or doorpost, but in lieu of it 
stood the name of a friend who had died in the chambers, and had given him 
the furniture. The story arose out of the furniture, and was to this effect:–Let 
the former holder of the chambers, whose name was still upon the door and 
doorpost, be Mr. Testator. (427-8)  
 
After from the clever coining of the name Testator (a ‘testator’ being a person who 
has given a legacy or made up a will) the story that arises ‘out of the furniture’ 
continues on with Dickens’s own particular blend of supernatural-realism. Of Mr 
Testator we are told that he had taken ‘a set of chambers in Lyons Inn when he had 
but very scanty furniture for his bed-room, and none for his sitting room’ (428). One 
wintery night in search of coal in the cellar, he comes upon a room (which his key 
fits) which contains ‘a confused pile of furniture. Alarmed by this intrusion on 
another man’s property, he locked the door again, found his own cellar, filled his 
scuttle, and returned up-stairs’ (428).  
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 Still, the furniture starts to preoccupy him. We are told almost immediately after 
his encounter that ‘[h]e particularly wanted a table to write at, and a table expressly 
made to be written at, had been the piece of furniture at the foreground of the heap’ 
(428). This comment is notable for how Heidegger’s structure of experience is 
exemplified so overtly: the piece of furniture he notices is ‘at the foreground’ of 
both the cellar and his concern, which is to suggest that what he sees is, in part, 
shaped by his concern; furthermore he sees in it a potential ready-to-handness – it is, 
he notes, ‘a table expressly made to be written at’ (428 emphasis added) – but it is 
not fully ready-to-hand as equipment because he ascribes it to another – it is, in 
short, not his. 
 At this point the tenant begins to enquire about the furniture to no avail. He 
surmises the owner might be dead or might have forgotten about his pieces as the 
things seem so long out of use. Eventually ‘he became desperate, and resolved to 
borrow that table. He did so, that night. He had not had the table long when he 
determined to borrow an easy-chair; he had not had that long when he made up his 
mind to borrow a book-case; then, a couch; then, a carpet and a rug’ (429). Two or 
three years pass over which time we are told that Mr Testator has ‘gradually lulled 
himself into the opinion that the furniture was his own’ (429). One night there is a 
knock on the door. A strange and ‘shabby-genteel’ man is discovered and he begins 
to ask a question: ‘…he said. “I ask your pardon, but can you tell me–” and stopped; 
his eyes resting on some object within the chambers’ (429). Shortly thereafter he 
asks ‘…“–do I see in there, any small article of property belonging to me?”’ (429). 
He then examines, ‘in a goblin way… first, the writing-table, and said, “Mine;” then, 
the easy-chair, and said, “Mine;” then the bookcase…’ and so on to the carpet and 
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‘every item of furniture from the cellar’ (430). An attempt to sort matters out calmly 
with a bottle of gin ensues and eventually the (now-drunk) visitor to whom the 
furniture originally belonged agrees to return the next day – though he does not. The 
narrative moves towards its conclusion by stating the following in the uncommercial 
traveller’s voice:  
 Whether he was a ghost, or a spectral illusion of conscience, or a drunken 
man who had no business there, or the drunken rightful owner of the 
furniture, with a transitory gleam of memory… he never was heard no more. 
This was the story received with the furniture and held to be as substantial, 
by its second possessor in an upper set of chambers in grim Lyons Inn. (430-
1)  
 
This story does two things to support the idea of an enduring tether between a person 
and their furnishings: one, it differentiates, throughout the story, between ‘owner’ 
and ‘borrower’ and later (in the lines quoted above) – even after the owner seems to 
have forfeited his claim – ‘possessor’ – as if the furniture’s assignment or tether to 
its owner has not been fully severed. Second, the conclusion allows for a variety of 
possible scenarios: that the man was a ghost (drawn in the form of ‘mine’ to his 
things), that he was an imagined manifestation of guilt made visceral because of the 
act of taking over another’s things, or that the visitor was, perhaps, just a random 
drunk man, or the rightful owner of the furniture out of his proper mind who has 
some form of memory or self awakened through the perception of familiar things.  
 What almost all of these scenarios support is the autographic potential of furniture 
as an encountered thing: furniture that not only belonged to someone, but furniture 
that can, even after it is passed on – as the cleverly named ‘Mr Testator’ passes it on 
after he dies – still refer back to the person to whom it last ‘properly’ belonged.  
 Whether this idea of belonging is ‘rightful’ ‘legal’ ‘fiscal’ or more integral (as per 
Dickens’s own mahogany desk which is not only ‘property’ but a ‘site’ of a 
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particular set of events) – or some mix of all the above – there is still, palpable in the 
taking on or over of someone’s ‘gear’ a sense of the thing’s previous engagements 
and entanglements. Which is to suggest that one of the pleasures of ‘Chambers’ is 
the implication that the new ‘possessor’ of the furniture has been given more of a 
legacy than just the things themselves, for it is easy to read into the outcome the idea 
that the rightful owner of the furniture might also figure into the legacy of the 
writing table, easy-chair et cetera; that one day he may show up at the door again. 
 
V – Stasis 
 
The next part of this chapter will consider the idea of stasis as it relates to a writer’s 
tool’s original assignment. Although almost every object discussed in this thesis will 
have been placed in some form of unready-to-hand state or stasis, a consideration of 
the implications of stasis for an object that is so readily recognizable as a piece of 
equipment for writing will, perhaps most visibly, help to reveal the initial change of 
status museum display objects undergo. Through this analysis a more clearly 
delineated illustration of what ‘stasis’ implies will be established.92  
                                                 
92 It should be noted here that while nineteenth-century objects like paintings, dresses, wedding bonnets and jewelry are 
equipment in Heideggerean terms, objects like these, at least as displayed in contemporary museum culture, can often be read as 
aesthetic objects: objects whose assignment, is, in part, or to some degree, to be of interest to the eye. An ink blotter, a pen, 
piece of paper, or even a desk and chair, while possibly ‘beautiful’ or interesting to look at, do not tend to forefront their 
aesthetic ‘face’, rather they tend to point to a larger set of references or assignments: ink to write with, paper to write on, a desk 
and chair for writing. While aesthetic encounters are obviously subjective (a carpenter might see Dickens’s desk as primarily 
aesthetic whereas a student of English Literature might see it primarily as a generic piece of furniture used by Dickens) I think 
that in general a case could be made that certain categories of tools (a hammer is an extreme example) are infrequently 
encountered as primarily aesthetic objects. This is not to say that an aesthetic consideration does not occur, only to suggest that 
many writers’ tools carry a strong for-which modality. Another argument for suggesting a division between the types of objects 
that I suggest have become more readily read as aesthetic objects (objects like paintings, dresses, wedding bonnets and jewelry) 
versus objects that I suggest are more readily regarded as tools (an ink blotter or a pen, or even a desk or chair) relates to 
contemporary perceptions of allographic versus autographic object types in the Victorian era (that which is perceived to be 
customized or made individually versus that which is perceived to be made en masse. (See, Benjamin, Walter: ‘Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction’ in Illuminations for more on this.) A final argument is display-related. My observations from 
writers’ houses/museums over the years have led me to believe that objects with foregrounded aesthetic values are often given 
space in museums (Charlotte Brontë’s going-away dress is not, for example, displayed on a mannequin in her cluttered bedroom 
posed as if she is busy packing suitcases for her honeymoon) whereas tools are often clustered thematically in purpose-oriented 
displays (i.e. as part of a set of tools with the potential to be used even though presently in stasis). 
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 In Being and Time Heidegger notes that ‘…when an assignment has been 
disturbed – when something is unusable for some purpose – then the assignment 
becomes explicit’ (105). The desk and desk chair’s assignment are, in the cases of 
the lives of the writers considered here, for writing on or with. Following on from 
Heidegger’s previously cited example of the shoe as equipment – ‘This shoe which 
is to be produced is for wearing’ (99) – I will suggest that this idea of a disturbed 
assignment can be uniquely registered in writers’ houses/museums by unused 
writing tools such as the unoccupied chair and desk, the abandoned pen or ink 
blotter. While objects such as a dress for general wearing or a lock of hair can 
presence the absent body no longer engaged with it and foreground that person’s 
absence and /or death, tools such as pens, ink blotters, desks and desk-chairs 
presence the body and being in the context of a particular act – and not just any act, 
but the act with which the individual as ‘a writer’ is so closely identified.  
 In order to illustrate the idea of stasis it might be useful to start with an analogy 
stemming from Heidegger’s shoe example. (This analysis will also lay the ground 
for the set of interrelated examples surrounding the worlding power of unused tools 
at the end of this chapter.)  
 In one of the rooms in Auschwitz-Birkenau (the memorial museum and former 
concentration camp located in Poland) there is a room containing a mountain of 
shoes (fig. 20, below).  
  231 
     
Fig. 20. Shoes at Auschwitz, photograph by Pawel Sawicki ©www.auschwitz.org. Web. 
 <http://en.auschwitz.org>. 
 
Here, the mountain of once worn, and now, unworn shoes, signifies the disturbance 
of their assignment (for protecting feet, for walking in, for the living to wear) in a 
way that profoundly (and, for many, horrifically) makes their original assignment 
explicit. What the shoes at Auschwitz are also capable of evoking, even in their 
number, is some sense of their particular assignment (an individual human for-
whom the particular shoe once fulfilled these purposes) along with that individual’s 
murder/death/absent-presence and present-absence. These tools, this gear, in its 
unused and static state (tools, it could be argued, that are made with the opposite of 
stasis in mind: for walking or moving in) are so ‘disturbed’ or removed from their 
assignment that they are, in fact, disturbing. It is very difficult to read this mountain 
of used shoes as primarily ‘aesthetic’. Even if the profundity of the context is 
reduced or removed from the viewer’s encounter – by which I mean the murder of 
more than 1,100,000 individuals at Auschwitz-Birkenau – or if the shoes themselves 
were located elsewhere, I would argue that the shoes (if recognized as tools for 
human wearing) in any context would still beg questions – likely borne from their 
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implied / understood assignment, questions such as: Who left this pile of shoes here? 
Why? Where are the people to whom they belonged? Is this an art installation? 
What is it trying to say?  
 Which is to suggest that when confronted with an object in stasis that is 
contextually aesthetic (agreed-upon as primarily aesthetic, such as a tapestry on a 
wall) the object, if one reads it as an aesthetic object, is less likely to raise these sorts 
of questions because it is, as an object, fulfilling its purpose – to be regarded as 
aesthetic, to be viewed and seen. So, if ‘stasis’ (from the Greek for ‘standing’ or 
‘stoppage’) can be taken as the perception of a thing suspended from its assignment 
(which means again, to differentiate between a painting in the National Gallery with 
its more intrinsic ‘to be viewed’ assignment and a pen with its intrinsic ‘to scribe 
with’ assignment) then a writer’s tools (that with-which they scribe) can be viewed 
in the house/museum context as standing in stasis. This is not only because the tools 
are not being used (the quill Charles Dickens wrote with is not being used casually 
at the cashier’s stand in the souvenir shop) or because they are tools that have 
survived their writer, but also because they are removed from use: are on display, or 
in a case, or in a removed setting (not to be touched). In this way it could be argued 
that the gear in question (whether an ink-blotter or a desk chair) might be perceived 
as dormant or sleeping, as if their use has been put on hold. The visitor views the 
ink-well on Thomas Carlyle’s desk and may understand what it was for when it was 
used by Carlyle while also assuming (rightly) that there is likely no ink in the ink 
stand for current use, and that, inkless, the ink stand has been removed so far from 
use as to be, in that instant, an ornament, unusable for its original purpose. As 
Heidegger notes, however, even when something is not ready-to-hand some sense of 
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a thing’s usability or its ready-to-handness can still sometimes be perceived – a state 
that is most palpable, I would suggest, in those instances when one feels a certain 
compulsion to sit in their writer’s chair when the museum staff leave the room or to 
check the ink-well (as I did) for ink.  
 Heidegger’s ideas around the un-ready-to-hand status of tools are useful here in 
that they can reveal the shimmering status of stasis more clearly: stasis as a state that 
is flexible or mutable, as a state that seems obdurately true (the pen is perceived as 
unused and unmoving and inaccessible and therefore as un-ready-to-hand) even as it 
is philosophically or phenomenologically dynamic. In Part I, Division III Section 16 
of Being and Time Heidegger notes: ‘To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world 
there belong certain modes of concern’ (102). It bears repeating the quote from 
section four of this chapter here, while also developing it further. In this case 
Heidegger states: 
 When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most 
closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly 
adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be 
damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is 
here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at 
it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the 
dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, 
equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-
to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that 
what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing 
which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that 
way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand 
announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-
to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself – that is to say, of 
the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair. This presence-at-
hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-
hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not 
just a Thing which occurs somewhere. (102-3) 
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Here we can take Heidegger’s philosophical analysis and modify it slightly to 
illustrate the kind of transfer that I am suggesting occurs in the case of those tools in 
stasis in writers’ houses/museums. What Heidegger is saying is that even if you 
happen upon a broken hammer, or a pair of spectacles with missing lenses, or a 
cracked cup, even as the thing is recognized as un-ready-to-hand it is recognized as 
such not just by looking at it objectively but also by considering its set of references 
(the cracked cup is only un-ready-to-hand if it cannot hold water or if it will cut a 
lip; the spectacles are not just understood as un-ready-to-hand by seeing them but 
also by understanding that they are no longer useful for helping a visually-impaired 
person to see what is in front of them). This is when the thing becomes conspicuous: 
we see it more clearly (we notice it) and its objective presence or present-at-hand 
nature is highlighted, meaning that we may, in such a state, examine the crack in the 
cup to see if it goes all the way through, if it can be glued and so on. Still, Heidegger 
suggests, even in the present-at-hand perception, that a sense of the thing’s usability, 
assignment and equipmental nature is there, even if only in the potential of its use 
when it is repaired.  
 Heidegger’s passage on the withdrawing nature of the present-to-hand in relation 
to a concern that evokes the tool’s relations is useful for us because applied to the 
writers’ house/museum model it can suggest that the unready-to-hand object (the 
desk chair, the desk, the ink blotter, quill and spectacles) is, as with Heidegger’s 
tools, not reduced in its stasis to some mere present-at-hand thing, rather it is a thing 
that still holds within it a sense of its equipmentality, its ready-to-hand nature. Here 
is where I will depart from Heidegger’s model. He suggests that: ‘Pure presence-at-
hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-
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hand of something with which one concerns oneself – that is to say, of the sort of 
thing we find when we put it back into repair’ (103). Here he implies repair: a 
scenario where, for example, one has picked up a broken hammer and wants to use 
it, but then cannot – a scenario where one retains the same concern they had 
originally: to nail the shingle back onto the roof with a working hammer. For 
Heidegger this consistency of concern is useful because it is a relatively simple 
model on which to build his hypothesis, but what if I insert ‘time’ and a change of 
context into this model? What if the tools under consideration might be read as more 
culturally malleable in a given context than the hammer? What if in this model of 
concern in which ‘[p]ure presence-at-hand announces itself…only to withdraw to 
the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself’ – the concern 
changes? What if on seeing a desk chair that is in stasis and upon registering its 
conspicuousness and present-to-hand/objective presence rather than just forecasting 
its return to its original ready-to-hand state one understands its potential for another 
kind of equipmental use? And what if the new use – imagined or intuited – for that 
object involves evocation or rememberance?  
 I am suggesting that even as the present-at-hand / materially objective nature of an 
object like Dickens’s desk announces itself in the stasis of the writer’s 
house/museum that its present-at-hand nature withdraws against a visitor’s ready-to-
hand awareness of the thing as a desk with an historical and autographic assignment 
(the desk that was for Dickens’s writing). Here the autographic ascription, the 
thing’s stasis and conspicuousness allow the thing to come to the fore as a 
remembrancer. Where Heidegger suggests a forecasting of a return to usability in 
relation to the thing’s future repair and its traditional use (wherein one sees the 
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readiness-to-hand of the thing because of an awareness of its potential repair or 
return to its former assignments) I am suggesting that in the context of the writer’s 
house/museum we see instead a ready-to-handness lingering within the equipment 
because of our awareness of its potential use as a tool, a tool for writing and a tool 
for remembering the writing, the writer and the set of relations that is the writer’s 
‘world’. Where Heidegger sees a return to the thing’s original with-which and in-
order-to, I see a metamorphoses.  
 This deviation may seem simple: a comparison between Heidegger’s reading of 
the perceptual shift (or oscillation) in Being’s awareness of equipment set alongside 
my reading of the perceptual shift (or oscillation) in a museum visitor’s encounter 
with a writer’s things; a divergence that is based, in this analogy, on concern: 
Heidegger’s Being wants the hammer to work, my visitor reads the cues of the 
museum space and ‘goes along with’ the shift many of the writers’ museums 
embody – a shift from seeing things as pure equipment to seeing things as loci of a 
particular kind of knowledge – of the past, of the writer, of the writer’s world. This 
metamorphosis is an important element and theme in this thesis but it is not the 
whole story. This thesis is suggesting that the work of how things arise out of 
suspended tool use to ‘world’ does not belong solely to the dynamics envisioned by 
the museum or to the acquiescence of the visitor, but also belongs to the things 
themselves. Things world. The affective state of encounter that can occur in a 
writer’s museum is one that is profoundly affected by what is doing the worlding. It 
is also profoundly affected by the idea and perception of stasis. Stasis is not just a 
removal from touch or from soiling or, as in the Dickens’s museum signage - hands 
that will damage these special objects – it is a state of preservation: literal 
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preservation (sometimes temperature controlled) but also preservation of aura or of 
contiguity. As this thesis suggests, these writerly things are often regarded as the 
things that either had repeated contact with the writers themselves or a last (and 
lasting) kind of contact. To reaffirm this idea of last things Mona Körte’s idea of last 
objects will be returned to briefly in relation to writers’ tools. 
 
VI – Last Objects 
 
In ‘Bracelet, Hand Towel, Pocket Watch: Objects of the Last Moment in Memory 
and Narration’ Mona Körte, in describing the beloved objects that kinderstransport 
children held onto after being forcibly separated from their parents at the start of the 
holocaust, Körte notes that through ‘preserving and caring for the object one remains 
loyal to it, perhaps, because there is an intuitive awareness that memory is constantly 
reshaped by the demands of the present. Remembering means renewing in the 
present the affect that is tied to the image or object; as such these mementos become 
aids to mourning’ (111-112). That the shoes at Auschwitz fulfill the needs and 
functions of memorializing is probably more readily understood than the suggestion 
that a writer’s desk and desk chair can also create an affective feeling and/or bridge 
memory or reveal ‘in a flash entire thematic clusters’ (110).  
 I have drawn attention to the shoes at Auschwitz not because they are a widely 
acknowledged symbol or because I think the shoes’ resonance is analogous to the 
desk and chair’s, but because the shoes – widely accepted as mnemonic remains – 
help delineate the path I am taking with the desk and chair, a path that leads from 
tool to remembrancer. What sets these shoes apart however, is not only their 
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collectivity (the mass of them and the number of individuals the shoes stand in for) 
but also their association with what Körte calls ‘the last moment’. The fact that these 
shoes were in proximal relation to the physical bodies of those individuals who were 
killed at Auschwitz is not lost on the viewer. This kind of heightened aura, one that 
can come from the sense that a material thing is a ‘bracket for an event’ (110) or was 
witness to an event is also prevalent in writers’ houses/museums. We see this in 
relation to the Dickens collection in a number of objects on display in 2007: the 
chalet writing table that has two plaques on it – an older brass plaque stating that the 
table is ‘The writing table from the chalet used by Charles Dickens…Gad’s Hill 
Place’ under which a more modern plaque was affixed stating: ‘Table (from the 
chalet) upon which Charles Dickens penned his last words’ (CDM).  
 This idea of the last object and of the objects as witness is also affirmed in the 
label below the Bennett clock – ‘This clock was in the hall of Gad’s Hill Place 
Rochester until Dickens died in 1870’ – a statement that suggests two things: 1) that 
the clock was there ticking away as Dickens lived, wrote and as he died, but also 2) 
that upon his death it somehow also came to a kind of closure (evidenced by the past 
tense ‘was in the hall’ and the use of ‘until Dickens died’) – a wording that implies 
that it too ceased in some way, ceased perhaps to be employed or to have a 
biography worth noting. Which is to say that the sign does not state that it ‘is’ the 
clock, or that it was moved, or that it broke-down or was taken down; rather just that 
it existed in its meaningful context until Dickens died. Even if the act of 
disassembling a house is to be read into the text, the text still proposes something 
else, some form of resonant contiguity between the clock as a tool and Dickens. This 
was also evident in relation to a worn and thinly feathered quill on display in the 
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museum in 2007. Its explanatory note stated: ‘with this pen Charles Dickens wrote a 
portion of…his unfinished novel “Edwin Drood”…’ a narrative that places the quill 
in proximal use near the end of Dickens’s days, a tool whose assignment as a pen ‘to 
write with’ likely ceased around the time of the author’s demise.93   
 With the idea of the last object hovering in the midst of the desk and chair the 
suggestion that there is a lasting entanglement between the body of the author and 
the desk and desk chair becomes more readily apparent, which is to say that as 
fundamental tools used repeatedly there may be a deeper sense of spatial contiguity 
in the desk and chair than there may be with other things and locations in the 
house/museum. Furthermore, the wear marks on most of the writer’s desks and 
chairs are visual reminders of the body, illuminating the way many of these writers 
would have engaged physically with the objects, sliding up and under the desk’s 
surface, scribbling on its plane, spilling ink on it (as Carlyle did), storing objects in 
its recesses and drawers.  
 Things that were repeatedly used in a person’s life tend, in their disuse, to point to 
a severance – much in the way that the static desks and chairs acknowledge and 
attest to the thoughts and books that the death of the writer has rendered un-writable. 
This is what made Fildes’ image so suitable for a mourning public, or, at least, for a 
public that was clamouring for, or lamenting, the loss of more of Dickens’s thoughts 
and work – because the image suggests a severance, and, as we see materialized in 
                                                 
93 Writers’ pens are often deeply metonymic objects. According to George Mell in Writing Antiques a pen nib with Charles 
Dickens’s likeness on it was made and sold abroad in the Victorian era (5). Mont Blanc (the renowned / contemporary pen 
company) currently has a limited edition Charles Dickens pen which features the author’s signature and Onoto pens recently 
released four Dickens-themed pens for the two-hundredth anniversary of the author’s birth. Dickens’s actual quill pen recently 
went on display in 1995 at the Serpentine Gallery in Cornelia Parker’s exhibit ‘The Maybe’. The Dickens Museum guest shop 
also capitalizes on the inherent relationship between the writer and his most handy tool in that they were selling (in July 2014) a 
plethora of pen-themed souvenirs: quill pens (£4.50), a calligraphy wallet (£5.50), a pheasant quill (£2.50), a feather biro quill 
(£2.50), a nib pen and ink set (£10), dipping ink (£4.50), a regular / modern pen with the museum logo (£2.25), and other 
related items such as a box of five ink set, blotting papers etc. Whether one reads this category of souvenirs as 
commercialization or kitsch the fact still remains that of all the objects (save books) that the museum could have chosen to 
embody the museum experience or visit, the pen, at the Dickens House Museum was selected as most fit for the task.  
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Buss, a severance that doesn’t just involve the man Charles Dickens, but whole 
thematic clusters that include both the man and the writer’s creative work. 
 
So far this thesis has largely considered the desk as a plane on which imaginative or 
literary work occurs. It has tied the desk, or desks, to the writerly act of inscribing on 
surfaces. Of course, desks are also containers. They often have slots or drawers 
(locked or accessible) in which further tools or equipment can be stored. Travelling 
desks or portable writing boxes of the sort on display in the Parsonage, Darwin, and 
Carlyle museums are also containers in that they often consist largely of a 
compartment or compartments for holding stationary, or trays for nibs, holders and 
ink; there may also be, even in travel desks, secret drawers or compartments (Mell 
29). Desks in this way, large or portable, might be read as private or personal 
locations, locations where more than the writer’s best or most useful tools are kept – 
places with the potential to hold secrets or meaningful totems or objects. This 
hypothesis is supported by findings in the desks of the writers considered in this 
thesis and by the objects associated with the desks.  
 Sir Walter Scott’s desk (on display in the study at Abbotsford where it was used) 
was made in 1810 by Gillow of London, and was a commissioned near-copy of a 
desk owned by Scott’s friend John Morritt of Rokeby Park. This was the desk at 
which Scott struggled to write in his last weeks of life, a scene described in John 
Gibson Lockhart’s (1795-1854) Memoirs of the Life of Sir Walter Scott (1837-1838) 
and remembered by Dickens at Abbotsford when he saw Scott’s last clothes. 
According to Lockhart (who was Scott’s son-in-law), as Scott’s weakness grew the 
author was sometimes taken outside at Abbotsford to be ‘wheeled about on the turf’ 
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(Vol IV 321). One day, Scott, complaining of idleness and of the likelihood that he 
would ‘forget what I have been thinking of, if I don’t set it down now’ (321) asked 
that the keys to his desk be fetched, at which point his daughters went into his study 
and ‘laid paper and pens in the usual order’ (321). Lockhart then took Scott to the 
desk:  
…into the spot where he had always been accustomed to work. When the 
chair was placed at the desk, and he found himself in the old position, he 
smiled and thanked us, and said, ‘Now give me my pen and leave me for a 
little to myself.’ Sophia put the pen into his hand, and he endeavoured to 
close his fingers upon it, but they refused their office – it dropped on the 
paper. He sank back among his pillows, silent tears rolling down his 
cheeks…. (321)  
 
Scott is then taken outdoors again, but then asks to be returned to bed, after which 
Lockhart notes ‘Sir Walter never, I think, left his room afterwards, and hardly his 
bed, except for an hour or two in the middle of the day; and after another week he 
was unable even for this’ (321).  
 Here the death of the ‘writer’ (of the man’s capability to write) is akin to a first 
death – one that corresponds to Scott’s withdrawal from the world and Scott’s 
eventual bodily death. The desk, as a survivor of Scott, then becomes a last thing 
with its own relics. As Lockhart noted: 
…perhaps the most touching evidence of the lasting tenderness of his early 
domestic feelings was exhibited to his executors, when they opened his 
repositories in search of his testament, the evening after his burial. On 
lifting up his desk, we found arranged in careful order a series of little 
objects, which had obviously been so placed there that his eye might rest on 
them every morning before he began his tasks. These were the old-
fashioned boxes that had garnished his mother’s toilette, when he, a sickly 
child, slept in her dressing-room – the silver taper-stand which the young 
advocate had bought for her with his first five guinea fee – a row of small 
packets inscribed with her hand, and containing the hair of those of her 
offspring that had died before her – his father’s snuff-box and etui-case, and 
more things of the like sort, recalling ‘The old familiar faces.’ (Lockhart, 
Memoirs Vol 4, 335) 
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Lockhart’s reading of Scott’s desk artifacts – specifically the use of the phrase 
‘domestic feelings’ potentially diminishes the affective power inherent in Scott’s 
remembrancers. While this term may have been used to signify his childhood home 
life or affection for his mother and family, the term, to my mind, still carries in it 
some sense of sentiment (as does the phrase ‘little objects’). For Scott, these 
talismans or remembrancers may have been part of his consolidated identity, may 
have been reminders of his past, his loved ones, his own grounding narrative 
(looking up from my own desk I have a similar set of identity-solidifying things 
arranged around me, meaningful and worlding things that connect me to the larger 
world and to my past). Crucially however, Lockhart, a familiar of Scott’s, sees these 
things not just as things but also as material markers of larger sets of relations or 
events. He recognizes that the taper marked both relations and an event and that 
Scott seemed to be employing it accordingly as a kind of remembrancer. This is part 
of the power of the desk as a site of creation: it is not only the site or plane of the 
writer working but also a site that contains aspects of that writer’s identity beyond 
the work that happens there. 
 While the objects Lockhart describes were discovered immediately after Scott’s 
death, it took over a hundred years (until 1935) for two secret drawers to be 
discovered in Scott’s same desk – one drawer containing some fifty love letters from 
his wife before and after their marriage in 1797 (‘Scott’s Study’). This is the desk as 
a container of secrets, as a container of a narrative that represents a less-than public 
self.  
 Dickens’s desk, like Scott’s, had its attendant objects. In the Dickens House Guide 
and Illustrated Souvenir (n.d.) they describe a ‘china monkey’ as ‘one of the objects 
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which Dickens always had standing on his desk, wherever he happened to be, and 
without which he could not settle down to work’ as well as describing some of the 
objects on the desk when he died, objects that included a paper knife, green cup (for 
flowers), an ink bottle and a quill pen ‘with which he always wrote’ (11).  
 If, as in Bachelard’s model, the house is a location for dreaming, then it is 
possible that the desk – for a writer who engages with the desk frequently – might 
also be a dreaming place, a site of imagination, memory or reverie (as in the Buss 
painting), a site for totems and talismans, remembrancers of who one is. Such items 
locate the desk as a place of charged connections, as a meaning-full place – a 
container for meaningful things.  
 In Charlotte Brontë’s rosewood and mother-of-pearl workbox the contents that 
have survived her are generally ‘work’ (textile) related: thread, needles, buttons, 
silk, textile fragments, ribbons (Dinsdale, Brontë Relics 10). Her paint box contains 
paint-related objects, whereas her portable writing desk contains a mix of things: 
wallpaper patterns, patterns for a collar and cuffs, an autograph poem, and a plait of 
her sister Anne’s hair (Alexander, The Art 267-269). At Darwin’s Down House a 
small writing desk belonging to Darwin’s daughter Annie (who died in 1851 at the 
age of ten) was filled by her mother with some of her most ‘treasured 
possessions…to remember her by: needlework, letters, trinkets and a lock of her hair 
bound in paper and dated the day of her death, 23 April 1851’ (Reeve 36).94   
 All of which is to suggest that desks can be both surface locations and containers 
and that one aspect of the fitness of a writer’s house/museum thing as a 
remembrancer is that it can contain: have the capacity to ‘store’ or hold the transient 
                                                 
94 The writing box lay undiscovered until sometime around 2000 when it was discovered by Charles Darwin’s great-great 
grandson Randal Keynes. His book about it Annie’s Box was published by Fourth Estate in 2002. 
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and the ephemeral. As Hallam and Hockey suggest in Death, Memory and Material 
Culture: ‘Metaphors of memory often highlight the notion of containment and so the 
ability to remember is frequently represented as the act of storing something in a 
vessel or structure’ (27). They note that, of the two prominent metaphors for 
memory, one focuses on fixity and stability (storage), and the other on fading or 
fleeting memory and transformation (27). Desks are containers, they store things and 
ground memory; are solid and lasting markers of both the body and the work made 
there.  
 When the British Library states of the Brontë family’s Cuban mahogany and oak 
table that it ‘witnessed the creation of Wuthering Heights, [and] Jane Eyre’ the 
thought is of a surface, of ‘a real writer’s work-place, stained with ink spills and 
scarred in the centre with a large candle burn’ (‘Brontë Table’); the thought is of the 
imaginative acts that occurred there, which is why placing original manuscripts of 
those works on top of the table in a display is considered meaningful. As Chris 
Fletcher the curator of the ‘Chapter & Verse’ exhibition at the British Library stated: 
‘to reunite the manuscripts with the table on which they were created – and which 
seemed to play such an essential part in their creation – is a remarkable and powerful 
thing’ (‘Brontë Table’). These ideas recognize both the object as equipment (‘a real 
writer’s workplace’ and as a site of imaginative acts. They also recognize the power 
of the ink-stain mark or mar or scar – the proof of the work and the acts that 
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Chapter Six: Handwriting  
 
In the Brontë Parsonage Museum collection there is a letter dated 9 July 1857 in 
Patrick Brontë’s hand to a Miss Atkins from Bath (P. Brontë, Letter to MA) The 
letter begins ‘Dear Madam, / The annexed scrap / is all I can spare of the / autograph 
of my dear / daughter Charlotte…’. In the letter Reverend Brontë explains the 
modest size of the ‘scrap’ by stating that he has had ‘so many applications’ for his 
daughter’s handwriting that his stock is nearly ‘exhausted’. Attached to his letter is a 
small rectangular section of Charlotte’s handwriting cut from a letter written in her 
hand. 
 The Parsonage collection also contains a scrapbook that belonged to a Mary Jesup 
Docwra of Kelvedon. Docwra’s scrapbook contains a number of pasted autographs 
and, on the seventeenth page, a similar note from Patrick Brontë with a sample of 
Charlotte’s writing attached. His note to Mary Dowcra of 23 September, 1858 reads: 
‘Dear Madam, / The enclosed is / all I can spare of / my dear Daughter Charlotte’s / 
handwriting. / Yours, very respectfully / P. Brontë’. The small square of Charlotte’s 
writing he included is a fragment that reads: ‘my book – no one / ious than I am to’ 
(P. Brontë, Letter to MJD). 
 Charlotte Brontë would have been dead approximately two years and three 
months by the time Patrick Brontë wrote to Miss Atkins of the deluge of applications 
for samples of his daughter’s handwriting and about three and a half-years by the 
time he wrote to Mary Docwra, but as many as thirty years later collectors were still 
seeking ‘the gift of a specimen of Charlotte Brontë’s handwriting’ (Shorter). 
Manuscripts or ephemera in Charlotte Brontë’s hand sometimes go on sale today: in 
  246 
2011 an autographed letter to Ellen Nussey signed ‘C.B’ (almost intact save for a 
cut-away on the third page) sold at Sotheby’s in New York for $28,750 (USD), and 
in 2013 a single sheet of Brontë’s French homework fetched £50,000 (the Brontë 
Society bought it after subjecting it to a handwriting analysis). 
 An author’s autograph95 or a sample of their handwriting was a much sought-after 
object in the Victorian era; handwriting is also one of the predominant artefacts in 
the writer’s house/museum space today. This chapter will demonstrate that 
authenticity, autographic ascription, contiguity and metonymical fitness are – as with 
hair, clothing, and writing tools – fundamental aspects of handwriting’s ability to 
evoke the mind and body of its author. Beginning with an overview of Victorian 
attitudes and beliefs about handwriting this chapter will assert that handwriting was 
regarded as a thing with resonant properties and that authentic and (literally) 
‘autographic’ samples of handwriting were perceived as especially contiguous and 
metonymic. Charlotte Brontë’s treatment of handwriting and letters in her novel 
Villette will then be considered for how the novel challenges traditional readings of 
writing as a semiotic expression of a personality. Through foregrounding the 
materiality or fact of writing over its semiotic meaning in a number of instances in 
her narrative, Brontë’s novel brings to the fore the thingness of the written word: 
writing as a mark or site of thought, of someone’s having-been.  
 This chapter will then analyze the perception of written words as ‘thought’ 
through a reading of an artwork based on a small section of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane 
Eyre manuscript (a section that was selected, photographed and put on display as a 
                                                 
95 ‘Autograph’ (from the Greek self + written) was frequently used in the Victorian era in relation to the broader definition of 
the word as ‘1.a. A manuscript written in the author’s own handwriting’ (OED). Although the use of the word to refer to ‘2.a. A 
person’s own signature, esp. one written by a well-known public figure for a fan or collector’ (OED) was in use in the Victorian 
era the use of ‘autograph’ as a synonym for signature was not consistent. In this chapter I have generally retained ‘autograph’ in 
my own words as a synonym for a signature and have used other references such as ‘handwriting’ or ‘manuscript’ or ‘letter’ for 
written text that exceeds the signature.    
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‘Brontëan abstract’ by the artist Cornelia Parker for her 2006 Parsonage exhibition) 
in order to demonstrate how both the original Dowcra fragment of Charlotte’s 
writing and Parker’s artwork convey the worlding or resonant power of handwriting. 
 A brief consideration of the surviving fragment of Thomas Carlyle’s lost draft of 
Volume 1 of his history of the French Revolution will further support the idea that 
handwriting evokes a sense of a lived thought – though his fragment points to a 
different kind of event, one signaled more directly by the material properties of the 
paper / fragment itself.  
 Once the idea of handwriting as a vestige of lived thought has been established I 
will then proceed to read handwriting in its most thingly aspect: as a mark. This 
section will argue that as a material ‘mark’ or ‘site’ Victorian writers’ handwriting, at 
its most fundamental level, resonates a sense of the individual’s being and of their 
having-been, and that, as an artefact that makes present an absence, handwriting 
brings the viewer into a sense of contact with the writer. In this way the material 
mark is a dwelling site conveying a sense of the author-as-trace through the medium 
of a mark in time. 
  
I - Handwriting in the Victorian Context 
 
The idea that one’s penmanship was congruous with one’s person appears frequently 
in the Victorian era. For some penmanship could reveal aspects of one’s 
class/breeding, gender, or nationality (Ingram 2-8; Beeton 73; Littell 88-89) an 
assertion that presumed that as a unique expression of an individual one’s 
handwriting was as a telling visual metaphor for one’s attributes or character (Florey 
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113). Beeton’s The Young Englishwoman (1875) acknowledges that it is ‘not without 
the pale of probability that these [styles of writing] should be taken to indicate 
certain peculiarities of national and individual character’ (73). The magazine also 
reiterates D’Israeli’s idea that emotional states can affect handwriting: ‘Who is there 
who in grief shapes his letters and writes as he does in joy?’ (73) For his part, 
D’Israeli in his section on ‘Autographs’ in the second series of his Curiosities of 
Literature (1823), bemoans the loss of individual characteristics in writing due to 
overzealous instruction – though he does draw correlations between writing and 
character and states that ‘the vital principle must be true, that the handwriting bears 
an analogy to the character of the writer, as all voluntary actions are characteristic of 
the individual’ (280). He also acknowledges the role of one’s vocation in one’s 
penmanship, stating that ‘[t]he merchant’s clerk will not write like the lawyer or the 
poet’ (280). 
 In Littell’s Living Age of 1865, the writers are more suspect of drawing 
correlations between a writer and their writing, stating that chiromancy ‘though 
practised with apparent success by individuals, seems to us rather random and 
uncertain’ (88). While their deconstruction of handwriting and characteristics figures 
on international differences, they do note that ‘[p]eople of the same, or nearly the 
same, period write more alike than people of the same character’ citing an affinity 
between the writing of Shelley and Byron despite the notable differences in their 
personalities (89).  
 Beeton’s The Young Englishwoman references the resurgence of autograph 
collecting at the start of the nineteenth century alongside the establishment of shops 
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for the sale of autographs (73; see also Littell’s 129-131; Clayton 269).96 Dating the 
practice of keeping autograph albums back to the end of the sixteenth century 
(Beeton 73, see also Phillips iii) The Young Englishwoman cites an essay on the 
subject by Thomas Byerley (1789-1826) who was an editor of the Literary Chronicle 
and who wrote on characteristic signatures in Relics of Literature (1823, published 
under the pen name Stephen Collett). Byerley’s long article on ‘the art of judging the 
character of individuals from their handwriting’ was reprinted in 1875 (Cooper, T) 
around the time Beeton’s entry on ‘Autographs’ appeared in The Young 
Englishwoman and four years before John Henry Ingram’s The Philosophy of 
Handwriting appeared. 
 John Henry Ingram’s pen name was Felix de Salamanca. His 1879 publication 
The Philosophy of Handwriting supports the assertion that autograph collecting, the 
‘literary souvenir’ and handwriting analysis were popular in the Victorian era. For 
Ingram’s The Philosophy of Handwriting combined all of these elements in that it 
featured 135 autographic ‘treasures’ (including Thomas Carlyle’s and Charles 
Darwins’ signatures) in which the chirography of distinguished individuals and 
celebrated contemporaries ‘whose reputation is not likely to prove ephemeral’ (5) 
was analyzed for correspondences or dissimilarities between the penmanship and the 
person, an analysis based on the belief that ‘a strong analogy exists between a man’s 
personal character and his calligraphy’ (1). Promoting the value of handwriting as a 
substitute for an absent person, Ingram suggested in his introduction that there is an 
established hierarchy between self, writing and image. He stated: ‘It has been 
declared that next to seeing a distinguished man we desire to see his portrait and, 
after that, his autograph. But an autograph has this advantage over a portrait, it must 
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be faithful, which a portrait rarely is’ (3). Ingram’s comments suggest that the 
problem with portraits is that while they may capture a likeness they are drawn from 
a source that necessarily involves another perspective – whereas a signature can only 
come from the individual him or herself. The ‘faithfulness’ Ingram’s suggests is 
contiguity of the highest order: a reference to the mind that moves a hand and pen 
across a surface in order to make markings on paper via a series of unbroken 
contacts. Autographs, for Ingram, are especially potent. He states that the autograph, 
more than any other kind of writing: ‘may generally be accepted as truly 
characteristic of its writer. It is often written more carefully–always more fluently–
than the remainder of his manuscript; and from these very circumstances–from the 
extra care, deliberateness, and frequency of its use–acquires a settled form that better 
portrays its author's idiosyncrasies…’ (2).  
 Because of this perceived connection between self, signature and handwriting a 
number of autograph books and collections featuring the handwriting of renowned 
figures were published in the Victorian era.97 These books reflect more than just a 
layperson’s interest in the handwriting of renowned people (writing as a curiosity or 
as a way of judging character) but the importance of authenticity in relation to the 
public record vis-à-vis the value of having a guide or verified samples of the 
handwriting of distinguished men and women on hand as a way of checking the 
authenticity of the signatures and handwriting of those figures who might be 
especially appealing to (potentially gullible) collectors – especially in an era where 
                                                 
97 Among them: J. Netherclift’s A Collection of One Hundred Characteristic and Interesting Autograph Letters of 1849, The 
English engraver Charles John Smith’s Historical and Literary Curiosities of 1852, T. Watt’s The Autograph Miscellany of 
1855, Lawrence Barnet Phillips’ The Autographic Album: A Collection of Four Hundred and Seventy Fac-similes of 1866 
(lithographed by F.G.Netherclift) and Edward Lumley’s The Art of Judging the Character of Individuals from their 
Handwriting and Style of 1875. During this period the lithographer and facsimilist Frederick George Netherclift published a 
number of titles including: The Autograph Miscellany: a collection of Autograph Letters, interesting documents etc… (with 
Richard Sims of the British Museum) published in 1855, The Hand-book of Autographs: being a ready guide to the handwriting 
of distinguished men and women of every nation… (with Richard Sims) (1858-62), The Autograph Souvenir: a collection of 
autograph letters, interesting documents etc (again with Sims) of 1863-1865, and The Autographic Album: a collection of four 
hundred and seventy fac-similes… of 1866.  
  251 
material remnants of historical persons were becoming increasingly valuable. F.G. 
Netherclift who published a number of titles mid-century (often with Richard Sims 
of the British Museum) including The Hand-book of Autographs: being a ready 
guide to the handwriting of distinguished men and women of every nation… was, in 
this way, more than just an assembler of autographs for publication and public 
consumption, he was also considered to be an expert on handwriting, giving 
testimony before Parliament in 1865 in relation to a case involving possible forgeries 
on a petition (Parliamentary Papers, iii-48). Authenticity in relation to autographs 
was important enough for Beeton’s The Young Englishwoman to advise its readers 
never to mix ‘original specimens’ and ‘facsimiles’ but rather to have separate albums 
for each (195).  
 Autograph collecting was ridiculed by some (the former poet-laureate Robert 
Southey (1774-1843) announced that he was entering into a ‘Society for the 
Discouragement of Autograph Collecting’) but defended by others. The Young 
Englishwoman asserted that autograph collecting ‘tends materially to the increase of 
knowledge. Biographical knowledge in an especial manner, for we can hardly 
possess the autograph signature of any individual without being induced by it to find 
out something of his life and history’ (194) – an idea that suggests a correspondence 
between the collection and keeping of an autograph and knowledge of the individual 
whose writing one treasures, collects or keeps. This comment is interesting in 
relation to the issue of material agency and handwriting as a thing because it suggests 
a sort of circular relationship: one collects the autograph out of an already given 
interest in an individual and is then inspired by the possession of the autograph to 
further their biographical knowledge. Here, in this model, the agency is with the 
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collector who, while inspired by the object, decides to further their knowledge. But 
The Young Englishwoman article also goes on to suggest that the materiality of 
writing reveals something of the writer: ‘[a]lmost everybody will admit that our 
handwriting is made to bear the impression of our feelings at the time, and even to 
reveal them’ (73) – an assertion that supports the idea that handwriting was regarded 
as more than just a passive object we meet with a concept (i.e. this is Charlotte 
Brontë’s writing, she is the author of Jane Eyre) but that handwriting as a material 
trace, as form, could also evoke something non-textual but palpable about the 
individual when they wrote it, something that springs from the materiality and form 
of the writing itself. 
 
II – Contiguity and Metonymy  
 
Although there were obviously many reasons to collect autographs or writing 
samples in the Victorian era (archival, commercial, personal etc.) one factor 
underlying the collection and display of writers’ handwriting is the sense of a 
connection between the signer/writer and the signed/written thing – an idea rooted 
partly in cultural and legal practice wherein the signature is able to stand-in for the 
self – but also rooted in notions of congruity and contact98 and the idea that, in 
                                                 
98 Sympathetic magic as described in Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (see esp pages 11-48) and by Marcel Mauss in A 
General Theory of Magic (see especially 15-16; 79-92; 121-26) (and as discussed in chapter three of this thesis) is based on two 
laws: the Law of Similarity – that ‘like produces like’ (see Florey 113 in relation to this law and handwriting) and the Law of 
Contact or Contagion (wherein it is believed that things once in contact with a person retain some kind of contact even after 
they are severed, or that things once in contact but now severed retain some element, residue or trace of the originating 
individual from whom they’ve come). The first law, ‘like produces like’ is most often evident in relations between handwriting 
and persons, for example, the physiognomist Lavater (1741-1801) in his book Physiognimic Fragments (1775-1778) promoted 
the idea that there was a strong relation between handwriting and the self, as did the ‘father of graphology’ (Landau 1) the 
Frenchman Jean-Hippolyte Michon (1806-1881). Michon authored two books on graphology: Système de graphologie in 1875 
(Paris: Bibliothèque graphologique) and Méthode pratique de graphologie in 1878 (Paris: Bibliothèque graphologique). He also 
published a book that read Napoléon the first’s biography alongside his handwriting: Histoire de Napoléon 1er d’après son 
écriture (1879) (Landau 8). In her essay ‘Michon and the Birth of Scientific Graphology’ Shaike Landau notes that Michon 
described handwriting as ‘soulwriting’ and that he believed that ‘…the manifestation of the soul through graphic signs is based 
on the intimate connection which exists between each sign…which emanates from the human personality, and the soul, which is 
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relation to Victorian writers, ‘writing’ is not only what one does, but strongly 
associated with who one is. This section will provide evidence that a powerful sense 
of trace can adhere to handwriting and that as a token or remain that stands in for the 
individual in question handwriting is metonymical – a metonymy suggested by 
Ingram in his introduction to The Philosophy of Handwriting when he states that ‘[i]n 
perusing the veritable handwriting of a celebrated person we seem brought into 
personal contact with him…’ (3).99 Through reading Charlotte Brontë’s ‘letter’ 
narrative in Villette and revisiting Patrick Brontë’s letters to Mary Dowcra and Miss 
Atkins this section will demonstrate that in some cases the perception of 
handwriting’s materiality can prioritize its thingly nature over its semiotic meaning, 
and, when the materiality is thus heightened, allow writing to be read as 
representative of a person’s self – a metonymy that allows handwriting to stand-in 
for the individual whose present-absence it traces.  
 In Charlotte Brontë’s novel Villette, Lucy Snowe struggles to come to terms with 
her unreciprocated romantic affection for Dr John Graham Bretton an English doctor 
and former acquaintance also living in Villette. Over the course of the novel Dr John 
writes several letters to Lucy as her friend. The treatment of his handwriting in the 
novel (compared to references to M. Paul Emmanuel’s letters where the writing’s 
materiality isn’t prominent) supports this chapter’s hypothesis that as a thing in the 
                                                 
the substance of that personality’ (9). This link between sign and soul (later, Michon identified the brain as the seat of the 
writing impulse) was described by Michon as a law, he wrote: ‘Here is the first law of graphic physiology to which there is no 
exception: a graphic sign never expresses the opposite trait to the one it represents.’ (Landau 10, emphasis hers). Here we 
see one of the founding principals of graphology reflecting the law of sympathetic magic, that like produces like, to the extent 
that Michon rejects the possibility that any kind of oppsitional trait can exist between an individual and their writing style. The 
implications of the second law – which in handwriting would seem to suggest that access to a person’s handwriting is a way of 
coming into contact with some aspect of them (when the real being is not accessible) will be considered in more detail 
throughout this chapter.  
99 In her introduction to her novel The Professor, Charlotte Brontë, in seeking to clarify that The Professor was her first novel 
(despite being published after Jane Eyre and Shirley) employed metonymy: ‘A first attempt it certainly was not as the pen 
which wrote it had been previously worn down a good deal in a practice of some years’ (3). Here the pen that writes stands 
metonymically for Charlotte: a pen employed in the act of inscribing, a pen that is a conduit that links (through contiguity) 
Charlotte and her written words. This sense of the metonymy between writer and writing via the medium of a writing tool 
creates a sense of presence that can make possession of writing feel like a form of contact. 
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Victorian era handwriting was strongly associated with whom one was as a person, 
and that this association could be metonymic in nature: the writing standing in for the 
writer. Crucially, in Villette, writing is metonymic to different degrees: sometimes 
being treated as a likeness and sometimes being treated as a material embodiment of 
the writer. 
 Writing as a likeness is exemplified in Villette by a number of scenes, including 
one in chapter eighteen in which there is a discussion between Graham and Lucy 
wherein Graham is seeking information about a student of Lucy’s – a Miss 
Fanshawe. In the scene he inquires after her handwriting and his enquiry implies that 
her handwriting must match the person he perceives her to be. He asks: ‘And her 
handwriting? It must be pretty, light, ladylike, I should think?’ (219).  
 Later, in chapter thirty-two, Paulina reports to Lucy that she’s been sent a note 
from Graham: ‘…addressed to Miss de Bassompierre. I spied it at once, amidst all 
the rest; the handwriting was not strange; it attracted me directly’ (433). Here, her 
attraction to the writing reflects her attraction to Dr Bretton. Instead of giving the 
letter to her father as she thinks she should have, Paulina keeps it on her lap during 
breakfast and then takes it upstairs to read it. She describes the material aspects of 
the letter to Lucy afterward:  
‘…Graham’s hand is like himself, Lucy, and so is his seal–all clear, firm, and 
rounded–no slovenly splash of wax–a full, solid, steady drop–a distinct 
impress; no pointed turns harshly pricking the optic nerve, but a clean, mellow, 
pleasant manuscript, that soothes you as you read. It is like his face–just like 
the chiselling of his features: do you know his autograph?’ (434) 
 
Here Paulina conflates aspects of Dr Bretton’s handwriting (and even his manner of 
stamping his seal) with his person – ‘clean, mellow, pleasant’ – going so far as to 
align the aesthetic of his script with the features of his face. Here the script, as in the 
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query about Miss Fanshawe’s writing, is representative of him as a likeness. In 
contrast, for Lucy, her engagements with Dr Bretton’s writing read as a stronger 
form of metonymy, perhaps because she does not ‘have him’ in the way Paulina 
does, as a romantic possibility.  
 In order to best demonstrate the foregrounded materiality of Bretton’s letters for 
Lucy, a reference to a set of letters mentioned in the closing scene of the novel 
(written by M. Paul Emanuel, Lucy’s eventual suitor) is useful. Here the writing is 
described as content-based, as delivering of emotion, and the analogy Lucy draws is 
between the content of the letters and the person. She notes:  
…he wrote as he gave and as he loved, in full-handed, full-hearted plentitude. 
He wrote because he liked to write; he did not abridge, because he cared not 
to abridge. He sat down; he took pen and paper, because he loved Lucy and 
had much to say to her; because he was faithful and thoughtful, because he 
was tender and true. (571)  
 
This summary of M. Paul Emanuel’s letters alludes subtly to the shape of his writing 
in the form of the word ‘full-handed’ but the emotional content or tenor of his words 
is what is deemed worthy of comment. In comparison, earlier in the novel when 
Lucy first received a friendly letter from Dr Bretton – who had promised a week 
earlier to write her so that she would not be lonely (264) – the materiality or 
thingliness of the letter, seal and handwriting are deeply considered: ‘A letter! The 
shape of a letter similar to that had haunted my brain in its very core for seven days 
past. I dreamed of a letter last night. Strong magnetism drew me to that letter 
now…’ (276). Shortly thereafter she describes the ‘clean, clear, equal, decided 
hand’ that had inscribed ‘Miss Lucy Snowe’ on the envelope, and the seal with the 
author’s initials which is regarded intently for having been in contact with his hand: 
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‘deftly dropped by untremulous fingers…’ (277; see also Crowther 130). These 
materialities so deeply affect Lucy that she states:  
I experienced a happy feeling–a glad emotion which went warm to my 
heart, and ran lively through all my veins. For once a hope was realized. I 
held in my hand a morsel of real solid joy: not a dream, not an image of the 
brain, not one of those shadowy chances imagination pictures, and of which 
humanity starves but cannot live…. (277)  
 
For Lucy the letter – as yet unopened or read – is already a kind of nourishment, an 
affective object that physiologically effects her through its material presence alone – 
a presence that she relates more than once (‘decided hand’ ‘untremulous fingers’) to 
the hand and body of the person who authored it. Lucy goes on to state that ‘[t]he 
cover with its address; the seal, with its three clear letters, was bounty and 
abundance for the present’ (277) then, ‘having feasted my eyes with one more look’ 
she presses her lips against Dr Bretton’s seal and returns to class thinking about the 
letter as ‘the source of my joy’ (278).  
 This motif of touching the name, initials or writing of the writer appears again at 
another point in the novel when Paulina (Dr Bretton’s eventual wife) sees a book 
from Graham’s childhood in which he’d inscribed his name in a ‘schoolboy hand’ 
(335, see also Crowther 131). Lucy observes Paulina as she looks at the signature:  
She looked at it long; nor was she satisfied with merely looking; she gently 
passed over the characters the tips of her fingers, accompanying the action with 
an unconscious but tender smile, which converted the touch into a caress. 
Paulina loved the Past; but the peculiarity of this little scene was that she said 
nothing: she could feel, without pouring out her feelings in a flux of words. 
(335)  
 
This scene further demonstrates the power of contiguity between the remain that is 
handwriting or a signature and the individual who scribed it. Pauline, in touching Dr 
Bretton’s youthful signature, is able to express her tenderness toward him – allowing 
his signature to stand metonymically for his body. In addition to this extension 
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(writing as stand-in for the self) Brontë’s narration suggests that in this context 
Bretton’s signature also presences or allows a kind of access to a moment or time (in 
this case ‘the Past’) which signals both Bretton’s childhood and the instance the 
inscription was made.  
 In her essay ‘Charlotte Brontë’s Textual Relics: Memorializing the Material in 
Villette’ Kathryn Crowther reads this act of caress metonymically. She states that 
Paulina ‘runs her fingers over the handwriting which connects it physically to 
Graham, effectively caressing his body itself’ (131). She further suggests that 
‘handwriting maps the body onto the text’ (131) which as a literal truth (the body, in 
the form of the hand, scribing and marking as it goes) supports the metonym of 
writing for body and of caress of text for caress of body/trace. For Crowther, 
however, the letters are ‘relics’.  Throughout her analysis of the letter narrative she 
reads Brontë’s use of what she calls ‘textual relics’ in Villette as reflective of 
Charlotte Brontë’s own anxiety about the commodification of her work (128-135) 
and defines relics (through Brontë’s use of the word in chapter sixteen – a scene 
described in chapter two of this thesis100) as things bearing a physical trace. Crowther 
states, of Brontë’s use of the word ‘relic’ in relation to furnishings: 
The choice of the word ‘relic’ is compelling here, because it is only when Lucy 
realizes that she knows these objects, created them even, that they turn into 
relics, highlighting the idea that it is the physical trace of the body in an object 
which grants it reliquary status. Although these objects are not textual [because 
they are furnishings], they serve as narratives of Lucy’s past, in the way that all 
relics do. (134-135)  
 
Crowther’s reading of letters and handwriting in Villette promotes the letters and the 
handwriting within the novel to relics and something approaching the fetish.101  She 
                                                 
100 The reference, in chapter sixteen of Villette, reads: ‘Upon the mantel-shelf there were two china vases, some relics of a 
diminutive tea–service, as smooth as enamel and as thin as eggshell…’ (Brontë, Villette 193). 
101 Although I disagree with the central hypothesis of this essay – that the treatment of textual relics in Villette is a psychological 
reflection of Brontë’s own anxiety around the movement of her own text into the commodified world of a publication – a 
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states: ‘[i]n fact, hand-written letters figure so strongly in Villette that they become 
almost fetishized for the connection they carry to the person who composed them’ 
(130). This reading supports my suggestion that the presence and materiality of both 
handwriting and the letters enact a sense of connection, but Crowther’s use of ‘relic’ 
is problematic for how it subtly undermines the affective power of the object and, 
thus, the agency of the thing that is handwriting. In order to best express the 
metonymical relationship between the written and the writer – and to support my 
reading of the Brontë fragments Patrick Brontë sent as vital remembrancers – a brief 
look at the term ‘relic’ in the context of Villette will be useful.   
 Crowther’s use of ‘relic’ to describe the letters contrasts Brontë’s own use of the 
word ‘token’ to describe them. One of the central letter narratives in Villette involves 
Lucy’s burial of the letters she received from Dr Bretton (‘A Burial’ see esp 338-
344). In order to move past her infatuation with him, in order to let him go Lucy 
must bury the ‘tokens’ he has given her. Lucy – and by extension Charlotte Brontë – 
never uses the word relic to describe the letters, rather she describes the cessation of 
Bretton’s letters as a lack of tokens: ‘The letter, the message, once frequent, are cut 
off; the visit, formerly periodical, ceases to occur; the book, paper, or other tokens 
that indicated remembrance, comes no more’ (308). Shortly thereafter Lucy 
describes the previous seven weeks which had seen a lack of letters: ‘[s]even weeks 
as bare as seven sheets of blank paper: no word was written on one of them; not a 
                                                 
reading that I would argue over-analyzes an unknowable set of psychological reactions to a complex process (writing / 
publishing) – see for example the suggestion near the beginning of Crowther’s essay that Charlotte was ‘simultaneously 
addressing the implications of personal versus professional writing as well as memorializing her own investment in the book-
making process’ (130) – this essay is valuable for how it reads the treatment of handwriting and letters linking the material 
object or thing that bears the trace of the body to the presence of the ‘artist’s original “hand”’ (129). Throughout her paper 
Crowther reads textual relics as objects that connect the reader to the body of the writer as a kind of metonymical thing: a 
‘synecdochal representation of the body’ (129) while also demonstrating that the narrative is filled with ‘text and objects which 
bear the mark of their producer’ (129). Here Crowther provides a reading of the things of Villette as autographic vis-a-vis her 
suggestion that the texts and objects ‘bear the mark of their producer…[and] memorialize a time when the work of art was 
always a singular, unique creation and the hand of the artist was preserved in her art’ (129). 
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visit, not a token’ (309). Shortly after this Lucy in securing her letters describes how 
she ‘had hardly time to recasket my treasures’ (311). Here the letters are tokens and 
treasures. By contrast, in the burial scene, she describes building materials as relics: 
‘[i]n  a tool-shed at the bottom of the garden, lay the relics of building-materials, left 
by masons lately employed to repair a part of the premises’ (343).  
 While the word relic carries within it metonymical aspects based on contiguity 
and contact – ‘relic’ as a person or thing ‘believed to be sanctified by contact’; 
‘something kept as a remembrance, souvenir, or memorial; a historical object relating 
to a particular person, place, or thing; a memento’ the difference between the word 
‘relic’ with its implications of pastness, of a person or thing as an ‘historical object’ 
as ‘[t]hat which remains or is left behind’ as ‘residue’ as ‘[a]n object vested with 
interest because of its age or historical associations’ (OED) troubles Brontë’s 
representation of handwriting and letters as powerful actors in the drama, capable of 
creating affect. Whereas ‘relic’ carries the implication of a thing surviving from an 
earlier time, kept out of a kind of reverence, and met with veneration – a thing valued 
and ‘sanctified’ for its former connection to an individual – Brontë’s use of the word 
token implies a more active mode of engagement. Unlike ‘relic,’ carried within the 
word ‘token’ are ideas of active employment, of a thing that serves: ‘[s]omething that 
serves to indicate a fact, event, object, feeling, etc.’; ‘[s]omething serving as proof… 
an evidence’ and elsewhere ‘[s]omething remaining as evidence of what formerly 
existed; a vestige, trace, “sign”’ (OED). Because Bretton’s letters are tokens that 
serve as a visible or tangible representation of a fact, event, or feeling – even in the 
evanescence of those feelings – they must be buried. Even though they are buried 
they remain objects of remembrance attached to the author, tokens, not relics: tokens 
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because they are still capable of enacting a strong presence, capable of standing in 
for and affectively presencing whole clusters of feelings and events. As Kate E. 
Brown notes in ‘Beloved Objects: morning, Materiality, and Charlotte Brontë’s 
“Never-Ending Story”’ Lucy’s ‘attachment is (and always has been) to the letters as 
things, material and tangible objects’ (398). Burying the letters she keeps them ‘from 
material decay; as such, they can retain their meaningfulness even in the absence of 
the relationship they memorialize’ (398 emphasis added). This retention makes them 
treasures, tokens that can be reactivated – a bridge between two people, one that 
tethers the two through material proof (his scribing her name, sending his thinking to 
her) – remembrancers that can be exhumed at any time, buried by the marker of the 
pear-tree where Lucy can find them. More than almost any other aspect of Brontë’s 
narrative I would suggest that it is this burial which most directly attests to the power 
of the object that is handwriting to presence and evoke – provoke – the individual for 
whom it stands. Charlotte must put her affection for Bretton behind her and so must 
remove the letters and his hand from her presence, not only protecting her treasure 
from other prying eyes but ensuring her own safety from the powerful effect the very 
materiality of the letters and his handwriting have on her.  
 If Lucy had truly wished to sever herself from Bretton fully she could have burned 
or otherwise destroyed the letters, but instead she stoppers them, preserves them and 
ensures their vitality. Even buried they remain (serve as) a link to a time, narrative 
and person in her life. While tokens of Bretton’s remembrance of Lucy may ‘come 
no more’ – as per the scene where she feels he is not thinking about her (308) – the 
tokens and trace of his remembrance of her (and care for her) remain vital, a proof in 
ink inscribed by his hand. 
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III – Writing as Evidence  
 
In Villette, Graham’s letters are proof that he is thinking of Lucy. Which is to suggest 
that the letters are a kind of evidence: of his care for her, of their relationship, and the 
kinds of discourse they had. In the same way the snippets of Charlotte Brontë’s 
handwriting sent by Patrick Brontë to Miss Atkins and Ms Dowcra are also a kind of 
evidence: of Charlotte’s life and the physical fact of her having-been. Handwriting in 
this way is evidence of existence in the form of a mark. 
 Crowther’s suggestion that ‘handwriting maps the body onto the text’ (131) is 
useful for how it informs the dynamic expressed by Patrick Brontë’s letters to Miss 
Atkins and Ms Dowcra. In both letters, written a year and some six weeks apart 
(again, the first letter, about two years and three months after Charlotte’s death) he 
uses similar phrasing, specifically the word ‘spare’. To Miss Atkins he writes: ‘The 
annexed scrap / is all I can spare of the / autograph of my dear / daughter 
Charlotte…’ (P. Brontë, Letter to MA) and to Mary Jesup Docwra: ‘The enclosed is / 
all I can spare of / my dear Daughter Charlotte’s / handwriting’ (P. Brontë, Letter to 
MJD). The word ‘spare’ – with its intimations of giving or granting some thing from 
a stock or quantity (OED); of the valued but extraneous that can be given away so 
long as a fundamental amount, degree, kind or essence is retained – is poignant in 
this context. ‘Spare’ here implies both the retention of something and the 
acknowledgement of excess, that which can be spared and, so, in this case, given 
away. The use of ‘dear’ in both letters is a further indication that what is given (the 
autograph of his dear daughter / his dear daughter’s handwriting) is valuable to the 
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giver. What these two letters suggest is that the handwriting (as that which was 
requested and severed from its context and given to the individuals who asked for it) 
is of a part, meaning: part of a larger font, a font that can be read as ‘all of the extant 
writing left behind by Charlotte’ or ‘all of the ephemeral writing left behind by 
Charlotte’ (this, assuming Mr. Brontë wouldn’t have cut up the manuscript of Jane 
Eyre for autograph seekers) and, even, I would suggest ‘Charlotte herself’. If 
Charlotte’s handwriting was wholly divorced from Charlotte’s mind and body, if it 
wasn’t a token or trace that presenced her vitality, I believe it wouldn’t have been 
sought or given and that the language of the giving wouldn’t have included the 
concept of what could be spared. Here Charlotte’s handwriting has mapped her mind 
and body on to the text, has left an indelible and particular trace. 
 While I cannot intuit Reverend Brontë’s motivations in responding favourably and 
obligingly to the numerous applications he received for a scrap of Charlotte’s 
handwriting (although I suspect the motive was not profit in the case of Miss Atkins 
and Mary Jesup Dowcra) his obliging of such requests seems far from trivial. Far 
from relics commemorating some distant past or the long dead, these fragments were 
tokens: objects generated by the hand and mind of a writer, material remembrancers 
capable of presencing or affectively connecting the recipient or viewer with Charlotte 
herself – a ‘connection’ that would allow Patrick Brontë to commemorate his 
daughter through the dissemination of a small and shareable part of her –a 
‘connection’ based on contiguity and metonymy. In Lakoff and Johnson’s terms this 
the metonymy of ‘producer for product’ (38) and here the case is the same: writer for 
writing, Charlotte’s body mapped onto the page even in the form of Dowcra’s 
fragment: ‘my book – no one / ious than I am to’. A mapping that the writer Miranda 
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K. Pennington’s description of a Brontë scrap suggests remains with the thing. In 
writing about the sale of a Brontë fragment in The American Scholar she states:  
Imagining myself holding Charlotte’s scrap of poetry sends tingles up and 
down the backs of my arms. This would be as close to a personal message from 
her as I’d ever get. I picture my hands in the same place where Charlotte’s 
hands would have been. Our fingerprints might line up. It would be thrilling to 
be united, even if just for a moment. (Pennington) 
 
This sense of contiguity over time brings with it a sense of access and closeness, of a 
direct ‘personal’ address. Writing in this way closes a gap, presencing the sender for 
the recipient.  
 
In 2005 the Brontë Parsonage Museum commissioned the British artist Cornelia 
Parker (1956-) to produce work inspired by objects connected to the Brontës. The 
resultant work was displayed on site in the Parsonage in late 2006 and included a 
number of imagistic ‘abstracts’ related to the act of writing. One (fig. 21, below) is a 
silver gelatin print of Emily Brontë’s quill nib as seen through a scanning electron 
microscope – a close-up that results in an almost surreal taxonomy of the used nib – 
an image that shows, as the last chapter suggests, a tool: in this case an amplified nib 
that bears the wear marks of its employment. 
 
Fig. 21.Brontëan Abstract (Emily Brontë's quill pen nib) 2006, silver gelatin print of an SEM 
image © Cornelia Parker (Parker, Brontëan 23). 
  264 
Another of the abstracts Parker produced and displayed at the Parsonage was part of 
a series featuring twenty-four images of deletions or revisions from Charlotte 
Brontë’s original Jane Eyre manuscript including the image below (fig. 22) – a work 
of art that is useful for how it selects, emphasizes and promotes a reading of writing 
as an event or ‘trace’ – not just of the body (in the form of the hand and the pen that 
move over the page together) but of writing as a trace of thought itself. 
 
 
Fig. 22. Brontëan Abstract (deletions from the original manuscript of Jane Eyre) 2006, c-type 
colour print of scan © Cornelia Parker (Parker, Brontëan 26). 
 
This digital scan of a revision from the original Jane Eyre manuscript features a 
double edit, likely from Chapter XIV of Jane Eyre (a scene in which Jane and 
Rochester are becoming acquainted) wherein Charlotte Brontë changed a word two 
times. If the placement of the words and strikethroughs are properly indicative of the 
order of thought it appears she has changed ‘could’ (in line with her sentence) to 
‘should’ (written above and then struck-through) and then ‘should’ to ‘would’ 
(written below). These edits represent a series of instances in Charlotte’s life in 
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which she was likely considering the implications of each word in relation to her 
scene and her character Jane’s thinking; words that would have meant very different 
things to both Jane as a speaker in the scene and to the book’s readers.102  
 What makes Parker’s work useful in this analysis (compared to looking at an 
original manuscript as a thing with the weight of its larger narrative and its own 
status as a narrative work of art) is how Parker’s fragment (like the Dowcra 
fragment) highlights the obdurate materiality of writing pared off from sentence, 
scene, story, or larger semiotic contexts. This foregrounding of a fragment of the 
manuscript, of the materiality of writing, expresses a number of things that an 
encounter with the whole manuscript might not evoke as clearly, in particular the 
idea of writing (and revision) as an event in the writer’s life: an event that consists of 
a series of thoughts or subsequent instances wherein Charlotte as a writer worked 
through a mental process of what each selected word might mean or imply in the 
context of her scene and her own politic or ideology.  
 Parker, of course, is making her own set of statements or opening up her own 
questions through the photographing and cropping of the section selected in this 
work – it is possible, for example, that she is highlighting words that can be read as 
particularly loaded for women in the Victorian era: words – ‘could, should, would’ – 
that evoke issues of ability, desire, convention and agency, words that might be read 
as particularly resonant in relation to certain aspects of the Brontë sisters’ lives.103 
                                                 
102 The sentence appears to be one wherein Jane and Rochester are beginning to formalize the rules of their conversation. 
Rochester has almost forgotten Jane is a paid employee and in their back and forth he says: ‘And will you consent to dispense 
with a great many conventional forms and phrases, without thinking that the omission arises from insolence?’ to which Jane 
relpies: ‘I am sure, sir, I should never mistake informality for insolence: one I rather like, the other nothing free-born would 
submit to, even for a salary’ (158). Parker’s fragment shows the last part of the word formality and the first part of the word 
insolence and the ‘orn’ of born.  
103 Gender and convention especially in relation to being women writers was certainly an issue for the Brontë sisters. At the start 
of their careers Charlotte, Emily and Anne felt it necessary to publish under male aliases (respectively: Currer, Ellis and Acton 
Bell) as a literary career was not generally deemed suitable for women. This is evidenced by the letter Charlotte received from 
the poet laureate Robert Southey (dated 12 March 1837) in which he advised: ‘Literature cannot be the business of a woman's 
life, and it ought not to be. The more she is engaged in her proper duties, the less leisure she will have for it even as an 
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One of Parker’s stated aims for the project – ‘taking the objects that the Brontës 
owned, or actual physical traces like locks of their hair, and examining these very 
closely to try to see something that they might not even have witnessed themselves’ 
(Wilcocks ‘Myths’) – supports a reading of the abstract as a kind of archeological 
find: as an uncovered and exhumed instant of resonant thought and meaning, one 
wherein the moment of meaning might be even greater or more ‘loaded’ for 
contemporary viewers of the fragment than it might have been for Charlotte herself.  
  One of the themes of Parker’s abstract series is the idea of the microscopic or 
telescopic: of seeing Brontë things close-up, in a way that even the Brontës wouldn’t 
have been able to have seen them104 in this case seeing, in a removed fashion, a kind 
of thinking – Charlotte changing her mind as she revised her scene, the tracks of her 
thinking evidenced on paper. What the ‘could / should / would’ abstract emphasizes 
then is doubly biographical: first it emphasizes the material trace of a series of 
moments related to an event called ‘writing’ instances where handwriting as trace 
presences the movement of both Charlotte’s body and her mind, acts of thinking, of 
revision that give us a sense of her embodied self in all that that implies: her physical 
form and physical action, as well as her politic and her care for language and its 
meanings. Second, the abstract emphasizes a series of moments in the biography of 
the book that became Jane Eyre, each strikethrough a recension of a possible version 
of the book. Here Charlotte and the book are ‘worlded’ in a Heideggerean way 
because the revisions reveal Charlotte both thinking and rethinking – a writing 
activity comprised of a series of instances manifested by movements of the mind and 
                                                 
accomplishment and a recreation’ (Southey). 
104 Other objects magnified, photographed and exhibited at the Parsonage include: the shaft of Charlotte’s quill pen and pen nib, 
Anne Brontë’s needle, a darn in Anne’s stocking. Anne, Emily and Charlotte’s hair, Charlotte’s left glove, Emily’s burnt comb, 
Charlotte’s picushion, marks in the margins of Emily’s lined paper, Emily’s blotting paper, Charlotte’s blotting paper and 
Branwell’s wallet (Parker, Brontëan Abstracts).  
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the pen, instances that have a duration and which therefore start to place the event in 
an even larger series of imagined or conjured relations that might include the act of 
writing (and its implements), environments and locations and so on. 
 While Parker’s abstract from Charlotte’s manuscript illuminates handwriting’s 
ability to evoke a larger set of relations (in this case acts of imagination, writing and 
revision in Charlotte’s creation of a novel) Thomas Carlyle’s original fragment from 
Volume I of his history of the French Revolution is useful for how it signals another 
kind of event – one less tied to the author and the imaginative act and more tied to 
the material thing that is handwriting on paper. Accordingly, the next section of this 
chapter will briefly examine how the surviving fragment of Thomas Carlyle’s 
manuscript signals an event related to the biography of the manuscript itself – and 
how, like the things that survive the writer in the writer’s house/museum, the 
manuscript as a ‘remain’ anchors absence. 
 
The surviving fragment of Thomas Carlyle’s manuscript of Vol I of The French 
Revolution 
 
In 1896 a visitor to the newly established Carlyle House Museum could find a 
variety of writing-related objects in the house’s attic study including Thomas 
Carlyle’s writing chair, an inkwell, two of his pens – including the pen ‘[w]ith which 
Carlyle wrote the last chapters of “Frederick the Great”’ (Carlyle’s House Catalogue 
98-99) – and examples of his handwriting in the form of letters, manuscript pages, 
proof corrections, a petition and annotated books. There were also a few facsimiles 
or photographs of important letters including one written to James Fraser in 1835 – a 
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letter that has become famous in its own right because it details Carlyle’s response to 
John Stuart Mill’s devastating news that through an accident the only copy of the 
first volume of Carlyle’s manuscript on the French Revolution had been destroyed.  
 
 
Fig. 23. Fragment of Thomas Carlyle's manuscript of The French Revolution Vol. I at 
 Carlyle's House © National Trust. Web. <http://www.ntprints.com> 
 
 The story of the manuscript’s destruction is as follows: in February 1836 Carlyle 
is said to have handed his only copy of Volume I of his history of the French 
Revolution over to his friend John Stuart Mill to read. The pages were, in the 
following weeks, allegedly mistaken for wastepaper and burned by a housemaid of 
Mill’s (Holme 17). Carlyle was devastated. The surviving fragment (fig. 23, above) 
is a sideways leaf or tear-shaped scrap of paper on which a handful of sentences 
(with revisions) appear. Described in the Carlyle House Catalogue of 1896 as the 
‘Small Fragment of Manuscript of “French Revolution.” (All there is)’ (CHC 98) the 
surviving scrap of the manuscript remains, according to the museum’s current 
custodians, one of the most popular objects in the museum. After all, as a material 
remain of a lost work of literary art it represents what once was but can never be in 
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that form again; it stands in for, or presences, the thinking and writing which were 
lost.  
 Carlyle’s own language in the wake of the disaster prefigures some of these 
dynamics of loss, for example, in his March 7 letter to Fraser he states: ‘…my whole 
First Volume…had been destroyed, except some or four bits of leaves; and so the 
labour of five steadfast enough months had vanished irrecoverably…. That first 
volume… cannot be written anew, for the spirit that animated it is past…’ (CLO 
10.1215/It-18350307-TC-JFR-01; CL 8:66-70 emphasis his; see also Holme 18). In 
his March 7 letter to Fraser and in his journal entry from the same day Carlyle 
repeatedly acknowledges the absolute absence of the book-that-was: to Fraser he 
uses the words ‘destroyed’ and ‘vanished’, and in his journal he uses the words 
‘irrevocably ANNIHILATED’ and ‘gone’ restating again later ‘It is gone; and will 
not return’ (CLO).  
 This profound sense of the lost material and the lost thought is made present by 
the surviving fragment and the museal narratives (oral and written) that surround it. 
But even without the added context of historical / biographical knowledge, museum 
signage, or anecdote (or other forms of authenticating narrative), an individual 
happening upon Carlyle’s fragment would likely be able to discern that it is a part of 
something larger – not only because the paper is torn and unsymmetrical and because 
the writing to the left side of the page adheres to a margin while ending abruptly on 
the right side, but because if one attempted to read the text it would become evident 
that the sentences are incomplete and that a number of words around the uneven 
edges are cut off, though from the context of a sentence it might be possible to 
imagine, for example, that ‘Fiel’ as ‘Field’ – to pre-figure the missing letter.  
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 In this reading, Carlyle’s fragment can be said to parallel a number of the resonant 
effects of an encounter with a Victorian writers’ handwriting. In the same way that 
the fragment of Carlyle’s lost work signals that liminal space between the larger 
work’s being and not being (we sense because of the fact of the fragment that a 
larger entity must once have existed) handwriting signals through its material remain 
the once presence of a body and mind in an act called writing. The fragment 
presences a larger missing piece, presences a sense of that which was but is no 
longer, allowing the spectre of what was and its possible relations to loom before the 
viewer in its uncertain and ghostly shape. Here authenticity and contiguity are 
signalled – what remains must be authentic in some way to be highlighted in its 
imperfect state – and what remains must also have been a part of (have once been 
contiguous to) something else: a larger piece of paper and the lived thoughts of an 
individual that haunt the severed page.  
 In both the Brontëan abstract and the Carlyle fragment what the writing presences 
is thought: in Parker’s amplification of Charlotte Brontë’s edit an instance of 
foregrounded thought that revolves around the choice of a word, and in Carlyle’s 
case a fragmented section of a larger narrative, a narrative that is made abstractly 
present through its absence and severance. Crucially here, both these examples are 
examples of handwriting met conceptually as a mode of communication – 
handwriting as a manifestation of (contiguous to) the writers’ thoughts. What is 
foregrounded in the case of Parker’s abstract, or missing in the case of the Carlyle 
fragment is writing as a meaningful mode of communication. Accordingly the 
writing presences the writer in the act of thinking: an event or series of events that 
world the writer through the tether that is their thoughts made manifest on the page. 
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 Moving briefly from meaningful words and sentences (even if severed) to the 
autograph supports the metonymic facet of handwriting in a different way. More than 
any other scrawl the autograph tends to be the most individual and the most 
verifiable. It is, at a basic level, a material thing; a mark or impression made via an 
implement, but even in the form of an ‘X’ it is intended as a mark made by a specific 
‘hand’ – a mark as authorization. There is, in looking at a signature, a sense of 
personal adhesion: a sense of the lead or ink adhering to the paper, and a sense of the 
unique hand that held the writing implement in order to move it in an again, unique 
pattern across an inscribable surface. This is, of course, the work of touch and touch 
or contiguity is one of the most fundamental components of resonance in things – to 
be encountering something that has been touched by the individual with whom one 
seeks a connection. 
 Materially, handwriting and autographs are the result of a conscious impression, a 
manifestation that springs from a particular individual. Authenticity is a pre-requisite 
as autographs or signatures that are false are no longer called autographs or 
signatures but are deemed forgeries.105 Because handwriting is unique and because 
the hand is almost always the closest human point of contact to the writing, 
handwriting evokes the hand that wrote it, a hand that stands in as a further (and 
commonly used) metonym for the whole being. Turning to Carlyle’s signature (fig. 
24, below) we see a series of marks that testify to Carlyle’s self having-been-present 
at the marking; the signature as coming from the ‘hand’ of the author – a contiguity 
that gives us the metonymy of ‘hand’ (‘in his own hand’) a hypothesis supported by 
the making and keeping of casts of Thomas Carlyle’s hands (figs. 25 and 26) hands 
                                                 
105 The idea of a ‘forgery’ becomes problematized in the case of an invented signature such as Charlotte Brontë’s ‘Currer Bell’ 
signature – a notation that inhabits an interesting middle ground. As an invention (of person and of autograph) the Bell 
signature isn’t technically a forgery but something akin to a conceit. And as an invention of Charlotte Brontë’s it still seems to 
carry enough contiguity and metonymy (from her hand / representative of her life as a writer) to be of value.  
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that are worthy of commemoration because (even in the form of the present-absence 
the casts evoke) the hand casts signal the metonymical: signal Carlyle the writer 
whose hands were the vehicle or implement of his writerly mind. 
 
        
 
Fig. 24. Thomas Carlyle’s signature.  Web.  <http://upload.wikimedia.org/> 
 
 Fig. 25. Crossed hands of Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) by Sir Joseph Edgar Boehm  
  REPRO.1892-97 © Victoria and Albert Museum. Web. <http://collections.vam.ac.uk/> 
 
 
Fig. 26. Thomas Carlyle, plaster cast of hands by Domenico Brucciani, 1875, on display at 
 The Carlyle House Museum © The National Trust, photo by author with permission. 
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IV – Handwriting as a Mark 
 
Thus far I have discussed writing as a fragment, as signaling thought even outside of 
whole semiotic contexts; writing as material trace; as a ‘token’ or record capable of 
evoking the maker beyond the instant of manifestation; writing as a product of a 
unique and particular source in both person and time; and writing as an inscription 
adhered to an object with its own provenance or ‘biography’ – one to which a 
narrative (such as its destruction) might be adhered. I would now like to turn to the 
foundational aspect of writing as a material thing: writing as a mark. 
 Marks, by their very nature, adhere. As Hallam and Hockey suggest in their 
consideration of the materiality of writing related to death: ‘written texts physically 
occupy material surfaces (such as paper) and spaces (for example books and 
shelves). The written or printed word requires materials, implements, machines, and 
bodily actions for its inscription and these have important implications for memory-
making’ (157). This suggests that writing’s materiality is always contextual beyond 
even ascription, as we cannot divorce writing from what it is written on or with 
(writing that exists in air is usually considered speech). In this way writing is 
tethered: it dwells in a site be it rock, hide, or paper and always in a site beyond that: 
box, case, room, museum, city, country, et cetera. Furthermore the writing this thesis 
is looking at (Victorian writers’ writing) is, by definition, also troubled in its sites by 
the intrusion of the biography of the one who marks – a marking that is always 
already read as autographic when its context is known. This section will examine 
three sets of ‘marks’ as a means of illuminating the fundamental material quality of 
writing: a scratch in the Carlyle House Museum, a (now-absent) pen stroke made by 
  274 
Thomas Carlyle, and wisps of ink on Emily Brontë’s lined paper, marks that 
illuminate having-been as one of the fundamental aspects of handwriting as a thing.  
 In 2007 Rizzoli International published a small hardcover book of the coffee table 
sort consisting mostly of photographs with identifying labels. The book, Dr 
Johnson’s Doorknob and Other Significant Parts of Great Men’s Houses by the 
London-based photographer Liz Workman was based on her National Heritage 
Revisited series, a series that focused on houses that had transitioned into museums 
because they had once housed a famous occupant. Described on the cover flap as a 
‘situationist’s catalogue of overlooked and underappreciated personal effects’ the 
book features just over one hundred photographs of great men’s doorknobs, 
crockery, mantelpieces, chairs, desks, books, banisters, mirrors, skirting boards and 
beds.106 In the skirting board section we are treated to a close-up section of Thomas 
Carlyle’s skirting board (fig 27, below) a red-brown slat that sits above a wood floor 
and under white wallpaper decorated with green leaves.  
 
Fig. 27. Thomas Carlyle’s skirting board from Dr Johnson’s Doorknob and Other Significant 
Parts of Great Men’s Houses, (Workman 168) image cropped. 
 
                                                 
106 The ‘great men’ featured in this book include five of the male authors considered in this thesis: Thomas Carlyle, Charles 
Dickens, Charles Darwin, John Keats and Sigmund Freud, as well as Winston Churchill, Thomas Cole, Victor Hugo, 
Washington Irving, Thomas Jefferson, Dr Johnson, Frederic, Lord Leighton, William Morris, Samuel Morse, Edgar Allan Poe, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Sir John Sloane and George Washington. 
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The skirting board is almost unremarkable save for its wear and a few notable 
scratches: one a thin line that swoops horizontally across the image, others shorter 
and more gouge-like: deep enough that the white of the wood comes through. These 
marks and others like them in a writer’s house/museum – whether the thick black ink 
splotches and ink circles on Carlyle’s desk (fig 28, below), the worn patch of floor in 
the turret window of Ruskin’s Brantwood, the cracked spines of Darwin’s books, or 
the repaired break-line in Emily Brontë’s Christening mug – signal an event or a 
series of events. (These events often include events between things i.e. a cup and the 
floor, a nail and a skirting board, events where the human agent dropped a thing or 
dragged a thing and two things made contact.) The mark that signals an event is a 
mark that also signifies a having-been; the very ‘having-been’ many visitors to a 
writer’s house/museum may be hoping to sense or encounter when they visit. 
 
 
Fig. 28. Carlyle's desk, ink stains, Carlyle House. Photo by author with permission. 
 
In this way, all ‘marks’ – especially the semiotic kind and those associated with 
writing – in a writer’s house/museum are likely to be contextually bound and highly 
valued. Two examples of non-semiotic material marks will accordingly be effective 
  276 
in illustrating what a mark’s release from the instance and context of literary 
production might look like and how such a release might inform encounters with 
other marks: the first mark taking the form of the aforementioned scratch on the 
Carlyle’s skirting board and the second mark taking the imagined form of a now-lost 
strike of a pen on a newspaper sent from Thomas to Jane Carlyle in the autumn of 
1835. These two examples will support my argument that the ‘mark’ aspect of 
handwriting is a central component in the affective experience of an author’s writing. 
An argument that will propose that while the semiotic communication in the form of 
a writer’s letter, manuscript or diary may serve to further a sense of the author’s 
presence or ‘life’ it is the mark as a site of event, dwelling or having-been that is the 
fundamental generator of felt-presence.  
 
Carlyle’s skirting-board and pen-stroke 
 
The scratch on the Carlyle skirting board is a mark that has most likely been made by 
some thing – a force of one material thing against the wood of the skirting board. The 
‘some-thing’ or ‘when’ of the some-thing’s encounter with the skirting board cannot 
readily be determined and is therefore ambiguous or absent. Whether the mark was 
made by some-thing that Thomas or Jane or a now-contemporary custodian held or 
moved or used is unknown. Thus the mark (a scratch) is cut free of the instance of its 
production and, accordingly, its context is destabilized. A viewer of the mark would 
likely not, for example, know what or who made the mark or how – though they 
might imagine a set of scenarios or players (human and material) based on logical 
suppositions within a context and/or their own experience with mark-making. Thus 
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the immediate context for the mark is unknown though the larger context (a-mark-
made-in-a-house-that-once-belonged-to-Thomas-and-Jane-Carlyle) is known because 
this mark, as with any such mark or thing in the writer’s house/museum is always 
apprehended materially in (or over/against) a particular environment, in this case a 
house in Chelsea associated with two writers, and is thusly endowed with a larger 
context – in this case one that assumes (correctly or not) as the photograph in the 
Rizzoli book suggests – a relationship to the Carlyles. Here the context gives the 
mark some of its meaning (its autographic ascription: that which makes it worthy of 
a coffee table book), but crucially the mark also means in and of itself even if cut 
free from contextual narratives, it means an event of presence, an event of being. 
 A stroke mark made on a newspaper by Thomas Carlyle in 1835 (a mark that has 
likely passed out of existence) represents a different kind of present-absence. This is 
a mark (lost to us in its material form but recorded as fact) that has been cut free 
from the museal space and accordingly serves (even if imagined) to support the idea 
of a mark as an instance of having-been. The mark in question is cited in Thomas and 
Jane Carlyle Portrait of a Marriage by Rosemary Ashton. Ashton writes that in the 
fall of 1835 some six, almost seven months after the disaster that befell Thomas 
Carlyle’s Volume One manuscript on the French Revolution and Carlyle’s dogged 
rewriting of the lost draft, Thomas went to visit his family. Shortly after he left he 
sent Jane a newspaper in the post ‘with a stroke indicating his safe arrival’ (171). 
According to Ashton the stroke was a means for Carlyle to communicate his safe 
arrival without having to pay the postage that was then charged on letters (171). Jane 
noted her receipt of the newspaper in a letter, stating that ‘[a] newspaper is very 
pleasant when one is expecting nothing at all, but when it comes in place of a letter it 
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is a positive insult to one’s feelings’ (171-2). Two things are notable here. The first is 
the hierarchy Jane’s response implies: a letter (semiotic narrative) is best, a 
newspaper with a stroke on it (signifying mark) is lesser, but still preferable to 
nothing (absence, or, at least the absence of an indication of being or well-being). 
The mark of a stroke on a newspaper therefore signals some-thing (being) and no-
thing (being without context) simultaneously. It traces a presence or a having-been at 
the time of the making of the mark, even if the mark has experienced a rupture or has 
become free-floating from its context or instance of production.  
 What these two examples hope to show is that regardless of the degree of rupture 
or destabilization and whether the mark is tied to context (the house proper) or floats 
somewhat independently in relation to its context (as a line on a newspaper might 
have done) the mark still, by its very being-there, signifies a having-been. The mark 
of the pen-and-hand (in the case of the stroke) or of the object that scrapes the 
skirting board (in the case of the scratch) are in this way not so unlike other marks in 
the world that signify non-semiotically a having-been-there. Again we see this 
fascination with the mark in Cornelia Parker’s abstracts: with the wisps of ink on 
Emily Brontë’s lined paper (fig. 29, below) – ghost traces of the words she wrote on 
the paper placed above her lines – a lacuna that presences absence both of words and 
the individual who left these ghostly traces. 
  279 
 
Fig. 29. fBrontëan Abstract (marks made in the margins of Emily Brontë's lined paper) 2006, 
 scan © Cornelia Parker (Parker, Brontëan  22). 
 
V – Worlding 
 
If the mark signifies presence, or the having-been of a being (even if in passing) one 
of the aspects of the mark’s signification is that it worlds even if it does so in an 
ambiguous way. In their analysis of death-related writings (wills, headstones, 
memorial inscriptions, handwritten tokens) Hallam and Hockey note that in relation 
to ‘the material dimensions of writing… the life of the inscribed word might overlap 
with, but may also extend beyond the physical body; materialized words become 
potent as markers that preserve identity after death’ (157). While this is certainly the 
case with an author’s texts: manuscripts, letters, and even their near-ephemera 
(Darwin’s beetle labels for example), it is also the case for other marks they made in 
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the world. In On Longing Susan Stewart attests to the way that writing can locate us. 
She states:  
 …writing contaminates; writing leaves its trace, a trace beyond the life of the 
body…. Our terror of the unmarked grave is a terror of the insignificance of a 
world without writing. The metaphor of the unmarked grave is one that joins 
the mute and the ambivalent; without the mark there is no boundary, no point 
at which to begin the repetition. Writing gives us a device for inscribing space, 
for inscribing nature…’. (31; see also Hallam and Hockey 157)  
 
The idea of the mark as setting a boundary is important here. Like a footprint in the 
snow, a handprint in a prehistoric cave, like a scratch along a skirting board or strike 
on a newspaper, marks gather to them a sense of some thing or some being, they 
contaminate a space, they delineate it, they are a trace ‘beyond the life of the body’. 
In this way absence is locatable in part because of its relation to things like marks or 
impressions. This idea is found in Frazer’s readings of sympathetic magic where he 
notes that it was possible to do magic on a person via the impression they left behind: 
a footprint, or the mark left by a reclining body (Frazer 45). In Margaret Gibson’s 
Objects of the Dead, Gibson identifies a ‘sunken couch, hand, a photograph… open 
door, hat’ as ‘ghostly signals’ signals that can appear in everyday things, things 
‘ordinarily overlooked until that one day when they become animated by the 
immense forces of atmosphere concealed in them’ (Gibson 185 emphasis hers; see 
also Gordon 204). In this way the mark – even in its shadowy form – can signal and 
hold the trace of the absent individual.  
 What the writer’s house/museum does is provide a context for these marks, traces 
and material remains, through autographic ascription (these are pen marks made by 
Charlotte Brontë), through a context that biases the authentic, through supporting or 
authenticating narratives, and through raising the register of the importance of things 
via stasis and display. Whether the marks exist in the form of the marks on the back 
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of the door at the Carlyle House from where the lock chain has always swung against 
the wood (when I asked one of the two museum caretakers what he thought the most 
resonant thing in the house was he showed me these marks – a sign of all the 
comings and goings over the years) or in the form of marks made by a pen – the 
fundamental quality of signaling an event is palpable. 
 Heidegger’s reading of things as related to the idea of assembly or gathering 
places (What 5) is especially useful here. This theme runs through much of his later 
thinking about things and can be found in his essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ 
when he describes how a bridge brings a set of relations into being. For Heidegger a 
bridge does more than just connect the banks of the stream, it also allows the banks 
to come to the forefront of perception in a new relation and further to that, brings a 
larger set of relations into relief or ‘into each other’s neighbourhood’ (PLT 150). For 
Heidegger the bridge worlds: it gathers relations and these relations are not only 
based on the landscape but also included relations with, and amongst, human beings 
who may ‘come and go from shore to shore’ carrying with them customs, beliefs and 
ideas that are shaped by the material world they inhabit and the relations the bridge 
as a gathering thing brings forth (150-151).   
 This idea of worlding is made explicit again by Heidegger in relation to the 
representation of a pair of shoes in a work of art in his essay ‘The Origin of the Work 
of Art’. This essay is useful for how it supports Heidegger’s notion of worlding 
things and also for how it serves as a reminder that in the context of the writer’s 
house/museum what tends to come to the fore in relations with worlding things is the 
fact of the writer’s life. 
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 Martin Heidegger’s essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ is based on a number 
of lectures he delivered on the topic of art – the first, given in Freiburg in November 
1935, and the last, a series of three talks (from which the translation cited here is 
drawn), delivered in late 1936 in Frankfurt. ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, 
presented almost a decade after Being and Time was written, engages is issues 
related to the distinctions and affinities between mere things, equipment, and the 
artwork. In writing about Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of ‘peasant’ shoes Heidegger 
engages in a description of the horizons of experience or ‘world’ the painting – and 
the shoes as painted things exude. He begins by stating of shoes that ‘[s]uch gear 
serves to clothe the feet’ (32) and then acknowledges that the gear calls to mind their 
usefulness and genuine use, which calls to mind ‘the toilsome tread of the worker’ 
and ‘the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-
uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind’ (33). He states: ‘This equipment is 
pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of 
having once more withstood want, and trembling before the impending childbed and 
shivering at the surrounding menace of death’ (33). In Heidegger’s reading the 
apprehension of the truth of the work of art and the truth of the peasant shoes as 
depicted gives the viewer access to a whole set of experiences; or the terrain of being 
(and Being) that the shoes presence. Here Heidegger is suggesting a kind of access 
the shoes make possible, he is affirming (again) that an encounter with things worlds 
or enlarges both the thing and us through the unconcealedness of a thing’s worldly 
(and possible) horizons. Heidegger does acknowledge that shoes for fieldwork and 
shoes for dancing will differ in matter and form (32) and thus world their own truths 
– but he does not equate the worlding of the shoe with anything empirically 
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knowable. In fact, in the first part of this essay he mounts a strongly analytic 
argument against the possibility of the aesthetic of mere things (its properties), the 
totality of a thing’s effect on our senses, or the integration of matter and form as 
being determinate in relation to knowing.  
 Heidegger’s knowledge is always slippery this way – an evanescing kind of 
knowing. For Heidegger even just ‘bringing ourselves before Van Gogh’s painting’ 
of the shoes can afford access to this worlding. Heidegger states:  
The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered. But how? Not by a 
description and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present; not by a report 
about the process of making shoes; and also not by the observation of the 
actual use of shoes occurring here and there; but only by bringing ourselves 
before Van Gogh’s painting. This painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work 
we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be. (34-35) 
 
Here, Heidegger is talking about the transporting nature of a pair of painted shoes, 
shoes seen in a resonant and worlding way. Through meeting a thing with the proper 
comportment (‘bringing ourselves before’ the work) Heidegger suggests that the 
thing – the artwork, the shoes – can reveals whole sets of relations. This is the power 
of the thing that speaks of someone else, somewhere else, or other sets of relations. 
This is the power of the thing ‘set-off’ or on display to evoke memories, ideas, or a 
felt-sense of an absent individual or even the thing’s own biography. Even a mark, as 
this chapter argues, brings relations to it – even if the mark and the relations are 
haunted by absence and unknowability.  
 In her reading of Cornelia Parker’s photographs of Charlotte Brontë’s revisions 
exhibited at the Parsonage Museum, Deborah Levy makes a point that supports 
Heidegger’s notion that works can bring a world to the fore. Levy states: ‘What 
Parker knows is that Charlotte Brontë the writer at work becomes more present in 
these unconscious lapses or mistakes or slips…. [I]t is in these mistakes and 
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corrections that one feels the author breathing, fidgeting, thinking’ (Parker, Brontëan 
10). For Levy the marks, the strikethroughs, the difference between ‘descended’ with 
its crossed out ‘ed’ and ‘descending’ – layer and mark time, create gaps and spaces 
and a sense of events, of a lived life. Levy goes on to wonder: ‘How did time pass 
between Charlotte dipping her nib into the ink and starting again? Between one 
thought and another, one correction and another? What were the sounds and 
interruptions in the Parsonage while she wrote?’ (10). This is an example of the mark 
made by the writer ‘worlding’ and of the writer’s things acting as a scaffold for 
memory (Hallam 33, Sutton 2) – of things provoking an imagination and calling the 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis began by asserting that writers’ houses/museums evoke the life of the 
absent writer through the provocative material objects housed within them – things 
that cohabited with the authors; things whose ‘life histories’ coincided with the life 
history of the writer. Identifying a fissure in thing theory discourse around how 
affective encounters in writers’ houses/museums worked (‘how the things things, and 
how it things the world’ (Brown, How 936)) I employed a strategy of reading objects 
in the writer’s house/museum alongside narratives of encounter and Heidegger’s 
work on the structure of experience as it pertains to things and their relations. This 
analysis led to the identification of six dynamics that contribute to affective 
encounters with writerly things: autographic ascription, authenticity, contiguity, 
metonymical fitness, equipmentality, and stasis / conspicuousness. 
 In chapter one I analyzed writers’ houses as pilgrimage sites and identified 
autographic ascription as a fundamental component in resonant encounters with a 
writer’s things. I demonstrated the roles of authenticity and contiguity in relation to 
affective encounters employing an analysis of failed encounters with writerly things 
as a means of demonstrating how statements such as ‘I felt no spirit, no ghosts, and 
no aura’ (Trubek 21) serve to acknowledge the dominant narratives surrounding 
meetings with meaningful things. I deconstructed the concept of contiguity in order 
to nuance the role of touch and nearness in affective encounters and to lay the ground 
for later discussions on stasis. In this chapter I defined resonance in order to give a 
shape to the kinds of affective experiences that narratives of encounter describe. 
Employing Virginia Woolf’s narrative of encounter with Charlotte Brontë’s dress 
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and shoes, and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work on how the metaphors used 
in everyday language reveal human conceptual systems (in their book Metaphors We 
Live By) I elaborated on affective encounters through a reading of what it means to 
be ‘touched’ by something.  
 In chapter two I read Heidegger’s ‘Analysis of the Structure of Experience’ 
alongside a nineteenth-century visit to the Carlyle House Museum and a scene from 
Charlotte Brontë’s Villette demonstrating that Heidegger’s analysis of the structure 
of experience has correspondences in both narratives. This laid the foundation for 
Heidegger’s concept of worlding which I read as a coming to the fore of a set or sets 
of relations made present by both the comportment of the individual and the giving-
forth of things – a mode of encounter that, in the context of the writer’s 
house/museum, brings the figure of the author and their world into resonant 
presence.   
 In chapters three, four, five and six I turned to the four categories of things that 
are prevalent across all of the writers’ houses/museums considered here: hair, 
clothing, writerly tools (such as desks and chairs) and handwriting. In these chapters 
I contextualized the object category within the Victorian era and examined its fitness 
as a remembrancer via its own particular qualities thereby foregrounding both the 
concepts things were met with, and the things’ own modes of giving forth. In each 
chapter I strove to emphasize the autographic, authentic, contiguous, metonymical 
and equipmental aspects of individual objects and their larger categories. In chapters 
six and seven on the writer’s tools and writer’s handwriting I furthered my analysis 
of Heidegger’s concepts of tools and tool use in Being and Time and his reading of 
the representation of a thing in art in order to demonstrate the role that stasis plays in 
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modulating a thing’s equipmental nature, allowing, in the case of the writer’s 
house/museum, a tool to transition from one kind of ‘with-which’ designation to 
another: i.e. from a tool ‘for writing with’ to a tool ‘for remembering with’. In doing 
so, I attempted to demonstrate that through this transition a writer’s things undergo a 
metamorphosis: ceasing to be everyday tools fit for a specific task (for sitting, for 
drinking with) and becoming instead tools for remembrance – evocative things that 
act as repositories for narratives about the absent individual with whom they are 
associated, and the world they inhabited in their lifetime. 
 Throughout this thesis I have returned consistently to material things – in the form 
of museum objects, works of art, and environments. I began with a lock of hair and 
ended with a scratch on a floorboard and the mark of a pen. In each case I hope to 
have demonstrated the power of things to signal an event of being – whether in the 
form of a lock of hair that references the absent body or a pen mark that signals an 
instance of thought and bodily motion. In each case I have attempted to assert that 
the things in question have a particular fitness for the task of evoking or presencing 
the absent individual for whom they stand.  
 In this way I hope to have contributed to contemporary material culture discourse 
through building a strong case for the provocative role things play in resonant 
encounters; through contributing to current discourses relating to what Bille, Hastrup 
and Sorensen have described as ‘absences in everyday practice’ (7) – in this case by 
establishing the role of things in giving a shape to the lives of absent writers; and 
through applying Heidegger’s thinking about things and environments to actual 
things in meaningful environments – a cross-reading that I believe supports and 
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expands on his thinking about worlding things while also affirming the value and 
importance of the house/museum as a space for resonant encounter.  
 Most importantly I hope to have demonstrated that there is a vital repository of 
knowledge about things that can be accessed through both the sustained study of 
things themselves and through how we write about things, speak about things and 
portray them, how we wittingly or unwittingly ‘say’ things in our literature and every 
day exclamations – exclamations that can range from Charlotte Brontë’s use of 
‘magic’ to describe her trip to Abbotsford, to a contemporary Parsonage visitor’s 
‘Wonderfully evocative’ (August 2011). 
 At the start of Writers’ Houses and the Making of Memory, Harald Hendrix states 
that ‘Writers’ houses have meaning, even beyond their obvious documentary value 
as elements in the author's biography. They are a medium of expression and of 
remembrance’ (1). Through reading things in the writer’s house/museum this thesis 
has expressed some of the ways that writers’ houses as mediums of expression and 
remembrance evoke the author and their world and how things can bring the museum 
visitor into meaningful encounter – a dynamic that is made possible by what gets left 
behind: by a lock of hair, or a wedding bonnet, a pen, desk, chair, a spill of ink; by a 
signature, letter, poem or novel – traces that bring to presence the past and the 
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